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ABSTRACT
Federal Homeownership Policy and Home Finance: A Study of Program Opera-
tions and Impacts on the Consumer
Rachel G. Bratt
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning on August 9, 1976
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
The policy of homeownership for low-moderate income families gained popu-
larity in the mid- and late-1960's and in 1968 a series of programs were en-
acted which enabled a new group of families to become homeowners. However, the
programs encountered difficulties and, by 1973, they had fallen so completely
out of favor by the Administration, that they were discontinued. The major
conclusion of this thesis is that homeownership for low-moderate income families
is still a viable policy and that it awaits a better planned and better exe-
cuted trial.
This conclusion is based on several issues which are analyzed in the thesis:
Homeownership legislation; home finance institutions and the actitivies of the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Homeownership legislation in this country has always had a variety of goals,
in addition to providing and expanding homeownership opportunities, per se. In
addition to a series of economic, political and social goals, the government
has encouraged the participation of lending institutions in order to increase
the supply of mortgage credit. It has done this through a series of institu-
tions which have been aimed at decreasing risk for lenders by providing them
with liquidity and removing the possibility of losses due to foreclosure. Due
to the multiple goals of homeownership legislation, the consumer has never been
the primary concern. Some of these multiple goals, have, in turn, conflicted
with consumer needs. Sections I and II analyze the multiple goals embodied in
homeownership legislation--from the Homestead Act to the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968--and discuss how these goals have impacted consumers.
These sections also focus on the specific institutions that have grown up over
time--Federal Housing Administration; Federal Home Loan Bank System; Federal
National Mortgage Association and Mortgage Companies. Ways in which the opera-
tions of these institutions conflict with consumer needs are discussed.
In the course of the government's shifting risk away from lenders, it has
shifted the risk onto itself. However, the major point of Section III is that
the government has not accepted the responsibility which is inherent in its
risk-taking position. And, as a result, the consumer's interests have been
harmed and the likelihood of his having a successful ownership experience is
reduced. Section III examines HUD's pre-purchase procedures, post-1968, and
demonstrates how it has neither acted to minimize its own risk or to protect
the consumer. This section also focuses on the default situation--a point at
which HUD's risk is considerable--and criticizes HUD's primarily inactive role
and assesses how other actors in the home finance system respond. Various
reasons why HUD's guidelines for providing relief to defaulting mortgagors are
not used by mortgagees are also explored in considerable detail.
The thesis concludes with recommendations for how the homeownership/
home finance system could be changed to benefit the position of the consumer.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley C. Keyes
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1. FEDERAL HOUSING AND HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICY:
With the passage of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968,
Congress reaffirmed the goal articulated in the Housing Act of 1949:
the "realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and
a suitable living environment for every American family."1 A key feature
of the 1968 legislation, aimed at reaching this objective, was a group
of programs which expanded homeownership opportunities -- to lower income
families; to families with poor credit histories; and to families
wishing to purchase homes in inner city areas, respectively known as
-the Section 235, 237 and 223(e) programs.2
Launched amid high hopes and bi-partisan support, these programs
have encountered serious problems and have been the subject of wide-
spread criticism. A particularly dramatic and troublesome outcome of the
post-1968 homeownership programs has been that thousands of families are
seriously behind in their mortgage payments and thousands more have lost
their homes through foreclosure. This has not only been problematic for
the families involved, but the Federal government has lost millions of
dollars during recent years.
As a result of these difficulties, by the end of 1973 it looked as
though the government's seven year old policy 3 of expanding homeownership
1Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Public Law 90-448, 82
Stat. 476, 601; Sec. 1601.
2Ibid. Secs. 101(a), 201(a) and 103(a), respectively. Secs. 235,
237, and 223(e) of the National Housing Act, respectively. See Appendix 1-1
for a detailed description of these programs.
3The policy of homeownership for lower income families began in 1966
with the 221(d)(2) program. Section 221(d)(2) of the National Housing Act;
Disaster Relief Act of 1966, Public Law 89-769, 80 Stat. 1316, 1317; Sec. 4(a).
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opportunities for low and moderate income people had come to an end. In
January of that year, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), George Romney, announced a moratorium on all subsidized housing
and rehabilitation programs. Following ten months of evaluation and
study of Federal housing programs, HUD's long awaited report was published.
"Housing in the Seventies" found that:
Although homeownership has long been encouraged by a variety of
Federal laws, no major programs offering homeownership to the
poor in the 20th century were enacted until the 1960's. Since
that time the problems which have arisen from the operation of
those programs -- principally the Section 235 and Section 221(d)(2) programs -- are so serious as to raise questions about
the validity of the concept itself.4
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 was in line
with this thinking.5 The new legislation, which presented the Federal
government's new strategies for attacking housing and urban problems,
included no assistance for lower income families who wanted to purchase
homes. Section 8 of that Act, the major new piece of housing legislation,
provided subsidies only to renters.
But only two years after the publication of "Housing in the Seventies"
homeownership for low-moderate income families was revived. In October
1975, Carla Hill, the new Secretary of HUD, announced the temporary re-
sumption of the Section 235 program. However, this resumption in funding
was based more on Congressional inquiries regarding the legality of HUD's
impoundment of the housing funds than on any rekindled feeling about the
value of the policy cn the part of the Administration.
4Department of Housing and Urban Development "Housing in the
Seventies" October, 1973 p. 4-108.
5Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Public Law 93-383,88 Stat., 633.
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Thus, the policy of homeownership for low-moderate income families has received
no support by the Ford Administration and the future of this policy is
dim.
Thus, the experiment of enabling low-moderate income families
purchase homes has, for all intents and purposes, come to an end. A
major public policy, undertaken with great fanfare in the late 1960's
has been removed from the Federal agenda.
The central goal of this thesis is to examine how and why Federal
involvement in homeownership for low and moderate income people has
come to this abrupt halt. Such an examination involves a detailed analysis
of a variety of complex institutional arrangements that have grown up
over a period of decades -- the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS);
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and HUD; the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) and the mortgage banker -- to determine the
ways in which their activities and interactions have been played out in
the low-moderate income housing effort. The critical task in this
analysis is to assess the role and influence of the Federal government
in the homeownership/home finance system and to understand the extent
to which the termination of this policy was the inevitable consequence
of a set of problems inherent in this complex system and if the policy
could still prove to be viable if existing problems are corrected.
Since the 1930's, the Federal government has intervened in the
homeownership/home finance system by trying to maintain a flow of credit.
-18-
into housing.6 It has done this by encouraging financial institutions
to lend money through a variety of incentives. These incentives have
had the purpose of shifting risk away from the lending institutions and
onto the government. Thus, by reducing risks for lenders, the govern-
ment has sought to encourage their participation in maintaining a flow
of credit into homeownership in order to enable people to buy homes.
Thus:
Incentives: Government reduces risks for lenders Government shifts
risk onto itself
Lenders partici pate Numerous responsibilitiE
inherent in accepting r-
Flow of credit into homeownership
Famil es enabled to purchase homes.
In the course of reducing the risk for lenders, the government has
shifted much of the burden onto itself. This thesis asks the followina
critical questions:
1. How has the government-supported homeownership/home finance system
reduced risk for the lending institutions? What impacts have these
efforts had on the consumer?
6Critical to homeownership is the ability of purchasers to obtain credit,
or a mortgage. Over 82% of the single family owner-occupied units purchased
in 1970 and the first ten months of 1971 carried mortgages. The percentage
of people who have mortgages on their homes has increased from 39.8% in
1920 to 60.6% in 1971. (Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1973,
p. 693.) Thus, home finance, or the lending of money to enable families
to purchase homes is closely associated with homeownership.
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2. How has the government carried out the responsibilities'which are
inherent in having shifted risk onto itself? How have these functions
impacted the consumer?
Consumer, as defined in this thesis, is the least equipped, yet
still eligible, individual to enter and maintain his participation in
the system. He is "least equipped" by virtue of his relative lack of
information, experience, resources, and income. He is "eligible,"
however, because of a preference for homeownership and an ability to
afford it, with or without a g3vernment subsidy.
It was not until the late 1960's that the consumer, as defined above,
was offered an opportunity to become a homeowner. Prior to that time,
Federal policy provided homeownership opportunities only to middle income
families. But, in addition to focusing on impacts on the consumer group,
defined above, the thesis also assesses impacts on a wider range of home-
owners under the Federal government's homeownership programs. Many aspects
of the homeownership/home finance system also have direct impacts on the
group of homebuyers -- those with middle incomes -- who have historically
been the primary participants in the Federal homeownership programs.
HUD's and the Administration's conclusion that homeownership for low-
moderate income families is not a viable policy is particularly important
in view of the role that homeownership has played in this country. In
addition to homeownership being a central theme in American history, most
people prefer homeownership over a rental situation. In 1970, almost
-20-
63% of the total number of occupied units in this country were owner-
occupied.7 (See Appendix 1-2)
7Compared to other countries, homeownership is considerably more prevalent
in the United States. For example: only about 40% of England's houses are
owner-occupied; in eastern European countries, such as the Soviet Union, home-
ownership is even less common. See, Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society (New
York: The MacMillan Co., 1967) p. 518, and Charles Abrams, Man's Struggle for
Shelter in an Urbanizing World, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966) pp. 31
and 49.
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2. COMPLEXITIES AND RISK IN THE HOME PURCHASE PROCESS:
The high frequency of homeownership in this country should not, how-
ever, lead one to believe that buying a home is a simple process. Both
because a home is usually the single largest expenditure that most families
ever make and because the step to homeownership often involves either a
short or long-distance move, the entire procedure is likely to be filled
with considerable risk and tension.
Home buyers must risk some money in the form of a downpayment and,
as the principal portion of their mortgage payments builds, the family
is continually risking a greater and greater sum of money. Thus, if
either payment difficulties arise or if the family wants to move for any
other reason, the equity in the house cannot be recaptured unless the
house is worth at least as much as the original purchase price. Further-
more, if the family finds that the house requires substantial, unexpected
repairs the family must risk an additional amount of money and, again,
would hope that this money could be recaptured when the property is sold.
In addition to the monetary risks involved in purchasing and owning
a home, the emotional risks can also be substantial. The family that has
made the wrong decision in purchasing a home may face considerable incon-
vience and irritation with their living situation that could lead to intense
dissatisfactions.
If the prospective purchaser has had experience living in his own
home and if he has negotiated the home purchase process before, buying
-22-
a home could, however, turn out to may be relatively painless. If, on
the other hand, the experience is totally new, the homeowner-to-be may
find the task overwhelming.
In the midst of this risky and potentially anxiety provoking situation,
homebuyers must address a series of critical questions and deal with an
array of individuals and institutions. Many questions should come to a
purchaser's mind and if one is naive about the process, answers may be
elusive. Or, even worse, the real neophytemay not even know enough to be
able to articulate the important questions.
For example:
1) Is the house worth the money that is being paid?
2) Is the house in good repair?
If not, what repairs are needed and how much will they cost?
Who will pay for them: buyer, seller, builder?
3) Does the house meet the needs of the purchasers? Where and how
accessible are jobs, shops, schools etc.?
4) What is the quality and future of the neighborhood?
5) Which financial institution will give the most favorable
financing arrangement?
6) How much will it cost to close the sale? lawyers fees; title
search; recording fees; escrow costs; taxes; etc.?
7) What are the responsibilities of a homeowner -- in caring for the
property? in making mortgage payments?
8) Will the purchaser be able to meet all the financial costs in-
volved in owning the home? mortgage payments; taxes; utilities;
maintenance?
9) What recourse is there if something goes wrong?
-23-
Unless these questions are answered satisfactorily, the home
purchase process and the actual experience of homeownership can become
a nightmare.
The complex set of issues involved in the decision to buy is made
even more problematic for the purchaser by the array of interests involved
in the home purchase process. As a result, "caveat emptor" -- let the
buyer beware -- has been long-ingrained in most home buyers. Recently,
however, more and more observers of the home purchase process have begun
to acknowledge that the consumer is usually at a severe disadvantage when
buying a home and simply advising the buyer to beware is not a sufficient
safeguard.
The problems faced by all home buyers have been amplified by the
growing concern over the particular plight of lower income, inexperienced
purchasers -- relative newcomers to homeownership. On this issue, a
1972 report by the Committee on Government Operations noted that:
Historically, HUD has relied on the assumption that value and
price are fairly determined when a prudent buyer and a know-
ledgeable seller meet in the marketplace and negotiate for the
purchase and sale of a house. For 1 w and moderate income
families this is often not the case.
This type of purchaser, naive about the home purchase process,
might assume that the various individuals and institutions with whom
See, for example, Melvin Mencher, editor The Fannie Mae Guide to
Buying, Financing and Selling Your Home, (New York: Dolphin Books, Doubleday
& Co., Inc., 1973) Foreward p.V.
2Fifteenth Report By the Committee on Government Operations, "Defaults
on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages -- Detroit, Michigan." June, 1972, p. 16.
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he will come into contact will be able to offer advice. These actors are
the seller/builder; the real estate broker; and the lending institution.
Unfortunately, however, none of the above share a complete identity of
interest with the home buyer. As a result, information offered to
the consumer may be incomplete, biased, or even totally inaccurate and
misleading. The Committee on Government Operations went so far as to
say that:
Often,...a very knowledgeable, if not unscrupulous, speculator
deals with an uninitiated and unknowledgeable buyer. The con-
sequences are tragic.3
The following discussion presents a brief review of the key in-
terests of the three major non Government actors that most home buyers
encounter in the course of purchasing a home.
Seller/Builder:
Depending upon whether or not the purchaser is interested in an
existing or new home, he will have to deal with a seller or a builder.
In either case, the interests of the party making the sale would probably
be to do few, if any, repairs; to maximize the sale price and to make
the sale progress quickly. Clearly, these sentiments are exactly the
opposite of those of any level-headed purchaser. Concerning this last
point, most buyers desire time to think, want to view the property several
3Ibid. p. 16.
4Unless the purchaser is a handyman looking for a house that needs
repairs in lieu of a higher cost, most people look for homes that are ingood repair.
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times, and feel pushed and anxious if they sense that things are moving
too rapidly. 5
Real Estate Brokers:
Since most real estate brokers are helpful and solicitous to the
prospective home buyer, it is very easy for the latter to forget that
the broker is really an agent, under contract, for the seller. As such,
his interests coincide most closely with those of the seller/builder,
as described above. Furthermore, the more money that the broker is
able to negotiate for the sale of the house, the greater will be his
commission. Thus, if a broker is working on a 6% commission, the dif-
ference between selling a $25,000 and $30,000 home will be $300 ($1500
and $1800 commissions, respectively). While, in fairness to the real
estate brokerage profession, brokers are bound by codes of honesty, and
are supposed to deal with purchasers fairly, the fact remains that their
clients are the sellers and not the buyers.
Lending Institutions:
Similar to the two actors described above, lending institutions
also have independent concerns from the buyer's that may also tend to
5Ronald G. Yelenik, an attorney for East New York Legal Services, Inc.
has argued that "there should be a grace period when the buyer-mortgagor
could decide whether or not to go forward with the contract." Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary,
"Competition in Real Estate and Mortgage Lending" U.S. Senate, 92nd. Congress,
2nd Sess; Parts 2A and 2B; 1972 p. 118. (Referred to as "New York Antitrust
Hearings")
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conflict with his needs. First, while lenders appraise the home that is
being bought, they usually do not inspect it. Thus, the fact that a home
may need a new roof may be of no interest to the lender and the appraiser
may not even have noticed the defect. As long as the lender is confident
that the home is worth at least as much as the mortgage amount, his
interests will be protected. As a result, the lender is generally not
interested in either the absolute condition of the house or whether the
purchaser is paying a fair price.
And, second, while the lender does not usually play an active role
in determining the sales price of the house, he may be more amenable to
lending money if the price is higher, rather than lower. The cost to
the lender of originatirg and servicing mortgages varies directly with
the number of mortgages and not with their dollar value. The fewer
the mortgages that an institution handles, the smaller the staff and
the less che amount of time necessary to maintain the accounts.6
Furthermore, lenders may be more interested in dealing with
higher priced homes because of "points." Depending on money market
conditions and the policies of the lending institution, points may or
may not be charged at the time that the mortgage is written. Each
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Staff Report, "Home Mortgage Financing
and Racial and Economic Integration" Washington, D.C. 1970 p. 615, and Home
Ownership Development Program, "Home Ownership and the Baltimore Mortgage
Market," Baltimore, E.d. 1974 p. 16.
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point that is charged costs the buyer 1% of the mortgage amount.7
For example, if a financial institution is charging 3 points, it would
receive $750 for originating a $25,000 mortgage and $900 for originating
a $30,000 mortgage.
Thus, financial institutions are neither concerned that the pro-
perty be free from defects or that the cost be as low as possible. In
fact, as described above, lenders are probably more interested in lending
money on higher priced houses and may therefore exert a subtle, infla-
tionary pressure on the housing market.
Furthermore, the common desire of everyone dealing in the home
purchase process -- except the buyer -- is to inflate the price of
the home as much as possible. Summing up this situation, Howard E.
O'Leary, Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Senate Subcommittee
on Antitrust and Monopoly, has stated that:
...given the nature of this market, it seems that it is in
everyone's interest to have the appraisal come in high;
namely, the greater the amount of mortgage, the more the
real estate broker makes in commission, the more he makes
as a speculator if he has previously bought the property
himself.8
Thus, not only are the actors in the home finance system considerably
more savvy than most home buyers, particularly those who are new to the
7However, if the mortgage is insured by the Federal Housing Admini-
stration all points must be paid by the seller. For a lengthy discussion
on points, see Chapter 5 and Appendix 5-1.
8New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 122.
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process, but they also cannot be expected to operate with the interests
of the buyer as their primary concern. The balance of power is clearly
tipped against the consumer.
To compound the advantageous position of the system actors is the
fact that, similar to the home buyer, each actor also has something at
stake, or is risking something, in the sale of the property.
Thus, builders and sellers own a piece of property in which they
have invested a considerable amount of money and which is at risk until
their equity is recaptured through the sale. Real estate brokers also
risk a great deal of time prior to the final sale of a house -- time
which is not reimbursed until or, indeed, if the sale is eventually
finalized. Thus, the time and money at stake for each of these actors
constitutes a real risk which does not disappear until the sale of the
house is closed.
The risk to lending institutions is also substantial, although
risk is not an issue until the money has actually been lent to the buyer.
Prior to the buyer's assumption of the mortgage debt, however, the lending
institution tries to minimize its future risk by making certain that the
property is worth at least as much as the mortgage amount, as discussed
above. To do this, the lender assesses the value of the property and
the ability of the prospective borrower to make the monthly payments on
the mortgage. Only when the lender is satisfied that the mortgagor will
be able to make the payments and recapture its money in the event that it
must take over the property and then sell it, due to a foreclosure, will
it extend the money to the buyer. If the lender has made any inaccurate
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judgments, either in the value of the property or in the ability of the
borrower to pay, its risk is increased dramatically.
Clearly understanding the needs of lending institutions, the
essence of Federal homeownership policy has been the government's
encouragement of the participation of lending institutions in its
programs by providing them with incentives aimed at substantially
diminishing their risk position.
Thus, the government has, on the one hand, sought to make maximum
use of the resources among private institutions in the home finance
system and to make the system work more efficiently, by reducing risk,
while, on the other hand, it has been trying to implement homeownership
programs. This thesis will show that while the government has spent
an enormous amount of energy focused on how to involve the financial
sector in housing, and has created an elaborate system to protect lenders
against losses by shifting their risk onto government or quasi-government
institutions, it has neither accepted its own position of risk nor
has it directed its efforts at minimizing the risk of the individual
home buyer.
9An important thrust of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968 was Congress' call for the "fullest practicable utilization of the
resources and capabilities of private enterprise" to reach the nation's
housing goal. op. cit. Sec. 2.
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3. OUTLINE OF CHAPTERS:
The research has been divided into three major sections, Section I
analyzes the history of Federal homeownership legislation and policy in
terms of how they have shifted risk away from the lending institutions
and how the consumer has been impacted. More specifically, Chapter 2
looks at homeownership in the 19th century and two of the key post-De-
pression recovery measures that related to homeownership -- The Home
Owner's Loan Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank System. Chapter 3
discusses, in some detail, the pre-1968 experience of the Federal Housing
Administration, the third post-Depression housing recovery measure.
Chapter 4 examines the multiple goals behind the emergence of the home-
ownership package embodied in the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968. Thus, Section I explores the ways in which the government has
minimized risk for lenders, by accepting more of the risk itself, in
order to induce their participation in homeownership. The fact that
this desire to minimize risk has been viewed as a goal in itself, in
conjunction with the government's desire to address a variety of other
goals through the legislation, have had some negative impacts on con-
sumers. Furthermore, the homeownership/home finance system which is
discussed in the remainder of the thesis requires the reader to have
a thorough understanding of the 1968 legislation that opened the way
for the lower income family's participation in the homeownership/home
finance system.
1See Appendices 1-3 and 1-4 for a note on research methodology and alist of the individuals consulted in the course of the research, respectively.
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Section II describes and analyzes the operation of three of the
major components and aspects of the home finance system. Chapters 5, 6,
and 7 look at The FHA Interest Rate Ceiling, Mortgage Companies, and the
Secondary Mortgage Market, respectively. Section II also continues the
theme of Section I -- that in order to involve lenders in homeownership,
a complex set of institutions and policies have been created to minimize
their risk, which have had the effect of placing the bulk of the risk onto
the government. And, again, some aspects of this sophistacted system have
had negative impacts on consumers.
Section III, the final and most expansive section of the thesis
presents a framework for understanding how HUD has operated and the extent
to which it has accepted the responsibility which is inherent in its risk-
taking position. HUD's activities will be analyzed in terms of how they
have impacted the consumer. Chapter 8 analyzes HUD's activities during the
pre-purchase period and evaluates whether HUD has accepted this risk
and has operated in a consumer-oriented manner. Chapter 9 and 10 focus
on a critical stage in the homeownership experience, default, and assess
HUD's role in this process-- a point at which HUD's risk is substantial.
Chapter 11 presents conclusions and recommendations for how the
homeownership/home finance system could be changed to operate in a more
consumer-oriented manner, by re-shifting the risk assumed by key actors.2
2See Appendix 1-5 for an image of an hypothetical consumer oriented
homeownership/home finance system.
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SECTION I:
ANALYSIS OF GOALS OF FEDERAL
HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICY
-33-
CHAPTER 2: MULTIPLE GOALS OF EARLY HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
1. INTRODUCTION:
Federal housing policy and legislation have always had a variety of
objectives. Indeed, it has frequently been noted that the history of
Federal housing policy is a story of competing and, sometimes, conflicting
goals. Some of the key goals of housing policy have stemmed from the
Federal government's desire to safeguard lenders against risk. Others
have grown out of other pressing objectives. As a result, the needs
of the consumer have often been subordinated to other concerns. The
multiple goals of Federal housing legislation have often been problematic
for consumers.
Since 1949, the stated objective of Federal housing policy has been
to achieve "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every
American family."I While this rings of a "welfare" orientation, Federal
housing policy has,nevertheless, always been directed toward the reali-
zation of a variety of "economic," social" and "political" objectives. 2
1Housing Act of 1949, Public Law 171, 63 Stat. 413, 414. Reaffirmed
by Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, op. cit.
2Definitions for this discussion:
Welfare -- For the benefit of the individual within society. i.e.; the consumer.
Economic -- For the economic well-being of society; the nation as a whole.
Social -- For the well-being, other than economic, of society.
Political -- For the benefit of specific public or private interest groups
within society. This benefit can be economic gain or the
enhancement of prestige or power of the particular interest
group.
Political -- For the enhanced power of the Administration.
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For example, making the argument that the slum clearance movement
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was aimed at bene-
fiting society in general, rather than the slum dwellers, Lawrence
Friedman stated that:
Throughout American history.. .men have frequently advanced solu-
tions to urban housing problems which meet external difficulties
only. The law has emphasized fire prevention, sanitation, mini-
mum standards of building and maintenance, and outright demolition
of the slums. These are ways of protecting society from contamina-
tion rising out of the slums. The pathology of this.. .approach is
its tendency to disregard the problems of people who live in the
slums.3 (underline added)
Further, Charles Abrams has viewed housing policy as being molded pri-
marily by economic objectives:
The economic motivation had been the dominant ingredient in
Federal housing recipes from the inception and the stated
ideal of better housing for everybody had simply supplied the
sweetening... 4
Similarly, Peter Marcuse has observed that housing policy has been
"input" rather than "out put oriented."
National housing policy in the United States has traditionally
been input-oriented; it has been concerned with the production
of housing; or its rehabilitation; its financing or its manage-
ment, but rarely with what it is itself supposed to produce.
In 1968, the President's Committee on Urban Housing summarized
this multi-goal nature of Federal housing policy by reporting that:
3Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and Slum Housing (Chicago: Rand
McNally and Co., 1968) p. 12.
4Charles Abrams The City Is The Frontier (New York: Harper & Row,1965) p. 85.
5Peter Marcuse, "The Legal Attributes of Homeownership for Low and
Moderate Income Familes," (Washington: The Urban Institute, 1972) Workingpaper 209-1-1; pp. 1-2.
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Housing programs have been enacted for a variety of purposes --
to create jobs, to clear slums, to im rove the tax base of
central cities, and to help the poor.
Thus, the notion that housing policy has been shaped by a variety
of forces, needs and objectives is well accepted by writers on the subject.
As a critical component of the government's overall involvement
in housing, Federal homeownership policy has also had a variety of goals
in addition to providing good housing to individual homeowners. This
multiple goal orientation was apparent during the three major phases of
Federal involvement with homeownership -- the land settlement movement of
the 19th.century; the post-Depression period of the 1930's; and the urban
and racial crises of the 1960's. During each of these periods, there
were discussions, sometimes quite passionate, on the benefits of home-
ownership. But, while valued as a worthwhile objective by itself, home-
ownership has always been viewed as a means to other important ends.
However, this multiple goal orientation of homeownership policy
need not be problematic. Housing, by its very nature involves a wide
variety of people in its production, sale, and management. To ignore
this fact - and the fact that housing legislation must be responsive
to the needs of these actors -- is to ignore an important reality.
But when translated into actual programs, this can cause problems for
the consumers of housing.
While it is not possible to eliminate multiple goals from housing
policy or legislation, it is important for students of housing policy to:
6The Report of the President's Committee on Urban Housing, A Decent
Home, 1968, p. 53.
-36-
1) Understand and assess the multiple goals of each piece of
homeownership legislation and;
2) Identify the conflicts, if any, between these goals and
consumer needs, particularly as the goals become expressed in opera-
tional terms.
These two points will provide the framework for reviewing the
history of homeownership legislation. Similar to the other two periods
in which homeownership was a popular issue, the multiple goals associated
with the Homestead Act conflicted with consumer needs.
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2. HOMESTEAD ACT: 1862:
In 1828, the Committee on Public Lands of the House of Representatives
issued a report which articulated the welfare-oriented underpinnings of the
Homestead Act. The Committee wrote that free land would assist
...many families who...have met with the usual share of the diffi-
culties always accompanying the settlement of a new country, and
who...never expect to see the day arrive when they will be enabled
to save enough, with all their efforts, frym their means of support,
to purchase a farm and pay for it in cash.
However, the report went on to argue for "free land to settlers"
from a highly pragmatic, social, and political/administration viewpoint.
...such small earnings (of settlers) applied to the improvement and
cultivation of small tracts, scattered through the public domain,
would be as advantageous to the public as though they should be paid
directly into the treasury. No axiom in political economy is sounder
than the one which declares that the wealth and strength of a country
...consists not so much in the number of its citizens as in their
employment, their capability of bearing arms, and of sustaining the
burdens of taxation whenever the public exigencies shall require it.
The poor furnish soldiers, and an experience shows that the patriotism
which exists apart from an integrated love of country cannot be re-
lied upon. The affections of good citizens are always mingled with
their homes an placed upon the country which contains fields and
their gardens.
In addition to these motivations, many.Congressmen voiced the
compelling need for land settlement in economic terms. Haynes of South
Carolina observed that "...free land (is) the only means of building up
in a wilderness great and prosperous communities." (underline added)
1Benjamin Horace Hibbard A History of the Public Land Policies (New
York: MacMillan Co., 1924) p. 351.
2Ibid., p. 352.
3Ibid. p. 354.
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And, in 1844, Congressman Ficklin of Illinois argued, somewhat poetically,
that:
Unless the government shall grant head rights, settlement rights,
or donations of some kind, these prairies with their gorgeous growth
of flowers, their green carpeting, their lovely lawns and gentle
slopes, will for centuries continue to be the home of the wild deer
and wolf; their stillness will be undisturbed by the jocund song of
the farmer, and their deep and fertile soil unbroken by his ploughshare.
Something must be done to remedy this evil. It is idle and sense-
less to continue a the present price such a wide expanse of un-
mitigated prairie. (underline added)
The stipulations of the Homestead Act, which finally became law in
1862, reflected the desire of Congress for homesteaders to truly be willing
to settle.
The person applying for the benefit...shall, upon application...
make affidavit...that his entry is made for the purpose of actual
settlement and cultivation.. .No certificate, however, shall be
given. .until the expiration of five years from the date of such
entry.
Measured in terms of the number of homesteads established, the
Homestead Act was an enormous success. Between 1862 and 1923, 1,346,163
homesteads were registered consisting of about 213,867,600 acres (up to
160 acres per homestead).6
4Ibid. p. 355.
5Circular from the General Land Office Showing the Manner of Pro-
ceeding to Obtain Title to Public Lands Under the Pre-Emption, Homestead,
Timber, Culture and Other Laws, Washington, D.C. 1880, Title XXXII -
The Public Lands, Ch. 5, Homesteads, Sec. 2289-2290.
6Hibbard op. cit. 398.
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Conflicts with Consumer Needs:
But despite this apparent record of success, the Homestead Act
also presented problems for some of the participants in the land
settlement program. By 1873, the government began to realize that many
settlers were either ill-equipped to farm or that certain homesteads
suffered from soil or climate problems.
Hibbard writes that:
The great weakness of the Homestead Act was.. .its utter inadapt-
ability to the parts of the country for which it was not designed.
The idea of the small farm in acres within the semi-ari$ regions
was... untenable. It was even vicious in its operation.
As a result, the government stepped in to try to help the homeowner.
In so doing, it attempted to reduce the ill-effects which resulted from
its program of land settlement and, instead, focussed its concern more
directly on the needs of the homeowner. In order to try to prevent
widespread abandonments of homesteads, Congress passed a series of relief
8acts aimed at assisting the faltering settler. These acts generally
granted homesteaders a temporary leave of absence from their claims
in order to permit them to earn a living elsewhere during periods of
crop failure. For example, following complete destruction of crops by
grasshoppers in 1873, Congress responded by granting these types of
leaves and, in turn, extended the period of time allowed for payment
of the homestead.
7Ibid. p. 409.
8For a lengthy discussion on the relief acts see Ibid. p. 390-408.
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By 1890, the number of homesteaders who were facing severe problems
-- with or without crop failure -- mushroomed. In 1894, Congress passed
legislation extending the period of payment to all settlers. While this
form of relief was well accepted by Congress, more direct forms of sup-
port for the homesteader were not popular with the majority of legisla-
tors.
Enthusiasm and wild land, by themselves, could not automatically
be turned into prosperous homesteads. Many families lacked the resources
to purchase the necessary equipment and furnishings. In 1878, a bill
was introduced in the House which would have granted loans of up to
$500 to each homesteader whose goods were worth no more than $300. How-
ever, this bill, and similar ones which would have provided outright
grants to settlers, failed to pass.
Thus, while Congress was willing to offer some forms of relief to
struggling homesteaders, it also kept its assistance within well-
defined limits.
Clearly, the two goals -- land settlement and homeownership are
inter-related. But, as demonstrated by the Homestead Act, too much
emphasis on the former, without adequate thought for the latter, pro-
duced problems for some settlers. Yet, it is noteworthy that, upon
realizing the conflict, the government stepped in to try to correct
at least some of the problems which the Homestead Act presented to
settlers.
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3. MORTGAGE LENDING AND THE DEPRESSION:
While the Homestead Act encouraged homeownership through the pro-
vision of free land, Congress was also eager to enhance the social,
political and economic well-being of the country through the very
action of land settlement. Similarly, while the post 1932 Depression
recovery measures had strong pro-homeownership aspects the primary
goals of these measures were also geared to economic, political, and
social needs, and not simply to increasing or supporting homeownership
per se (welfare). In particular, the goal of encouraging the partici-
pation of lenders, by reducing their risk, was the dominant theme of
the post-Depression recovery measures.
To examine the goals of the recovery activities, it is necessary
to begin by looking at the mortgage market in the years preceding the
Depression.
Prior to 1932 mortgage loans were considered good investments by
lenders. Willis Bryant, writing about mortgage lending in the early
1920's observed that:
Mortgage loans had proven to be one of the most stable and
dependable revenue-producing assets of banks, life insurance
companies, savings and loan associ tions, individuals, and
others for over one hundred years.
However, as the economy weakened in the late 1920's, the positive out-
look of the financial comunity toward mortgage lending was reversed.
As the depression deepened in the early 1930's, many homeowners became
1Willis R. Bryant Mortgage Lending (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962) p. 18.
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unable to meet their mortgage obligations.
The problematic situation for homeowners was compounded by the prevailing
pattern of mortgage lending during the pre-Depression era. Most mortgages
written in the 1920's were either partially amortized or unamortized; the
terms of the loans were extremely short; there were low loan to value ratios;
and interest rates were high.
By 1933 the foreclosure situation had become extremely serious, with
over a thousand homes being foreclosed per day.2
To make matters more difficult for mortgagees, huge numbers of
unemployed people also started to withdraw their savings from inter-
mediaries. Thus, mortgagees were quickly losing liquidity as the in-
flow from mortgage payments diminished and the outflow to depositors
increased. In addition, the liquidity problem was exacerbated by the
lack of funds available from commercial banks, the traditional source
of credit for mortgage lenders.
The high default and foreclosure rates on home mortgages and the
near bankruptcy days of the early 1930's left most lenders shaken and
cautious. It became clear that innovative measures were necessary to
stimulate mortgage lending activity.
Acknowledging the magnitude of the problem, Herbert Hoover, in
late 1931 convened "The President's Conference on Home Building and
2Senate Subcommitee on Housing,>Committee on Banking and Currency
Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, A Study of Relationships, Staff Report, 1956, p. 4.
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Home Ownership."3 The major outcomes of this meeting were the reaffirma-
tion of the nation's strong pro-homeownership policy and the creation of
the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS) during the following year.
But while the FHLBS had important implications for the long-term growth
of home finance, it was not sufficient in the short-run. Lenders
remained cautious. Home-building stagnated. Owners continued to lose
their homes. For lenders to lend again and borrowers to borrow, wider
reforms were needed. This dim outlook was the challenge for the
Roosevelt Administration.
3Herbert Hoover, "President's Conference on Home Building and Home
Ownership," Tentative Reports of Committees, December 1931.
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4. HOME OWNER'S LOAN CORPORATION:
In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt presented his first major housing
legislation to Congress. Accurately assessing the problems facing
lenders, the Home Owner's Loan Corporation Act (HOLC)1 was aimed at
minimizing the two key elements of risk for mortgagees: losses
due to foreclosure and a lack of liquidity.
The creation of the HOLC was a timely, innovative measure.
By purchasing mortgages in default from lenders who were no longer
able to carry them, losses due to foreclosure were avoided and lenders
were provided with desperately needed liquidity. But, in addition to
assisting lenders, the HOLC was also a great help to homeowners. By
refinancing the mortgage notes, it enabled over a million defaulting
families, many of whom were several years behind in payments, to
keep their homes. Past-due mortgage payments, real estate taxes, and
even deferred repairs were included in new, moderate interest rate
mortgages that were fully amortized over an extended number of years.
Another positive outcome of the HOLC was that its activities were
not a drain on the Treasury. While Congress originally assumed that
the HOLC would lose several hundred million dollars, the corporation
was liquidated in 1951 showing a profit of over 14 million dollars,
1Homeowners' Loan Act of 1933 - Public Law No. 43, 73rd Congress
H. R. 5240. "To provide emergency relief with respect to home mortgage
indebtedness, to refinance home mortgages, to extend relief to the
owners of homes occupied by them and who are unable to amortize their
debt elsewhere...and for other purposes."
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payable to the U. S. Treasury. 2
The HOLC was also credited with beginning the process of
modernizing mortgage lending procedures, which was to be continued
by the Federal Housing Administration. Nathaniel S. Keith has
pointed out that:
The repayment pattern set by HOLC on its refinanced mortgages
was also of great influence in modernizing mortgage lending
practices, in contrast to the crazy-quilt of multiple short-
term loans which had largely prevailed during the twenties.3
And, according to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. the HOLC contributed,
not only to social stability, but also enhanced the power of the Roose-
velt Administration. (Political/Administration)
...by enabling thousands of Americans to save their homes, it
(HOLC) strengthened their stake both i-n the existing order and
in the New Deal. Probably no single measure consglidated so
much middle-class support for the administration.
Thus, the HOLC was premeated with far-reaching objectives of
social and economic stability, including reducing risks for lenders,
in addition to its desire to assist defaulting mortgagors. The sweeping
national concerns which the HOLC was to address were well stated in
Frankin Roosevelt's original message to Congress about the Home Owner's
Loan Act:
2Housing and Home Finance Agency and Federal Home Loan Bank Board,
"Final Report to the Congress of the United States Relating to the Home-
owner's Loan Corporation" p. 38, 1957. This profit was
realized from the spread between the cost of money to the Corporation
through the bonds that it issued -- with its $2 billion bonding authority --
and the amount of interest charged on the refinanced mortgage loans.
3Nathaniel S. Keith Politics and the Housing Crisis Since 1930 (New.
York: Universe Books, 1973) p. 24.
4 Arthur M. Schlesincpr, Jr. The Coming of the New Deal (Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin Co., 1959) Quoted in Keith, Ibid. p. 24.
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Implicit in the legislation which I am suggesting to you is
a declaration of national policy. This policy is that the
broad interests of the nation require that special safeguards
should be thrown around home ownership as a guarantee of social
and economic stability, and that to protect home-owners from
inequitable enforced liquidation, in a time of general distress,
is a proper concern of the government.5
The HOLC left an enviable record: over 80 percent of the
1,017,821 families who were accepted for HOLC assistance were able
to bring their mortgage payments current. 6 However, it is also important
to point out that the HOLC refused over 800,000 applications for
assistance, viewing them as either ineligible under the Act or beyond
help. Thus, in spite of HOLC's accomplishments, many families were
excluded from its benefits.
Thus,while the HOLC clearly had a variety of objectives, as dis-
cussed above, it is noteworthy that this did not seem to diminish the
program's success in assisting homeowners. And, aside from excluding
some potentially eligible families from participation, conflicts with
consumer needs were absent from the HOLC's program. Indeed, the ability
of the HOLC to successfully combine a variety of goals sets it apart
5Homeowner's Loan Act, oU. cit.
6
HHFA and FHLBB "Final Report" op. cit. p. 23.
7Ibid. p. 17.
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from most other government efforts in housing.
While the HOLC was tremendously successful in helping to
stablize existing homeownership, it was never thought of as a long-
term component of the home finance system.8 Instead, the Federal
Home Loan Bank System and the Federal Housing Administration were
created as the long-range measures to stimulate and support mortgage
lending activity. While the HOLC was able to minimize the risk to len-
ders for loans that had been made prior to the Depression, the Federal
Home Loan Bank System and the Federal Housing Administration were
mechanisms for minimizing risk on yet-to-be-made loans.
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a brief review
of the Federal Home Loan Bank System and an assessment of how itsopera-
tions have both minimized risk for lenders and have conflicted with consumer
needs. Chapter 3 will then focus entirely on the Federal Housing
Administration.
8Unfortunately, HOLC was not maintained as a backstop for the consumer
once the high default rate accompanying the Depression had declined. During
the late 1950's and early 1960's, and then in the early 1970's, foreclosure
rates were again on the upswing. However, the services which had been
performed by the HOLC were not available to the consumer. Despite
the fact that the usefulness of this agency had been demonstrated, no
attempts have been made to revive the HOLC.
One possible reason is that during the latter periods, lenders have
had FHA insurance as their cushion against losses due to foreclosure. Without
their input, consumers could not muster the necessary support to reinstitute
an HOLC-type program.
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5. THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK SYSTEM (FHLBS):
In the preceeding sections of this chapter, the multiple goals of
the Homestead Act and the Home Owner's Loan Corporation were assessed.
Support and maintenance of homeownership was, quite clearly, a major
goal of both pieces of legislation -- although by no means the only one.
In the case of the HOLC a key competing goal was the reduction of risk to
lenders by providing them both with liquidity and reducing the fear of
loss due to foreclosure.
In examining the Federal Home Loan Bank System (FHLBS), it will
become clear that while homeownership was again an important objective,
it was deeply buried within the government's overriding need to strengthen
the nation's faltering financial institutions. It accomplished this by
minimizing the risk of financial institutions by providing liquidity.
The FHLBS emerged as the first major emergency measure of the
Depression period, preceding the HOLC by eleven months, and was always
intended to provide "a permanent framework for the nation's home financing
institutions."1
Starting in 1918, various groups acknowleged the need for a govern-
ment agency to support mortgage credit activities. In that year, several
savings and loan associations joined together to lobby for a government
sponsored "mortgage rediscount bank." However, without a sense of
urgency and with most savings and loan associations having both adequate
1United States Savings.and Loan League. 1973 Savings and Loan Fact.
Book (Chicago, 1973) p. 109 See also: Charles Haar, Federal Credit and
Private Housing: The Mass Financing Dilemma; (New York: McGraw-[iTT,~T960)
p. 345.
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capital and investment opportunities, this proposal, as well as a
similar one introduced in 1928, received little response in Congress. 2
However, in July, 1932, amid a steadily collapsing mortgage market,
Herbert Hoover signed into law the Federal Home Loan Bank Act. But,
as suggested above, the FHLBS was unable to revive the depressed mort-
gage market,3 the goal which Hoover had set for the new institution.
Analyzing the reasons behind the system's short-run failure, Lowell
Harriss observed that the very design of the system precluded its
effectiveness during the chaotic days of the Depression.
The System was built along traditional concepts of financial
soundness;... In effect, the Federal Home Loan banks could give
aid only where the risk was slight, where the need was insigni-
ficant.
The significance of the FHLBS has been its role, subsequent to the
Depression, in shaping one of the country's two major systems of home
finance. Modeling the FHLBS after the Federal Reserve System, the
FHLB Act of 1932 authorized the establishment of regional banks, under
the direction of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The board, now
consisting of three members, is appointed by the President of the United
States and oversees the operation of the twelve Federal Home Loan Banks.
The Federal Home Loan Bank System serves a variety of functions
2Henry E. Hoagland and Leo D. Stone, Real Estate Finance (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard Irwin, Inc. 1973) p. 440.
3Ernest Bloch, "The Federal Home Loan Bank System" In George F. Break,
Jack Guttentag et al., Federal Credit Agencies, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1963 Commision on Money and Credit, p. 168.
4C. Lowell Harriss, History and Policies of the Homeowner's Loan
Corporation (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951)
p. 8-9.
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to its members; to its adjuncts, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation (FSLIC) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
(FHLMC);5 as well as to the depositors and borrowers who deal with member
institutions. But despite its many functions, the FHLBS is primarily a
regulatory agency for savings and loan associations (S & L's)
As the regulatory agency for savings and loan associations,6 the
FHLEB establishes general operational and accounting procedures for
members to follow; charters new Federal Savings and Loan Associations;
approves and disapproves association mergers; establishes reserve and
liquidity ratios; establishes maximum interest rates payable on savings
deposits in member institutions; and establishes interest rates and loan
to value ratios on mortgages. In addition to regulation, the FHL banks
also provide technical assistance and advice to member institutions.
But, advancing credit is probably the most important service that the
FHLBS provides member institutions. Money for these advances, or loans,
is raised by the FHLBS in the open market. Credit is then extended to
member institutions by each regional bank based on the security of
mortgages held in the institution's portfolio. Thus, if an institution
5See Appendix 2-1.
6All Federally chartered savings and loan associations are required
to become members of the FHLBS. In addition, qualified state chartered
S and L's, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies may join on
a voluntary basis. As of 1972, 2,044 Federally chartered S and L's and
2,368 other institutions formed the membership of the FHLBS. S and LFact Book, op. cit. p. 112.
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is faced with low cash reserves and is suddenly confronted with a rush
of withdrawals, it has the assurance that it can obtain the needed
liquidity by borrowing from the FHLBS or, in other words, taking an
advance.
Thus, similar to the HOLC, the FHLBS minimized risk to lenders by
providing them with a source of liquidity -- one of the two major prob-
lems faced by lenders after the Depression. The FHLBS can also be
credited with two additional accomplishments. First, it has firmly
established and lent support to a coordinated system of home mortgage
lending. By providing member institutions with guidelines and rules
for their operation -- as well as liquidity and added flexibility
through credit advances -- the FHLBS has contributed to legitimizing
and strengthening a major system of home finance in this country.
Second, the FHLBS began the procedure of channeling funds from
areas of the country where investment surpluses exist to areas where
mortgage money is limited. Until the creation of the FHLBS, money that
was available for mortgages was highly localized. If a lender in the
West had a great demand for mortgage money but only a small amount of
money available, mortgage lending would have been out of the question.
The FHLBS has changed this situation. Now, if the West is short of
money the FHLBS can float bonds, thereby raising money for advancement
to the member institutions. With a scarcity of capital in the West,
the purchasers of the bonds would most likely, be located elsewhere,
such as in the East. Hoagland and Stone have observed that:
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By the sale of these bonds and notes, the member institutions
have access to the capital markets of the country. This repre-
sents an abrupt change from the prevailing dependence upon 7local funds that obtained before this bank system was started.
Thus, the creation of the FHLBS was a significant step toward nationalizing
the mortgage market.8
An important and basic assumption of our present home finance
system took shape with the emergence of the Federal Home Loan Bank
System. For the first time, a smooth flow of credit was seem as a critical
component of Federal homeownership policy. It was assumed that if lenders
could be persuaded to re-enter the mortgage lending business -- by reducing
one element of risk, liquidity, and if credit surpluses and scarcities could
be evened out among the various sections of the country, then potential home
purchasers would be able to enter the homeownership market. Thus, achieving a
smooth flow of credit was seem as a key means of promoting homeownership.
It is important to emphasize that the needs of the financial institu-
tions to reduce risk were, therefore, the major concern of the system and that
consumer needs were expected to be met once a smooth flow of credit was achieved.
Thus, the Federal Home Loan Bank Act only dealt with consumer needs
as the end result of the improved functioning of the financial institutions.
While it is difficult to visualize how most families could purchase homes
7Hoagland and Stone, op. cit. p. 443.
8While the FHLBS provided the mechanism for member S & L's to gain
access to additional credit through the advance system, they have often
been reluctant to take advantage of this. Thus, despite the national frame-
work, the S and L's have, until recently, operated in a primarily local area.
Marvell has noted that "the actual amount of advances has always been far be-
low what is allowed by (the rules) and policy statements. At least one-half
of the associations have no advances at all and many others have just nominal
amounts." Thomas B. Marvell, The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (New York:
Praeger, 1969) p. 69.
-53-
without an availability of credit, the point to be made here is that
credit has often been seen as the only need of the consumer. While this
may, in fact, be the case for some home purchasers, many other people
who enter the homeownership market also require other types of assistance.
The assumption that only a good flow of credit is needed to assure a
viable homeownersh.ip program is one that has persisted to the present and
is still an important factor whenever legislators address themselves to
improving homeownership programs.
Yet, even on the credit-flow issue, there has been much debate as
to the effectiveness of the FHLBS. For example, Harry Schwartz, a Vice
President of FNMA has noted that:
Most important, however, was the explicit statement (in the legisla-
tion which created the FHLBS) that supply of mortgage credit should
be regulated so as to avoid building booms and to support normal
construction over time. This is the buffer or contra-cyclical de-
vice reinforced by an injunction to prevent excesses in residential
construction activity. It is this function which would appear most
important to maintaining an adequate volume of mortgage credit, and
it is this phase of the FHLB's activity that has been at the center
of many episodes of criticism and debate.
Similarly, Rosen and Kearl have argued that prior to 1968, the
FHLBS did not focus its efforts on helping to maintain an even flow
of funds into housing. Moreover, they even have blamed the FHLBS for
10
exacerbating tight money periods, such as the credit crunch of 1966.
9Harry S. Schwartz, "The Role of Government-Sponsored Intermediaries"
in Housing and Monetary Policy. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference
Series no. 4, 1970, p~. 70.
10Kenneth Rosen and James Kearl, "A Simultaneous Equation Model of Housing
Starts, Mortgage Flows, Federal Home Loan Bank Board and Federal National Mort-
gage Association Behavior." January 30, 1974. Unpublished Manuscript p. 6.
-54-
Conflicts with Consumer Needs:
Thus, it is debatable as to whether or not the FHLBS has done as
much as has been needed or as much as it could to even out mortgage credit
cycles. The point is, however, that credit availability was the major
way in which the FHLBS was to benefit the consumer. As mentioned earlier,
the FHLBS provided no direct supports to the consumer. Also problematic
for the consumer has been the system's lethargic attitude toward ensuring
equal access to credit to all potential borrowers. As the regulatory
agency of S & L's, the FHLBB has permitted various forms of overt and co-
vert discrimination in home finance to occur. The U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, in investigating this matter in Baltimore in 1970, issued
a report which concluded with the following:
Policies of the FHLBB permit, but do not require, savings and
loan associations to service the low-income market... FHLBB regu-
lations could indicate that there is an affirmative duty on the
part of each federally chartered or insured S and L to review
its policies for mortgage credit to determine to what extent
they operate to the disadvantage of minority persons.. .The adop-
tion of a policy resolution opposing discrimination, with no ac-
companying enforceable regulations, appears to mean that failure
to comply with the resolution neither jeopardizes the association's
charter or insurance, nor subjects the institution to the cease
and desist authority of the Board.11
It is to the credit of the FHLBB that since the publication of the
Commission's 1970 report, it has become the only financial regulatory
agency to have issued fair housing requirements in the form of regulations.12
11U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1970) op. cit. p. 619.
12A Report of the U.S..Commission of Civil Rights, "The Federal Civil
Rights Enforcement Effort -- 1974; Volume II, To Provide...For Fair Housing"
Washington, D.C. p. 152.
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On April 27, 1972, the FHLBB published regulations which pro-
hibited discrimination in the preapplication phase of the mortgage
lending process on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national
origin of the applicant. And, furthermore, the regulations prohibited
discrimination based on the racial, ethnic, or religious composition
of the neighborhood for which the loan was being sought. 13
While the FHLBB later issued guidelines which were aimed at
assisting S & L's in implementing these regulations,14 there is still
much more that the FHLBB could do to ensure an end to the discrimination
practiced by member institutions. Both the regulations and the guidelines
lack requirements for affirmative action; racial, ethnic, and sex data
collection; compliance reviews; and, perhaps most disoncerting of all,
enforcement.15
Thus, a key way in which the FHLBS has conflicted with consumer
needs is by not taking more positive steps to safeguard the rights of
all consumers to gain equal access to credit. It has concentrated far
more on the goals of preventing credit crunches and on providing liquidity
than on guaranteeing that all potential purchasers will be able to finance
13Fed. Reg. 8436 (April 27, 1972).
14Fed. Reg. 34653 (December 17, 1973).
15U.S. Commision on Civil Rights (1974) op. cit. p. 155. Unfortunately,
little data exist which identify discriminatory practices among S & L's or
the actual extent of monitoring and supervision pe-formed by the FHLBB. How-
ever, a recent survey of 46 Washington area S & L's found several instances
of noncompliance with the Civil Rights Act of 1.968 and insufficient monitoring
by the FHLBB. Eileen C. Sweeny, "Nondiscrimination in Mortgage Lending Practices
." The Housing Opportunities Council of Metropolitan Washington, October, 1974.
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their homes.
Since the FHLBB is a public agency, it is appropriate to question why
these exclusiona'ypractices exist. There are at least two plausible reasons.
The first one relates to the complex mixture of public and private aspects
of the FHLBS. While the FHLBS is a public agency, it is independent of
the Federal government for funding. Since the creation of the FHLBS,
the trend has been toward diminished government involvement and increased
privatization. By 1939, the government had invested nearly $1.3 billion in
the savings and loan industry, with capital supplied to the FHL Banks
totaling $125 million. 16 However, by 1950, the member institutions had
bought up all the FHL Bank's capital stock, thereby eliminating the invest-
ment of the U.S. Treasury in the FHL Banks.17
On this point, Ernest Bloch has noted that:
The admixture of government aid (has been) much diluted from the
original Act, and even more from the Depression setup.. .The Fed-
eral government's role in the financial structure of the System
has shifted from direct support of member associations and of
the Home Loan Banks, to the point wheg all funds used at all
levels of the System are now private.
Yet, in spite of its private funding, the FHLBS is definitely a public
agency. First, the FHLBS is a creature of the Federal government. It
was first created by an act of Congress in 1932 and, since then, major
16Bloch, op. cit. p. 173. In addition to capital supplied to the FHL
Banks, the government also provided $100 million in capital to the FSLIC;
direct aid of $260 million to associations in the form of deposits and in-
direct aid totaling $770 million for HOLC purchases of mortgages.
17Ibid. p. 176.
18Ibid. pp. 178-179.
-57-
changes in its operation have occurred through Federal legislation.19
Second, the FHLBS is governed and regulated by a three-man board
whose members are appointed by the President of the United States. The
board, an independent agency within the executive branch of the Federal
government, is subject to review by Congress.
And, the third "public" aspect of the FHLBS is its relationship
to the U.S. Treasury. Using the Federal Reserve System as a model Congress,
in 1950, provided the Secretary of the Treasury with the authority to pur-
chase, at his discretion, up to $1 billion of the FHLBS' obligations.
This authority was expanded by the Rate Control Act of 1969, which in-
creased the purchasing authority of the Secretary of $4 billion. How-
ever, the Act specified that this "backup" is to be used only in situations
in which the open market is not able to absorb these obligations. Thus,
the Secretary of the Treasury was advised to only act in emergency situ-
ations "to avoid substantial impairment of the Home Loan Bank System be-
cause of monetary strigency or rapidly rising interest rates." 20 While
this "backup" is not an explicit Federal subsidy, Penner and Silber have
suggested that "this safety device undoubtedly lowers the interest rate
19
For example, the Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966 gave
the FHLBB the power to issue "cease and desist" orders to any member institu-
tion suspect of wrong-doing or non-compliance with regulations. And, also
in 1966, the Interest Rate Control Act empowered the FHLBB to set limits
on the interest rate that member S and L's could give on their savings ac-
counts. Another example of how Federal legislation has shaped the FHLBS
is The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 which. authorized $250 million to
be disbursed through the FHLBS for the purpose of lowering the interest rate
on mortgages for low and middle income families. (Known as the Housing
Opportunity Allowance Program.)
20Hoagland and Stone, op. cit. p. 445.
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which the FHLBB must pay for funds." 21 Thus, although FHLBS obligations
are not actually guaranteed by the U.S. Government, investment in these
types of notes are still extremely attractive, and are perceived as only
slightly less safe than Treasury bills.
In summary, then, charges that the FHLBS has not acted with a stronger
consumer orientation could be countered with arguments pointing to the
ambiguity between its role as a public agency with private funding.
The second characteristic of the FHLBS that probably accounts, in
part, for its weak position vis a vis the consumer is its role as a regu-
latory body. Not only is the FHLBS part-private and part-public, but
its close connection to private interests, as the regulator of S & L's,
has further served to diminish its public orientation.
Much has been written about the relationship among regulatory agencies,
those entitles that are regulated, and the general public. The literature
suggests that regulatory agencies are primarily set up and function to
serve the needs of the regulated. For example, writing on the regulator-
regulatee relationship between the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
railroads, Gabriel Kolko has concluded that:
National regulation of the railroads, from 1887 until 1916, was
an attempt to create a political capitalism for the sake of the
railroads, and the railroads supported it for precisely this reason.
Indeed, they were the most crucial factor behind the federal regu-
lation of the railroads. And although it was necessary to pay lip
21Rudolph G. Penner and William L. Silber, "Federal Housing Credit
Programs: Costs, Benefits, and Interactions" in The Economics of Federal
Subsidy Programs: Part 5 -- Housing Subsidies, A Compendium of Papers
Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States,October 9, 1972, p. 670.
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service in political rhetoric to the desire to enhance and protect
the general public welfare, at least Roosevelt explicity made it
clear that the public welfare would be served by the government
concerning itself first with the welfare of the honest railroads. 22
Based upon this well-accepted observation, one might expect that
the FHLBS' services would be geared toward the regulated institutions,
rather than toward the welfare of the general public. Similar to the
I.C.C., the FHLBS was intended to stabilize and strengthen the regulatees --
the mortgage lenders.
By supplying credit to member institutions their resources were
expected to be strengthened and supplemented. And, just as the above
quote indicates Roosevelt's belief that the public would ultimately be
served by first regulating the railroads, the FHLBS was, as discussed
above, also intended to serve the public by increasing and stabilizing
the availability of mortgage money, by strengthening the member institu-
tions.
On the surface, there is no reason to believe that this situation
would produce conflicts between S & L needs and consumers. However, if
one goal of the FHLBS is to support and strengthen S & L's and another
is, or should be, to maximize money available to all consumer groups,
conflicts could arise if the latter would tend to threaten S-& L's.
Whether risks are real or perceived, many S & L's have chosen to
22Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (New York: Free Press
of Glencoe, 1963) p. 238.
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avoid lending to minorities, women and to families wishing to buy inner
city properties.23 And, as discussed earlier, it is significant that the
FHLBB has made only slow and incomplete efforts at correcting these
discriminatory practices among S & L's.
Thus, it appears that the regulatory and private aspects of the
FHLBS have dominated over its public orientation, both in its own practices
and policies and in the way its activities have been perceived by others.24
23See, for example, "Where the Lender Looks First; A Case Study of
Mortgage Disinvestment in Bronx County, 1960-1970", "Richard J. Devine et
al. National Urban League, New York City, 1973; "Mortgage Money: Who Gets
It? -- A Case Study in Mortgage Lending Discrimination in Hartford, Connecti-
cut," U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Clearinghouse Publication No. 48.
June, 1974; "Discrimination in Home Finance" Daniel A. Searing. Notre Dame
Lawyer, June, 1973. Michael Stegman, Housing Investment in the Inner City.
MIT Press 1972; and "Patterns and Practices of Discrimination in Lending
in Oakland, California "A Report of a Study by NCDH/HUD Urban Renewal
Demonstration Project." February 1972,(Mimeo).For a good discussion on
this subject including a review of the above studies see: Kerry Vandell,
Barbara Hodas and Rachel Bratt, "Financial Institutions and Neighborhood
Decline: A Review of the Literature" Prepared for the FHLBB, Nov. 1974.
24The following example substantiates this conclusion. In 1968, bitter
attacks were launched against the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) for
not taking the lead in trying to stimulate lending activity in inner city
areas and to lower ircome and minority families. (See Chapter 3, Section
4d) But despite this awareness of the government's role in contributing
to discriminatory lending practices, no criticism was directed to the
activities of the FHLBS. And, yet, blame would have been in order. Both
because of its role as the regulatory agency of S and L's as well as its
function of providing cash advances to member institutions, the charge
could have been made that the FHLBS was as guilty as the FHA for permitting
red-lining and other discriminatory practices by S and L's. But because
the FHLBS was generally perceived as a private regulatory banking institution,
it escaped the frequent and harsh attacks that fell on the FHA.
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CHAPTER.3: FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
1. INTRODUCTION:
The previous chapter noted that while the HOLC addressed both
major components of risk -- fear of loss due to foreclosure and the
lack of liquidity -- the FHLBS addressed only the latter. However,
the FHA mortgage insurance mechanism created by the National Housing
Act of 1934 was aimed at decreasing the risk due to foreclosure there-
by attempting to increase the participation of financial institutions.
The same legislation also created the Federal National Mortgage
Association, another important cushion against illiquidity
(see Chapter 7). Both of these institutions shifted risk from the
lenders and onto the government, although the FHA was the most sig-
nificant government effort in reducing lender liability.
The discussion of FHA will follow the framework set up in Chapter
2. That is, the FHA will be analyzed in terms of the various goals
that were embodied in the legislation and the subsequent impacts that
these goals have had on consumers.
INational Housing Act, Public Law 479, 48 Stat. 1246.
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2. MULTIPLE GOALS OF THE FHA:
a. Need for Broad-Based Participation of Lending Institutions:
The FHLBS was two years old when the National Housing Act of
1934 was enacted. In view of its experience in home mortgage operations,
it is appropriate to question why the government's home modernization
and mortgage insurance programs were not placed under the direction of
the FHLBB. Marvell offers a possible reason:
By 1934, the FHLBB was already very much under the influence of the
savings and loan industry, which did not like the insurance scheme
because it called for insured mortgages made by banks and insurance
companies as well as by S and L's. The industry figured that
government insurance would offer the banks and insurance companies
a chance to ?at into what it considered its own share of the mort-
gage market.
Thus, because other lending institutions, in addition to S and L's,
were welcome to participate in the new mortgage insurance program,
Roosevelt's advisors feared that the FHLBB would not administer the
program fairly.
It is problematic as to whether or not the FHLBB would have
administered the insurance program impartially so as to permit the parti-
cipation of non S and L lenders. However, statements from representatives
of the building and loan industry, at the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee hearings of 1934, indicate that there was little enthusiasm
for the new program. The articulated opposition to the scheme ranged from
criticism of creating a new agency -- to ambivalence about the need for
such a program -- to practical objections to the government's getting
1Thomas B. Marvell, op. cit. pp. 27-28.
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involved in the business of guaranteeing mortgages.
In response to a question concerning the proposed insurance
mechanism, Morton Bodfish, the Executive Vice President of the U. S.
Building and Loan League articulated his opposition to the creation
of a new agency:
We have a substitute program that we think would be more immediate
and more feasible to use the existing agencies. To use t e Home
Owners' Loan Corporation and the Home Loan Bank System...
John H. Fahey, Chairman of the FHLBB, voiced his ambivalence:
... this proposal of the insurance of individual mortgages is a
novelty. None of us who have been giving it attention believe
that there is going to be a general demand for its immediate
use...3
And, Maco Stewart the President of the largest building and loan
association in Texas raised political objections to the mortgage
insurance plan:
If the U. S. Government goes into guaranteeing the payment of
mortgages, secured mortgages, as they call them in this bill,
someday or other, in t e next depression, if one ever comes...
We will all go blooie.
But with the sentiment both within Congress and the Roosevelt Ad-
ministration leaning strongly in favor of providing employment opportunities
and stimulating the home building industries, the interests and concerns
2Hearings Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S. Senate.
73rd. Cong. 2nd. Sess. May 1934, p. 254 (Referred to as"National Housing
Act Hearings").
3Ibid. p. 209.
4Ibid. p. 100.
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of the S and L's were not heeded. The Federal government was trying to
involve a wide range of financial resources and lending institutions in
the economic recovery of the nation and mortgage insurance was perceived
as a means to that end.
The decision to create a new agency to administer the mortgage
insurance program marked the emergence of the dual home finance structure.
While attempts were later made to coordinate the activities of the FHLBS
and FHA, they were unsuccessful. Writing about one such attempt, Miles
Colean points out that:
The Reorganization Act of 1939 brought the two agencies together in
the new Federal Loan Agency. This move, however, did not result in
a basic reorganization. Even duplicate administrative functions
were not eliminated. Research divisions and technical operations
were still separate and administrative conflicts, created partly
by agency rivalr and partly by fundamental differences in philo-
sophy, remained.
One can view the creation of the dual home finance system as the
outcome of the Federal government's intervention in an area dominated by
private actors with varying interests. Since the S and L's had been the
prime mortgage lenders prior to the Depression,6 this group first received
attention and remedial support in the form of the HOLC and FHLBS. However,
with the additional goal of stimulating home building, the government
5Miles L. Colean, American Housing (New York: 20th Century Fund, 1944)
p. 269.
6Marvell oR. cit. p. 19: "Savings and loan associations held one-third
of the nonfarm home mortgages in the early 1930's, considerably more than
any other type of lender, although insurance companies and savings banks
were also important home-mortgage lenders. Commercial banks were the only
organizations with enough funds to be in a position to help the home owners,but they were hoarding their money, afraid to risk it during the hard times of
the Depression. Therefore, the government looked to the savings and loan
associations, along with insurance companies and savings banks, to help solve
the plight of the home owners."
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chose to broaden the range of lending institutions involved in home
mortgage lending through the new mortgage insurance program.
b. Mid-Depression Needs of the Construction Industry:
In addition to its clear priority to involve a broad range of lending
institutions, the government was also under substantial pressure from the
construction industry to assist them in regaining their lost momentum.
That industry had suffered enormous setbacks during the Depression as
housing unit starts fell well below the foreclosure rate.
In 1933 only about 40,000 new homes were built,7 while only eight
*years earlier the new housing construction rate had toppled 800,000
units.8 This plunge in construction fueled the spreading nationwide
unemployment. By 1934, the unemployment rate in the construction
industry was about 85% of a total on-site work force of at least a million
and a half and an off-site work force of about 6 million.9
The combined efforts of the FHLBS and the HOLC were not able to
significantly affect the unemployment rate or substantially stimulate the
construction industry. The answer for the construction industry was
contained in Title I of the National Housing Act, a labor-intensive home
7National Housing Act Hearings, op. cit. p. 288.
8Glenn H. Beyer, Housing and Society op. cit. p. 197.
9National Housing Act Hearings, op_. cit. p. 412-414.
-66-
modernization program, and the Title II mortgage insurance programs.
While the construction industry was unable to recapture the momentum
of the mid-1920's, by 1941 the FHA programs managed to stimulate the
construction of about 700,000 units. 1
Title I of the National Housing Act provides insurance to private
lenders on loans made to homeowners for the purpose of "financing altera-
tions, repairs, and improvements upon or in connection with existing
structures..."" The insurance that is provided under this title only
covers 90% of the loss encountered by a lending institution on a foreclosed
loan.
Title II of the Act provides complete insurance to private lenders
on loans made to people who are purchasing a new or existing home, there-
by eliminating risk from the lending decision. By the end of 1973,
over 10 million families had become homeowners using Title II FHA
insurance, while almost 3 million families were assisted in making
repairs to their homes through Title I.12
Whether one views the creation of the second home finance system, the
FHA, as an outcome of the interests of lending institutions, the construc-
tion industry, or both, it seems clear that it evolved out of the
10Beyer, op. cit. p. 197.
11
"Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development" (Revised
through Jan. 31, 1971) Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Repre-
sentatives, 92nd. Cong. 1st. Sess. p. 6-7.
HUD Statistical Yearbook, 1973, Washington, D.C. p. 142.
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government's desire to assist the private actors who were already key
participants in the housing industry. Based upon this interpretation
of why this country created a dual approach to home finance, as well as
because the insurance mechanism was aimed at protecting lenders, it is
fair to conclude that the major clients of the 1934 Federal housing
legislation were the lending institutions and the construction industry.
The consumer was not intended to be the first-order recipient of the
benefits of the legislation.
The following comments by noted students of housing policy sum
up the multiple goals of the National Housing Act -- with economic, political,
.and social objectives taking priority over welfare goals.
Charles Haar:
(FHA) was designed to provide an adequate home financing system,
to exert a stabilizing influence on the mortgage market an to
encourage improvement in housing standards and conditions.13
John Dean:
The favorable attitudes of those testifying at the hearings before
the Senate Committee which handled the FHA legislation indicate
whose bread was to be buttered by the passage of the act. (i.e.,
lumbermen, building trade representatives, real estate men, building
materials suppliers, and bankers all spoke with enthusiasm for
the FHA.) 14
Nathaniel Keith:
While the establishment of the FHA mortgage insurance program
had some reform aspects from the standpoint of correcting the
mortgage abuses of the Twenties, it was primarily sold politically
as a program to unfreeze the home building industry and thereby
13Charles Haar, op. cit. p. 21-23.
14John P. Dean, Homeownership: Is It Sound? (New York: Harper and
Row, 1945) p. 48.
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stimulate employment and the economy.15
Miles Colean:
The new measures had far-reaching implications and were for the
most part intended to be of indefinite duration, but they were
enacted when emergency conditions prevailed and had an emergency
point of view. Each new housing bill was advocated as a means
of stimulating the durable goods industries or putting men to
work. Housing thus was looked upon as a remedy for general
economic ills rather than a problem in itself. This confusion
of objectives has hindered the coordinated development of Federal
housing policy. 16
Thus, the creation of the FHA represented a landmark decision on
the part of the Federal government. The National Housing Act of 1934
opened the way for financial institutions to become re-involved in mort-
*gage lending through the use of the risk-reducing mechanism of FHA
insurance. The government's position was c-lear: "We'll insure you
against risk if you get back into lending." Explicit in this was the
government's willingness to act as a backstop to the financial institu-
tions and to assume the risk inherent in mortgage lending.
Following a brief review of the early accomplishments of the FHA,
the various ways in which the multiplicity of goals of the National
Housing Act led to conflicts with consumer needs will be examined.
15Nathaniel S. Keith, op. cit.. p. 24.
Interestingly enough, the same groups that had spoken so positively
about the FHA were, just three years later, to oppose the new public housing
program. Keith observes that this "was viewed as a dangerous threat to private
enterprise in real estate.. .The ideological opposition of these groups (Chamber
of Commerce; National Association of Real Estate Boards, The U.S. Savings and
Loan League; and the National Association of Retail Lumber Dealers) to Federal
intervention in housing did not extend to the entities formed to support private
enterprise... the FHA and the FHLBS. On the contrary, these organizations had
played a role in the enactment of the legislation establishing FHA and the HLBB.
But they viewed public housing as an enemy wedge for the eventual socialization
of residential real estate." (pp. 29-30).
16Miles L. Colean, op. cit. pp. 261-262.
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3. EARLY ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE FHA:
As mentioned above, FHA's primary task was to minimize the risk
of loss due to foreclosure for lending institutions. But, in addition,
it standardized the mortgage lending process and actually helped to
revolutionize mortgage lending procedures.
a. Minimizing Risk Due to Foreclosure:
In the case of Title II programs, an insurance premium is paid by
the mortgagor and deposited in one of FHA's four insurance funds.
This premium is based on 1/2 percent/year on the outstanding balance
.of the principal mortgage amount. In effect, the premium equals an
interest rate increase to the buyer of 1/2 percent. But, in return,
the buyer is permitted to make a lower downpayment than if the mort-
gage were written without government insurance, on a conventional
basis.
A very substantial benefit also accrues to the mortgage lender.
.Without any cost to him, FHA insurance promises the lender that, in
the event that the mortgagor is unable to meet his mortgage obliga-
tions and a foreclosure occurs, the FHA, drawing upon the appropriate
insurance fund, will reimburse the mortgagee for 100% of the outstanding
balance of the loan plus foreclosure expenses and lost interest payments.
This insurance settlement payment, originally made in an illiquid form
of asset, debentures,has, since 1965, been made almost exclusively in
cash. Thus, FHA has minimized one of the most prominent fears of any
business -- the fear that money may be lost on investments.
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b. Standardizing Mortgage Lending Procedures:
The creation of the FHA insured mortgage was also the first
major step toward standardizing mortgage lending procedures. Rules
were laid down by the FHA on the type of property that would be con-
sidered a reasonable security for the loan and the necessary income and
credit standing of prospective purchasers. FHA rules went into great
detail on these points -- and even went so far as to prescribe the
type of neighborhood that would be acceptable in terms of its racial
composition. Thus, a banker in Boston that was lending money with
FHA insurance was following the same ground rules as his counterpart
in Boise. This standardization paved the way for the buying and selling
of FHA insured mortgages. If the banker in Boston had more deposits
than he could invest in his own area, he could now purchase mortgages
in Boise. The Boston banker would not have to know the neighbor-
hoods and property values in Boise, the quality of a particular
appraiser's work, or the characteristics of the local borrowers.
FHA guidelines specified the exact type of loan on which its insurance
could be issued. Personal familiarity on the investor's part disap-
peared as a critical component of the investment decision. If the
banker in Boise, as well as the FHA insuring office in Boise, both
thought that the loan was good, then why shouldn't the banker in
Boston buy it?
Federal Housing Administration, "Underwriting and Valuation Pro-
cedures Under Title II of the National Housing Act," Section 937, 1938.
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2
The answer is that he should and he does. But, while similar to
the advance systemof the FHLBS in which surplus capital from one part
of the country is channeled into mortgage money in another, there is
also an important difference. In the case of the FHA system, mortgages
are actually originated in one area of the country and sold in another,
while in the case of the FHLBS, it is only capital that is transferred.
c. Revolutionizing Mortgage Lending Procedures:
As mentioned earlier, prior to the Depression, most mortgages had
short terms to maturity; were only partially amortized or completely
unamortized; and had low loan to value ratios. But with the bulk of
the risk removed, lenders using FHA insurance were willing to extend
the terms of mortgages; to write fully amortized loans; and to accept
higher loan to value ratios.
But even lenders writing non-FHA insured mortgage loans quickly
began to adopt the practices authorized for lenders using FHA insurance.
Thus, the FHA insurance programs had a profound impact on revolutionizing
the entire quality of home mortgage lending in this country. However,
as suggested above, the FHA also presented an array of problems to
some consumers. While the following discussion focuses on these nega-
tive side-effects, it is important to keep in mind that the FHA provided
substantial benefits to numerous homeowners.
2The mechanics of this operation are lengthy and complex and require a
chapter of their own (see Chapter 7). For the present, it is sufficient
to note that there has been a steady growth in the buying and selling of
FHA insured mortgages. Moreover, the government has contributed to this
growth by the creation of the Federal National Mortgage Association, the
Government National Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mort-
gage Corporation. These three agencies are the government-sponsored secon-
dary mortgage market facilities.
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4. CONFLICTS WITH CONSUMER NEEDS:
With the New Deal and Congressional goals for FHA directed at
stimulating the construction industry and safeguarding financial insti-
tutions, FHA was destined to grow into an industry-oriented, rather than
consumer-oriented, institution. Some observers were able to foresee
this at an early stage.
During the hearings on the proposed housing legislation, in 1934,
the new bill was denounced for the lack of orientation toward the home-
owner. Marvin Farrington, representing a national organization of
homeowners (Home Owner's Protective Enterprise, H.O.P.E.) testified
that:
The title of Senate bill No. 3603 as well as the publicity given
it thus far, conveys the impression to the homeowner that this
legislation is primarily in his interest. It is respectfully
submitted that this is not true. 1
Farrington continued, pointing out two aspects of the bill which, he
felt, were not in the best interests of the homeowner:
[First] there is not a line in the bill assuring or guaranteeing
the homeowner that his presently due or past due mortgage shall
be renewed or refinanced.
To which Senator Bulkley responded:
It is not intended to do that here. That is financed in the Home
Owner's Loan Act.
Mr. Farrington: That is true. But the Home Owner's Loan Act is
very limited...that language.. .is limited to those really in
distress...
Senator Bulkely: Yes, of course, but that is what we intended to
do for the fellow who was in distress. This bill does not pretend
to do anything from that direction. It is for an entirely different
purpose. It is not a fair criticism of this bill to say that it
INational Housing Act Hearings op. cit. p. 372-382.
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does not do anything for the distressed homeowner, because we
have already done what we thought was right for him in another
piece of legislation.
Mr. Farrington: [Second] proper care has not been exercised by
the draftsmen of the bill in the matter of protecting the home-
owner himself.
And, Senator Buckley responded:
Well, of course it is to be assumed that the homeowner won't enter
into a contract for renovation unless he thinks it is to his bene-
fit. It is entirely voluntary with him whether he enters into a
contract or not.
And, further, Mr. Farrington accurately predicted one of the out-
comes of the legislation although he didn't believe it could happen:
It taxes common sense.. .to believe that homeowners, very many of
whom are now distressed by due or past due mortgage indebtedness,
to say naught of their reduced incomes, are going to further
obligate themselves for repairs or improvements if they know their
estates are in jeopardy by foreclosure. 2
In the same vein, Marie L. Obenauer, an official of H.0.P.E., claimed that
her group had proposed a different method of home repair, but with a
more homeowner-oriented component:
[The group's proposed plan] provides for competent and disinterested
counsel to the homeowner as a guard against needless further debt
commitments and unsound charges for credit. Neither of these things
are done by Senate bill 3603. Furthermore, the bill could effectually
block such services to the home owners of the country. 3
Yet, the momentum for passage of S. 3603 was great and, aside from
the above objections, opposition was minimal.
Following its legislative mandate, FHA undertook its mission with a
fervor rarely seen in public agencies. Lauching a publicity campaign that
3 Ibi d. p. 388.
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could rival even the most successful commerical advertising ventures,
thousands of people joined the FHA home improvement and purchase
programs, (Sae Exhibit 1).4 The intensity of the "own you own home"
movement, which began to gain momentum during the early 1930's,
prompted one writer to warn that: "Every prospective home buyer
should be immunized with an antitoxin against the blah-blah of own-
your-own-home campaigns."5
John Dean, a well-noted mid-1940's critic of the one-sided nature
of the FHA campaign urged that home-buying families ask themselves:
"Just what is it we expect to get out of owning this home... ?" Instead,
"American families are encouraged to bypass this kind of reflective
consideration of home ownership and to step boldly ahead."6 Further, he
wrote that:
It may be urged that criticsim of the activities of those
merchandising houses is captious, because they are simply
engaging in normal business practices. But since the pur-
chase of a home represents the largest single purchase a
family ever makes and since a house and lot represent a
highly complex choice, the rightness or wrongness of which
colors a family's future for years, the delivery of the
conditions of promotion and sale over to ballyhoo by interested
groups of sellers.. .is a questionable social policy.7
While Dean never detailed actual cases in which families were
badly burned by the ownership experience, he suggests that there are
numerous ways in which homeownership may not live up to a family's
4Federal Housing Administration, "Portfolio of Publicity for a Local
Better Housing Program," 1934.
5Rose Stein, "More Homes or More Mortgages" The New Republic, Sept. 7,
1932, p. 90.
6John Dean, op. cit. p. 18.
7Ibid. p. 39.
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FITA-205a
"Home" Poster, 14 by 22 inches (card-
board), 2-color offset, sepia and buff. For
use on windows, walls, posts, etc.
FHA-208
Information Bulletin, for wall or
window posting (cardboard), 14 by 22
inches, giving questions and answers
about financing plan of National
Housing Act. Red, white, and black.
F H A-206
Metal Sign (28 gage), 8
by 11 inches, 3 colors, red,
white and blue. For use by
dealers and contractors on
trucks or at their places of
business.
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F HA-320
Mat of "Home" Poster,
2 inches wide. For use in lit-
erature, advertisements, news-
papers, and other publicity.
FIA-321
Mat of "Home" Poster,
4 inches wide. For use in lit-
erature, advertisements, news-
papers, and other publicity.
FIHA-20.
"Home" Poster, same as
above except.8%& by 13%4 inches
(paper), sepia rotogravure.
FHA-205b
"Home" Poster, 28 by 44
inches (paper), 2-color lithog-
raphy. Sepia and buff. For
use on walls, billboards, neib-
borhood posting panels,. win-
dows, etc.
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FHA-319
Mat of Better Housing Emblem,
2 inches wide. For use in literature,
advertisements, and other publicity.
FHA-102
(Below)
"Community Campaign" Book-
let, 6 by 9 inches, 36 pages. illustrated,
giving detailed instructions on how to
conduct a community modernizing
and improvement campaign. For use
of committee members, campaign
workers, field canvassers, and others.
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National Housing Act (full text).
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at campaign headquarters for reference
and other uses.
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FHA-106(Abore)
"Community Planning" Book-
let, 6 by 9 inches, illustrated, teing
how various group modernization and
improvement projects might be organ-
ized under the Better Housing Pro-
gram. For use of building and plan-
ning officials, city housing commissions,
FIHA-104(AbOVR-)
"Manufacturers'" Booklet,
6 by 9 inches, tellirg specifically what
manufacturers, advertising agencies,
publishers and others profitably can
do to help support the Better Housing
Program and their local community
campaign.
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Spot Announcements for Radio
(TEAR HERE)
1
You can have a modernized home
NOW; and as much as 3, and in
some cases 5, years in which to pay
for it. For details, ask any financial
institution approved by the Federal
Housing Administration.
2
Thousands of property owners are
getting action today on needed
home and business building im-
provements. Just ask any fman-
cial institution, approved by the
Federal Housing Administration,
for the facts.
3
Owners of apartment buildings,
stores and business property, indus-
trial plants and farm property, are
entitled to the new property im-
provement loans. Ask any finan-
cial institution approved by the
Federal Housing Administration.
4
The National Housing Act au-
thorizes home and business property
improvement loans of. 5100 to
S2.000, with as much as 3 (some-
times even 5) years to pay. Ask
any fmiancial institution approved
by the Federal Housing Admnis-
tration.
Needed improvements to homes
and business property are a wise
investment-and they help put un-
employed men back to work. For
details ask the ........... Better
Housing Committee.
6
Tniake old homes young again-
that is one of the worth-while pur-
poses of the National Hlousiing Act.
Any financial institution approved
by the Federal Housing Admiis-
tration can tell you about the
liberal loans now available.
7
Perhaps your .wasted attic or
basement space can be put to ser-
viceable use at small expense. The
National Housing Act makes it
possible to finance such improve-
ments on liberal terms.
8
Homes long overdue for a paint
job will welcome the National
Housing Act. Work of this kind
can now be paid for on easy terms.
Ask your local Better Housing
Committee.
9
An important book telling how
home and business property owners
can benefit under the National
Housing Act may be obtained free
from your local Better Housing
Committee.
10
Your home improvement job may
seem small in itself, but millions of
such jobs will go a long way toward
bringing back prosperity. Sup-
port your local Better Housing
Program.
11
Need a new garage or an extra
bedroom? The National Housing
Act has made private capital avail-
able for such improvements. Ask
any financial- institution approved
by the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration.
12
Women know how new color
and new conveniences in the homne
can add to family happiness. Now
is a good time to make these ai-
provements. Support yoLir local
Better Housing: Program.
13
Proper insulatiom of home or
business buildin]r will save fuel and
add to comfort. Loans are av ail-
able to property owners for this
work. Ask yvour local bank or other
financial institution.
14
Does the roof leak? That's an
important and needed repair wvhich
can now be financed on liberal
terms. Ask any financial institu-
tion, approved by the Federal
Housing Administration, for the-
details.
15
Your property improvement loan
under the National Housing Act
may run for any number of noths
up to 3 years, or even 5 years in
certain cases. For completr de-
tails ask any financial intiit ion
approved by the Federal iHuing
Ad minstration.
16
The provisions of the NatioJna
Housing Act apply to property im-
provements on the farmin, in vilaes,
and in cities. Get com ete do 1 L
from your local Better H-o01ing
Committee.
17
Are you one of inmillions of Ameri-
cans in city, suburb, and farm who ze
home is in need of repairs? Liberal
loans are now available with whlich
to maLe them. Ask your iolal
bank or other financial institutio.
18
Does your store or place of bus-
ness need repairs or a moderno Iont ?
Such improvements can now be
financed on easy terms. s. anY
bank cooperating with the Fedeail
Housing Administration.
19
The first recovery expendiure an
Owner 0h211t to mak e is for n!eede
prUperty repi It s
sense security to put pop b 'i'
order-and the roviim of te
National llou-'ng\Actimake the
financing of such impr ment
possible on r eas t-rm-
NOTE.-Suggested follow-up story to create support among business interests
(TFAB HERE)
BETTER HOUSING. PROCRAIM "iEANS
MORE JOBS FOR BUILDING WORKERS
Chairman of Local Committee Declares Plan Was
Evolved by Business Leaders
The National Housing Act is the who normally depend upon the con-
Nation's challenge to the forces of de-
pression which have left in their wake
lagging construction and capital-goods
industries.
Explaining the objectives of this
highly important legislation today,
Mr. ------------ , Chairman of the
-Better Housing Cam-
paign Committee pointed out that the
rogram is more than a plan to revive
a single industry. "It is ", he said, "a
broad recovery measure regarded as
one of the most far-reaching in impor-
tance that has been enacted by Congress
since the National Recovery Act."
"It is a plan to remove the largest
remaining obstacle in the way of full
recovery ", Mr. ----------- declared,
"one which is destined to restore to
useful, private enterprise the largest
group of workers still unemployed.
"No single man or industry pros
posed the National Housing Act. It is
the work of a group of leading busi-
ness men, among them the heads of
the largest commercial organizations,
banks, and insurance companies, and
representatives of important manufac-
turing and trading interests.
"Early last winter these men be-
came concerned with the slow progress
toward recovery of certain basic in-
dustries. They found that whereas con-
sumer goods had made a substantial
come-back since the bank holiday of
1933, there were other industries, prin-
cipally those dealing in heavy or dur-
able goods, that were falling far be-
hind. The most important of these
was the construction industry. It was
found that new home building had
dropped nearly 90 percent from the
1926-29 level, and that nearly one-
third of all the fainlies then on the re-
lief rolls were the families of workers
normally engaged in building. It was
to solve this situation that the National
Housing Act became law.
"It is expected to alleviate the dis-
tress among a large portion of the
4,000,000 persons in the United States
struction industry for their livelihood."
The Federal Government, througa
the Housing Administration, will in-
sure lending agencies against 100 per-
cent of all losses, provided the total
of such losses does not exceed 20 per-
cent of the aggregate amount of funds
advanced for property improvements.
Tnis insurance is virtually an iron-
clad guarantee of protection for the
financial institutions, since the high-
est known loss ratio on similar types
of loans has not exceeded 3 percent.
Experts in this field have expressed
the opinion that it is hardly con-
ceivable that these credits, extended
by prudent institutions, could result
in losses greatly exceeding this pre
vious experience. The insurance, they
agree, is tantamount to a complete
guarantee for financial institutions.
That is, if a lending ageacy acquires
notes aggregating a total volume of
$100,000, it will be insured against
100 percent of loss on aUl items up to
total aggregate losses of $20,000.
Losses of this proportion have never
b..een approached in America on this
type of business, even in the worst de-
pression years.
The Federal Housing Administra-
tion, in its rules and regulations cover-
ing the making of loans, will not re-
quire collateral, except in some cases
where the State law demands mort-
gages as security for loans. This is
true of some building and loan asso-
ciations and savings ban.ks, but the
great majority of loans to be made
under this nian will be in the form of
character loans, based solelv on the
reputation of the borrower and his
ability to repay. Endorsecs and co-
-makers wHi not be needed.
James A. Moffett, the Housing- Ad-
ministrator, emphasizes that while the
Federal Housing Administration is
anxiolls to receive tie hearuest co-
operation from property owners and
the public, no moder'izati loans that
are not fully justined. on the grounds
of sound judgment are desired.
(47)
NOTE.-Suggesled feature story for use during campaign
on women's page. Use blank, page 103, to order mat
-(TFR HERE)
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expectations or be suited to a particular family's needs. However,
other studies and Congressional hearings between the 1940's and the
1960's pointed to problems which the FHA and, later, the Veterans
Administration (VA) programs were causing for home buyers.
The following discussion is not intended as an exhaustive evalua-
tion of FHA's early failures. Rather, it is intended to underscore the
fact that FHA has had its share of difficulties; that many of its problems
have been of a recurring nature; and that at least some of the problems
can be attributed to the strong pro-industry goals which were embodied in
the 1934 legislation and which have set the tone for the implementation
of the FHA programs.
a) Title I problems:
In 1955, the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency issued a
report which disclosed abuses in the FHA programs. The hearings con-
firmed Marvin Farrington's and John Dean's fears that many families would
be duped into undertaking home repairs because of the publicity campaign
and without understanding their obligations. But, in addition, the
1955 hearings exposed what was to be a recurrent theme in the FHA/VA
programs: Uncontrolled exploitation by private businessmen. Homer Cape-
hart, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, stated
the problem:
The act (Title I) permits a homeowner to make repairs without making
any downpayment to the contractor and permits the contractor to dis-
count the homeowner's note at a bank with an FHA guaranty. Over the
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years "suede-shoe salesmen" and "dynamiters" whose ranks have
included racketeers and garters have infiltrated this business.
They have used fraudulent and deceptive sales practices on thou-
sands of homeowners.
In the belief that home repairs of substantial value would cost
them little or nothing, many homeowners have signed contracts
which they did not read or understand. After obtaining work
which was either unsatisfactory or worthless, these homeowners
found that a bank held their note for a substantial sum of money
and that under the law they had no defense to the payment of
the note, in spite of the frauds practiced upon them. The testi-
mony shows that many lending institutions were, at a minimum,
careless in accepting notes from questionable dealers and there-
by encouraged these fraudulent practices. Most home repair con-
tractors are both honest and reliable. But the laxity in the
administration of the Title I program enabled dishonest people
to make illicit profits from owners of small homes who perhaps
could least afford the losses.8
The accurateness with which Capehart's statement predicted the
problems that were to plague the FHA home programs of the 1960's and
1970's is both incredible and alarming: poor HUD-FHA administration;
the tendency of even ethical private actors to renege on basic respon-
sibilities in a risk-free situation; and the opportunity for a fringe
of totally irreputable characters to exploit the FHA programs.
b. Title II Problems:
In 1952, the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on
Banking and Currency convened hearings:
8Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, U.S.
Senate, 84th. Cong. 1st. Sess., 1955, p.5.
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... in order to determine to what extent the insurance or guaranty
of...loans (by any department or agency of the United States) has
been granted in the case of housing which is defective with respect
to construction, drainage, sanitary conditions, and other features,
and to what extent the practices and procedures followed by any
such agency or department, and any acts of omission or commission
of officers or employees thereof, have facilitated or made p ssible
the insuring or guaranteeing of loans for defective housing.
In almost a thousand pages of hearings, investigating 9 cities,
the Subcommittee heard testimony charging FHA and VA with faulty
inspection procedures. This led, witnesses claimed, to situations in
which large numbers of people bought FHA insured and VA guaranteed
homes that had significant defects.
One of the worst aspects of this problem, according to observers,
was the sense of deception experienced by many people who believed that
their homes were guaranteed by the insuring agency and, therefore, were
approved by the government. Rep. Reva Bosane of Utah described a defec-
tive FHA single family housing project in her home state.
When the homeowners looked around for someone to hold responsible
for failure of the heating units, there was no one to help them.
FHA had no authority to finance any such adjustments. It could
not put pressure on the building corporation because that corpora-
tion no longer existed. The homeowners could not appeal to the
corporation for the same reason.. .The project clearly shows that
actually the home buyers have no legal protection. If FHA falls
down on its part of the job, or if the builders go bankrupt,
then the purchaser is the goat. 10
9Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing, House Committee on
Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, 82nd. Cong. 2nd. Sess.
1952, p. 1.
10Ibid. p. 80.
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Further making clear FHA's responsibility (or lack thereof) to
mortgagors, Isidore Dollinger, a New York Congressman, stated that:
The government did not guarantee.. .that the home would be in good
condition... there has been a misconception of the idea.. .The
government never approved the building. All it says is that the
loans are guaranteed to the builder or to the bank.11
In response to this confusion, FHA personnel made attempts to
clarify the meaning of FHA insurance. For example, the New Jersey
District Director of FHA, Mr. Whitsell, testified that he had:
Requested discontinuance of a sign in front of a builder's
operation, where it says, FHA approved. Because the FHA does 12
not approve. It passes on the eligibility for insurance only.
Yet, such instructions were slow to become enforced, as George
Armour, a New Jersey FHA homeowner pointed out:
I think it was Mr. Whitsell who mentioned that the "FHA approved"
stamps on homes were taken off these advertisements. Well, in
1949 and until September of 1950, those signs were still out there.
You can go up and try to buy a home in these developments and ask
"Are these FHA approved?" They will say, "We can get you any one
you want."
Rep. Albert Cole: Probably we can leave that out and then the
government can guarantee that it is properly built, or we should
require them to put big signs upon each house that "you buy at
your own risk. Pay no attention to anything that anybody said
to you about specification."
Mr. Armour: I would not be here today if that was the case.
If we can't trust the Government, what are we going to do? 13
This problem -- the assumption among mortgagors than an FHA inspection
means that FHA also guarantees the quality of the house -- has, unfortunately,
11Ibid. p. 163.
12Ibid. p. 125.
13Ibid. p. 157.
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been a recurrent one.
For example, twenty years later, a Government Audit team reported
that the mortgagor has no way of learning "the extent of responsibility,
if any, which HUD assumes in connection with the condition of a house
involved in an insured mortgage transaction. "14 Without any additional
information, mortgagors assume, not illogically, that if the government
has inspected the house, that it must therefore by adequate, at the very
least.
Many mortgagors told us that a seller, broker or salesman had
represented the house to be free of significant defects, as
evidenced by a completed or to-be-made inspection and appraisal
by HUD; however, many mortgagors informed us and our inspections
confirmed the existence of defects that should have been cor-
rected before the sale was closed. Even when no such overt
or implied representations are made, the unsophisticated mort-
gagor could mistakenly assume that he can rely on HUD to insure
detection and correction of defects. If data were furnished
to prospective home buyers to explain the function of the HUD
appraisal and the risks inherent in the purchase of a house,
many unfortunate misunderstandings usually at the expense of
the buyer might be avoided.15
But it is not only the unsophisticated mortgagor who has been
confused by the meaning of the FHA inspection. In more recent Congressional
hearings, it has been pointed out that there is also confusion among the
general public about the meaning of an FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loan.
The following exchange took place in 1972 between the President of a New
York bank, John Payne, and Senator Philip Hart of Michigan:
14HUD Office of Audit, "Audit Review of Section 235 Single FamilyHousing," 05-2-2001-4900, December 10, 1971 p. 55. (Referred to as "235 Audit")
15Ibid.
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Mr. Payne: As the Secretary points out, it would be interesting
to make a survey among the higher salaried, better educated, better
informed section of the population and ask them what they feel that
this mortgage guarantee or the FHA, or sign of the eagle means to
them. And I'm afraid you get probably the same feeling expressed
among them as you do among the lower disadvantaged group. They
would say, "Well, that must be a Government program."
Senator Hart: I'm sure that would be the case.
Mr. Payne: If I didn't know better, I might assume the same thing.
Senator Hart: Certainly.16
c. Veterans Administration:
While this thesis does not concern itself with the VA homeownership
programs, a brief overview of early problems in the VA is presented here
for two reasons: First, the early VA experience underscores the recur-
ring and similar nature of many of the problems encountered by the FHA and,
second, the early abuses of the VA programs received a great deal of atten-
tion during the 1950's.
John Keats, a 1950's critic of the post-World War II VA programs
reported that:
In the nine months between July 1, 1947 and March, 1948, the
Housing Expediters' Office in Washington received 31,233 veterans'
complaints against builders. The plain fact was, the chisel
was the tool most often used to construct the postwar develop-
ment houses...17
In response to these complaints, in 1952 a House Select Committee,
under Representative Olin Teague of Texas was convened to investigate
16New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 218.
17John Keats, The Crack in the Picture Window (Boston: Houghton-
Mifflin Co., 1957) p. 24.
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abuses in the VA home guarantee programs. Keats has summarized some of
the findings of that committee, based upon testimony from 26 cities:
The committee found everywhere indications of the skillfully
wielded chisel. Veteran purchasers complained of no insulation,
of missing streets, sidewalks and driveways -- sometimes of
missing rooms. Linoleum had been substituted for tile in
bathrooms, refrigerators were missing, as wereindow and door
screens, waterproofing and weatherstripping...
Echoing the charges of more recent Congressional committees,1 the Teague
commi ttee:
found evidence of "widespread criminal conspiracy" on the point of
Veterans Administration loan guaranty officials, fee appraisers and
inspectors, officials of lending institutions and builders. 20
As a result, indictments were turned in by juries in at least nine cities.
But, beyond the uncontrolled abuses of the program, the VA mortgage
itself had the potential for creating enormous problems for mortgagors.
While the veteran was allowed to sell his home to another mortgagor --
and the new mortgagor could assume the old mortgage -- the veteran was
seldom told that if the new mortgagor defaulted, he was still liable
for payments!
The Teague committee's report on the Washington area summed up the
orientation of the VA program. The VA conceived the loan guaranty program:
to be a builder's program, rather than a veterans program, and
operated on the assumption that the builder must be pacified
at all costs, without regard to the effect...on the homeowner
veteran.21
18Ibid. p. 25.
19See, for example, New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. and Hearings
Before the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Home Financing Practices and Procedures of the
Committee on Banking and Currency. "Financing of Inner City Housing" House of
Rep., 91st. Cong. 1st. Sess., Part 1, June, 1969.
20Keats, op. cit. p. 27.
21Ibid. p. 27.
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But, why, Keats asked, does the veteran still choose to buy? Answering
his own question:
The answer is twofold. First, few veterans had any business
experience, and practically none had experience in real estate
ventures. Second... [the veterans].. .were in desperate need for
living space...[Since] no other quarters were available on the
marke [they] would have signed any contract put in front of
them.
Thus, the travails of the unsophisticated home buyer in a savvy housing
market, as discussed in the Introduction, is a problem that surfaced
at least twenty-five years ago.
d. Exclusionary Practices: 1934 --_Mjd-1960's:
In addition to causing problems for some participants in the FHA/VA
programs, Federal housing policy, until the mid-1960's, was overtly dis-
criminatory and exlusionary. Thus, similar to the FHLBS, another way
in which the early FHA programs were ncn-consumer-oriented was in excluding
minority and lower income families and certain inner city areas from FHA
eligibility.
Exclusion of Non-White Families and Urban Properties:23
The most crucial aspect of the lending decision has always been
22Ibid. p. 33.
23This section is an expansion of a discussion contained in a manuscript
which this writer co-authored with Kerry D. Vandell and Barbara Silbert Hodas,
"Financial Institutions and Neighborhood Decline: A Review of the Literature"
op. cit. Pages 45-48 of that report, on which the present discussion is based
were~'owever, written by this writer.
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the appraisal of the real estate which secures the mortgage. In fact,
it has only been since 1934 that emphasis also began to be placed on the
credit worthiness of the borrower himself.24 The appraisal process
usually consists of two parts -- an assessment of the property and
an evaluation of the neighborhood. Historically, "hard-nosed" business
practice was the operating philosophy.
Following the traditional pattern of mortgage lending, the FHA
paid considerable attention to the quality of the neighborhood in which
the property to be insured was located. Through an eight-point Location
Rating Scale, the notion that good location must include certain social,
racial, and economic characteristics became a written law of mortgage
lending practice. Section 929 of the FHA Underwriting Manual of 1938
stipulated that the "varying social characteristics of neighborhood
occupants must be carefully considered and incorporated into the rating."25
And, Section 937 articulated the importance of racial and social
homogeneity:
Areas surrounding a location are investigated to determine whether
incompatible racial and social groups are present, for the purpose
of making a prediction regarding the probability of the location
being invaded by such groups. If a neighborhood is to retain stability,
it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the
same social and racial classes. A change in social and racial occu-
pancy generally contributes to instability and a decline in values. 26
24Willis R. Bryant, op. cit. p. 181.
25
"Underwriting and Valuation Procedures Under Title II of theNational Housing Act." op. cit.
26 Ibid.
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In addition to espousing racial homogeneity -- which, for the most
part, meant no insurance for minority families -- the FHA manual even
defined the practice that has since been termed "red-lining." Section 911
stated that:
Having determined the Economic Background Rating for the area the
first step in making Established Ratings of Locations is to deter-
mine ineligible or caution areas. The central downtown area can
usually be outlined and considered as ineligible. However, such
downtown reject areas must be outlined with the greatest care in
order to avoid unfair decisions in connection with application for
mortgage insurance covering properties which lie within such
borders. Central reject areas include slum and blighted areas as
well as the central business and commercial sections of the city. 27
Charles Abrams has pointed out the continuing role that these early
FHA policies have played in discriminating against minority families and
in shaping two housing markets -- one for whites and one for blacks.
A government offering such bounty to builders and lenders could
have required compliance with a nondiscrimination policy. Or
the agency could at least have pursued a course of evasion, or
hidden behind the screen of local autonomy. Instead, the FHA
adopted a racial policy that could well have been culled from
the Nuremberg laws. From its inception FHA set itself up as
the protector of the all-white neighborhood. It sent its agents
into the field to keep Negroes and other minorities from buying
homes in white neighborhoods. It exerted pressure against
builders who dared to build for minorities, and against lenders
willing to lend on mortgages.8
Thus, with the FHA taking a firm discriminatory stance, the unavailability
of mortgages for minorities in certain areas became a well-entrenched
tenet of mortgage lending practice.
27Ibid.
28Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1955). p. 229.
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By 1949, FHA had dropped all references to "inharmonious racial
groups" or "areas threatened by minority infiltrations." However, Abrams
has written that:
The damage had been done. It was more serious than most realize.
It was the first time in our national history that a federal agency
had openly exhorted segregation.. .The evil that FHA did was of a
peculiarly enduring character. Thousands of racially segregated
neighborhoods were built, millions of people re-assorted on the
basis of race, color, or class, the differences built in, in
neighborhoods from coast to coast.29
The FHA continued to be an extremely conservative force in mortgage
lending until the mid 1960's. The Section 203 program, (of the 1934
Housing Act) the standard home mortgage insurance program of the FHA,
provided that "no mortgage shall be accepted for insurance.. .unless the
Secretary finds that the project with respect to which the mortgage is
executed, is economically sound." 30 According to the Committee on
Government Operations this policy enabled the FHA "to avoid the risks
of mortgages on properties in declining inner-city neighborhoods, or
of mortgagors whose income was considered too low to assure loan repay-
ments without excessive risk." 31
The first relaxation in FHA's "economic soundness" criterion occurred
in 1954 with the passage of the 221(d)(2) program. Section 221, which was
aimed at providing housing for low- and moderate-income families and
displaced families (i.e., by Urban Renewal and other public actions),
introduced the notior, that properties must meet the less stringent require-
29Ibid. p. 234.
p_ Qutegin Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations,
Ibid.
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ment of "acceptable risk." 32
Yet, in 1965-1966, only 37.9% of FHA's insurance activity was in
the central cities and 62.1% was outside of them.33 Thus, even slower
to disappear from FHA policy than the racial restrictions, were the
FHA's anti-urban prejudices. It was not until 1966 that FHA began
to insure properties in older, urban areas. In the text of the
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, a more
explicit exemption from the "economic soundness" criterion of Section 203-
was articulated by Congress:
The Secretary is authorized to insure.. .any mortgage.. .if he
determines that 1) the dwelling covered by the mortgage is situated
in an area in which rioting or other civil disorders have occurred
or are threatened, 2) as a result of such actual or threatened
rioting or other disorders the property... cannot meet the normal
requirements with respect to economic soundness, and 3) such
property is an acceptable risk giving due consideration to the
need for providing adequate housing for families of low and
moderate income in such area. 34
But, in spite of this new mandate, the response of the FHA was
sluggish. ln 1968, the Report of the National Commission on Urban
Problems clearly described the prevailing nature of the FHA home insurance
program and its impact on neighborhood decline:
32Ibid. p. 52 For a description of the evolution of the concept of
risk, in the FHA home insurance programs, see Apendix 3-1.
33Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, "Review of Federal Housing Administration - (Part 2 - Update of FHA
Mortgage Insurance Funds Deficits) House of Representatives, 93rd. Cong.,
2nd Sess., March, 1974. p. 159-160.
34Ibid. p. 52.
35See for example Chapter 4, Section 4 testimony of Senator Edward
Brooke and George Sternlieb during 1968 Senate hearings.
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The experience of members of the Commission and others convinced
us that up until the Summer of 1967, FHA almost never insured mort-
gages on homes in slum districts, and did so very seldom in the
"gray areas" which surrounded them. Even middle-class residential
districts in central cities were suspect, since there was always
the prospect that they, too, might turn as Negroes and poor whites
continued to pour into the cities, and as middle and upper-middle
income whites continued to move out.
The result was a general, even if unwritten agreement between
lending institutions and FHA that most of the areas inside the
central cities did not have a favorable economic future, and
that their property values were likely to decline.
...Redlining by insurers weakened still further the ability of
the slums to obtain loan capital with which to improve existing
housing or to construct new units.
There was evidence of a tacit agreement among all groups -- lending.
institutions, fire insurance companies, and FHA -- to block off
certain areas of cities within "red lines," and not to loan or in-
sure within them. The net result, of course, was that the slums
and the areas surrounding them went downhill farther and faster
than before. 36
When, in the late 1960's and early 1970's, FHA finally began to
insure mortgages for lower income families (Section 235), families with
poor credit histories (Section 237) and families in older, declining
urban areas (Sections 221(d)(2) and 223(e)), it did so with a strong re-
luctance, since this policy was contrary to its historical prudence and
conservati sm.
Yet, FHA did comply with the new Federal programs and Area and Insuring
offices all over the country began to write insurance on inner city proper-
ties. In sharp contrast to the insurance patterns of 1965-1966, in 1973
33.7% of FHA insurance activity was outside the central cities and 66.3%
was inside of them. 37
36Douglas Commission, Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems
to the Congress and to the President of the United States, Building the American
City, 1968, p. 100.
37
"Review of FHA - (Part 2...)" op. cit. p. 160.
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Exclusion of Lower Income Families:
In view of the preceding discussion, it will come as no surprise
that the FHA excluded lower income families from participation in its
programs and, instead, dealt aimost exlusively with middle income home
buyers.
Until the 1960's there appears to have been little difference
between the types of people who participated in the FHA and conventional
home finance systems. While enabling families to become owners with
minimal downpayments and on lenient terms, FHA still had strict guide-
lines which dictated the income levels that would be needed to support
ownership. And, as noted above, FHA had a conservative and "economically
sound" orientation.
Interestingly enough, data collected during the 1950's indicated that
families who purchased homes with FHA insurance had even higher incomes
than those who bought their homes with conventional financing.
In 1950, almost 40 percent of FHA mortgagors had incomes above
$5,000 while only 30 percent of the conventional mortgagors had incomes
exceedingthis amount. Similarly, in 1956 while over 70 percent of the
FHA mortgagors had incomes above $5,000, only about 60 percent of the
conventional mortgagors had incomes exceeding this amount. (See Tables
1 and 2)
Conversely, at the lower income levels, the data reveal that a
greater percentage of conventional mortgagors had lower incomes than
FHA mortgagors. In 1950, over 44 percent of the conventional mortgagors
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TABLE 1
Comparison of Incomes of Borrowers Using FHA-Insured
and Conventional Financing -- 1950
Income FHA Conventional
Under $2,000
2,000-3,499
3,500-4,999
5,000-7,999
8,000-9,999
10,000 and over
Median Income:
4.5%
21.2
34.5
31.1
4.2
4.5
100.0%
$4,400
13.9%
30.7
25.8
20.7
3.7
5.2
100.0%
$3,700
Source: Residential Finance, p. 171 [From 1950 Census of Housing Vol. IV
Residential Financing Part I. Chapter 3. Table 14-14c]
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TABLE 2
Comparison of Incomes of Borrowers Using FHA-Insured
and Conventional Financing -- 1956
Income FHA Conventional
Under $2,000 2.2% 5.1%
2,000-2,999 2.0 5.7
3,000-3,999 7.2 12.9
4,000-4,999 17.4 15.6
5,000-7,999 48.1 36.1
8,000-9,999 12.1 10.4
10,000 and over 11.0 14.2
100.0% 100.0%
Approximate Median Income: $6,100 $5,400
Source: Federal Credit Agencies Break, p. 39. (Computed from 1956
National Housing Inventory Vol. II. Financing of Owner-
Occupied Residential Properties, p. 22)
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had incomes below $3,500 while only about 26 percent of the FHA mort-
gagors had incomes below this amount. Similarily, in 1956 almost 11
percent of the conventional mortgagors had incomes below $3,000 while
only 4 percent of the FHA mortgagors had incomes below this amount.
(See Tables 1 and 2)
But, despite the overall picture of higher incomes among FHA than
conventional buyers, the latter also tended to slightly outweigh the FHA
buyers at the highest income levels. For example, in 1950 while 5.2 per-
cent of the conventional mortgagors had incomes above $10,000, only 4.5
percent of the FHA mortgagors had incomes exceeding this amount. And,
in 1956, while 14.2 percent of the conventional mortgagors had incomes
above $10,000, only 11.0 percent of the FHA mortgagors had incomes
exceeding this amount. (See Tables 1 and 2)
Basing their comments on an independent survey38 conducted between
late 1950 and early 1951, which confirmed the findings of the 1950
and 1956 censuses, Saulnier, Halcrow, and Jacoby noted that:
... Federal programs.. .are employed with the greatest relative
frequency by a middle class of home buyers. Individuals both
in the lowest and in the highest income brackets, those buying
the least, and those buying the most, expensive homes,...are
more frequently found borrowing on a conventional basis than
are those in the in-between groups, where the deendence on
FHA-insured or VA-guaranteed loans is greatest.
Similarly, Ratcliff, Rathbun, and Honnold, summarized the 1950
data with this strono statement:
38Survey conducted by National Analysts, Inc. for the Board of Governers
of the Federal Reserve System.
39R.J. Saulnier, Harold G. Halcrow and Neil H. Jacoby, Federal Lending
and Loan Insurance (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Press, 1958) p. 306-307.
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Although typically granted on relatively illiberal terms,
conventional loans are widely used by all classes of borrowers
and are of particular importance in meting the needs of bor-
rowers of above-average credit risk. 8  Conventional loans are
of major importance in the case of low-income borrowers, low-
cost properties, loans on older properties, and borrowers of
above-average age.41
Thus, not only did the FHA programs create some problems for
program participants, as discussed in Sections 4a-c, but they also
excluded large numbers of potential consumers -- among them, those
in greatest need of improved housing -- lower income and minority
families and families wishing to purchase homes in inner city areas.
40It is interesting to note that at least some early observers of
the FHA programs predicted that the FHA borrower would be the higher risk.
Dean quotes H.E. Hoagland as having observed the following, sometime be-
fore 1938. "It is no secret that many such (mortgage) institutions insure
only their weakest loans -- those that they would not make except for
the insurance protection." Dean, op. cit. p. 50.
41Richard U. Ratcliff, Daniel B. Rathbun and Junia Honnold,
Residential Finance (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1957) p. 175.
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5. SUMMING UP THE FHA: PINPOINTING REASONS FOR ITS OVERALL SUCCESS:
Based upon the above, it is evident that through exclusion, lack
of good management practices, and inadequate consumer safeguards and
education -- even the "old" FHA caused mishaps for consumers. But in
spite of this non-consumer orientation -- with the scale always tipped
against the consumer and in the direction of the real estate/constuc-
tion/mortgage interests -- the great majority of participants in the
FHA programs seemed to fare adequately, if not admirably. FHA is
generally considered to have been extremely successful between 1934
and 1969. Old-time FHA personnel point to FHA's early record with
pride. Horace Bazan, an FHA official for 31 years, recently wrote:
FHA's achievements, during 35 years of public service without
cost to the taxpayer, were enormous. Its influence was far-
reaching. Every American family who had bought a home with
20 percent or less downpayment and financed the balance with
a long-term, level payment mortgage was, directly or indirectly,
the beneficiary of FHA. Homeownership during those 35 years
had increased from about 45 percent to about 65 percent of
American families.
FHA's financial record was enviable. It had reserves of $1.5
billion, accumulated from net earnings after payment of expenses
and losses. It had repaid, with interest, the capital that the
Treasury had advanced to get it started, a total of about $86
million. It had paid about $200 million to home purchasers as
partial return of premiums under the mutuality feature of its
legislation.l
Thus, -prior to 1968 FHA's lack of a consumer orientation did not
appear to substantially diminish its record of overall success. FHA
Horace B. Bazan, "The Fragmentation of FHA" Preparedfor the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America, Washington, D.C. June, 1974. p. 5.
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operated with an unbeatable and virtually fool-proof formula -- "Don't
take any risks -- either real or perceived." In this type of rarified
and totally safe lending environment, the need for strong consumer safe-
guards and cushions was minimal. FHA could maintain its pro-industry
orientation and still manage to assist vast numbers of homebuyers.
Yet, there were still problems along the way, as discussed in
Section 4 of this chapter. Furthermorewhile the FHA encouraged the
participation of lenders by insuring them against losses due to fore-
closure, FHA's strict underwriting policies were very much in line
with traditional concepts of mortgage lending. Whether or not a loan
was to be insured, strict interpretations of risk seemed to be operating.
Standard market forces determined who would-participate in the govern-
ment's homeownership programs, in spite of the FHA insurance.
But, as alluded to several times in the preceding discussion, after
1968, Federal homeownership policy opened the way for a totally new
consumer to enter the home purchase process. Families with lower incomes,
many of whom bought older, inner city homes, were, for the first time,
able to purchase homes with FHA insurance.
Unfortunately, the post-1968 HUD-FHA home finance system was neither
prepared for these new consumers nor, did HUD accept the responsibilities
inherent in its risk-taking position. Furthermore, Congress either lacked
the foresight or was unable to build into the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968 the safeguards that would have been necessary to fully
protect the interests of the consumer.
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CHAPTER 4: FORCES BEHIND THE HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1968
1. INTRODUCTION:
The Congressional hearings of 1967 and 1968, on proposed housing
legislation, focused more directly on expanding homeownership opportuni-
ties for consumers, and particularly those consumers with low-moderate
incomes, than ever before. Yet, similar to the circumstances surrounding
the enactment of the post-Depression recovery measures, a variety of
objectives also helped to shape the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968. While these goals were, indeed, critical they have been responsible
for some of the difficulties which arose in the post-1968 HUD-FHA home
finance system and which ha.e had adverse impacts on some consumers.
The following objectives played an important role in molding the
shape of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.1
*Desire to stimulate the construction industry and to achieve
high levels of production. (Political/Private Interest Groups;
and Political/Administration)
*Desire of the Johnson Administration to be the author of any
new homeownership program. (Political/Administration)
At least two additional goals surrounded the passage of this legislation:
One goal vas te desire to reduce moitjage credit shortajes in "credit crunch" periods and
to even out the cyclical flow of funds. (Political/Private Interest Groups;
Economic). However, this goal had its most direct implication on changes in
secondary market institutions, rather than on the shape of the homeownership
legislation. For this reason, a discussion of this objective, as well as
its implications for the consumer will be postponed until Chapter 7.
A second goal that will not be addressed here was the desire of the Johnson
administration to minimize the deficit in the Federal budget. This was
one of the motives behind making the Federal National Mortgage Association
a private agency and the changeover from the 221(d)(3) to the 236 program.
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*Desire of HUD-FHA to maintain its power. (Political/Public
Interest Group)
These various interests were the key forces behind the final shape
of the homeownership package embodied in the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968. This package included a homeownership subsidy for lower
income families (Section 235); mortgage insurance for inner city areas
(Section 223(e)); and mortgage insurance for families with poor credit
histories (Section 237). Each of these objectives will be assessed below.
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2. DESIRE TO STIMULATE THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY AND TO ACHIEVE HIGH
PRODUCTION LEVELS:
A critical goal of the 1968 legislation was the production of new
housing units -- "26 million new or substantially rehabilitated units
over the next decade." The Kaiser and Douglas Commissions assigned a
number to the nation's housing need, Presioent Johnson echoed this in
his message on the cities and Congress created the programs and appro-
priated the funds to make the goal a reality.
Interest in production of new units was not, however, unanimous
-among spokesmen from the various housing-related industries. Those who
had a stake in existing housing spoke against the new production pro-
gram. For example, Fred Tucker, Chairman of the Realtor's Washington
Committee, National Association of Real Estate Boards,voiced his objection
to the minor role that existing units were to play in the proposed home-
ownership program:
We are at a loss to understand why existing housing units cannot
be utilized more widely...The administration apparently views the
primary purpose of this program to increase the supply of low-cost
housing. While we recognize that this objective should occupy a
lofty position on the list of national priorities, we believe this
should be incidental rather than a planned benefit of the new pro-
gram. We feel that the present limitations in the bill preventing
more widespread use of existing dwellings would, unfortunately,
delay accomplishment of the program's over-riding objective--to
provide decent housing for ownership by low-income families.
For this reason, we urye the subcommittee...to permit the use
of existing dwellings.
1Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Committee on Banking and Currency, "Housing and Urban Development Legisla-
tion of 1968", U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, March, 1968, p. 453
(Referred to as "HUD Senate Hearings, 1968".)
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Not surprisingly, both the home builders and labor were strongly
in favor of the production goals. Lloyd Clarke, President of the U.S.
National Association of Home Builders made clear his organization's
interest in the passage of the bill.
Our association has taken the lead in calling for the establish-
ment of such national housing goals (i.e., goals in numbers)...
Central to this whole concept is what now has become a generally
accepted thesis -- that the only way to meet housing needs is
to build housing in a volume far greater than at present...Give
us the tools...and we (i.e., the homebuilders) can do the job.2
Thus, while the constuction industry was, by no means, in the
desperate state that it had been in during the 1930's, the anticipation
of 26 million new units of housing was clearly of considerable interest
to the home builders. Putting the 26 million figure in perspective,
between 1946 and 1968 a total of 22 million housing units were built.
Thus, 2.6 million units per year represented over a doubling of the pro-
duction levels of the previous twenty years.3
Similarly, while the unemployment rate was the lowest that it had
been during the decade,4 labor welcomed the possibility of new jobs opening
up. Andrew Biemiller, Director, Department-of Legislation, AFL-CIO,
stated that the 1967 "AFL-CIO convention reaffirmed organized labor's
support for a massive program of federally assisted housing," and urged
2Ibid. p. 289.
3Ibid. p. 290.
4Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1972, p. 221.
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that "2 1/2 million new housing units be built yearly..." 5 And, Walter
Reuther, President Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO, explained
exactly how this would benefit construction workers:
What this nation ought to really do is that we ought to get
around to the kind of massive, long-range housing problems
and the total task of rebuilding America so that we could
say to every construction worker: "We need all the skill
that you can bring there. We need all the manpower.. .we
will work out a guaranteed annual waqe so that you are
guaranteed that you are going to be. fully employed." And then
take this job on. 6
Clearly, the production goals of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968 were well supported by the new-housing interest groups.
5HUD Senate Hearings, 1968, op. cit. p. 168.
6Ibid. p. 378.
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3. DESIRE OF THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION TO BE THE AUTHOR OF ANY NEW
HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAM:
Confronted with the increasingly unpopular Vietnam war, the Johnson
Administration was sorely in need of good publicity which might follow
the passage of an appealing piece of legislation, such as a homeowner-
ship program. The intensity of this desire became evident during the
battles waged over the Housing and Urban Development Act's forerunner,
Senator Percy's bill, S.1592.
Criticism for FHA's non-low income, minority, and inner-city orientation
became widespread in the mid- and late 1960's. For example, scoring FHA's
exclusionary practices, (discussed in Chapter 3, Section 4d), the Douglas
Commission pointed out that:
The main weakness of FHA from a social point of view has not been
in what it has done, but in what it has failed to do -- in its
relative neglect of the inner cities and of the poor, and expecially
Negro poor. Believing firmly that the poor were bad credit risks
and that the presence of Negroes tended to lower real estate values,
FHA has generally regarded loans to such groups as "economically
unsound." Until recently, therefore, FHA benefits have been
confined almost exclusively to the middle class, and primarily only
to the middle section of the middle class. The poor and those on
the fringes of property have been almost completely excluded.
Acknowledging the difficulty that FHA would probably have in adapting
itself to social goals, Republican Senator Charles Percy proposed the idea
of creating a National Home Ownership Foundation (NHOF) as the vehicle
Christa Carnegie, "Homeownership for the Poor: Running the Washington
Gauntlet." AIP Journal, May, 1970.
2Douglas Commission, op. cit. p. 100.
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for expanding homeownership opportunities for low and moderate income
families. S. 1592 of 1967, would have enlisted private enterprise to
provide a wide range of technical assistance to lower income home buyers. 3
But, unable to acquire bi-partisan support,amid HUD Secretary Robert
Weaver's charges that Percy's program was "a snare and a delusion and
a cruel hoax",4 S. 1592 died.
The debates over the provision of counseling services underscore
the political nature of the Administration's opposition to Senator Percy's
1967 homeownership plan.
Counseling was an important component of the NHOF. The Technical
Assistance Service, a part of the Foundation would have been authorized:
to assist eligible bworrowers (i.e., local nonprofit housing associa-
tion, cooperative, or limited dividend corporation) to obtain through
both public and private channels, the access to supporting programs
in the fields of training employment and counseling, and other related
programs necessary to the success of a homeownership program.. .5
And further:
The eligible borrower must be conducting, or otherwise arranging for,
supporting programs in such fields as training, employment, credit
counseling and budget management as needed to enable lower income 6families to assume the privileges and responsibilities of homeownership.
3Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Committee on Banking and Currency, "Housing Legislation of 1967" U.S. Senate,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., July-August, 1967. p. 1426-1427 (Referred to as "Senate
Housing Hearings, 1967").
4HUD Senate Hearings, 1968 ofp. cit. p. 35.
5Senate Housing Hearings, 1967 op. cit. p. 1427 [Sec. 108(a)(6)].
6Ibid p. 1432 [Sec. 110(a)(2)].
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However, according to Secretary Weaver these provisions were inadequate:
The provisions of the bill that are addressed to counseling and
other supporting services are also inadequate. The bill would
provide for a Federal grant of up to $3 million to the NHOF to
assist it in meeting initial organizational and operating expenses
and to provide initial capital for the contemplated technical ser-
vice. Thereafter, the cost of such services would be financed through
expected contributions from private and public sources or from adding
to the mortgage debt.
It will take substantial sums of money to assist both the local
non-profit organizations that will be providing the housing and
the low-income homeowners themselves, particularly where services
for the homeowners are extended to meaningful programs of job
training, employment and the many health and welfare programs
faced by the poor. This is true even though the counseling and
other services are those of an intermediary between the home-
owners and pre-existing sources of help. The bill assumes that
somehow the funds will be found. The assumption may prove to be
correct, but the risk is too great since the success of the entire
program will depend on these services being skillfully performed
at the precise times and places they are needed. (underline added)7
During the 1968 hearings, when the Administration presented its
own homeownership program, a bitter Senator Percy challenged Secretary
Weaver's apparent change of heart on the issue of a homeownership program
for lower income familes.
Senator Percy: On June 10, 1967, less than 10 months ago, you
said: "I -think to promise large numbers of low-income people
that in the immediate future they are going to be able to achievehome ownership is a snare and delusion, ang it can be a cruel hoax."
What has caused you to change your mind?
Claiming that he hadn't changed his mind and that he still felt
his statement was true, he outlined the three things that would have to
be done to ensure that this would not happen. Weaver's second point
7Letter to John Sparkman from Secretary Weaver, July 14, 1967 on S. 1592.
Reprinted in Ibid. p. 1448-1449.
8HUD Senate Hearings, 1968 op. cit. p. 35.
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related to counseling:
... in order to provide a sound program of homeownership,...for
low- and moderate-income families you have to do more than to
simply say, "It's desirable and we are going to give you some
financial assistance in terms of an interest subsidy." You have
to have a counseling service as we have provided for here, and
it must be adequately funded..."9
Despite Percy's protestations, Weaver refused to accede that NHOF
had provided for similar, if not superior counseling services to the
Administration's recommendations.
The outcome of the counseling battle was the Section 237 program --
"Special Mortgage Insurance Assistance."
(a) The purpose of this section is to help provide adequate
housing for families of low and moderate income, including those
who, for reasons of credit history, irregular income patterns...
are unable to meet the credit requirements of thp Secretary for
the purchase of a single-family home... but who, through the in-
centive of homeownership and counseling assistance, appear to
be able to achieve homeownership.
(e) The Secretary is authorized to provide, or contract with public
or private organizations to provide, such budget, debt management,
and related counseling services to mortgagors whose mortgages are
insured under this section...
(g) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be
necessary to carry out the provisions of Subsection (e) of this
Section. 0
In view of Secretary Weaver's strong statements about counseling
services, it is particularly revealing that HUD made no request for an
appropriation for counseling in its FY 1969 budget. (See Chapter 8,
9Ibid. p. 35
10Section 237, National Housing Act; op. cit.
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Section 3) This, in conjunction with Weaver's reversal on homeownership
and his objections to the counseling services provided by NHOF clearly
expose the political overtones of the controversy. Further trying to
give the Administration credit for the new homeownership program,
Secretary Weaver touted the proposed 1968 bill as the remedy for the
gap in the current housing programs. However, provision for a new
agency to administer the new program was glaringly absent from the
proposed legislation.
HUD Senate Hearings, 1968, p. 7.
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4. DESIRE OF HUD-FHA TO MAINTAIN ITS POWER:
The Administration's omission of any suggestion of a new agency to
administer the 1968 homeownership programs can be construed as its way
of thanking Secretary Weaver for his role in killing Senator Percy's
S. 1592. During the 1968 Senate hearings, with the full weight of the
Administration behind him, Secretary Weaver stood firmly to the position
that homeownership for lower income families was "in", but that a new
agency to administer the new program was "out". When questioned by
Senator Percy about the absence of the NHOF in the Administration's
package, Weaver claimed that he "found great difficulty... in discovering
-what the Foundation... (was) to do and what its functions... (were) to be."
Further he said:
I have read the legislation. I have read the report of the
Committee, and I have still not been able to find out the
role that it plays or its basic rationale, an for that reason,
I have not included it in the recommendation.'
However, Christa Carnegie has suggested another, more plausible,
reason why the NHOF was omitted from Secretary Weaver's recommendation:
... some of the principles of S. 1592 were a threat to HUD as an
organization because the program was designed to circumvent HUD.
Although the HUD Secretary would be on the board of the NHOF, he
would have no firm control...By competing with HUD and being
semi-private, NHOF was seen as a threat to HUD's purported raison
d'etre -- efficient and coordinated exercise of federal influence
to aid the rational development of urban areas. 2
Thus, HUD, which was still in its early years of establishing itself as
a cabinet level department, was strongly opposed to competition.
Ibid. p. 53.
2Carnegie, oR. cit.
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However, many Senators and Representatives disagreed with Secretary
Weaver and readily saw the need for a new agency with a clear-cut social
mandate. Trying to revive Percy's original NHOF of 1967, Senator
Edward Brooke proposed the creation of a separate division in HUD to
administer the "socially oriented low- and moderate income housing
programs which would otherwise be administered by FHA." 3 The need for
a "Moderate Housing Division" was based on Brooke's perceptions of FHA's
inability to change its operations. Senator Brooke stated that the
Administration's proposals:
... authorize FHA to take the risk of going into the ghetto. But
I would point out to the committee that the Commissioner of FHA
has himself been unable to persuade his people that FHA must
enter the ghetto area.
A 1965 directive to the regional offices (FHA) noted a "hesitancy
on the part of insuring offices to make FHA programs available
in older neighborhoods"; a July 1967 directive made the same
point in identical language, while at the Directors Conference in
October the Commissioner again repeated: "We have got to recognize
that stimulating a flow of mortgage funds to the inner city... is
an FHA mission of the highest priority."
It is not an easy matter to change longstanding policies. It is
still more difficult to ask that the old policy be applied in
some cases and the new one in others. It is especially hard when
administrators accustomed to the old ways are obliged to depart
from their familiar practices.
Surely the prospects that this system will succeed are slim. The
different nature of low and moderate income housing programs demands
that they be administered separately. The urgency of the Nation's
need for this housing demands that the programs be given priority.
I believe this can be achieved most aensibly and effectively
through a Moderate Housing Division.
3HUD Senate Hearings, 1968, op. cit. p. 126.
4 Ibid. p. 128-129.
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And further:
The Government is really going into a new business when it
goes into low and moderate income housing.. .philosophically
FHA has just not been attuned to such a program. They have
done excellent work in the job that they were created to do,
but now government moves into social purpose legislation...
into the ghettos, into the social areas.
The criteria are different. The procedures are different.
And even though Commissioner Brownstein has attempted, and
I think unquestionably in good faith, to move low- and
moderate-income housing, the personnel that he has just are
not attuned to doing it...If we are really going to have a
low- and moderate-income housing bill, we need new personnel
who are attuned to doing exactly this job. 5
Many others, including scores of businessmen, politicians, newsmen
and academics could also see the need for a new organization with the
special mandate to tend to the needs of lower income home buyers.6
Pinpointing why he felt that FHA could not do the job, George Stern-
lieb noted that FHA's mandate had been narrower than the goals of
the proposed legislation.
If we attempt to add to it (the FHA), the responsibility for
facilitating the housing of the poor and lower moderate incomed,
we can only water down its capacity to deal with the groups with
which it has been very successful, while still inhibiting the
development of facilitating activity for those less fortunate.
I think that the FHA has been critized for not doing things which
it in turn simply was never given the primary responsibility and
mandate for. The mechanisms of the FHA are reasonably adequate
to deal with middle income new construction mortgage guarantees;
we can only impair its effectiveness if we continue to link this
activity with the quite different activity of providing essential
inputs into the financing of housing for the poor.'
5 Ibid. p. 131.
6 Ibid. p. 45-53.
7Ibid. p. 143.
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This view must have been based, in part, upon some of Sternlieb's
observations concerning the difficulty which FHA Commissioner Brown-
stein was having in trying to persuade FHA personnel to redirect some
of their efforts to inner city housing. Echoing Brooke's comments,
Sternlieb noted that:
I have had the privilege of reading some of Commissioner
Brownstein's -- I was going to say "er.cyclicals" to his parish
heads, if you will. They are as strong, as from the heart, as
the strongest housing person could ask for. They are as earnest
and as solid. They are wonderful documents.
The mere redundancy of them indicates on the other hand that,
somehow or other, we are hitting mattresses in there.
If I saw one of them I wouldn't think so. And if I had seen
maybe two or three of them I would think he's just giving a
reminder. But those things come out, you know, like the monthly
mail. 8
Chairman John Sparkman, responding to Sternlieb's observations, added his
own:
I notice some of the personnel of FHA, when they get these
encyclicals as Dr. Sternlieb speaks of it, throw them away.
They are interested in promotions and what not. And their
records have been built on the basis of the number of cases
that they have been able to work on which have been successful.
In other words, they are always avoiding these risks, and
they don't want to take anything that looks like a risk because
they don't want to have any failures on their record. It has
become quite a thing in FHA. You just don't proceed up the
ladder if you have had several cases that exhibit failures.
...people who have been working with this in mind as a
paramount concern are not apt to take on any social-purpose
cases and certainly not apt to take on anything which is be-
low the economic risk that they had in the first instance,
and this is no matter how many encyclicals are received by them.9
8%bid. p. 142.
9Ibid. p. 142.
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In the midst of these attacks, FHA Commissioner Brownstein was
making a desperate effort to maintain the strength of FHA, already
weakened as a result of its recent repositioning within HUD. He argued
that his staff would be capable of abandoning its middle-class orientation
and administering the new socially oriented programs. In an impassioned
speech at an FHA Directors and Underwriters Conference, Brownstein told
his staff that he had faith that they could adapt to the requirements
of the new social legislation.
I suppose that it has come to your attention that there are
some who say FHA cannot do this new job. There are those who
believe FHA is too wedded to the split-level house for middle-
class residents of suburban subdivision to be interested in, or
capable of, mounting a massive effort to help private enterprise
house families of low and moderate income. It is also believed
that FHA has no interest in the inner city -- that we, like most
private lenders, redline large segments of the central city --
where the housing needs are greatest and the problems most pressing.
There are others who say that FHA has lost its drive, that it is
too cautious and too bogged down in inflexible rules, immovable
procedures and tortuous redtape to mobilize itself and private
enterprise to do the job which must be done.. .There are people
today who are urging that this job be taken away from FHA and
be given to a new organization in the Department or somewhere
else.
I do not agree with these sentiments, and I will tell you why.
First, FHA personnel have the skills to do the job that must be
done. We have the experience, and the organization. It would
take time and be difficult to create a substitute of the same
size and competence...Second,...FHA has already gone some dis-
tance in the direction of turning its programs and its talents
to the inner city and to providing housing for low- and moderate-
income families...Third, I have faith that FHA, as an organization,
can make the additional changes in attitude and action needed to
accelerate the job we have already begun. 10
10Ibid. p. 309.Reprinted from remarks of Commissioner Brownstein
at Directors Conference, October 23, 1967 on "FHA's Job Today."
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In his concluding comments, Brownstein spelled out what would happen
to the FHA and its employees if it failed to respond to the needs of
the inner city and low-moderate income families. What comes through
clearly from Brownstein's statement is his desperate desire to see
FHA survive the threat of the creation of a new organization to ad-
minister the socially oriented programs.
Just as surely as you are sitting here today, if FHA fails to
respond effectively and affirmatively to this challenge, if
FHA fails to produce the results needed, then no longer will
FHA be looked at as our Nation's housing agency and the need
and justification for its continuation may very well be the
central theme. Undoubtedly alternative organizations will be
developed because the need is too great and too critical to
leave a void.
I have given a number of reasons why I believe FHA must mount
a major effort to accelerate and expand use of our programs
which serve families of low- and moderate income and revive
and rebuild the inner city. Let me give you one more reason.
You should work at this task as though your job depended on
it, because it may.11
Thus, both HUD and FHA were vehemently opposed to the Percy-Brooke
plans to create a new agency either within or outside HUD. The main
thrust behind this opposition appears to have been the fear of losing
political clout and power.12
1 Ibid. p. 312.
12HUD-FHA's opposition to any suggestion that a new agency be created
confirms Don Schon's view that: "Because of its dynamic conservatism, a
social system is unlikely to undertake its own change of state. Because
it sees every effort at transformation as an attack, transformation be-
comes a kind of war. Major shifts in the system come about in response
to the system's failure or to the threat of failure." Don Schon, Beyond
the Stable State (New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 1971) p. 55.
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5. HIGH HOPES FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP: PANACEA FOR MINORITY AND LOWER INCOME
FAMILIES AND INNER CITY AREAS:
The previous three sections have explored key forces that helped
to shape the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968. Superimposed
on these was a strong move toward expanding homeownership opportunities
for lower income families. So, while a variety of political and economic
motives molded the specific form of the homeownership package, the fact
is that homeownership, per se, was more of a dominant theme in the late
1960's than ever before.
Ironically, it was Secretary Weaver who helped set the strong pro-
homeownership tone during the 1968 Senate hearings:
Today, homeownership is out of reach for most low and moderate
income families. Yet, it remains the goal toward which many
American families strive. To own one's own home is to have a
sense of place and purpose. Homeownership creates a pride of
possession, engenders responsibility and stability. Until now,
however, Federal help to low and moderate income families to
achieve homeownership has been very limited. Section 1l1 of
the bill would remedy this gap in our housing programs.
Yet, as strong as this move toward homeownership was, proponents
of the legislation still had hopes that other pressing social objectives
would be addressed. Building upon the precedent and conventional wisdom
that emerged from the Homestead Act and the post-Depression recovery measures,
homeownership was grasped as the means to quiet the unrest among blacks and
to help rejuvenate the cities.
'HUD Senate Hearings, 1968. op. cit. p. 7.
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Extrapolating from his findings in Newark, George Sternlieb helped
to popularize this view. In his testimony before the Senate on the pro-
posed housing legislation, for 1967, he argued that:
There is no question that the chance of riots in Newark or for
that matter any other major core area would have been substan-
tially lower with more Negro ownership. 2
And, echoing the rhetoric of earlier years -- that homeownership is
good for the social well-being of the nation -- the Kerner commision
stated that:
The ambition to own one's own home is shared by virtually all
Americans, and we believe it is in the interest of the nation
to permit all who share such a goal to realize it.3 (under-
line added)
Putting these concerns into the context of the 1968 Senate Hearings,
Senator Charles Percy stated that:
Our hearings last year were held just after the Newark riots.
And today we are holding our hearings in the aftermath of the
report issued by the Civil Disorder Commission. If we do not
begin to do what the Commission recommends, what do you think
will happen in the cities this summer?4
2Senate Housing Hearings, 1967, op. cit. p. 1607.
3Kerner Commission, Report of the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 477.
4HUD Senate Hearings, 1968, op. cit. p. 41.
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6. SUMMARY AND PREVIEW:
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 was a landmark piece
of legislation. The homeownership package which was contained in it pre-
sented homeownership opportunities to vast numbers of previously excluded
homebuyers. Indeed, there was something for almost everyone -- including
"the good, the bad and the ugly." The "good" lower income family could
purchase a home with a subsidy through the 235 program; the "bad" credit
risk family might be eligible to obtain a mortgage through the 237 program;
and the "ugly" or older sections of cities became viable sections for FHA
insurance with the 223(e) program.
Yet, as discussed in this chapter, the desire to expand homeownership
opportunities, per se, was only one aspect of the 1968 Act. Similar to
the Homestead Act and the post-Depression recovery measures, the late
1960's concept of homeownership for the poor, gained popularity not only
for its welfare orientation but for its ability to address various political,
social and economic objectives. But this most recent homeownership movement
was also unique in that it was more directly concerned with consumers than
either of the two earlier periods. While a coalition of forces certainly
contributed to the final shape of the 1968 legislation, the lower income
family and the inner city neighborhood were viewed as the direct beneficiaries
of the legislation. In light of this, the problems that arose in the imple-
mentation of the 1968 Act are all the more sobering. Some of the reasons
for this problematic outcome can be found in the variety of forces behind
the Act, as discussed in this chapter.
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The remainder of the thesis will analyze how the 1968 homeownership
legislation impacted the consumer. The following summarizes the key
aspects -- or omissions -- of the 1968 Act that will be particularly
relevant to the following chapters.
1) An "old" HUD-FHA with a pre-1968 business orientation being
given the mandate to administer the new socially-oriented homeownership
programs.
2) Pressure on HUD-FHA to insure a high volume of mortgages as an
indication that they could meet the demands of the new socially oriented
legislation and to meet the nation's housing goal.
3) Weak role of counseling services.
4) No other direct supports for consumers authorized in the legislation.
5) A new lower income consumer and a new type of inner city property
becoming eligible for FHA insurance for the first time.
6) Absence of concern or an understanding for how the home finance
system would adapt to the new consumer.
7) No consideration for how HUD would make the transition to handle
the new people and the new properties and no acknowledgement of the risks
involved in insuring the new mortgagors.
In concluding this analysis of homeownership legislation it is
important to underscore the fact that minimizing risk of lending institutions
in order to induce their participation was a recur-ing theme. Stemming
from the problems that surfaced during the Depression, Congress created
several tools to do this.
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Yet, in spite of the risk-free lending environment, the conservatism
of FHA combined with the traditional conservatism of the lending institu-
tions, excluded the participation of people and properties that market
forces would have excluded in any case. HUD-FHA's attempts to reorient
its outlook, combined with the mandate of Congress to include a wide
range of buyers, without any consideration for how HUD-FHA would accept
its new responsibilities and the enormous risks that it was undertaking,
produced a formidable set of problems.
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SECTION II
KEY ASPECTS OF THE
HUD-FHA HOME FINANCE SYSTEM
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Since the creation of the FHLBS, the assumption that by increasing
the flow of mortgage capital, the homebuyer would benefit, has persisted.
(See Chapter 2) Since the 1930's, the government has repeatedly inter-
vened to expedite this flow. As Miles Colean has stated:
Having entered the housing stage from the financial wing,
the Federal Government has 1played its part chiefly from a
financial point of view...
Yet, government efforts to enhance the flow of capital and decrease
the risk of financial institutions by protecting them against losses due
to foreclosure and increasing their liquidity have been more than means
to the end under discussion -- the expansion and support of homeownership.
Again, as discussed in Chapter 2, the near catastrophic situation of
financial institutions in the 1930's started the precedent of government
intervention in home finance with the specific goal of assisting the
faltering banks, as a goal in itself.
In view of this, it is ironic that the early savings and loan
associations, known as building associations, were set up only to enable
families to attain homeownership.2 Most early associations never had
any aspirations beyond this basis objective and their own existence
had no legitimacy beyond the goal of enabling people to finance their
homes.
1Miles L. Colean, og. cit. p. 262.
2See, for example, Henry E. Hoaqland and Leo D. Stone, og. cit. p. 178
and William Atteberry, Modern Real Estate Finance (Columbus, Ohio: Grid, Inc.,
1972) p. 131.
-123-
For example, the goal of the first building association, which
was organized in Pennsylvania in 1831, was to "enable the contributors
thereof to build or purchase dwelling houses." 3 Describing the localized,
small scale nature of the original building associations, Atteberry
writes that:
...these first associations were managed and operated like today's
local civic clubs or investment groups...members would buy shares
and pay dues; when sufficient funds accumulated, they were loaned
to members. The choice of which member or members were entitled
to borrow the accumulated funds was made in different ways.. .In
order to encourage and compel thrift while providing for a con-
stant input and availability of funds, members were required to
pay fines if they missed dues payment dates; in some cases they
... forfeited their membership.4
Moreover, one type of early association known as "terminating"
associations actually ceased operation once each member "had acquired
a home and paid for it in regular installments. When all had been served
in this manner, the association was expected to dissolve, since it had
reached its objective."5
Today, savings and loan associations are the single largest mortgage
lender on 1-4 family residential properties. In 1972, S & L's held 47.9
percent of the 1-4 family nonfarm mortgage debt. (See Table 3) But, in
spite of this dominant position in the 1-4 family market, S & L's have
never been major participants in the FHA-insured home programs, preferring
3Henry E. Hoagland and Leo D. Stone, op. cit. p. 179.
4William Atteberry, op. cit. p. 131.
5Henry E. Hoagland and Leo D. Stone, op. cit. p. 180.
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TABLE 3
1-4 Family, Nonfarm Mortgage Loans Outstanding, by Type of Lender, Year-End 1972
Dollar Amount
(in Billions)
Savings & Loan Associations
Commercial Banks
Mutual Savings Banks
Life Insurance Companies
Federally Supported Agencies
Others
TOTAL
$165.9
55.7
41.6
22.3
30.4
30.3
$346.2
Percent
47.9%
16.1
12.0
6.4
8.8
8.8
100.0%
Source: 1973 Savings & Loan Fact Book, United States Savings and Loan League,
Chicago, Illinois. p. 38.
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instead to invest in conventional mortgages. (See Table 4)
S & L's have been reluctant to participate in the FHA programs for
several reasons. First, the S & L's were so bitter about the creation
of the FHA that utilizing its programs could have been perceived as
"joining the enemy." Second, the highly localized nature of the S & L
lending philosophy probably made them wary of the nationwide scope of
the FHA. And, third, there are an array of technical reasons that S & L's
articulate for not participating in the FHA programs.6 Thus, the S & L's
aversion to the FHA, in conjunction with the financial structures created
by the Federal government -- FHA and FHLBS -- has served to further shape
and solidify the two systems of home finance -- FHA and conventional.
In the void left by S & L's, financial institutions, known as
mortgage companies, have become the dominant lender in the HUD-FHA home
finance system. But the mortgage company also warrants special attention
in the context of this thesis for another reason.
All the other "social programs" that emerged in the 1960's provided
services to recipients, or clients, through some type of specifically
created social service agency. Head start programs, neighborhood health
6For example, administrative requirements and regulations under FHA,
so-called "red tape;" time delays in processing FHA insurance forms; low
interest rate ceiling on FHA loans; ability of S & L's to meet their invest-
ment needs through lending in their local market area; and an idealogical
opposition to the government assuming the risk in mortgage lending. Leon
T. Kendall, The Savings and Loan Business, Commission on Money and Credit,
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962) pp. 90-91.
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TABLE 4
Mortgage Activity of Savings and Loan Associations in FHA, VA, and Conventional
Loans: 1950, 1960, and 1970.
(Amounts in Millions of Dollars)
1950 1960 1970
Amount
848
2,973
9,836
Amount
3,524
7,222
49,324
Amount %
10,178
8,494
131,659 87
13,657 100% 60,070 100% 150,331 100%
Source: Statistical Abstract of the
FHA
Conv.
TOTAL
U.S. - 1972, P. 450.
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centers, offices of economic opportunity, community action programs --
and so on -- proliferated during the years of the "Great Society." But,
unlike these programs, the lower income homeownership programs, although
also oriented to social needs, did not operate out of a specially designed
office. Instead, the mortgage lender (and, most often, this was a mortgage
company) was the only actor that was certain to come into contact with
home buyers. Thus, the prime responsibility for initiating the family
to homeownership rested with the mortgage lender. Chapter 6 examines the
mode of operation and the unique characteristics of mortgage companies
and discusses how these characteristics have had negative impacts on
some home buyers.
Chapter 7 then goec on to look at the secondary mortgage market --
what it is, how it operates, and how its activities have affected consumers.
The main point of this chapter will be to show how, in the course of the
government's improving the position of lenders, by minimizing their
risk,.-- through enhancing their liquidity and expediting the flow of
capital, some consumers have been negatively impacted. The creation and
growth of the secondary mortgage market is a good example of how government
intervention in housing has served the needs of the finanical sector as
an end in itself -- although, here too, the assumption that the consumer
would benefit through easier access to credit, has prevailed.
But before goinj on to Chapters 6 and 7, it is first important to
present a short chapter on the "FHA Interest Rate Ceiling." Chapter 5
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examines the rationale for a government-controlled maximum interest
rate on FHA-insured mortgages and will describe the side-effects of this
policy. This chapter is critical as a background for understanding
the workings of the HUD-FHA home finance system.
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CHAPTER 5: THE FHA INTEREST RATE CEILING AND "POINTS"
1. RATIONALE FOR AN INTEREST RATE CEILING:
Since the passage of the National Housing Act of 1934, Congress
has determined the maximum interest rate that may be charged on FHA-
insured loans. On the surface, this would appear to be a consumer-
oriented policy. Supporters of FHA mortgage interest rate ceilings
have argued that this form of regulation can maximize benefits to the
general public by keeping interest rates low. Further, they have
claimed that a carefully administered rate ceiling can also serve as
a kind of "anchor" that keeps mortgage interest rates from rising as
much as they might otherwise during tight money periods and can help
*bring mortgage rates down more quickly than otherwise when monetary
policy eases. (i.e.: money becomes more available.) 2
Wright Patman, long-time Chairman of the House Banking and Currency
Committee was probably the most adamant supporter of this position.
He, along with Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullivan, argued that the
movement to remove interest rate ceilings "is inimical to the consumer."3
Yet, many other Congressmen and economists have disagreed with
Patman and Sullivan, primarily because of the negative side-effects
1
"Report of the Commission on Mortgage Interest Rates to the President
of the United States and to the Congress" August, 1969, p. 63 (Referred to
as "Interest Rate Commission Report")
2Ibid.
3Ibid. p. 124. Dissenting Views of Congressman Wright Patman and Congress-
woman Leonor K. Sullivan.
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which the interest rate ceiling has created. The most important of these
side-effects is "points."
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2. SIDE-EFFECT OF THE INTEREST RATE CEILING: POINTS:
At the same time that FHA interest rates have been regulated by
Congress, the market place has determined interest rates on conventional
mortgage loans as well as on other types of investments. Frequently, the
two mortgage interest rates -- conventional and FHA -- have not been the
same.
While Congress has granted discretionary authority to the Secretary
of HUD to raise the interest rate on FHA mortgages "to maintain a competitive
position in the market place,' market rates have frequently changed more
rapidly than changes in the FHA rate. One might logically assume that,
since the FHA mortgage is insured and the conventional one is not, lenders
might be willing to accept lower yields in view of the lesser risk. How-
ever, this has not been the case. Lenders have insisted upon trying to
make up the interest rate differential through a system which circum-
vents the FHA-controlled interest rate ceiling. "Points" or "discounts"
are fees which are charged by lenders at the time that mortgages are
originated: One point is equal to one percent of the mortgage amount.
For each two points charged, the effective yield to the lender is increased
by approximately one quarter of a percentage point above that provided
by the contract interest rate. 2
For example, if the FHA interest rate ceiling is seven percent, but
competitive investments are yielding seven and a half percent, lenders who
IStaff Report of the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, Committee on.
Banking and Currency, "Financial Institutions: Reform and The Public Interest"
House of Representatives, 93rd. Cong. 1st. Sess., Aug. 1973, p. 29.
2Interest Rate Commission Report" op. cit. p. 28.
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are originating FHA loans might charge four points at origination thereby
increasing the yield on the FHA mortgage to about seven and a half percent.
During periods in which the FHA interest rate ceiling is considerably
lower than yields on other investments, it has not been uncommon for
as many as seven or eight points to be charged at origination.3
Thus, during periods in which "deep discounts" are being charged,
lenders are actually lending considerably less money than that represented
by the full face value of the mortgage note. For example, if eight points
are being charged to originate a $20,000 mortgage, the lender's net out-
lay is only $18,400. Since the FHA does not allow the buyer to pay
these points,4 they must be paid by the seller/builder. As a result,
the actual transfer of funds at closing would be as follows. 5
Lender Lender net outlay = $18,400
$1,600 $20,o00  Seller/Builder net amount received = $18,400$s Buyer/Borrower net amount borrowed = $20,000
Seller/ Buyer/Borrower
Builder & At an interest rate of 7.0% the yield to the
$20,000 lender would be 8.1%.
3New York Antitrust Hearings op. cit. p. 541-542.
4According to HUD Guidelines the buyer may only be charged a one point
origination fee, which is separate from the additional points which can belevied due to market conditions.
5The example does not include any of the other fees or transfers offunds which are associated with closing, such as lawyers', title search,
recording and buyers' one percent origination fee.
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3. SIDE EFFECTS OF POINTS:
Points have been cited as the cause of several undesirable side-effects.
First, since the seller does not receive the full amount of money from his
sale he would certainly choose to sell on a conventional basis, if possible.
This could result in many homes being closed off to potential FHA buyers.
But, second, if the seller or builder knows that the house will be sold
with FHA insurance, he will probably add the amount of the anticipated
discount to the original sale price of the house.1 Ultimately, then,
the buyer ends up paying the discount and ends up with a house that has
an inflated value.
This situation, according to a recent HUD report will, in turn,
lead to a third effect: an increase in the risk of foreclosure. The
report stated that:
We believe risk is increased whenever a mortgagor assumes a liability
...without receiving equivalent value in property... In today's market
the cost of selling a house with an FHA or VA mortgage may easily
consume ten percent to fifteen percent of the sales proceeds (six
percent real estate sales commission, three percent to seven percent
loan discount, and in some states one percent to three percent seller's
closing costs.) Consequently, a mortgagor with a minimum investment
cannot realize enough sales proceeds to cover the indebtedness against
the property, unless his house has benefited from inflation. Such a
situation discourages mortgagors from selling their houses, particularly
in slow markets, and encourages them to let their mortgages go into
foreclosure.2
IInterest Rate Commission Report op. cit. p. 30 and"Report on Internal
Audit of HUD Single Family Appraisal/Inspection Procedures and Mortgagees'
Loan Processing Activities" HUD Office of the Inspector General, Office
of Audit, Washington, D.C. September, 1973. p. .54. (Referred to as "All
Homes Audit")
2All Homes Audit op. cit. p. 54. Points can
also cause an increase~Tn ftFe risk of foreclosure in another way. However,
because of the complexity of this issue a closer examination of this critical
side-effect of points will be postponed until Chapter 10.
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And, fourth, points can also change the level of lender participation
in mortgage lending and thereby reduce the amount of mortgage money
available. The Commission report noted that:
Especially large discounts -- as occur when market interest rates
rise well above the FHA-VA ceilings -- have an independent constraining
effect on the real estate and mortgage markets... some lenders simply
are reluctant to make discounted loans -- especially when the discounts
are large. 3
Since discounts can be confusing to home buyers and sellers, some
lenders would rather completely withdraw from the FHA-VA market rather
than be susceptible to criticisnand adverse publicity. For example, while
many Boston bankers actively buy out-of-state FHA and VA loans, they
have been unwilling to use FHA-VA programs in their local lending areas.
One plausible reason for this is that the conservative Boston banking
community has found it "cleaner" to buy loans with high yields rather
than having to negotiate competitive yields by charging several points
to local customers.4 (See Chart 1 for a summary of side-effects of the
FHA interest rate ceiling.)
3Interest Rate Commission Report op. cit. p. 64.
4
"Competition in Real Estate and Mortgage Lending" Hearings Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. Senate, 92nd Cong. 2nd. Sess. Part 1, September 1971 (Boston).(Referred to as "Boston Antitrust Hearings")
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CHART 1
Summary of Side-Effects Which Can Result From FHA
Interest Rate Ceiling and the Points System
Seller
Sellers that can
choose between FHA
and conventional, would
choose the latter.
Receives less than
the full amount of
money from his sale.
Inflates price of
house to avoid
above.
Buyer
Some buyers may be
cut out of the mar-
ket while others
may have a reduced
choice of homes be-
cause of the reluctance
of sellers to use FHA.
Buys inflated property.
Unless property value
inflates, owner may have
a negative equity in the
house and, if forced to
move, may end up in
forecl osure.
Progression of
Side Effects
Source: Gathered from information presented in the Report of
Commission on Mortgage Interest Rates.
Lender
Some lenders may
choose to not get
involved with points
at all, thereby re-
ducing the availability
of mortgage money.
Obtains a mortgage
note for which he
paid less than its
face value.
Because of above,
lender may be less
willing to assist a
mortgagor in default
with relief measures,
because the FHA in-
surance will reimburse
him for more than what
he paid for the mortgage
note.(See Chapter 10)
Points may become
an ingrained aspect of
home finance and some
lenders may use them
arbitrarily, rather than
as a mechanism to adjust
yield.
the
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4. POINTS AND THE MARKET PLACE:
While attempts have been made to control discounts
it has been difficult for the Federal government to alter well-established
patterns within the home finance system. Except during periods of
declining interest rates, an increasingly rare occurrence, secondary
mortgage market investors usually charge several points in order to
get the best yields. The practice of only buying at a discount has,
in fact, become a standard part of the operating procedures of many
secondary mortgage investors, most notably, FNMA.I Thus, unless the
mortgage banker is willing to absorb this discount -- which, of course,
he is not -- he, too, must originate the loans at a discount. The
following was the official position or the Mortgage Bankers Associa-
tion (MBA) on this issue as of January 1974:
Mortgages originated without a discount must be marketable in
the secondary market with a discount or a premium, depending
upon whether rates rise or fall during the warehousing period.
Premiums are generally not acceptable to institutional investors
because the premium becomes a capital loss if the loan is paid
off before maturity. Neither FNMA nor GNMA purchase mortgages
at prices above par. Thus to prohibit discounts would mean
that the mortgage banker could break even or lose, but could
never gain on the sales of mortgages in the secondary market.
This is an impossible business risk and the destructive effect
of a prohibiti n against discounts on the secondary market is
clearly total.?
While there has been no legislation on discounts since 1958, it
has continued to be a much - discussed issue within Congress and various
1NN.Y. Antitrust Hearings op. cit. p. 523.
2
"Critical Legislative Year" Mortgage Banker, January, 1974.
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ways to eliminate discounts have been suggested. For example, in 1969,
the Commission on Mortgage Interest Rates recommended that "the Congress
permanently abolish the present statutory ceiling -- on the interest rate
on FHA-VA mortgages." And, further, the Commission noted that "the
desirability of limiting.. .discounts is perhaps the sharpest single
argument for complete abolition of the FHA-VA interest ceilings." 3
In addition to the many negative side-effects of discounts, the
Commission argued that:
As discounts persist, they tend to get built into (or buried in)
selling prices of all homes -- whether sold with FHA, VA, or
conventional financing -- or institutionalized in some other way.
They then take on a life of their own and no longer serve simply
as a flexible mechanism for adjusting mortgage yields. 4
However, the Commission acknowledged that since "present institutional
practices in the FHA-VA market...have evolved over a considerable period
of time" they will not be easily discarded.5 Thus, rather than recom-
mending total abolition of interest rate ceilings the Commission recom-
mended that Congress enact legislation that would create a dual market
system, for a three year trial period. One part of the system would
operate with a fixed interest rate ceiling and with discounts permitted
(basically status quo). In the other, innovative part of the system:
3Interest Rate Commission Report op. cit. p. 65-67. Congressman Pat-
man and Congresswoman Sullivan dissented and opposed the abolition of the
statutory ceiling.
4Ibid. p. 64.
5Ibid. p. 66.
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The rate on FHA-VA mortgages would be determined in the market-
place, without regard to any administrative (or statutory) ceiling,
provided the mortgage originator or lender neither charges nor
collects any discount from any party in connection with the
transaction. 6
Further explaining their position, the Commission added that their:
Concern applies only to discounts in the so-called primary market,
i.e., on new mortgage originations. Discounts also exist, of
course, in the secondary mortgage market. In that market, how-
ever, they do serve the necessary function of adjusting prices
on already existing mortgages traded among investors...discounts
in the secondary market are absolutely essential and are per-
forming their function well. 7
However, the Commission was also quick to point out that a ban on
discounts could prove disastrous to the current operations of the home
finance system, particularly to the mortgage banking business.
Current conditions in the mortgage market are such that an absolute
ban on discounts on mortgage originations -- unless phased in gradually
-- could be highly disruptive to the market.. .Mortgage banking com-
panies in particular, might have problems in quickly adjusting to
a system absolutely banning discounts on new mortgages... In cases in
which no prior commitments are involved, a rise or fall in mortgage
prices between the orgination and sale produces a profit or loss for
the company. If the origination must be at par (because of a ban on
discounts) any upward price movement would bring the mortgage to a
"premium." But there is widespread feeling that lenders.. .would re-
sist buying mortgages at premium prices, and thus that a complete
ban on discounts on new mortgages would leave the mortgage banker
on a one-way street in wich he could lose or maybe come out even
buy never make a profit.
With this reality of the market place in mind, it is difficult to
understand why the Commission believed that a gradual phase-in of the
discount ban could deter the problems that mortgage bankers would have
6 Ibid.
7 bid. p. 67.
p. 68.
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to face -- whether sooner, later, or gradually. While the Commission
stated that "in time mortgage bankers and other market participants could
adjust to a ban on discounts in the primary market" it never suggested how
this adjustment could come about or what form it would take.9 The Com-
mission did acknowledge, however, that it would probably not be the
mortgage banker who would participate in the "innovative" part of the
dual market system:
Many "over-the-counter" mortgage transactions involving a local
lender and borrower will opt for this part of the dual market
from the beginning. Discounts are not needed in these trans-
actiors and many lenders do not like the adverse publicity that
sometimes comes when points are charged.10
The Commission's recommendations were never followed and the question
of how or whether to control discounts has persisted. The Commission's
idea of creating a dual market system was revived by the Subcommittee
on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs in both 1971 and 1972.11 However, Wright Patman's
opposition to this position helped to block the enactment of such legis-
lation. (See Appendix 5-1 for a more detailed discussion on attempts at
controlling discounts.)
What emerges from this discussion is the reality that, at this
point in time, points have less to do with FHA interest rate ceilings than
with the well accepted workings of the primary and secondary mortgage
9Ibid. p. 69.
10Ibid. p. 69.
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "Mortgage Settlement Costs"
U.S. Senate, 92nd. Cong. 2nd. Sess. March, 1972 p. 17.
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markets. To discuss abolishing points, without also examining how
secondary market investors would adjust their operations, is a useless
exercise.
As interest rates have continued to climb upward and, in some
cases, to surpass state usury ceilings, points have also become an
increasingly familiar occurence in the origination of conventional
mortgages. Further, as the sale of conventional mortgages to secondary
investors has become increasingly common,12 points are being used as
a cushion to originators against rising interest rates between origina-
tion and sale.
12There are three factors that have contributed to increased secondary
mortgage market activity, in conventional loans: Increased use of private
mortgage insurance; Creation of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporationin 1970 and, also in 1970, the granting of permission to FNMA to purchase con-
ventional mortgages (Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 P.L. 91-351, 91st.Cong., July 24, 1970).
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CHAPTER.6: MORTGAGE COMPANIES: THE DOMINANT LENDER IN THE HUD-FHA HOME
FINANCE SYSTEM
1. MORTGAGE COMPANIES: A DEFINITION:
A mortgage banker recently was discussing his business and its
future. "Generally," he said, "things look pretty good." But he
did have one problem. "My kids don't know what I do. My wife finally
understands but she can't explain it to anyone else, so the neighbors
don't know what I do, either."1
In spite of this mortgage banker's problem, mortgage banking is
not conceptually difficult to understand. Mortgage banking has two
major components -- origination and servicing. Origination includes all
the activities which are performed by the mortgagee which terminate
in the lending of money to the mortgagor -- "the processing of a mort-
gage application leading to the closing of a mortgage transaction." 2
The two key activities of origination are property appraisal and an
assessment of the credit worthiness of the borrower.
Servicing is the monthly procedure of receiving and recording
mortgage payments made by the mortgagor. More specifically, servicing
includes: The collection of payments of principal, interest, and
escrows, such as hazard insurance premiums, real property taxes, FHA
mortgage insurance premiums, as called for by a mortgage. Included
in servicing is the payment of premiums and taxes when due, periodic
inspection of the mortgaged property, loan analysis, delinquency
I"Mortgage Middlemen Try Opening New Doors," Business Week,
September 26, 1964.
2William Atteberry, oR. cit. p. 384.
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followup, and foreclosure. 3
Clearly, origination and servicing are also routinely performed
by any institution involved in mortgage lending -- whether a savings
and loan association, mutual savings bank or commercial bank. However,
the distinction between these institutions and mortgage companies is
that these functions are the latter's principal activity while the
other financial institutions also carry out additional functions.
In addition, mortgage companies usually originate loans with a pre-
commitment from another investor to purchase them.
Thus, the mortgage company services loans which are owned by other
investors. In contrast, most other mortgage lenders originate or
acquire loans with the intention of holding them in their own portfolio
as long-term investments. This is an important difference between mortgage
companies and other types of institutions involved in mortgage lending
and it will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.
3Ibid.
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2. MORTGAGE COMPANIES AND THE FHA:
At the time of the passage of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968, the mortgage company was firmly established as the dominant
mortgage lender in the HUD-FHA home finance system. In 1946 mortgage
companies originated only slightly more than one-quarter of all FHA
insured home mortgages. However, by the late 1950's mortgage companies
began to originate at least half of all FHA-insured 1-4 family homes.
(See Table 5.)
Since then, this percentage has increased substantially. In 1972
mortgage companies originated 74.3 percent of all FHA-insured home loans.
(See Table 6.)
In addition, out of all types of home loans originated by mortgage
companies, over 60 percent are FHA or VA. Thus, mortgage companies are
heavily dependent upon the FHA, and the FHA also relies upon mortgage
companies.
This relationship is one which has grown steadily since the creation
of the FHA in 1934. Saul Klaman, the author of the first major study
on mortgage companies wrote that:
More than any other type of institution active in mortgage
markets, mortgage companies owe their present structure and
method of operation, as well as their extraordinary rapid
postwar growth, to the introduction and later expansion of
federal mortgage insurance and guaranty.2
Economics and Research Department, Mortgage Bankers Association of
America, "Highlights of 1971."
2Saul B. Klaman, The Postwar Rise of Mortgage Companies, (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1959), p. 1.
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TABLE 5
Financing of FHA-Insured Home Mortgages,
By Type of Institution, 1946-1970, Selected Years
(Percentage Distribution of Face Amount of Mortgage)
1946 1950 1954 1958 1962 1966 1970
Mortgage company
National bank
State bank
Insurance company
26.7 27.7 35.2 51.4 58.6 60.3 69.2
24.3 15.8 22.0 12.1 12.8 9.6 8.4
17.7 13.8 12.5 7.4 6.3 8.0 4.0
15.4 20.8 11.8 5.5 3.8 1.3 1.1
Savings & Loan Assoc. 9.8 10.8 10.8 12.2 9.6 6.6 12.2
Savings bank
Other
TOTAL
3.2 7.6 5.8 7.9 6.9 6.4 3.8
2.9 3.5 1.9 3.5 2.0 7.8 1.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: 1973 HUD Statistical Yearbook, p. 173.
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TABLE 6
Financing of FHA-Insured Home Mortgages
by Type of Institution, 1972
(Dollar Amounts in Thousands)
Number Percent Dollars Percent
Mortgage company
National bank
State bank
Insurance company
Savings & Loan Assoc
Savings bank
Other
TOTAL
317,701
32,506
17,366
1,859
42,344
15,539
2,041
427,901
74.3%
7.6
4.1
0.4
9.9
3.2
0.5
100.0%
5,921 ,632
655,017
355,046
34,798
790,845
263,329
36,760
$8,067,818
Source: 1973 HUD Statistical Yearbook, p. 161.
73.5%
8.1
4.4
0.4
9.8
3.3
0.5
100.0%
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Describing how mortgage companies were well suited to the needs
of the new Federal programs, Klaman continued:
The FHA and VA mortgage underwriting programs, with their standard-
ized mortgage contracts, uniform and improved property and borrower
appraisal techniques, and minimization of risk, have reduced geo-
graphic barriers to mortgage investment and enhanced negotiability
of contracts. In the broadened national mortgage market that de-
veloped, accompanying the marked postwar expansion in residential
building and financing, mortgage companies grew rapidly in response
to the increased need by out-of-stae investors for local institutions
to originate and service mortgages.
Thus, unlike other mortgage lenders who, for the most part, have
chosen to minimize their participation in the FHA insurance programs,
mortgage companies have drawn their life-blood from the FHA.
In spite of this considerable involvement with the FHA, the mort-
gage company has escaped close examination. Klaman's 1959 observation
on the lack of current information on mortgage companies also holds true
for 1976:
Despite the integral and uniquely important role of mortgage
companies in postwar mortgage markets, very little quantitative
or qualitative information has been available on their background
and development, on their financial structure, or on the nature
of mortgage operations. 4
While Klaman's own work made important contributions to understanding
the history and role of mortgage companies up to the mid-1950's, little
research has focused on these institutions in the past twenty years.
- Recently, however, several journalistic accounts have been pub-
lished documenting some scandalous activities of mortgage companies;
various Congressional committees have heard testimony related to the
3Ibid. p. 1.
4Ibid. p. 2.
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practices of mortgage companies; and, within the past few years, HUD
has finally begun to examine some of its own procedures in connection
to mortgage companies.
Brian Boyer, in introducing his section on mortgage companies in
his book, Cities Destroyed for Cash, stated that: "The proper -- and
unreadable -- way to present this dissection of the mortgage banking
industry would be in a scholarly tome replete with footnotes." 5 While
Boyer chose "to charge through with his own interpretation, this section
will attempt the "proper" and, hopefully, still readable alternative.
This chapter will describe the unique characteristics of mortgage
.companies and assess how these qualities open the way to performance
inadequacies that can have adverse impacts on mortgagors.
5Brian D. Boyer, Cities Destroyed for Cash, (Chicago: Follett
Publishing Co., 1973), p. 94.
6Ibid.
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3. UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF MORTGAGE COMPANIES AND IMPACTS ON MORTGAGORS:
a. Geographic Boundaries:
In its role as an originator of loans, the mortgage company has come
a long way from the localized lending patterns so characteristic of
savings and loan associations. Unhampered by geographic boundaries,
mortgage companies carry out transactions on a nationwide basis.
The issue of local vs. national service area has been a fundamental
concern of the banking industry for a long time. During the Congressional
hearings which preceeded the enactment of the National Housing Act of
1934, this divergent geographic outlook was clearly articulated. In
opposing the program which was to become the FHA, Morton Bodfish, the
Executive Vice President of the U.S. Building and Loan League testified
that:
...The first mortgage concerns to fall in this depression were
concerns trying to operate nation-wide,...It shocks us that this
bill, proposed under Federal sponsorship, should repeat that on
80 percent loans.
I hope the Federal Government will encourage sound local cooperative
institutions. That is the only way in the world you can make 75
percent or 80 percent loans and ever hope to collect them back.
It is when a little group of neighbors makes a loan to somebody they
know. That is the reason for the Federal Govern ent to conceive
one savings and loan program. (Underline added.)
Currently, Federal savings and loan associations can originate loans
only "within 100 miles of any branch or agency office so long as no state
boundaries are crossed."3  In contrast, mortgage companies both do not
1The trade association for early S & L's.
%ational Housing Act Hearings op. cit. pp. 256-257.
3Atteberry, op. cit. p. 149. But, "in order to enable savings and loanassociations in areas with capital surpluses to offer their funds to areas which
are capital poor, savings and loan associations can invest 20 percent of theirassests nationwide, provided they have a local loan servicing agent such as amortgage company."
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and cannot confine themselves to local markets. While much of a given
company's lending activity may be directed to a certain area, investors
are usually solicited from diverse and sometimes distant locations.
Interestingly enough, this situation has come about only within the
past decade. Similar to S & L's early mortgage companies were also pri-
marily local institutions, serving as local correspondents (loan originators
and servicers) for a single life insurance company. Thus, they grew out
of the need of large life insurance companies to have local lending
offices. While the FHA insured mortgage was an attractive investment for
the bulging post-World War II assests of life insurance companies, not
experienced in mortgage lending, the life insurance companies looked to
middlemen, the mortgage companies, to carry out all the dealings with
mortgagors.
But as other investors began to enter the mortgage market, mortgage
companies began to operate more independently. Unhinged from working
for a single investor, the present day mortgage company usually sells
mortgages to a variety of investors. Out of the one hundred largest mortgage
companies in the country, thirty-three service loans for at least one
hundred investors. Most striking is Lomas and Nettleton, the largest
mortgage company in the country with a record six hundred investors. 5
(See Chart 2)
4Statement of Everett Mattson, President, Mortgage Bankers Association
of America, to the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, April 11, 1973, p. 1-2,
(Reproduced by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America).
5Atteberry, op. cit. p. 202.
-150-
CHART 2
Servicing Activity of Selected Large Mortgage Companies
Volume of Number of Number
Mortgages Mortgages of
Rank Seivices Serviced Investors
Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp. 1 $3,267,279,424 264,513 600
Advance Mortgage Corp. 4 1,534,336,170 101,528 349
J.I. Kislak Mortgage Corp. 6 670,150,000 49,381 208
Colonial Mortgage Service Co. 20 1,236,499,778 74,457 235
First Mortgage Corp. 30 557,598,000 23,652 135
Mellon National Mortgage Co. 38 494,740,000 19,208 43
Northland Mortgage Co. 41 462,071,232 20,379 106
Source: American Banker, New York, 1971. Reproduced in Modern Real
Estate Finance, William Atteberry, p. 202. Data as of June
30, 1971.
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In 1971, S & L's became the largest customer of mortgage company
originations, by-passing purchases of mortgages by life insurance companies
by almost one billion dollars. 6 (See Table 7)
At present, HUD is the only regulatory body with the authority
to restrict the geographic lending area of mortgage companies. However,
HUD guidelines impose no locational restrictions on mortgage companies,
provided that certain financial requirements are met. HUD's Handbook
4000.2 states the following:
Any approved mortgagee in Group 3 (the group in which the great
majority of mortgage companies fall...Non-supervised institutions)
may request HUD-FHA approval to establish branch offices through
which it originates and services insured mortgages...There are no
financial requirements for approval if the branch office is located
in the mortgagee's home state or in a contiguous state. However,
to establish a branch office in a non-contiguous state, the Group 3
mortgagee must have acceptable net worth of at least $150,000. For
each non-contiguous state to that of its main office, in which it
establishes a branch office or offices, Group 3 mortgagees must
have an additional $50,000 in net worth until net worth reaches
$250,000. Upon reaching this level, no further increase in net-
worth will be required if branches are opened in additional non-
contiguous states.7
Thus, a mortgage company with only $250,000 in net worth may have any
number of branch offices any place in the country.
As one might expect, many mortgage companies have taken advantage
of this provision. Donald A. Luff, Executive Vice President of the
6
"Highlights of 1971," op. cit.
A HUD Handbook, 4000.2 "Mortgagees' Handbook: Application Through
Insurance (Single Family), March, 1975; p. 3-4,5.
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TABLE 7
Mortgage Company Sales to Investors, 1971
Volume (in billions) Percent
S & L's (not including GNMA securities)* $4.5 25%
Insurance Companies 3.6 20
FNMA 3.3 18
GNMA Securities* 2.3 13
Mutual Savings Banks 1.9 11
Other investors, each purchasing 2.4 13
less than a billion dollars each.
TOTAL. $18.0 100%
*The GNMA securities are ultimately purchased by other investors, such as
S & L's and life insurance companies. For example, almost half of the
GNMA securities $1.2 billion, were purchased by S & L's, thus bringing
the total purchases of mortgages by S & L's of mortgage banker originations
to $5.7 million.
Source: "Highlights of 1971," Economics and Research Dept., MBAA
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Mellon National Mortgage Company of Ohio, the thirty-eighth largest
in the country,8 noted that his company has four origination offices,
but only one servicing office, located in Cleveland. In addition, while
Mellon National focuses its origination activities in Ohio, with only a
minor amount of origination occurring in one other state, the company
services mortgages located in five states.9
Similarly, while the First Mortgage Corporation has seven origination
offices, they service mortgages located in seven states out of a central
servicing office in Richmond, Virginia. 10
Not only is HUD permissive concerning mortgage company branching,
but the guidelines are also extremely unclear when describing how mortgage
companies are expected to service loans. The following excerpt from HUD
Handbook 4191.1, is permeated with vague and undefined terms, as
underlined below.
3. MORTGAGEE RESPONSIBILITY. Approved mortgagees are required to
service their insured mortgage accounts in accordance with the
accepted practices of prudent lending institutions...HUD...expects
the investing mortgagee to insure that adequate facilities to
service the loans are available in the area in which the property
is located. Insured mortgage accounts shall be handled in the
same manner as are those accounts which are not insured, where
the mortgagee is entirely dependent on the property as security
for the protection of its investment. The investing mortgagee
may appoint any individual or firm to service its insured port-
folio. However, the actions of any such servicer will be con-
sidered by HUD to be the actions of the approved mortgagee holding
the mortgage ...A prudent lender's practices evolve from a broad
range of knowledge and sound judgments as well as flexible, far-
sighted administration of its servicing responsibilities. The
lender is expected to provide competent and aggressive servicing
that will result in fewer defaults and foreclosures...
8Atteberry, op. cit., p. 102. This was the rank as of June 30, 1971. At
that time, the Mellon National Mortgage Company was called Jay F. Zook, Inc.
9Interview, Donald A. Luff, Executive Vice President, Mellon National
Mortgage Company, Cleveland, Ohio, November 7, 1974 (telephone).
10Interview, Stuart Blanton, Senior Vice President, First Mortgage Corpora-
tion, Richmond, Virginia, November 7, 1974 (telephone).
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4. SERVICER RESPONSIBILITY. Servicers are not restricted to
geographic areas in which they may service insured mortgages.
However, a servicer must establish adequate facilities to assure
that loan information is available to individual borrowers and
to HUD personnel when needed. Moreover, the servicer's staff
shall be readily available to borrowers desiring individual
loan consultation. A wide range of alternatives is available
to servicers in meeting these requirements, and servicers may
select a communication technique best suited to their port-
folio, provided only that techniques utilized do not work un-
reasonable hardship on any borrower. The use of local servicing
offices or toll-free telephone service are examples of acceptable
communication techniques. HUD does not consider it prudent
servicing to expect borrowers to pay for long distance tele-
phone calls in order to obtain information or discuss their
loans.
5. STAFFING. Lenders are required to be adequately staffed
with trained personnel who are competent in all aspects of
mortgage sevicing, including the area of field collection
activity... I
b. Impacts of Unrestricted Lending and Servicing Areas on Mortgagors:
The permissiveness of the HUD guidelines, above, allows mortgage
companies to originate and service loans any place in the country and
at any distance from a branch office. This leniency, compounded by
vagueness, can present problems for mortgagors. While interviews with
HUD and counseling agency personnel did not disclose any problems for
mortgagors at origination, regardless of where the mortgage company was
located, considerable concern was voiced by several individuals over the
absence of mortgage company servicing offices in many, particularly less
densely populated, sections of the country.
A HUD Handbook, 4191.1, "Administration of Insured Home Mortgages,"
April, 1974, p. 2.
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A FNMA regional office official, who had been with the agency for
more than twenty years, observed that:
The problem with all seller-servicers is the servicing. It's the
bastard end of mortgage banking. There's a high turnover among
the servicing personnel; a lack of expertise; and 1 er salaries.
The suede shoe part of the business is origination.
Another FNMA employee, in charge of working with mortgagees,
articulated her concern over the lack of personal contact resulting
from the nationally oriented mortgage company.
Loans are being made more fluid -- the good part of this is
making more money available in the mortgage market -- but the
bad part is the impersonalization. A mortgage company used
to be required to have an office within 100 miles of any
loan that it was servicing. But, if you go back to that,
you lose the liquidity. 13
In addition to lack of expertise and impersonalization, there are
also indications that long-distance servicers are less willing to
follow HUD guidelines and that simple communication between mortgagors and
servicers is thwarted. For example, the Community Services Advisor
in the HUD Insuring Office in Phoenix, Rose Strickland, commented that:
The major problem that our mortgagors have is that servicers only
have production (i.e. origination) offices, not servicing offices.
Getting distant mortgage bankey to accept long-distance calls from
mortgagors has been a problem.
Similarly, William Bonner, the Housing Counselor in the Shreveport,
12Interview, Norman Camber, Assistant Regional Vice President, FNMA
Los Angeles, March 1974.
13Interview, Ellen Allison, Senior Loan Representative, FNMA, Los
Angeles, March 1974.
Interview, Rose Strickland, Community Servicers Advisor, HUD Insuring
Office, Phoenix, March 12, 1974. (telephone).
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Louisiana Insuring Office, said that:
Out of state mortgagees are a problem -- primarily because com-
munication with them is costly. Except for one Jackson, Mississippi
mortgage company, the out-of-state lenders don't do the servicing
in Shreveport; they merely have origination offices. 15
According to Thomas Clendenon, the HUD Housing Counselor in Louis-
ville, out-of-state servicers who service Kentucky mortgages are the
ones who do particularly poor servicing. "They do collection and that's
all -- they don't do what they get paid to do." He related a story
about a woman who lived in a small town in Kentucky. For some reason,
she needed to contact the servicer of her mortgage - perhaps to notify
them that her payment was going to be late. Since her loan had been
originated by an originating branch office of Lomas and Nettleton in
her home town she went there first for assistance. But she was'told
that no servicing problems were handled there and that she would have to
contact the Louisville office. Upon doing this, she was referred to
the Lomas and Nettleton office in Philadelphia -- but even this didn't
work and she was finally advised that her problem could only be solved
by contacting Lomas and Nettleton in Dallas!
According to Mr. Clendenon, this, unfortunately, was not a unique
or isolated example of the problems that can arise from the lack of geo-
graphic boundaries. Mr. Clendenon's solution is simple:
Servicers should not be allowed by HUD to service a loan unless they
can really service it. And this means being within a reasonable dis-
tance from the mortgagor. 16
15Interview, William Bonner, Housing Counselor, Shreveport, LouisianaInsuring Office, December 1972.
16Interview, Thomas Clendenon, December 1972. In addition, the problems
arising from long distance servicing were also underscored during telephone inte
views with Katie Washington, HUD Housing Counselor, Little Rock, Arkansas;andLucille Henderson, HUD Housing Counselor, Kansas City, Kansas, February, 1974.
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Emphasizing the difficulty of communicating with out-of-state
servicers, the Organization for Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI)
Inc. in a February 1974 report to HUD, noted that:
All six (counseling) agencies reported that at one time or another,
they had encountered difficulties establishing effective lines of
communication with servicing mortgagees... Usually these difficulties
were mentioned in connection with out-of-state mortgage servicing
and with computerized servicing techniques. 17
Furthermore, at least some high-ranking officials at HUD's Central
Office are aware of the problems presented by out-of-state servicers.
A 1973 intra-department memorandum noted that:
"Absentee Mortgagees" (Mortgagees with servicing offices in cities
other than that where mortgagors reside) make the servicing of
Section 235 and 237 mortgagors difficult. 18
Thus, while it is impossible to say how many people have been
troubled by out-of-town servicing problems or in how many cases fore-
closure was due to this reason, interviews yielded sufficient information
to conclude that this has definitely be2n a problem for a group of mortgagors.
c. Capital Requirements and Sources of Income:
Two additional unique and important characteristics of mortgage companies
1 7Organization for Social and Technical Innovation (OSTI) "An Evaluation
of the HUD Concentrated Default Counseling Program." Final Report to HUD,
January 1974, p. 40. The six agencies referred to were HUD certified 237
counseling agencies in Spokane, Washington; ShrevEport, Louisiana; Louisville,
Kentucky; Jacksonville, Florida; Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Washington, D.C.
18HUD Memorandum from Clifton P. Landers,*Jr. Counseling and Community
Services Division to Paul Williams, Director Office of Administrative and
Program Services. "Report of Fact Finding Visits to Delinquency and Default
Counseling Contractors and Government Technical Representatives"- February,
1973. p. 7-8.
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are their minimal mandatory capital and their absence of depositors.
Unlike other institutions that are involved with mortgage lending,
mortgage companies do not usually have much capital of their own. In
order to receive HUD certification as an "approved mortgagee" -- a mort-
gagee that is entitled to originate and/or purchase FHA insured mortgages
-- mortgage companies must have "sound capital funds of not less than
$100,000."I9 However, this capital is not used to invest in mortgages.
In contrast to this, thrift institutions such as S & L's have depositors
whose funds are invested by the institution.
Since, unlike other financial intermediaries, mortgage companies
do not invest their own money,20 their income does not come from interest
on investments. Rather. the bulk of their income is derived from fees
charged to investors for mortgage origination and servicing.
Customarily, mortgage companies receive a 1% (of the mortgage amount)
fee from the buyer for originating the mortgage. Once the loan is being
serviced for the long-term investor, mortgage companies are allowed to
charge a set fee for servicing the loan. This fee is usually calculated
on the basis of 3/8 or 1%/yr. of the outstanding balance of the mortgage
loan. Thus, if a mortgage company originates a $30,000 mortgage, it
would be entitled to receive $300 as an origination fee and the first
year it would collect a little under $112 in servicing fees. (Assuming
little amortization during the first year and that the outstanding balance
19HUD Handbook -- 4000.2, op. cit. p. 3-2.
Between the time that a mortgage is originated and sold to an institu-
tional investor, mortgage companies usually borrow the money from a commercialbank. "Warehousing," usually performed by commercial banks, is the holding oflong-term mortgages for the interim period between origination and sale to aninvestor. The interest which is received on warehoused loans is used to offsetthe interest payments on the short-term loans that were used to finance the
original mortgage loans.
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will be close to $30,000.)
d. Impacts of Non-Reliance on Depositor Capitalin Conjunction with FHA
Insurance, on Mortgagors:
A basic quality of thrift institutions is their strong sense of
responsibility toward the assets of their institutions and their con-
21
cern over safeguarding the investments of their depositors. This
protective attitude toward the institution's assets is based upon the
notion that the lender assumes a risk in any investments that it makes.
However, an interesting characteristic of many mortgage lenders is that
even when no risk is being taken, they still act with the same caution
and conservatism that accompanies truly risky situations. In the FHA
insured programs, in which the risk to the lender is virtually nonexistent,
the sense of caution among lenders can still dominate.
For example, when asked during Senate hearings in 1971, "What is
the risk to the bank if the Federal government insures the mortgage?",
an ex-Chairman of the Board of a large Boston mutual savings bank responded:
Well, the risk to the bank is...that we consider any loan that goes
sour on us a poor investment. We do not care whether it is insured
or not.22
21For example, interviews with Thomas Wilmore, Loan Officer Cambridge
Savings Bank, Cambridge, Mass. January, 197~4 and William Sawyer Northeast
Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., Watertown, Mass. February 1974. In addition
to the internal sense of responsibility of financial institutions, financial
regulatory agencies are firm about how financial institutions must handle their
assets to safeguard depositors and to assure the viability of the institution.
22Boston Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 254.
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Similarly, Lon Worth Crow, the First Vice-President of the Mortgage
Bankers Association of America, in testifying on the proposed housing
legislation of 1968; made clear the basic conservatism of many investors,
in spite of FHA:
Despite FHA insurance, it is difficult to attract substantial funds
for loan programs which are likely to have higher than normal rates
of default and foreclosure. 23
At the other extreme, in the period following the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, many mortgage companies, have not viewed their
responsibility with anything approaching Mr. Bacheller's or Mr. Crow's
sense of caution. This is certainly due, at least in part, to the fact
that in order to make FHA insured investments even more attractive to mort-
gagees, since September 1, 1965, FHA has paid mortgage insurance claims
in casP9 Prior to that time payments were made in -the form of long-term
debentures that had a lower yield than the mortgage investment.
23Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking
and Currency, "Housing and Urban Development Legislation and Urban Insurance"
House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 2nd Sess., Part I, March 1968, p. 278.
See also testimony of Julian H. Zimmerman, Commissioner of FHA, In Hearings
Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the Committee on Banking and Currency,
"Emergency Home Ownership Act." House of Representatives, 86th Cong. 2nd
Sess. January, 1960. p. 28.
24Authorized by Housing Act of 1964, Public Law 88-560. September 2,1964, 78 Stat. 769, 772.
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It appears that for some mortgage companies, the combination
of using someone else's money on virtually risk-free, FHA insured, invest-
ments has contributed to irresponsible mortgage loan originations. For
example, a mortgage loan officer for one of the largest national mortgage
companies, located in Philadelphia, indicated that he would not screen
out applicants even if he felt that they were ineligible for a mortgage
loan. He felt that this was HUD's job, not his.
Even if only four outof 10 marginal cases make it (i.e., get
approval from HUD) they ( the mortgage company) will take all 10
-- and let HUD decide. 25
Similarly, in testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust
-and Monopoly, a former Chairman of the Board of a New York mortgage
company stated that:
It was the practice of United Institutional Servicing Corp. to
close all loans, approved by FHA or VA...it was our feeling that
for every foreclosure at lgst 19 familes would be enabled to
find (better) quarters...
Interviews with two mortgage companies in Louisville demonstrated
the variation in lender attitudes on the issue of property inspections.
An officer at the larger company bluntly commented: "We don't do
property inspections, that's HUD's job." 27 But, in contrast, an officer
at a much smaller company noted that:
25Interview, Romeo Valentino, Loan Officer, Colonial Mortgage Company,
Philadelphia, Pa. January, 1973.
26New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 289.
27Interview, Harold Dickson, Assistant Vice President, Pence
Mortgage Co., Louisville Ky. February 19, 1974 (telephone).
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We inspect properties at origination. We've always done it.
We wouldn't disqualify a house, (because of bad repairs) but
we would write down what re airs are needed -- and send this
off to HUD with the forms. O
The sentiments expressed by the latter mortgage company are most in
line with classical notions of the role of the mortgage lender, whether
dealing with conventional or FHA loans.
Writing in the early 1960's, Willis Bryant, author of a text on
mortgage lending, described the importance of the lender's screening
function in the FHA system:
Each loan application should be approved by the lender in all
respects for any type of FHA loan or VA loan prior to submitting
the application to the FHA or the VA. It should be remembered
that these agencies do not see their potential borrower.Over a
period of more than twenty-seven years of handling FHA loans and
seventeen years of VA loans, because of preliminary screening
by the mortgagee, the number of applications disapproved by
FHA and VA ater preliminary approval by lenders is almost
negligible.
Thus, Bryant visualized the lender in the FHA programs as a true
representative, almost an arm, of the FHA.
Unfortunately, however, the Committee on Government Operations,
in examining the default and foreclosure problem on FHA-insured homes
in Detroit found that most mortgage companies in that city behaved more
like the first Louisville mortgage banker, quoted above.
28Interview, Bill Salyer, Assistant Vice President, Louisville
Mortgage Co., Louisville Ky. February 21, 1974 (telephone).
29Willis R. Bryant, op. cit. p. 143.
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Mortgage companies write mortgages for home purchasers and then
sell 100 percent FHA-backed mortgages to FNMA. Because of the
security afforded by this guarantee, most mortgage companies have
abdicated responsibility for screening potential home purchasers
and determining if the mortgaged property is structurally sound
and fairly valued. Neither FHA nor FNMA has taken steps to bar
imprudent mortgage lenders from doing business. 30
The following exchange between Rep. George Collins of Illinois and
Lawrence Katz, a former Director of the HUD Area Office in Milwaukee,
contributed to the Committee's conclusion, as stated above:
Mr. Collins: ...don't you feel that the obligation of determining
the quality of the security should be assured more by the lender
rather than FHA than it has been?
Mr Katz: It is a theory, but in fact it doesn't work; it doesn't
work for the very simple reason the lender is an interim lender.
The mortgages are taken by FNMA and GNMA.
Mr. Collins: He dnesn't give a damn?
Mr. Katz: His risk is almost nonexistent. He is not going to hold
a mortgage for 30 years. He turns it over to the quasi-government
agency, and the Government agency is the one who takes the mogfgages
and the risk. All of your mortgage bankers operate this way.
In contrast to-this type of mortgage company operation, it appears
that at least some commercial and savings banks are still cautious in
evaluating FHA-insured loans. Moreover, these types of lenders often
register shock upon learning that many mortgage companies do not operate
30Fifteenth Report By the Committee on Government Operations,
9. cit. p. 4-5.
31Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
"Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages (Part 2)" House of Representatives, 92nd
Cong. 2nd Sess. February and May, 1972. p. 161-162.
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in a similar manner.
For example, John H. Payne, the President and Chief Executive Officer
of the Empire National Bank learned, to his surprise, that their recently
acquired mortgage company never did any evaluation of FHA mortgages:
(In an)evaluation of the mortgage company's operations, (it was)
reported to me that one of the major problems influencing the
control of the quality of mortgages was the fact that there were
no internal procedures for approval of mortgage loans accepted for
processing.
In other words,...any mortgage on which a firm commitment was issued
by the FHA or VA was automatically closed without any further internal
investigation.
Because these loans were Government insured or guaranteed, it was
apparently assumed that there would be no substantial loss to the
company irrespective of whatever loss there might be to the Govern-
ment by virtue of its insurance or guarantee.
To those of us who have been used to doing a commercial banking
business, this was a novel procedure because we don't operate
on a nonapproval or nonreview practice. What the mortgage company
was doing was not consistent with what we've been accustomed to
doing in our bank relative to all types of loans, including those
which carry a Government guarantee;...
The functions of the marketplace in the mortgage banking area are
quite different from those of commercial banking. While we recog-
nized this before we acquired (the company).. .we were not prepared
to accept some of the practices those companies followed, practices
which were apparently common to the mortgage banking industry.3
Upon realizing that their acquired mortgage company had no procedures
for evaluating mortgages, Empire National Bank instituted its own internal
reviews. However, they found that the volume of mortgages derived from
local real estate brokers fell off substantially. With their income coming
32New York Antitrust Hearings op. cit. p. 212-213.
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from commissions on sales of real estate, most brokers chose a prospective
mortgagee based upon how likely and how rapidly they felt the financing
would be approved. Payne testified:
We recognize the validity of the real estate brokers' reply to
tougher underwriting standards, and I quote, "So, OK, I'll go
to another company. They'll accept anything I bring in."
And as the word spreads among the brokers that we are tightening
up, and as the word becomes exaggerated in its second and third
repetition, even the high-quality producer becomes concerned about
getting his mortgage approved and seeks alternate companies to
work with. 33
Because of the possibility of a painful decline in business "the temptation
of the mortgage company to accept any and all cases the broker produces
is great."34
Thus, the lender that unilaterally tries to tighten its procedures
or to impose lending standards could find itself out of business. This,
Payne felt, is a key rationale for tighter regulation of mortgage companies:
It is really not enough for individual mortgage companies, such as
our own, to tighten procedures and quality controls; the mortgage
banking industry needs legislated and regulated standards, much as
the banks of the country have through their banking regulatory
authorities.
Such regulations, in combination with quality standards applied with-
out favor by mortgage guarantee and mortgage insurance agencies, will
enable us all to compete on an even basis.
And, as most of us in the mortgage banking business do business in
many States, I believe that uniformity of these regulations and
standards among all of the States is vital. 35
33Ibid. p. 215-216.
34Ibid. p. 215.
35Ibid. p. 216.
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During the December, 1972 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee,
Rep. Ben Blackburn of Georgia noted that:
One of the criticisms of this program (235) has been that
the Government has given a check to the lender and said in
effect, "Whatever loss occurs, we will bear"...Under our
present operation the lender has no incentive. to protect
the houses to see that they are' properly maintained...36
Thus, the classic mortgagee job of assessing a family's ability
to pay the costs of the mortgage, or underwriting, has simply not been
performed by some mortgage companies. Similarly, property appraisal
-- including assessment of the house and location -- another long-standing
function of mortgagees has also been ignored by some mortgage companies.
Clearly, since HUD does not require the mortgagr to undertake any major
screening function, there is really very little motivation for mortgagees
to do so.37 But whatever type of job is performed by the lender, HUD
ultimately takes full risk and responsibility. 38  In view of both the
36Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Govern-
ment of the Joint Economic Committee, "Housing Subsidies and Housing Policies"
Congress of the U.S. 92nd. Cong. 2nd Sess. December 1972. p. 31-32.
37There may also be real motivation for mortgagees not to screen
applicants, lest they be charged with discrimination. This point was
made during a Hearing Before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, U.S. Senate, 94th. Cong. 1st. Sess. Chicago, July, 1975, p. 104.
38In some states, such as Massachusetts, state regulated financial
institutions are required to perform property inspections regardless of
whether the mortgage will be FHA-insured or conventional. Regulations governing
FHA loans by savings banks state that "all statutory requirements in respect
to appraising and approving real estate as security for conventional loans
shall be complied with..." Further, the bank must obtain for its files "an
appraisal of property securing the loan and certification as to the generalphysical condition of the property..." (Quoted in letter to David Rogers,
Boston Globe, from Thomas W. Lawless, Jr., Attorney for Massachusetts Commis-
sioner of Banks, June 6, 1974).
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minimal decision-making role of mortgagees, and of HUD's substantial risk,
one would expect that HUD would act in such a way that would consistently
serve to minimize its vulnerability. The extent to which HUD has fulfilled
this expectation will be discussed in Section III.
Ironically, not only has the lack of concern for underwriting not
been forbidden, it seems to be understood -- if not completely condoned --
by some HUD-FHA officials. For one thing, many HUD-FHA personnel were,
at one time, in the mortgage banking business themselves and still have
close ties and allegiances to the industry. 39
After being the Assistant Secretary for Housing Production and Mortgage
Credit and Commissioner of the FHA for only four days, Sheldon Lubar, coming
straight from a mortgage banking firm to the FHA, expressed these sentiments:
39Interview, William Bonner, op. cit. See also Boyer, op. cit. p. 95.
Boyer relates a story told to him by one of Secretary Romney's aides about
a powerful HUD Under Secretary and the Under Secretary's attempts not to
discipline a mortgage company that had been publicly caught with its hand
in the "honey pot." The aide had argued for strong measures against the firm
including long-term or permanent suspension. "Listen, you son-of-a-bitch,"
the Under Secretary told the aide. "You can be righteous, because your future
is open to you but I have to go back to the industry." Another indication of
the close ties between the mortgage banking industry and HUD-FHA was pointed
to during Congressional hearings held in 1970. Based upon an interview with
an FHA appraiser, it was learned that: His regional office is heavily influenced
by the mortgage and real estate industries. He denied any specific knowledge of
outright bribes but told of common occurrences where overtures had been made
to him personally. Moreover, many of the appraisers feel that their only
future lies in the possibility of 'good jobs' with the mortgagees or
the real estate firms." Committee on Banking and Currency, "Investigation
and Hearing of Abuses in Federal Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Programs"
Staff Report and Recommendations, House of Representatives 91st. Cong. 2nd
Sess. December 1970, p. 6.
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... You find that mortgage bankers or anyone else involved in the
housing industry, do whatever they are allowed to do. And if 221
financing is available for houses that are not inspected or the
credits are not looked at, I suppose they are generally going to
take advantage of it.40
Legislators, upset about the problems with the 235 program, have
looked for new techniques to modify the risk-free nature of mortgage lending
under the HUD-FHA programs in the hope that this would put a halt to ir-
responsible mortgage lending.
For example, Rep. Blackburn, after making the observation quoted
above, went on to note that:
We have protected the lender completely, and I think he ought
to share some of the loss. And if he did, he would look at the
value of that land, and he would say, "Wait a minute, I know the
fellow next door just bought a hundred acres at fifty percent less
or one-third of what they have appraised this land. I am not
going to loan money like that on this land."41
Thus, according to Blackburn, if lenders assume some risk, they
are likely to exert a tempering effect on the market and to act more
responsibly in lending decisions.
Outlining the basic theme of Congress' "coinsurance" program,42
Blackburn suggested:
that we instruct the lender, the mortgage tankers in effect, to
understand if this loan goes sour they are going to share in the
loan to the extent of at least twenty percent.43
40Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
"Review of Federal Housing Administration" (Part 1 -- The Financial Status of
FHA Mortgage Insurance Funds), House of Representatives, 93rd. Cong., 1st Sess.
July, 1973. p. 56 (Referred to as "Review of FHA Part 1, Hearings").
41Ibid. p. 42.
42Title III, Section 244; Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.
43Review of FHA Part 1, Hearings, op. cit. p. 32.
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According to this view, then, the lack of risk associated with
the mortgage companies' business is the primary cause of the irresponsible
types of activities which have been described above. Shifting some of
the risk in mortgage lending away from HUD and back onto the lenders
is one key way in which the HUD-FHA home finance system might be improved.
This issue will be discussed in greater detail in the final chapter.
e. Regulation:
Perhaps the two unique characteristics of mortgage companies,
discussed above, would have fewer adverse impacts on mortgagors if the
regulation of mortgage companies were tighter. However, in sharp con-
trast to other types of lenders, mortgage companies are subject to little
direct regulation or supervision. Unlike banks, savings and loan associations,
insurance companies, and mutual .savings banks, which are under the rig-
orous supervision of an array of state and/or Federal financial agencies,44
4 4The Federal Reserve Board regulates state charted banks which are
members of the Federal Reserve System; The Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion regulates insured state banks which are not members of the Federal
Reserve System; The Comptroller of the Currency regulates national banks;
and as discussed in Chapter 2, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulates
federally charted savings and loan associations.
In general, the above regulatory bodies supervise and examine member
banks. More specifically, the types ofa-tivities included in this regulation
are: establishing interest rates on deposits and loans; overseeing financial
records; establishing criteria for chartering, branching and mergers;
and setting reserve requirements.
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mortgage companies come under regulation only through the corporation
laws of the particular state in which they are incorporated. In addition,
since the great majority of mortgage companies seek HUD certification
and approval and have extensive dealings with FNMA, they must also meet
various requirements of HUD and FNMA. The relative lack of regulation of
mortgage companies is their third unique characteristic and, as mentioned
-above, may be the one that makes the other two so potentially problematic.
Klaman offers an explanation for the comparatively limited super-
vision of mortgage companies:
(This) may perhaps be explained on the grounds that they do
not hold deposits or other large reservoirs of funds of the
general public as do financial intermediaries.45
Yet, it is interesting to note that in 1971 the role of mortgage
companies in dealing with over three million FHA mortgagors, representing
almost $46 billion in FHA-insured mortgages,46 has not qualified them,
in the Federal government's opinion, for stricter regulation, more closely
approaching the supervision required of the other financial institutions. 47
The fact that HUD is the only regulatory agency of mortgage companies
does not necessarily mean that supervision is not performed properly.
45Saul B. Klaman, op. cit. p. 9.
46
. Calculated from MBA highlights of 1971, 2R. cit. and HUD Statistical
Yearbook, 1971, Washington, D.C. p. 184.
4 7Regulation of the other financial intermediaries has also come underfire; not for its laxity, but for its excessive strictness. For example,
there has been a movement toward enabling S&L's and mutual savings banks to
perform a wider range of banking functions. See, "Financial Institutions:Reform and the Public Interest," op. cit. and "The Report of the President'sCommission on Financial Structure and Regulation', Reed 0. Hunt, Chairman.December, 1971.
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However, it is unfortunate that this appears to be the case. Since
the shortcomings are largely HUD's, the issue of regulation will be
postponed until Chapter 10. For the present, it is important to note
that a recent report by the Comptroller General of the U.S. disclosed
widespread inadequacies and inconsistencies in HUD's mortgagee approval,
monitoring, and suspension procedures. While the intent of the report
was not "to develop the significance...of weaknesses noted"48 these
oversights in mortgage company regulation have opened the way for a
variety of careless, at best, and dishonest, at worst, mortgagee under-
writing practices.
Obviously, concerning the issue of regulation, mortgage companies
are content with the status quo. Oliver Jones, the Executive Vice President
of the MBA has noted that FHA, VA, FNMA, and GNMA all play a supervisory
role over mortgage companies. Although HUD has not exerted its authority
adequately, it is their responsibility to "find ways to implement the
nation's laws in an efficient and business-like way."49
Further, Jones outlined exactly what he feels is at stake if
mortgage companies become subject to more stringent regulation:
48Report to the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly Committee on
the Judiciary, "Processes for Approving and Monitoring Nonsupervised Mort-
gagees" U.S. Senate by the Comptroller General of the U.S. Nov. 8, 1973,
p. 5.
49
"Mortgage Banking Is Regulated!" The Mortgage Banker, Mortgage
Bankers Association of America, July, 1972, Vol 32. No. 10, p. 10.
-172-
Before the would-be regulators move into the field of mortgage
banking, they should consider the economic significance of a
financial institution that has the freedom to be flexible in
adjusting to change; the freedom to move into commercial lending,
into financing apartments; the freedom to seek mortgage funds
from all types of financial institutions, from the securities
markets, and from pension and trust funds.. .The nation must
retain the mortgage banker's flexibility to make these adjust-
ments. Other lenders are too restricted by regulation, law,
and custom to meet the nation's changing demands for mortgage
credit...50
In contrast to Jones' views, other institutional lenders have
articulated the need to regulate the mortgage banking business. Re-
flecting on his bank's experience in purchasing a problem-laden New
York City mortgage company, John H. Payne testified before the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly:
...the mortgage banking business needs to have some intelligent
program of regulation to protect the people of this country, just
as in the commercial banking business.
The State and national banking departments have set certain
requirements for the people who are allowed to go into this
business, both on the basis of their own moral backgrounds and
financial standards. We have certain capital requirements. We have
certain limitations of how, when, and where we can do business.
And we are examined, not only to make sure that our financial
records are all right, but also that we are following the ethical
rules and regulations laid down by the banking supervisory
authorities.
And I submit, Mr. Chairman, that we need this in the mortgage
banking business, too. I'm not prepared to be an expert in how
to set up the proper supervision of the mortgage banking business,
particularly only having been in it about 9 months, but I can see
the great similarity between that and commercial banking, and
certainly can see some of the things that need desperately to be
done, if we are going to protect the buyer, the public, and the
Government, and the taxpayer.51
50Ibid. p. 10.
51New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 217-218.
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Echoing Payne's comments, Isidore J. Lasurdo, the Executive
Vice-President of the Green Point Savings Bank in Brooklyn called
for:
all mortgage companies (to) be licensed and regulated so
they can operate in a more responsive and responsible manner.
Supervisory authorities should regularly examine not only 52
their records, but their overall objectives and operations.
Yet, at this writing, the situation is basically unchanged. Although
the mortgage company is the key lender in the HUD-FHA home finance
system, no regulatory body has been created to oversee their operations.
.However, on a more encouraging note, as discussed in Chapter 10, Sections
7 and 9, HUD has made some efforts to improve its own regulatory functions.
The extent to which these will be effective remains to be seen. But it
must be emphasized that regulation of mortgage companies is a key way
in which HUD could reduce its position of risk and, in turn, serve the
consumer's interests.
52Ibid. p. 755.
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CHAPTER 7: THE FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION AND THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET
1. INTRODUCTION:
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA, known as "Fannie
Mae"), is the most important agency of the secondary mortgage market
and has been called "the key factor of the entire housing situation."1
Indeed, FNMA is the link in the HUD-FHA home finance system that brings
the components together.
While the FHA created a standarized mortgage instrument that could
be traded throughout the country it did not, however, also create the
vehicle, or the market pace for those transactions. Furthermore,
while the FHA was able to reduce the lender's fear of loss due to fore-
closure -- or, in other words, minimize his risk -- it never addressed
the other critical fear of lenders -- also stemming Trom the Depression
-- of not having enough liquid assets to meet the demands of depositors.
Since mortgages are long-term investments a rush of withdrawals, such
as the one that occurred during the Depression, could leave lenders
without sufficient cash reserves. The FNMA has addressed these dual
needs: To make the FHA mortgage negotiable and to enable lenders to
achieve a totally liquid position.
The FNMA and mortgage companies function hand in hand. Mortgage
companies, lending money without any real assets of their own, rely
on a close relationship with FNMA -- as a so-called "secondary source
of funds" -- to provide the money to purchase their mortgages.
1Charles M. Haar, 2p. cit. p. 74.
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FNMA's growth as a holder of FHA insured home mortgages has been
2dramatic. As of 1971, FNMA held slightly under 10% of these mortgages
while in 1974 FNMA purchased 69% of all FHA insured mortgages issued
that year.3 FNMA's total portfolio more than quadrupled between 1968
*and March 1975 -- from an outstanding balance of $7.2 billion to
almost $30 billion.4 (See Table 8) Thus, with the creation and growth
of the secondary mortgage market a new layer of bureaucracy was added
to the HUD-FHA home finance system.
The growth in the secondary mortgage market has meant that there
is a growing trend for FHA-insured mortgages to be serviced by an
agent other than the holder. In both 1950 and 1960, about 45% of the
FHA-insured mortgages wcire not serviced by the mortgage holder. By
1970, the percentage had jumped to 62%.(See Table 9)
This is in striking contrast to the servicing of non FHA-insured
loans. Between 1950 and 1970, at least 89% of the conventional loans
were serviced by the mortgage holder. (See Table 9)
In addition, as of 1971, only 36% of the FHA insured single family
mortgages had been originated by the current holder, as compared to an
overwhelming 88% of the conventional mortgages. (See TablelO) Also
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Residential Finance, 1971, pp. cit. p. 70
3Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
"Mortgagee Servicing and HUD Property Management," House of Representatives,
94th. Cong. 1st. Sess. July, September and October, 1975, p. 74.
4Ibid. p. 84.
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TABLE 8
Dollar Value of FNMA Loan Portfolio as of March 31, 1975
(In Billions)
Non-
Subsidized Subsidized Total
Home Mortgages:
FHA
VA
Conventional
Project Mortgages:
FHA
TOTAL Unpaid Principal
Balance
3.0 10.3
8.3
2.2
4.8
7.8
1.3
22.1
13.3
8.3
2.2
6.1
29.9
Source: "Mortgage Servicing and HUD Property Management," p. 84.
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TABLE 9
Servicing of FHA & Conventional 1-Unit Owner-Occupied Properties
1950-1970
Serviced Serviced
by Holder by Agent TOTAL
1950
FHA 55% 45% 100%
Conv. 89% 11% 100%
1960
FHA 54% 46% 100%
Conv. 89% 11% 100%
1970
FHA 38% 62% 100%
Conv. 93% 7% 100%
,%-7u0.Cu 5t.- P- v-&s, o,!;L
10 '. loco lq-70.
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TABLE 10
Holder's Acquisition of First Mortgage
1-Unit Homeowner Properties, 1971
United States
Originated by
Holder
Purchased from
Present Servicer
Purchased from
Someone Else
Not Reported
TOTAL
(Numbers of Mortgages in Thousands)
FHA % VA % Conventional % TOTAL %
1471 36 1058 38 10878 88 13407 70
1977 50 1245 45 704 6 3926 20
521 13 453 16 517 4 1491 8
28 1 27 1 221 2 276 2
3997 100 2783 100 12320 100 19100 100
Source: Residential Finance p. 71
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significant is the fact that 13% of all FHA mortgages were held by
mortgagees that had neither originated the mortgages nor purchased
them from the current services, as compared to only 4% of all con-
ventional mortgages.5 (See Table 10) Thus, in these mortgage trans-
actions, at least three parties were involved.
This chapter will present some background material on the secondary
mortgage market and FNMA and will discuss how its activities have further
minimized risk for lenders and impacted the consumer.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Residential Finance, 1971, op. cit. p. 71.
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2. NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATIONS: PREDECESSORS OF FNMA:
The National Housing Act of 1934 not only created the FHA, but
it also contained the enabling legislation for the creation of private
national mortgage associations "to purchase and sell first mortgages
on real estate."'
In the following statement, Charles Haar summarizes why a need
for this type of institution was perceived by the drafters of the
legislation.
The financial community had grown accustomed to short-term,
low-ratio, unamortized mortgages. Draftsmen of the National
Housing Act foresaw that the FHA mortgage, with its low
interest rate, long term, and high loan-to-value ratio would
be an object of suspicion to bankers, inevitably a conservative
group, despite the existence of government insurance. In
addition, lenders, in those days of the Great Depression,
harried by a need for liquidity, would hesitate to take up
FHA mortgages were they unsalable beyond the immediate con-
fines of a local and, owning to the newness of the FHA mort-
gage, spotty market. Thus, the private national mortgage
associations were looked on as a means of assuring lenders
that the FHA mortgages were sound nd would be taken off
their hands should they so desire.
Thus, the key role that the national mortgage associations were to
play was to help lenders gain confidence in the new FHA mortgage by
providing them with both liquidity and new markets for the sale of FHA
mortgages. In addition, Jones and Grebler note that:
1Title III, National Housing Act of 1934, op. cit. Sec. 301.
2 Charles M. Haar, op. cit. p. 76-77.
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The associations were also intended to supply a means by which
funds could be more easily transferred from capital-surplus to
capital-deficit areas and effective mortgage interest rates more
nearly equalized throughout the country. As primary lenders
were givEnaccess to dependable purchasers of.FHA loans, it was
hoped that they would use the proceed from the sale of existing
mortgages for investment in new ones.
The creation of national mortgage associations was perceived as a critical
component of the post-Depression home finance package and a stimulant
to the ailing construction industry. The first annual report of the
Federal Housing Administration stated that:
...the operation of such associations is regarded as vital to
the effective and rapid growth of the mutual mortgage insurance
plan, and should constitute an enduring part of the new h me
financing system which this Administration is fostering."
It is indeed a credit to the Congress that this sophisticated
measure was conceived and enacted at the same time that the FHA
mortgage insurance plan was created. However, there was a pervasive
lack of interest among private parties to form national mortgage
associations.
Despite repeated attempts by Congress to entice private capital
into this type of venture, private national mortgage associations never
became more than a much-talked about idea. 5 A variety of reasons have
been offered to try to explain why no private associations were ever
formed. One particularly plausible reason is suggested by Jones and
3Oliver Jones and Leo Grebler, The Secondary Mortgge Market (Los
Angeles: University of California, 1961) p. 115.
4Quoted in Ibid. p. 115.
5In Ibid. p. 116-117 and Charles M. Haar, op. cit. p. 79-80 the series
of amendments passed by Congress in attempts to encourage the formation of
private national mortgage associations are reviewed.
6For complete and excellent discussions on the lack of interest in forming
private national mortgage associations see Ibid. p. 117 and p. 83, respectively.
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Grebler:
The depressed general conditions of the thirties were not con-
ducive to the formation of new financial institutions as private
ventures. Th5 investment quality of the insured mortgage was
yet unproven.
Thus, if bankers were conservative about using the FHA-insured
mortgage, it is likely that they, as well as other private parties,
would be even more wary about an even more complex concept. The national
mortgage association was to enter into transactions considerably more
intricate than simply originating mortgages. Yet, business activity
would still be based on the inherent worth of the FHA mortgage something
that, as mentioned previously, was still unfamiliar. However, once
the FHA mortgage did begin to prove itself as a worthy instrument, it is
interesting that even then -- and up until 1948 -- when authorization
to form private national mortgage associations was finally repealed --
that no private party took the initiative. Haar's explanation is that:
"given a government supported secondary market it was more profitable
for lenders to operate in the primary field where two backstops were
present."8 Thus, with FHA insurance greatly reducing risk due to fore-
closure and with the promise of liquidity through the government supported
secondary market, mortgage lenders began to enjoy a relatively risk-free
business environment.
7Oliver Jones and Leo Grebler, Ibid. p. 117.
8Charles M. Haar, op. cit. p. 84.
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3. THE EMERGENCE OF A GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET:
a) RFC Mortgage Company:
With no interest to form national mortgage associations generated
in the private sector, the government perceived a need to become directly
involved with this function; the Reconstruction Finance Company (RFC)
Mortgage Company was created in 1935 for this purpose.
Ironically, while the legislators who enacted the National Housing
Act of 1934 had realized that there would be a need for institutions that
could trade FHA-insured home mortgages that had been originated by private
lenders, the initial role of the RFC Mortgage Company was not directed to
this goal. Instead, it was authorized to originate and finance mortgages
on apartment houses, motels and office buildings, if financing was not
obtainable at reasonable rates from private sources. Thusthe RFC
Mortgage Company's activities were originally limited to loans
for new construction or to the financing of income-producing real estate.1
Shortly after its creation, however, officials of both the FHA
and RFC instructed the RFC Mortgage Company to purchase FHA-insured
mortgages on residential housing, thereby hoping to further stimulate
the construction industry and loosen the mortgage market. Between 1935
and 1948, when the RFC Mortgage Company was dissolved, it had purchased
IFederal National Mortgage Association "Background and History, 1973",p. 2. To carry out its functions, the RFC supplied the RFC Mortgage Company
with an initial revolving fund of $10 million. This was later increased
to $25 million. Oliver Jones and Leo Grebler,op. cit. p. 117.
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63,424 mortgages with a value of over $250 million.2
b) FNMA:
With the recognition that the RFC Mortgage Company could not alone
provide the needed secondary source of funds to the still sluggish housing
industry Congress, in 1938, created the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion.3 Clearly focusing on the need to stimulate construction, Congress
limited FNMA purchases to mortgages on new construction. The RFC Mort-
gage Company then assumed the responsibility of purchasing mortgages
not eligible for FNMA purchase, such as those on existing housing.4
While the mandate for national mortgage associations and, later,
FNMA, grew out of the need to help stimulate construction by offering
lenders liquidity on FHA-loans, FNMA has also been used for a variety
of other functions.
Writing in 1960, Jack Guttentag observed that FNMA carried out
four distinct functions that had been legislated by Congress.5 Among
those that were specified in the 1938 legislation were, as discussed
above, "to increase the general level of residential construction" and
"to make a market in Federally underwritten mortgages."6 Two additional
2FNMA "Background and History," op. cit. p. 3, Between 1946 and 1948
the RFC Mortgage Company also purchased 24,070 VA guaranteed mortgages with
a value of over $140 million-.
3The FNMA was chartered on February 10, 1938 and was originally called the
National Mortgage Association of Washington. Two months later this name was changed
to FNMA.
40liver Jones & Leo Grebler, op. cit. p. 121.
5Jack Guttentag, "The Federal National Mortgage Association" -- Research
Study #2 in George F. Break et al. Federal Credit Agencies (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963) p. 67.
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roles were made explicit in the Housing Act of 1954 -- "to provide
special assistance to specific housing programs" 7 and "to convert
to private ownership." 8
This last goal was realized with the passage of the Housing and
Urban Development Act of 1968; FNMA became privately owned although
it is still subject to Federal supervision and regulation. The 1968
legislation also removed two of FNMA's earlier functions -- the financing
of so called "special assistance" programs and the management and
liquidation of certain mortgages held by the Federal government. The
Government National Mortgage Association, (GNMA, known as "Ginnie Mae")
a wholly owned government entity was created to carry out these two
functions. FNMA, as it now stands, conducts secondary mortgage market
activities in FHA, VA, and conventional mortgages.
7Assistance to special housing programs, such as armed services
and disaster housing had developed on an ad hoc basis between 1951 and
1954. It was not, however, made a formal part of FNMA's activities until
1954. Ibid. p. 68.
8While this did not become explicit until 1954, the desire to create
a private secondary mortgage market facility was, as mentioned above, the
original intent of the 1934 legislation.
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c. GNMA
GNMA is another mechanism which the government has created to en-
courage the involvement of lending institutions in order to increase the
volume of housing and, particularly, low-moderate income housing. GNMA,
along with FNMA, provides lenders with liquidity. However, unlike FNMA,
GNMA only buys certain loans that the government has designated eligible
in order to increase mortgage credit for special purpose housing programs.
GNMA's basic operation is known as the Tandem Plan. GNMA buys loans
at par, or close to par (the full face value of the mortgage) and then
sells it to FNMA at prevailing market prices. The difference in price
--or, the loss to GNMA, is subsidized by the government. Thus, GNMA's
operation is one of buying high and selling low.
In addition to selling loans to FNMA, GNMA can also sell loans back
to the originator of the loan at a lower price, which is in line with
current market prices. In this way, GNMA supports the price of mortgages
and encourages the participation of private investors, with the end-of-
the-road goal of increasing the supply of housing for low-moderate income
families.
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4) THE MORTGAGE MARKET AND FNMA:
The level of housing construction swings up and down. However,
peaks in construction do not occur during economic booms. Instead,
they occur when the economy is sluggish. A Decent Home has explained
this seeming paradox:
When industrial production is high, there generally is an
expansion of capital investment which tends to increase the
cost of money, in turn resulting in higher housing costs.
When the economy starts down, the cost of money decreases
and housing production tends to increase. For this reason
economists tend to say that housing production is "counter-
cyclical."1
While some economists feel that it is appropriate for housing to function
as a "sponge" and to help stimulate a faltering economy, others feel
that housing carries an unnecessary, unfair and costly burden.
As mentioned above, one of FNMA's original goals was to increase
the general level of residential construction. However, FNMA's role
as a counter-cyclical device -- pumping money into the mortgage market
when financing for mortgages becomes scarce and interest rates high --
was not made explicit until 1968.
In introducing the 1968 Housing legislation to the Senate,
Secretary Weaver concluded his comments concerning the partitioning of
FNMA into two agencies by adding that:
'A Decent Home, op. cit. p. 127.
2For example, Prof. Arnold C. Harberger has cone so far as to state
that: "I'd be worried if housing were not being squeezed, because the tight
monetary policy would not be having its desired effect.. .We have got to allow
tight monetary policy if we are going to have an effective fine-tuning or
short-run stablizing policy tool in our kit..." in "Housing and Monetary Policy"
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series No. 4 p. 37.
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It is my hope, too, that (these measures) can reduce the
scope of cyclical movements in the mortgage money market
that we have experienced in the past.3
Several other witnesses at the House and Senate Hearings echoed
Weaver's desire to offset the swings in the construction industry.
For example, Lloyd E. Clarke, President of the National Association of
Home Builders, observed that there is an:
imperative need to remove some of the impediments to unleashing
the vigor and capacity of private enterprise...The homebuilding
industry is still suffering from the credit debacle of 1966 and
is now being hit by another money squeeze. Real, substantial,
and sustained progress toward curing the housing problems of
America is extremely difficult, if not impossible, so long as
the homebuilding industry is allowed periodically to beco e
the first and sometimes the only casualty of tight money.
Although FNMA's counter-cyclical goals did not become explicit
until 1968, many of FNMA's earlier efforts were aimed at evening out
the swings in the construction industry. However, by being tied to
the Federal budget, it was difficult for FNMA to carry out this function
optimally. Rosen and Kearl offer a concise explanation:
3HUD Senate Hearings 1968, op. cit. p. 15.
4Ibid. p. 289. However, Clarke was pessimistic that this could be
achieved through the FNMA/private - GNMA/public combination:
Certainly the concept of a private FNMA has a great deal of appeal.
It would free the secondary market function from the present budget
and other constraints.. .Yet, in considering our position on this
issue.. .we question whether the resultant institution would be
adequate to do the job -- whether the revised FNMA could continue
to perform the vital functions of support for the mortgage financing
of homebuyers and of the homebuilding industry.. .We think the
objective of removing FNMA Secondary market operations from the
Federal budget could be accomplished in some other way and with
less risk of disturbing the entire mortgage market. p. 296.
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Prior to (1968) FNMA operations were included in the Federal
budget and as a consequence mortgage acquistions which added to
the Federal deficit were discouraged even when they were needed
to stabilize the market.5
Thus, while FNMA might have tried to purchase mortgages during
periods of tight money, thereby pumping more money into the mortgage
market, those purchases were discouraged by the Federal government
because they were treated as deficits.
Since 1968, however, FNMA has been credited with diminishing
the severity of credit crunches and with helping to maintain a flow
of credit into housing.6 Thus, FNMA plays a critical role in the
housing and money markets.
But while the production of housing is an end-of-the-road goal,
other intervening goals are also addressed by FNMA's activities. For
example, many private actors, such as homebuilders and mortgage lenders
depend upon FNMA for helping to stabilize their businesses. It is clearly
5Kenneth Rosen and James Kearl, op. cit. p. 3.
In addition, Guttentag has noted another interesting conflict between
FNMA's counter-cyclical goal and another of its original, as well as present,
purposes -- that of providing a market for mortgages:
It is characteristic of this function (making a market) that although
the dealer himself determines the price at any given moment (which
is what "making a market" means), over a period of time he is a com-
pletely passive agent; he registers, as it were, the consensus of
others. The function of making markets is thus quite distinct, and
to some extent probably operationally inconsistent, with functions
that involve influencing markets -- for example, exercising a counter-
cyclical influence on construction, or reducing yield differentials
between different areas of the country. It would be extremely difficult
to register the consensus of the market with one hand while altering
it with the other. Jack Guttentag, OP. cit . p. 124-125.
6Dr. Harry Schwartz in "Housing and Monetary Policy" op. cit. p. 85.
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critical to bankers that FNMA pump money into mortgages when other
investors look to other higher yielding investments. Without FNMA,
many mortgage banking concerns would suffer. In addition, the con-
struction industry, as articulated in the above statement by Lloyd
Clarke, has a significant interest in a constant level of residential
construction.
Similar to the multiple goals of housing legislation, FNMA is
charged the major tasks of helping to stabilize a key sector of the
economy--housing, as well as enabling more people to purchase homes.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, FNMA provides lenders with liquidity,
thereby giving them a second level of protection, on top of the FHA
insurance.
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5. OPERATION OF FNMA:
FNMA buys FHA and VA mortgages from approved mortgagees, pri-
marily through its Free Market System. FNMA has created an "auction"-
like procedure whereby mortgagees bid to sell mortgages to FNMA at a
specific price. Prior to the "auction", which is usually conducted
every other week, FNMA decides on the minimum and maximum amounts
that can be bid by any mortgagee.
Based upon the mortgagee's knowledge of the mortgage market,
he decides on the dollar amount of mortgages to be offered and the
yield. That is, he estimates the lowest yield that he feels FNMA
is likely to accept. Mortgagees making bids in this manner must pay
an "offer fee" to FNMA of .01 percent of the mortgagc amount being
offered.
When all the bids are entered, FNMA decides on the dollar amount
of mortgages and the range of yields to accept. If a mortgagee's bid
is accepted, he must pay FNMA a "commitment fee" of .5 percent of the
mortgage amount. Thus, if a mortgagee's bid on mortgages worth $500,000
is accepted by FNMA, the mortgagee will have to pay a total of $550
to obtain the commitment. ($50 = offer fee; $500 = commitment fee)1
If a mortgagee does not want to bid competitively he also has the
option of bidding non-competitively or, in other words, he agrees to
IMortgagees whose bids are rejected must also pay the offer fee,
which is nonrefundable.
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accept the average yield which FNMA determines through the auction pro-
cedure. For the seller, bidding non-competitively carries the advantage
of excusing him from the .01 percent non-refundable "offer fee." How-
ever, it is disadvantageous in that the seller loses the opportunity
of obtaining a commitment at less than the average yield. Therefore,
while the seller won't pick up a bargain through non-competitive bidding,
it is certainly a less risky and less costly way of obtaining a commit-
ment.
If a seller's bid is accepted, FNMA agrees to purchase the accepted
amount of mortgages at the specified yield for a period of four months.
If the seller cannot meet this deadline, or if he chooses to sell the
mortgages to another investor with whom he can get a better yield, he
is released of any commitment to FNMA.
If, however, the seller does wish to sell to FNMA, he must deliver
the package of mortgages, at the specified yield, to FNMA within 4 months
of the commitment. Upon delivery, the seller must pay .25 percent of
the unpaid principal balance of the mortgages he is selling to FNMA.
This sum represents a subscription to FNMA common stock.
Chart 3 presents an example of a series of possible bids during a
given auction. After the close of the bidding, FNMA decides that it will
buy mortgages offered with prices between 95.07 and 96.00, with corresponding
yields of 9.731% and 9.589%, respectively. Based upon this decision,
sellers 2 and 4 would not receive commitments, while all the other bids
would be accepted.
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CHART 3
Hypothetical FNMA Auction
$ Amount
of Mortgages
Beinq Offered
85,000
1,480,000
190,000
45,000
725,000
1,300,000
810,000
340,000
190,000
1,660,000
*FNMA will accept bids of
*FHA Interest Rate = 9%
Yield Pri ce/$100
-t 4 4
9.703
9.505
9.642
9.560
9.600
9.589
9.689
9.671
9.731
9.712
95.25
96.56
95.65
96.19
95.93
96.00
95.34
95.46
95.07
95.19
up to $2,000,000
1 Selling Price
80,963
1,429,532
181-,735
43,286
695,493
1,248,000
772,254
324,564
180,633
1,580,154
These yields and prices are based upon an actual open bid auction
held during the first week of December, 1974. However, the specificbids are hypothetical.
FNMA accepts mortgages with prices - 95.07-96.00; which have corresponding
yields of 9.731%-9.589%.
Source: Federal National Mortgage Association, "Mortgage Yield ConversionTables and Supplemental Amortization Tables," 2nd. Edition, 1972.
Seller 1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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It is important to point out that the lower the price that FNMA
has to pay for a given block of mortgages, the higher the yield. Thus,
sellers "3" and "9", who are both offering mortgages with a principal
balance of $190,000, sell these mortgages to FNMA at two different
prices, based on the yields which they bid. Clearly, seller "9" does
not do as well as seller "3". Seller "3" will receive $181,735 while
seller "9" will only receive $180,633 for $190,000 worth of mortgages.
However, from FNMA's point of view, it is happier with the deal that it
makes with seller "9". On seller "9's" mortgages, FNMA's yield will be
9.731%, while the yield will only be 9.642% on seller "3's" mortgages.
FNMA raises money to buy these mortgages by selling debentures and
short term discount notes on the open market. These securities, while
not backed by the full faith and credit of the United States, have the
special "Federal Agency" status which makes them highly marketable.
As of March, 1975, FNMA's outstanding debt totaled $2.8 billion in dis-
count notes and $25.4 billion in debentures. 2
In addition, FNMA has raised equity capital through the issuance
of about 47.5 million shares of stock which are held by about 18,500
individuals and organizations.3 Servicers are required to purchase and
retain stock equal to 1/4 of 1% of the principal amount of mortgages
held by FNMA. Thus, if a mortgage company services mortgages with an out-
standing balance of $3 million for FNMA, it would be required to hold $7500
in FNMA stock.
2
"Mortgage Servicing and HUD Property Management" op. cit. p. 85.
3Ibid. p. 85.
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6. IS FNMA A TRUE SECONDARY MARKET FACILITY? POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF
THIS QUESTION:
Jones and Grebler, authors of one of the most important analyses of
the secondary mortgage market have offered the following definition of
this function.
The secondary market for residential mortgages is that part of the
mortgage market in which existing mortgages are bought and sold.
The primary market, on the other hand, is that part of the market
in which mortgages are originated. Thus, the primary market in-
volves an extension of credit and the secondary market a sale of
the credit instrument.
This definition excludes transactions from the secondary market
that were preceded by the buyer's promise to purchase the loans
prior to their acquisition by the seller. In such "sales," the
transaction is no more than a transfer from agent to principal
and is, therefore assigned to the primary market. Thus, the
definition of the secondary market is limited to sales of mort-
gages without prior commitment from the buyer.1
Jones and Grebler also note that their definition of the secondary
mortgage market is unique.
The FHA, for example, classifies statistics on activity in FHA mort-
gages according to originations, purchases, and sales. The latter
are labeled "secondary market transfers" without distinguishing be-
tween committed and uncommitted transactions. Similarly, it is com-
mon in the trade to describe t e aggregate volume of purchases and
sales as the secondary market.
While Jones and Grebler are willing to accept such transfers as
secondary market transactions in a statistical sense, they "cannot be
classified as secondary market activities for purposes of economic analysis."
IOliver Jones and Leo Grebler, op. cit, p. 4.
2Ibid.
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The key factor then, in determining whether a
given transaction is primary or secondary rests upon whether or not the
originator has a pre-commitment from a buyer. Only when no pre-commitment
has been made, do Jones and Grebler label the transaction as secondary.
Thus, "the compelling criteria are entrepreneurial decision-making and
risk-taking."3
Prior to the passage of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968, FNMA operated as a secondary mortgage market facility, as defined
by Jones and Grebler. In purchasing mortgages "over-the-counter" lenders
had to make the lending decision without assurances as to whether or not
FNMA would purchase these mortgages.4
But with FNMA's auction procedure, in which delivery of the mortgages
is optional, depending on whether the mortgage originator can sell them
for a higher price to another investor, FNMA has been criticized for
being something of a lender of "last resort."5 That is, a lender that
is willing to buy any mortgage as long as it is FHA insured.
3Ibid.
4Dr. Harry S. Schwartz, Vice President and Chief Economist of FNMA
has noted that the "over-the-counter" program had a component that enabled
lenders to deliver mortgages 45 or even 90 days in the future. Thus, even
pre-1968 FNMA was not a strict secondary mortgage market facility according
to Jones and Grebler's definition. Harry S. Schwartz, In"Housing and Monetary
Policy,"op. cit. 1970. p. 77.
5Brian Boyer, op. cit. p. 109.
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Comments by high FNMA officials provide fuel for this argument.
For example, Raymond H. Lapin, while president of FNMA, made the fol-
lowing comments before the First Annual meeting of stockholders of FNMA,
in 1969.
In effect, we treat FHA and VA loans as interchangeable assests such
as negotiable securities. To us, one FHA or VA mortgage is just as
good as another. There is nothing unique about any one mortgage.
The house itself is not the critical criteria, nor is the location,
nor is the home owner. As a mortgage investment, the thing that
matters is the FHA insurance or VA guarantee.6
Similarly, Oakley Hunter, the present Chairman of the Board and
President of FNMA, has recently stated that:
FNMA does not itself underwrite FHA insured loans which it purchases.
This means that FNMA fully accepts the FHA insurance in making its
investment in an FHA insured loan without regard to the credit
worthiness of the individual borrower, the character of the neighbor-
hood in which the property is located, or the value of the property
itself... FNMA believes that it should and must be the ultimate
responsibility of the FHA to make the determination as to the credit
worthiness of the individual borrower and the investment value of
the property securing the FHA insured mortgage.7
Unlike FNMA, not all purchasers of FHA/VA mortgages on the secondary
market view the mortgages as simply "interchangeable assests" or "paper."
For example, Isidore Lasurdo, the Executive Vice President of the
Green Point Savings Bank in Brooklyn expressed what he felt were the unique
practices of his bank before they were willing to purchase mortgages.
6Raymond H. Lapin, President, FNMA; speaking at the First Annual meeting
of stockholders of FNMA, reprinted in FNMA News, May 15, 1969.
7
"Mortgage Servicing and HUD Property Management" p. cit. p. 89.
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...we appraise each property. We inspect each property...Whether
we originate it directly or by assignment. We do not buy bulk
loans by assignment. If the package is offered to us, we enter-
tain on one loan at a time... If we buy $1 million worth of loans
by assignment.. .and say they constitute 50 different loans, we
will issue 50 different commitments, assuming we take the 50.
We may just take 25 or 30. For whatever reason, if.. .we do not
like something about any particular loan, that we look at, we do
not commit for it. We only commit for those loans that satisfy
our practices as we understand them--evaluation and underwriting.8
And, Frank Caruso, an official of a large New York bank testified
that:
There are some investors who are much more stingent in their
requirement. We use, internally, a term, we say, "there are
buyers of paper" and then, "there are buyers of loans"...In
other words, as long as it's insured or guaranteed, they will
buy. Others will look at the credit criteria and they will
set their own standards which you'll have to meet.9
Yet, in spite of these comments, interview with
mortgage originators produced a mixed reaction to the question: "Are
some investors choosier than others about the loans that they buy from
you? What type of investor is FNMA?"
Similar to the above testimony by the New York bankers, a Boston
savings and loan association official stated:
Mortgage bankers sort out the stuff (the loans). FNMA usually
gets the junk.10
Harold Dickson, a Louisville mortgagor banker said:
All investors have different underwriting criteria. For example, Western
Southern Ljfe Insurance Company, (their major purchaser) is stricter
than FNMA.1'
8New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 757.
9Ibid. p. 225.
10Interview, C.L. Gildroy, Northeast Federal Savings and Loan Association,
Watertown, Mass. February, 1974.
11Interview, Harold Dickson, op. cit.
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And, a Vice President of the Kislak Mortgage Company responded:
Some investors are absolutely choosier than others...
We know what the investor wants.. .But some investors do
send some stuff back anyway. FNMA is less choosy. They
will buy any FHA or VA loan period. And thank God for
FNMA and GNMA.12
But, balancing out these comments, other mortgage bankers felt that
FNMA's requirements for purchasing mortgages was equal to, or even stricter
than those of other investors.
For example, the Senior Vice President of a Richmond, Virginia mortgage
company said that:
FNMA has strict underwriting rules. I have no sense that we sell
them the worst mortgages. But some of the mortgages that we have
sold to GNMA are loans hat you wouldn't make and I wouldn't make,
but FHA approves them.1
Thus, there is no definitive conclusion on the extent to which FNMA's
presence in the mortgage market encourages lenders to originate marginal
loans only because of the added cushion and assurance of liquidity which
FNMA provides. Based upon the above comments, one can only conclude that
FNMA has sometimes, and to some lenders, provided a negative influence on the
quality of mortgage loan originations, thereby allowing some people to become
homeowners who should probably be screened out of homeownership.
12Interview, Robert R. Jordan, Vice President, J.I. Kislak Mortgage Company
Newark, N.J. November 6, 1974 (telephone).
13Interview, Donald Luff, op. cit.
14Interview, Stuart Blanton, op. cit.
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7. SUMMING UP THE POST-1968 HUD-FHA HOME FINANCE SYSTEM: IMPACTS ON THE
CONSUMER AND QUESTIONS YET TO BE ANSWERED:
The HUD-FHA home finance system, since at least 1968, has had the
following characteristics:
1) The interest rate that can be charged on FHA-insured mortgages is
regulated by Congress. An important side-effect of this policy is "points"
or discounts, which results in mortgage notes which have a greater value
than the actual amount of money forwarded by the lender.
2) Lenders have two cushions against risk. FHA insurance diminishes the
risk due to foreclosure and FNMA provides liquidity.
3) The FHA insurance, combined with the lack of mortgage companies having
any capital from depositors, has encouraged many, if not most, lenders
not to perform the classic mortgagee tasks of property appraisal and
mortgagor credit analysis.
4) Servicers are the representatives of mortgagees and neither lender nor
servicer is required to be in close proximity to the mortgagor.
5) Mortgages are sold and traded on the secondary mortgage market, fre-
quently without any concern for either the quality of the property or the
ability of the mortgagor to pay.
6) Mortgage bankers are regulated primarily by HUD and, to some extent,
their activities are also under scrutiny by FNMA.
In Chapter 6, the impacts of points 3 and 4, above, on the consumer
were discussed. Yet, the question of what impacts these other characteristics
have on the consumer remains to be answered.
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The government has supported home finance and has made lending
relatively risk-free and, in so doing, has shifted risk onto itself.
FNMA has pumped money into the mortgage market; it has fueled the
growth of the mortgage banking business and it has assisted the con-
struction industry, at least to some degree, in stabilizing new housing
construction.
In the course of these improvements to the home finance system,
the consumer has also benefited by being given an easier access to a
more stable flow of mortgage credit. But have these characteristics
also had negative impacts on the consumer?
As one FNMA employee said, quoted in Chapter 6, the bad part of
the current operations of the home finance system is the "impersonaliza-
tion." But what does this really mean? Close personal contact between
mortgagee and mortgagor may not be at all important as long as no problems
arise. Thus, it may not matter that the "behind the scenes" activities
of the mortgage market are humming along. But when a mortgagor does
need to make contact with the lender the simple act of communication is,
as discussed in Chapter 6 Section 3.b.,more difficult.
Thus, the cushions for the lender in the home finance system
and the extra layer of bureaucracy represented by the secondary mortgage
market, may not be particularly problematic as long as there is no need
for contact to be made between mortgagee and mortgagor. But in the default
situation, the mortgagor must contact the system and the mortgagee or his
servicer must respond if the family is to avoid foreclosure.
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In addition, for the lower income, more marginal mortgagor, who
needs extra help and understanding, the impersonalization of the home
finance system may have serious implications. It may mean that families
who are really in no position to become homeowners are allowed to do so,
since the secondary mortgage market and FHA shift the risk in the lending
decision away from the mortgage originator.
Both FNMA and many mortgagees look to HUD-FHA for making the lending
decision. The historic role of the lender in underwriting is gone and
the secondary mortgage market investors are involved in maintaining the
flow of mortgage credit and providing lenders with liquidity. The tradi-
tional risk-takers in the home finance system no longer assume any risk;
the dominant feeling is that "This is HUD's job." The key question then
becomes: What has HUD's role been in accepting this risk and, in turn,
in protecting the consumer, particularly the low-moderate income consumer,
in homeownership?
In addition to the above, the remaining portions of the thesis will
focus on how the home finance system operates when a mortgagor goes into
default. Specifically,
- How do mortgage servicers respond?
- What role does FNMA play when a mortgagor goes into default?
- What role does FNMA play in supervising mortgage companies, particularly
as they act in the default situation?
- What is the significance of points, specifically with regard to
the default situation?
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SECTION III:
THE ROLE OF HUD IN
ACCEPTING RISK AND IN
PROTECTING CONSUMER
INTERESTS IN HOMEOWNERSHIP
PROGRAMS
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In the first two sections of this thesis Federal homeownership
legislation and key aspects of the home finance system were analyzed
in order to understand how the government has shifted risk away from
private lending institutions and onto itself; how the goal of enhancing
lender participation by reducing their risk, in conjunction with the
other goals of homeownership legislation, have impacted consumers;
and how various operations of the present complex home finance system
have presented problems for some homeowners.
In this section, HUD's role in relation to the consumer will be ana-
lyzed in order to assess the extent to which HUD has assumed the re-
sponsibilities inherent in its risk-taking position. Given HUD's vul-
nerability, as well as its role as a public agency, one would anticipate
that HUD would take a strong stand in protecting its own interests and
the interests of consumers.
This expectation has a basis in Federal legislation. The Housing
Act of 1954 clearly articulated the consumer-oriented role of any Federal
housing agency, administering any housing program:
The first responsibility...of any agency administering.. .the
housing program(s), is to protect and preserve the public in-
terest in general and the rights of homeowners in particular.
Agencies participating in housing programs shall at all times
regard as a primary responsibility their duty to act in the
interest of the individual home purchaser and in so doing pro-
tect his interest to the extent feasible.1
Yet, HUD must manage to protect itself and to perform in a consumer-
oriented fashion without any formal direct contact with individuals. In
1Housing Act of 1954, Public Law 560, 68 Stat. 590, 593.
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fact, the purchaser can go through the entire home purchase process with-
out ever communicating with a HUD representative.2
On this point, George Romney, in meetings with FHA officials is
said to have expressed amazement at learning that the FHA rarely, if
ever, has any contact with the family buying the house beyond a review
of the application form.3
But in spite of Romney's surprise, a HUD Handbook makes this indirect
relationship between the FHA and the home buyer explicit:
If the lender is willing to make the loan, it provides the
proper forms and helps the borrower complete them. Then
it forwards the papers to the FHA insuring office that
serves the area in which the property is located.4
But while direct contact between HUD and the home buyer is minimal,
HUD's policies, regulations and procedures still serve to protect HUD's
and the consumer's interests.
There are three major points at which the consumer comes into contact,
albeit indirect, with HUD:
1. All the pre-purchase activities that are related to home buying
(underwriting; appraisal of the property, etc.)
2. If the family registers a complaint about its house.
3. If the family goes into default.
2This point was also cited in: Vincent
DiPentima, "Abuses in the Low Income Homeownership Programs--The Need for
a Consumer Protection Response by the FHA" Temple Law Quarterly, Spring,
1972, Vol. 45, No. 3.p. 467.
3Lambarth, "The "235" Hassle: Counselling and Preventive Law"
Clearinghouse Review, National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, Vol. 5, No. 1.
4U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Pub. No. 43-F,
Home Mortgage Insurance (March, 1970) p. 2.
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During the past six years, there have been many inquiries concerning
the role that HUD has played during pre-purchase, the initial point of
contact. These investigations have focused on the effects on homeowners
of abuses by private actors, and mismanagement and even indictable offenses
by HUD personnel. However, there has been little investigation concerning
the second and third contact points. But, here, too, HUD's activities
have direct impacts on consumers.
Unfortunately, very little information exists on how HUD handles
complaints and, since this was not a prime interest of this research, the
existing data are briefly reviewed in Appendix 8-1.
In this section, particular focus will be placed on the default situ-
ation. Default is a critical point at which the needs of the consumer and
the needs of private actors may come into direct conflict and, it is a
point at which HUD's own liability is increased substantially.
At all three points mentioned above, HUD has the opportunity to in-
tervene to protect itself and on behalf of the consumer in three major ways:
The first and most overt is by providing counseling services. The second
and third are less apparent but still have direct impacts on homeowners:
--HUD's internal procedures and HUD's relationship with mortgagees.
Before going on to look at the default situation in Chapters 9 and 10,
Chapter 8 will review the studies that exposed major problems in the pre-
purchase process. This will be presented in terms of the three methods of
intervention that HUD has at its disposal--counseling; internal procedures;
and relationships with mortgagees. Chapter 8 will also, wherever possible,
present explanations, or analyses, of HUD's behavior.
Chart 4 summarizes the three contact points, the three forms of inter-
vention and the primary sources of data for each.
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CHART 4
HUD's Methods of Intervention at Three
Points of Contact With The Consumer
Methods of Intervention
HUD's Internal Pro-
cedures includes all
activities that HUD,
itself, carries out
in the administration
of the homeownership
programs.
Counseling
-- Direct
assistance or
other infor-
mation giving
to the consumer
Relationship
with Mortgages;
includes over-
seeing adher-
ence to guide-
lines.
Pre-Purchase
(Chapter 8) 1) 235 Audit;a b 1) OSTI Final 1) Non-Super-
2) All Homes Audit; vised Mort-
3) Non-Supervised c gagee Report
Mortgagee Report;
4) Congressional
testimony;
5) Interviews;
6) OSTI Finald
Complaints 1) 235 Audit; None None
(Appendix 8-1) 2) All Homes Audit;
3) OSTI Interim
Default 1) OSTI-D+D Reports 1) OSTI-D+D Re- 1) OSTI-D+D Re-
(Chapters 9 2) Interviews ports ports;
and 10) 2) Interviews 2) Interviews
(superscript letters, a-e, refer to references, described on next page)
Points of
Contact
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a) A December, 1971 Report by the Office of Audit of HUD on 52
HUD Area/Insuring Offices' handling of the 235 Program. This Audit
also included a reinspection of 1281 new and used 235 and 223 (e)
homes.
HUD Office of Audit "Audit Review of Section 235 Single Family
Housing" 05-2-2001-4900, December 10, 1971 (Referred to as "235 Audit").
b) A September, 1973 Report by the Office of Inspector General of
HUD on 9 HUD Area/Insuring Offices' handling of all FHA-Insured Home Pro-
grams. This Audit also included a reinspection of 700 FHA insured single
family homes and audits of 80 mortgagees.
HUD Office of Inspector General, Office of Audit "Report on Internal
Audit of HUD Single Family Appraisal/Inspection Procedures and Mortgagees'
Loan Processing Activities." 05-2-4001-0000, September 14, 1973 (Referred
to as "All-Homes Audit").
c) A November, 1973 Report by the Comptroller General of the United
States on the Processes followed by HUD in approving and monitoring non-
supervised mortgagees. Procedures at Central Office and at eight HUD
Area/Insuring Offices were assessed.
Comptroller General of the United States, "Processes for Approving
and Monitoring Non Supcrvised Mortgagees" Report to the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly; Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, November
8, 1973 (Referred to as "Non Supervised Mortgagee Report").
d) A May, 1974 Report prepared by the Organization for Social and
Technical Innovation, Inc., (OSTI) under contract to HUD assessing twenty
voluntary pre-purchase counseling agencies and the locales in which they
operate. Also, a June 11, 1973 Interim Report on this study by OSTI.
Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, Inc. (OSTI) "A
Study of the Effectiveness of Voluntary Counseling Programs for Lower
Income Home Ownership" Submitted to HUD under contract H-1881, May, 1974
(Referred to as "OSTI Final") and "Interim Report on the Study of the
Effectiveness of Homeownership Counseling Servies for Lower-Income Families"
June, 1973 (Referred to as "OSTI Interim").
e) Two additional reports prepared by OSTI on the Delinquency and
Default Counseling Program as it operated in six locales.
Organization for Social and Technical Innovation, "Evaluation of the
Operation of the Concentrated Default Counseling Program". First Stage
Report, Under contract H-1881 to HUD February, 1973 (Referred to as
"D & D #1") And, "An Evaluation of the HUD Concentrated Default Coun-
seling Program". Final Report Submitted to HUD January, 1974. (Referred
to as "D + D #2").
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This writer served as the D + D evaluation project head, on the OSTI
staff, from July 1972 to March 1973. This role included major responsi-
bility for the first-stage field collection efforts and preparation of
the first report. In addition, this writer helped to organize the second
stage data collection effort and, along with Victor Bach, Study Director,
played a role in devising the overall evaluation design.
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CHAPTER 8: HUD'S PRE-PURCHASE INTERNAL PROCEDURES
1. HUD'S APPRAISAL, UNDERWRITING AND CLOSING PROCEDURES:
Before HUD-FHA will issue a commitment to insure a property, the
agency must carry out three key functions--all of which are inherent in
HUD's risk taking position and which have direct impacts on homebuyers.
First, HUD must assign a value to the property in order to determine
the maximum allowable amount of mortgage insurance. According to HUD
Handbook 4000.2:
Appraisal of the property is the "A" in the "ABC's of Processing."
It is the property appraisal which determines the maximum mort-
gage which can be insured by HUD-FHA. The estimate of value
represented by the appraisal serves as a guide to th buyer in
determining how much he should pay for the property.
HUD's second major task is to determine the credit worthiness of
the prospective mortgagor in order to ascertain his ability to carry
the costs of the home. According to the HUD Handbook, "the buyer's credit
is the B in the ABC's of Processing."2
And, last, HUD is also in charge of overseeing the closing process
and making certain that documents are accurate and complete prior to
issuing the insurance certificate. Again, according to the HUD Handbook,
"closing the loan is the C in the ABC's *of Processing. "3
Each of these three functions will be discussed below with the emphasis
on how they were carried out between 1968 and the early 1970's. (See Chart 5)
HUD Handbook 4000.2 op. cit. p. 5-1. (This handbook superseded HUD
Guide, FHA G4005.8, in effect at the time that the data presented in
this section was collected. However, the handbooks are substantively the
same.)
2Ibid. p. 6-1
3Ibid. p. 8-1
CHART 5
Basic Processing Procedure for all FHA-Insured
Single Family Homes
Prospective Mortgagor Selects House.
Seeks FHA Insurance. Supplies Mort-
gagee with Information related to
house and income.
Mortgagee files "Application
for Property Appraisal" with
local HUD office.
Valuation staff appraises
property.
Appraiser assigns value to
house which, in turn, deter-
mines maximum amount for FHA
insurance.
Appraiser determines whether
an inspection will be re-
quired. I
Mortgagee files Mortgagee re- Mortgagee re
"Application for quests credit quests veri-
Mortgagor Ap- check from a- fication of
proval" with gency having employment.
local HUD office. local contract
Along with ap- with HUD.
plication, mort-
gagee must sub-
mit credit re- Credit agency Employee(s)
port and employ- 4--- sends report send verifi-
ment and bank to mortgagee. cation(s) to
verifications. mortgagee.
Mortgagee re-
quests verifi-
cation of bank
deposits.
Bank(s) send(s)
statement veri-
fying amount of
deposits.
HUD issues "Conditional Mortgage credit Issues a "Firm Closing
Commitment". Commitment staff reviews Commitment" for
is conditional upon ap- application. FHA Insurance.
proval of borrower and
other conditions specified
by appraiser being met.
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a. Determining Value:
The value of a home is critical to any home purchaser. If a family
pays more for a home than the property is worth, resale for the original
price can become impossible. Rather than selling for a lower price than
the family paid--and possibly facing owing money to the mortgagee--the
family's only alternative may be to walk away from the property, lose
the equity that it has built up in the home and allow the mortgagee to
foreclose and take the property.
The fact that HUD-FHA plays the key role in determining the value
of any home to be insured is therefore an important way in which the
consumer's interest can be protected. Unfortunately, however, there
is a substantial case against HUD-FHA for poor appraisal practices,
particularly concerning 235 homes.
As early as December 1970 the House Committee on Banking and Cur-
rency issued a report and recommendations on its"Investigation and
Hearing of Abuses in Federal Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Programs."
Basing its findings on the 235 housing market in ten cities across the
country, the Committee disclosed numerous instances of poor HUD-FHA
practices which resulted in appraisals which were "inflated by several
thousands of dollars above the true value of the home." 4
4
"Investigation and Hearing of Abuses"...op. cit. p. 1.
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It was not uncommon, for example, to find that a home that had been sold
with FHA insurance under the 235 program was, only a month or two earlier,
bought for half the price of the appraised value. 5
Shortly after the problems in the 235 program were reported nation-
wide, Congress began to focus attention on Detroit--an area particularly
hard hit by abuses and mismanagement in the HUD-FHA home insurance pro-
grams. In a June 1972 report issued by the House Committeeon Government
Operations several problems in valuation procedures were cited. Inadequate
appraisal personnel and the resulting reliance on part-time appraisers,
fee appraisers, who often had conflicts of interest with the properties
which they were appraising, were pointed to as major causes in the over-
evaluation of homes.6
More recently, several investigations have pointed to continuing de-
ficiencies in the appraisal practices of 235 homes as well as problems in
appraising homes insured under the other HUD-FHA home programs. The
following examines some of the technical findings related to appraisal
procedures discussed in the All Homes Audit.
The use of comparable properties as a tool in establishing value is
an important aspect of the real estate business. In assigning values to
properties, HUD-FHA guidelines require the use of three comparable pro-
perties, of which one must have been conventionally financed.7
5Ibid. Examples appear throughout the text.
6Fifteenth Report By the Committee on Government Operations, oR. cit.
p. 5 and pp. 22-24.
7All Homes Audit, o cit., p. 25 (quoted from Circular HPMC-FHA 4441.27)
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However, the Audit found that for about 20% of the houses in its sample,
comparables were:
inappropriate due to age, condition of the house, size and
amenities, distance from subject/property, and excessive
reliange on FHA and VA cases to the exclusion of conventional
sales.
In one extreme violation of HUD-FHA guidelines, in Boston, a "comparable"
property was used which sold for $20,000 more than the value placed on the
subject property. Equally incomparable was another case from the same area,
in which a "comparable" was located more than 50 miles from the subject
property.9
The All Homes Audit found widespread deficiencies in the use of
comparables in most of the nine HUD Area offices reviewed. It concluded
that:
The volume of questionable comparables observed...causes us to
conclude that the Central Office needs to evaluate HUD-FHA's
method of deriving comparables and deyglop a consistent pro-
gram to be used by each field office.
HUD-FHA suggests several other methods, in addition to the "market"
approach (i.e., use of comparables) to arrive at value. However, the
"capitalized income" and "replacement cost approaches have not, according
to the Audit, been used appropriately. Based upon their findings, the
8Ibid.
9Ibid. p. 26.
10Ibid. p. 27.
11In the capitalized income approach value is arrived at by estimating
the market rental income from the unit. In the replacement cost approach
value is arrived at by estimating the current cost of replacing an existing
unit.
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audit team recommended that HUD evaluate the possible usefulness of these
alternative approaches and:
either require the field offices to carry out steps that are
necessary and clearly prescribed in HUD manuals to correctly
use... (these approaches) or discontinue the facade of a
three-pronged approach to estimating value.12
Thus, it is clear from the above that HUD-FHA's appraisal practices
have often been in violation of department guidelines. This is a critical
way in which HUD has failed to fully accept the risk that it is taking
in its insurance programs. As a result of this failure, the consumer
has been left vulnerable to purchasing over-priced homes.
Assessing Condition of Property
Probably the most blatant way in which HUD-FHA has neglected to
take responsibility for the homes that it is insuring is in its refusal
to be accountable for the condition of the property. HUD Handbook 4000.2
stresses that HUD does not warrant the condition of the property.13
Yet, in spite of this disclaimer, the property is, nevertheless,
supposed. to meet an array of "acceptability standards"--including minimum
property standards.14 In addition to determining the value of the property, the
12All Homes Audit, op. cit., p. 37.
13Ibid., p. 5-17.
14Ibid., p. 5-3 -- 5-5. This ambiguous role with regard to HUD's respon-
sibility for the condition of the property has, since the inception of FHA,
caused confusion among many homebuyers. For example, on this point, formerSecretary Romney noted that: "Buyers expect the Government involvement to mean
that the house is sound and free from major maintenance problems." Hearing
Before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, "Interim
Report on HUD Investigation of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing Programs" 92ndCong. lst sess. March 31, 1971, p. 11. See also Chapter 3, section 4.b.
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HUD-FHA appraiser must also specify any conditions that must be satis-
fied prior to issuance of the insurance certificate. Thus, the appraiser
must decide whether any repairs will have to be completed and, if so,
whether a department inspector will have to visit the property or
whether a certificate of completion by the mortgagee will suffice. 15
If the appraiser stipulates that a visit by a HUD-FHA inspector will
be required to determine whether the repairs or other defects have been
remedied, a "compliance review" must be performed. Unfortunately,
various reports issued in the early 1970's disclosed that faulty com-
pliance inspections by HUD-FHA were frequent. The 1970 Report on the
"Investigation and Hearing of Abuses in Federal Low- and Moderate-Income
Housing Programs" disclosed numerous new and existing 235 homes that
were found to have severe defects.
The staff found cases of families who have become dis-
appointed owners of houses which will not even come close
to lasting the life of the mortgage. In existing Section 235
housing the most common deficiencies are faulty plumbing, leaky
basements, leaky roofs, cracked plaster, faulty or inadequate
wiring, rotten wood in floors, staircases, ceilings, porches,
lack of insulation, faulty heating units, and the like...The
staff also examined two Section 235 new construction projects
in Everett, Washington, and Elmwood, Missouri. In these two
cases, in the staff's opinion the construction is of such poor
quality and the cost so questionable that the projects can best
be described as "instant slums." 16
Similar to the appraisal situation, discussed above, these early dis-
closures of HUD's inadequate inspection procedures did not seem to greatly
alter HUD's operations. Both the 235 Audit, which was performed in late 1971
15HUD Handbook 4000.2, op. cit. p. 5-16.
16
"Investigation and Hearing of Abuses..." op. cit., p. 3.
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and the All Homes Audit, performed two years later, disclosed many defects
in homes that had been insured by HUD-FHA.
As part of the 235 Audit, 1,281 homes were reinspected to determine
the frequency of deficiencies -- 740 "235" homes and 541 "223(e)" homes.
Overall, about one-third of the homes were found to have significant defects,
with a considerably higher percentage (43%) occuring in the existing
housing. Table 11 summarizes the deficiencies found during the reinspections.
Similarly, part of the All Homes Audit consisted of reviewing and
reappraising 700 single family homes that had been insured since December
10, 1971. The Audit
revealed an unacceptable number of existing properties containing
significant defects as well as many minor defects in both new and
existing houses in most of the nine field offices audited. 17
Slightly over 10% of the homes re-inspected contained "major" defects --
"which could affect livability or safety" and 56% of the homes "contained
more than one minor defect which shoulJ have been corrected prior to HUD's
insuring the mortgages. 18 As Table l2 indicates, considerably more defects
17Ibid. p. 13.
18Significant or "major" defects included items that could not be
corrected "without extensive or expensive repairs." For existing houses,this category included items such as rusted out plumbing systems, rotting
floor joists and supports, foundation failures, severe drainage problems,
inadequate wiring and significant termite damage. Major defects in the
new houses included bedrooms and baths without heat because the ductworkhad not been run; steel beams and girders without the required support;
severely cracked walls and improper sealing of roof around the chimney,
causing water to leak into the house.
The minor defects "may adversely affect the safety or livability of
the houses but generally would not cost much to repair or correct." In-
cluded in this category were, for example, for existing houses: unventedfurnace, buckling ceiling, rotting porch columns, leaky plumbing, signifi-
cant foundation cracks and deteriorated and sagging roofs. And, for newhouses, minor defects included inoperative appliances, such as dishwashers,
sloppy and incomplete painting, problems with electrical switches and wiring,
and cracks in foundation and brickwork. Ibid. p. 17-18.
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TABLE 11
Defects Found in 235 and 223(e) New and Existing Houses During Reinspections
New Construction
223(e) % of Total (A)
Existing Housing
235 223(e) %Total(A)
Source: 235 Audit, p. 71
235 Total A
% Total (A)
Total numer of Houses
Reinspected - B 398 274 52% 342 267 48% 1281
Total - C 672 609 100%
Evidence of Poor Work-
manship or Materials 67 33 100% NOT APPLICABLE 100
Total 100 7%
More Significant Defi-
ciencies Affecting 34 39 25% 99 126 75% 298
Safety, Health, or 73 225 23%
Li
Total
Aggregated Deficien-
cies Which Should
Have Made House Not NONE - 19 16 100% 35
Insurable 35 3%
Total
Total No Inspected
With Problems 101 72 13% 118 142 20% 433
173 260 33%
%Total (B) 101/398~72/274= 118/ 3421142/267
25% 26% =35% =53% -
%Total (C) 173/672= 260/609= -
26% 43%
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TABLE 12
Defects Found in FHA-Insured Houses Reinspected by
Inspector General of HUD, September 1973
With More Than
One Minor Defect
No Significant
Defects
Existing
Construction
203(b) 16 93 84 193
221(d)(2) 23 115 67 205
235 24 64 13 101
Total Existing 63 272 164 499
% Existing 13% 54% 33% 100%
New
Construction
203(b) 3 34 23 60
221(d)(2) 1 11 2 14
235 6 75 46 127
Total New 10 120 71 201
% New 5% 60% 35% 100%
Total New
and Existing 73 392 235 700
% New and
Existing 10% 56% 34%
Source: All Homes Audit, p. 16
100%
With
Major
Defects Total
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TABLE 13
Percent of Defects in Reinspected Houses in Nine Area/Insuring Offices
#Houses with
Major Defects
and More Than
One Minor De-
fect (New and % Total
Existing) Defects
# Houses
Reinspected
% Total Re-
inspected
Boston
Newark
Washington, D.C.
Atlanta
Indianapolis
Dallas
St. Louis
Denver
Los Angeles
Total
-Source: All Homes Audit, p. 18
43
46
64
30
81
85
28
57
31
465
9%
10%
14%
7%
17%
18%
6%
12%
7%
9%
9%
10%
13%
13%
13%
10%
11%
12%
100% 100%
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were found in existing homes than in new constructions. Overall, only
about one-third of the homes reinspected contained no significant
defects. (See Tables12 and13.)
Additional evidence pointing to major defects in FHA insured homes
was gathered by OSTI Inc. in the course of their study of counseling
services for lower income homebuyers. A survey of 526 "235" owners in
ten cities disclosed a high frequency of major problems in the house at
the time of purchase. A staggering 56% of all homes had major problems
according to homeowners interviewed.19 (See Tablel4.)
Based upon these findings, OSTI concluded:
That large numbers of counseled as well as uncounseled families
purchased housing in inadequate condition -- even with FHA property
screening and appraisal -- is a serious indication of how poorly
the federal lower-income ownership programs functioned in the
consumer's interests in this respect.2U
19OSTI Final, op. cit. p. 179. Major problems are those related to
the basic structure of the house -- the condition of the roof, foundation,
basement, walls and ceilings and the functioning of the basic utilities
such as heating, electricity and plumbing. Minor problems include poor
workmanship and finishing, as well as decor issues such as paint, carpeting
and linoleum. p. XXI Appendix. In addition, a survey of 118 defaulting
"235" homeowners in Columbia,South Carolina disclosed that one third of
the homes -- all new units -- had major defects that affected livability.
William B. Traxler, Jr. et al. "The 235 Housing Program in Action:
An Empirical Examination of its Administration and Effect on the Home-
owner-Participant in the Columbia South Carolina Area" South Carolina
Law Review, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1973, p. 128.
200STI Final, op. cit. p. 180.
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TABLE 14
Age of House Versus Severity of Housing Problems at Purchase
New
Major
Problems
Minor
Problems
None Total
No. % No. % No. % No. %
118 13 104 254 48
-29 Years
Old 68 61 11 10 32 29 111 21
30 or More
Years Old 107 67 10 6 43 27 160 31
Total 293 56% 53 10% 179 34% 525 100%
Source: OSTI Final p. 179
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The above findings are all the more alarming in view of the fact that,
to check that the appraisal is done properly, HUD procedures require that a
supervisor review the appraisals of at least 10% of the appraisals made by
fee appraisers and 5% made by staff appraisers.21
However, the 235 Audit "disclosed that no reviews were being made
in some offices and only minimal reviews in others." 22 While the situation
had improved by September, 1973, the All Homes Audit found that several
field offices were still not performing the review function adequately.
For example, in Washington, D.C. reviews were performed much too
late to be effective -- three to nine months following appraisals. And,
in Boston, one appraiser's work was field reviewed se'.'en times of which
four reviews ranged from 180 to 274 days following the appraisals. 23
Field reviews that are performed after a firm commitment has been issued
or after the loan has been insured are practically useless in that any
repair modifications that may result from the review are difficult to
implement at this late date.
Early reviews can, on the other hand, "be used to assure that re-
quired repairs are completed," 24 thereby enhancing the likelihood of
mortgagors receiving homes with fewer defects. HUD regulations do not even
require that reviews be made prior to loan closing. However, a good
21All Homes Audit, op. cit. p. 19.
22Ibid.
23Ibid. p. 19-20.
24 Ibid. p. 25.
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rationale for the regulations to be changed to require more timely re-
views is based upon a finding of the All Homes Audit:
Where our audit revealed the least number of uncorrected defects,
most field reviews were made prior to issuance of conditional
commitments or clearance of final inspections. 25
Another problematic finding of the All Homes Audit was that several
Area offices performed far less than one review per five or ten appraisals.
Particularly striking was the situation in Dallas, in which one staff
inspector made 773 inspections, and one fee inspector made 597 inspections
withoutany being field reviewed. According to HUD guidelines, about 97
of these appraisals should have been reviewed. (38 plus 59,respectively).26
Also deficient in this regard was the situation in Denver, in
which only 149 of the 666 required field reviews in a fourteen-month
period were made.27  (January 1972-February 1973).
In Indianapolis, not only was the number of reviews inadequate --
380 of those required during 1972 were not made -- but the quality of
many reviews that were made was poor. One reviewer who had been con-
sidered to be a "good" worker over a 5-year period was "observed to be
so poor (in approach and performance) that administrative action was
contempl ated."28
However, poor reviews were not always the blame of the reviewers.
The All Homes Audit -eport states:
25Ibid.
26 Ibid. p. 21.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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In one field office we were informed by a staff member... that
he was instructed by supervisory personnel to temper the criti-
cisms he reported on Form 1038. He showed us copies of two Form
1038 reviews in his personal records. One was highly critical
of the appraiser's performance and included photographs to sub-
stantiate the reviewer's findings. He gave the appraiser a poor
rating for his negligent performance, but the official field29review file contained no evidence of the review or rating...
In another field office, while field reviews may not have been
tempered to camouflage inadequate appraisals, "poor" appraiser ratings
often went unnoticed. "Neither sufficient performance upgrading efforts
(training) nor disciplinary measures were evidenced by management." 30
Thus, there is a substantial case against HUD-FHA for problematic
inspection procedures. According to Michael B. Bixby of the Center for
Urban Law and Housing of Wayne County Neighborhood Legal Services in
Detroit, HUD-FHA has flagrantly disobeyed the law in its performance of
inadequate inspections:
The Federal Housing Administration has, in many instances, failed
to abide by the clear requirementS of Federal law. One section
of the National Housing Act which governs both sections 221(d)(2)
and 235 housing requires, and I quote: "To be eligible for in-
surance under this section a mortgage shall...be secured by pro-
perty on which there is located a dwelling.. .meeting the require-
ments of all state laws, or local ordi-nances or regulations re-
lating to the safety, zoning or otherwise, which may be applicable
thereto." In hundreds of cases the Department of Housing and
Urban Development has quite simply ignored this rather clear ex-
pression of Federal law. Congress foresaw the problem and ex-
pressed its desire that only dwellings meeting all applicable
codes should be insured. Somehow, in the face of this madatory
directive HUD continues to claim that it has no duty to inspect
homes to determine if they meet local codes. How HUD can take
this position despite the clear wording of the statute is beyond me.31
29Ibid. p. 22.
30Ibid. p. 23.
31Hearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,House of Representatives, 92nd Cong. 1st sess. "Defaults on FHA Insured Mortgage(Detroit)"Dec., 1971, p. 113.
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HUD's protestations that it is not responsible for the condition
of the house that it is insuring are all the more absurd in view of
Section 518(b) of the National Housing Act. The Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1970 authorized the Secretary of HUD to:
make expenditures to correct, or to compensate the owner for
structural or other defects which seriously affect the use
and livability of any single family dwel jng which is covered
by a mortgage insured under Section 235. 'l
To receive compensation,.the property must have been at least one year
old at the time the property was insured, the claim must be filed within
one year from the date the property was insured and
the defect is one that existed on the date of the issuance of the
insurance commitment and is one that a proper inspection could
reasonably expect to disclose.33
Through January 1975, HUD had paid a total of $7,626,426 in claims to
9,896 Section 235 homeowners; the average claim being $770.34
The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 revised Section
518(b) to include homes with two units, as well as one family homes, and
any property
which is located in an older, declining urban area and is covered
by a mortgage insured under Section 203 or 221 on or after August
1, 1968, but prior to January 1, 1973.35
Data concerning the number of people who have filed claims under the
expanded 518(b) program are not yet available.
32P.L. 91-609, December 31, 1970 84 Stat. 1770, 1771;Sec. 104.
33Ibid.
34Letter from George 0. Hipps Jr., Acting Director, Office of Underwriting
Standards, HUD. to Rachel G. Bratt. June 10, 1975.
35P.L. 93-383. 93rd Cong. August 22, 1974 88 Stat. 633, 741. This revision
to Section 518(b) was prompted, at least in part, by the activities of community
groups organized by Gale Cincotta and the National Training and Information Center.
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Based upon the above findings, the conclusion that one must arrive
at is that HUD-FHA appraisal and inspection procedures have frequently
been deficient and, as a result, many HUD-FHA insured homeowners have
bought homes in various states of disrepair. The impacts of this situation
on consumers have, in some cases, caused major financial hardships, and
even abandonment of the property.36 But whatever the outcome, HUD has
neglected one of its major and most critical responsibilities inherent
in accepting risk and has placed purchasers,as well as itself, in an ex-
tremely vulnerable position. While HUD-FHA has managed to make amends
to some homeowners through the 518(b) program, its own risk has been
underscored as a result of this program.
b. Determining Credit of Mortgagor:
While property appraisals and inspections are under HUD's direct
control and supervision, HUD delegates the responsibility to mortgagees
to supply them with the forms pertaining to the prospective mortgagor's
ability to purchase and maintain payments for his home. While faulty
inspections are, as discussed above, due to inadequate or improperly
implemented internal procedures of HUD, faulty credit reporting is the
work of mortgagees and relates to improper supervision of mortgagees by
HUD. As such, this discussion will be postponed until the general dis-
cussion on HUD's regulation of mortgagees in Chapter 10, Sections 7 and
9.
However, HUD personnel do have responsibility for reviewing 3
specific types of credit-related mortgagee-supplied information, in
36Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, op. cit. p
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addition to any other documents pertinent to the prospective morgagor's
financial position.
*credit reports;
*employment and salary verification forms;
*bank deposit verification forms.
Credit Reports
While the personal interview is usually a critical component of
the lending decision,37 as mentioned earlier, HUD personnel rarely have
any personal contact with prospective mortgagors. As such, HUD depends
heavily upon accurate and reliable credit reporting. To maximize the
likelihood of good reporting, HUD awards annual contracts to local
credit agencies on a competitive basis. In addition, HUD requires
field offices to determine the reliability of information supplied by
these credit agencies.38
In response to disclosed deficiencies in credit-reporting, HUD
issued detailed procedures for the systematic verification of credit
reports in July, 1972. The purpose of these guidelines was to enable
field offices to ascertain the extent of poor credit reporting; to
identify those agencies producing systematically poor reports, by
rechecking reports with a second agency; and to ultimately improve
the overall quality of credit reporting. 39
37Willis R. Bryant, op. cit. Chapter 5.
38 Non Supervised Mortgagee Report, op. cit., p. 19
39 Ibid.
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Based upon observations in eight HUD Area offices, the Comptroller
General of the United States found noncompliance with the July 1972
instructions in some Area offices. In other offices, which had imple-
mented these procedures, many inaccuracies in the credit reports were
found upon cross-checking.40
The major reason for noncompliance was the absence, in several
cities, of more than one HUD-contracted credit agency. While the July
1972 guidelines called for cross-checking credit reports received by
HUD-contracted agencies with reports from other HUD-contracted agencies --
Lubbock, Philadelphia, Camden and Wilmington each had only one agency
under contract with HUD and were therefore unable to comply with the
guidelines.41 Since the Comptroller General's report, HUD has made
attempts to contract at least one more agency in each of these cities.
But the real usefulness of cross-checking is in locating inaccurate
reports and repeatedly deficient agencies. For example, in Los Angeles/
Santa Ana, of the 362 credit reports that were verified, 98 (27%) were
deficient.42  The following are three examples taken from this Area office
on the types of discrepancies found between the original and backup credit
reports.43
40 Ibid. p. 26.
41 Ibid. p. 21-23.
42Ibid.
43 Ibid. p. 21.
-230-
Original Credit Report Backup Credit Report
1. No credit established. Four short-term debts outstanding
and $200 per month child-support
payments due.
2. One short-term debt being paid One short-term debt being paid as
as agreed. Two dependents. agreed. Also 3 long-term debts
amounting to $454/month with 10
late charges. Four dependents.
3. No credit established. Three short-term debts owed. Two
long-term debts amounting to $89
per month.
Fortunately, in these three cases, the backup reports were completed
in time to preclude the issuance of a final commitment for FHA insurance.
However, in 18 of the 98 cases in which deficient reports were disclosed,
final commitment had already been made.
According to HUD officials:
If the backup credit reports had been received before the time
the final commitment was issued, these 18 cases would not have
been approved.44
Based upon these findings, Los Angeles and Santa Ana reported three
credit agencies to HUD for the preparation of 69 deficient credit reports. 45
Subsequently, HUD terminated its contracts with two of these agencies. 46
44 1bid. p. 21.
45 1n addition to the reports filed by Los Angeles and Santa Ana at
least one agency in each of the other 6 areas were reported to HUD --
10 in all -- representing 31 deficient credit reports. Ibid. p. 24.
461bid. p. 25.
Employment and Bank Verification Forms
In addition to checking a prospective mortgagor's credit, it is also
important to check his employment record and bank assets. However, HUD
guidelines do not require field offices to test the reliability of the
employment and cash asset data received from mortgagees on prospective
mortgagors. Thus, it is not surprising that none of the eight field
offices assessed by the Comptroller General were performing any such
verifications.
However, the need for this type of effort was disclosed during
hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly:
Mr. O'Leary: (Chief Counsel) What are you telling us is that if
the buyer said that he worked for Yellow Taxi Cab, and he made x number
of dollars, the mortgage company would feed that information to the
retail credit bureau and they would feed it right back?
Mr. Morales; (El Sol Realty) Right. They would feed it right
back. They would not call the Yellow Taxi Cab Co., or anybody.
They would say that he works there as far as they know, because
the buyer told them so.
Mr. O'Leary: They would type that up on a form?
Mr. Morales: That is correct...
Mr. O'Leary: And that would then go to the FHA?
Mr. Morales: Right.
Mr. O'Leary: Now what happens if the mortgage company calls you
and tells you to check with the bank, and your buyer does not have$500 in there like he is supposed to? Let us say that he has only
got a hundred dollars in the bank. What do you do then?
Mr. Morales: I would advise my client to go and borrow money
and place it in the bank.
Mr. O'Leary: I take it, that in the trade that was not uncommon,
right? If for some reason it looked like the deal was going to fall
through, the mortgage company would call you, and you would tell yourbuyer what had to be done?
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Mr. Morales: That is correct.
Thus, whenever HUD fails to verify the ability of home buyers to
carry the commitments of the mortgage, it increases its risk substantially.
On this point, the All HomesAudit concluded that:
HUD assumes the risk of reimbursing the mortgagee if the home
buyer defaults and the mortgage is foreclosed. HUD increases
this risk because it approved buyers for mortgage insurance
without determining the reliability of the employment and
cash asset data received on the buyer.48
It is ironic that HUD, itself, has offended the practice of
thoroughly assessing and checking the prospective mortgagors' credit.
While the most crucial aspect of the lending decision has always been
the appraisal of the real estate which secures the mortgage, it has only
been since 1934 -- with the creation of FHA -- that emphasis also began
to be placed on the credit worthiness of the borrower himself.49 Thus,
HUD-FHA has not fulfilled its responsibilities and has failed to protect
the consumers' interest in both aspects of the lending decision -- in
the appraisal of the property and in the assessment of the borrower's
credit. This, alone, would be sufficient evidence to question HUD's
concern for families whose homes are insured by the FHA. Unfortunately,
however, additional support for this view is found by examining HUD's
other pre-purchase activities that have impacts on the consumer, as
discussed throughout this chapter.
4 7 New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit., p. 457-458.
48All Homes Audit, op. cit., p. 26.
4 9Willis R. Bryant, op. cit., p. 181.
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Closing
Closing is the final stage of HUD's pre-purchase activities: the
point at which the buyer pays the seller and title to the property is
transferred. If a mortgage is involved, the bank pays the seller the
principal mortgage amount and the new mortgagor signs the mortgage note,
thereby assuming the mortgage debt. If insurance is invovled, the insurer
issues its insurance certification to the mortgagee at closing or shortly
thereafter. All fees, such as real estate commissions and mortgagee
origination fees are also paid at closing.
Closing is a point at which the prospective owner is extemely vul-
nerable. He is very much locked into the purchase and probably anxious
to assume ownership. For example, if the buyer were to suddenly learn
that it was going to cost him another $500 to buy his home, he would be
likely to pay it, perhaps without even understanding the reason for the
additional cost.
Closing personnel at HUD are responsible for making sure that all
documents related to closing are in compliance with HUD guidelines and,
upon approval, they are authorized to issue the FHA insurance certificate.
If the loan closing statement is incomplete, inaccurate, or charges have
been levied which are in excess of those permitted, insurance endorse-
ment could be withheld pending correction. However, the All Homes Audit
reported that closing section personnel "were not qithholding insurance
endorsement of mortgages in such instances" and were not, moreover,
receiving adequate information on which to base their assessments.50
50All Homes Audit, op. cit., p. 56-57.
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The Audit found that in six of the nine field offices reviewed,
incomplete closing statements were commonly accepted by HUD.
...we were told by loan closing personnel in several field offices
that they had not withheld insurance endorsement on mortgage be-
cause they had not received instructions or training as to what
elements a closing statement1must contain in order to be considered
a complete loan settlement.
Moreover, the Audit went on:
One field office did not have any closing clerk positions and
closing statements were reviewed only for the signatures of the
parties involved in the loan closing.52
Clearly, if HUD were at all interested in being a watchdog in the home
finance system, closing would provide an excellent opportunity to review and
approve all aspects of the transaction. HUD also could hold out a critical
stick to mortgagees at this stage. By threatening to withhold the insurance
certificate-- and meaning it -- HUD could play an important control function.
Yet, control is meaningless if HUD personnel are not aware of exactly what
it is that they are supposed to be watching for.
The Audit reported that some field offices
have not made available to their closing section a schedule of
maximum allowable customary fees and charges for services pro-
vided by mortgagees. As a result, closing section personnel
are unable to determine if the charges on closing statements are
within the limitations set forth in the FHA regulations.53
51Ibid. p. 57.
52Ibid. p. 58.
53Ibid. p. 59.
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Unfortunately, several sources have pointed to irrational and inflated
closing costs in many sectionsof the country.54 For the lower income mort-
gagor, the burden of excessive closing costs can precipitate immediate
financial problems and signal a downward spiral ending in foreclosure.55
Thus, it is clear that closing is another critical stage of the pre-
purchase process--a stage at which tighter procedures by HUD could serve
to both minimize HUD's risk position and to protect consumers against
inflated costs.
54See, for example, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Housing of the
Committee on Banking and Currency; House of Representatives, "Real Estate
Settlement Costs, FHA Mortgage Foreclosures, Housing Abandonment, and Site
Selection Procedures" 92nd Cong., 2nd sess. Part 1, February 1972; especially
pages 1-23. See also, "Mortgage Settlement Costs" Report of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development and Veterans' Administration, March 1972
(Printed as Part 2 of the above hearings.)
Among the major findings of this report were: 1) In some areas there
are charges for services which are apparently excessive or unnecessary; and
2) Rates of charge are based on factors unrelated to the risk involved or to
the cost of providing the services.
The great variation in costs involved in closing FHA-insured homes in
various parts of the country was disclosed in the above report, as follows:
(March 1971)
Washington, D.C. - $936
Duval County (Jacksonville, Fla.) - $856
Los Angeles County - $717
Bexar County (San Antonio, Texas) - $613
Marion County (Indianapolis, Indiana) - $536
Suffolk County (Boston, Mass.) - $468
(Data based on sales prices of FHA-insured homes in the $24,000-27,999 range.)
These hearings were prompted, in part, by a request set forth in the
Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970. (Public Law 91-351) Title VII, Section
701 (48 Stat. 1246., 12 USC 1701) of that Act directed the Secretary of HUD
and the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to prescribe the maximum allowable
settlement costs in any area for FHA-insured and VA guaranteed homes. The two
agencies were further directed to undertake a joint study and to report to HUD
within one year of the enactment of the Act concerning legislative and adminis-
trative actions that would reduce and standardize settlement costs.
55All Homes Audit, op. cit., p. 59.
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2. CAUSES OF HUD'S DIFFICULTIES:
The first section of this chapter presented an account of some of
the key ways in which HUD's internal procedures in the pre-purchase
period were frequently deficient. The negative impacts which these
problematic procedures can have both on consumers and in increasing HUD's
risk should be clear. Yet, the questions of "what went wrong" or,
"why did HUD have so much difficulty implementing the post-1968 home-
ownership programs" remain to be answered.
There are several plausible explanations which account for HUD's
difficulties stemming, in part, from the forces behind the legisla-
tion, as discussed in Chapter 4. These can be grouped into two types
of problems -- which can be called "technical" and "philosophical."
Falling under HUD's technical problems are: a) late 1960's re-
organization of HUD; b) inadequate staffing; c) corruption on the part
of HUD personnel.
HUD's philosophical problems include: d) confusion over whether-HUD's
mandate was to insure a large volume of loans or to insure quality
loans; e) difficulties in dealing with a new type of property -- inner
city -- and a new type of home buyer -- lower income.
a. Reorganization of HUD:
According to Horace B. Bazan, a 31-year-veteran employee of FHA,
the November 1969 reorganization of HUDwas the key reason why HUD-FHA
had so much difficulty in implementing the homeownership programs in the
early 1970's Whereas under the "old FHA organization the Commissioner
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ran FHA as an integrated agency... (and) was accountable for successful
operation of FHA" each of the 10 new Regional Administrators "adopted their
own methods and approaches to supervision."
Further, according to Bazan,
the resulting supervision varied in scope, content, method, and
frequency...the Assistant Regional Administrators for Housing
Production and Mortgage Credit...had sharply varying degrees of
training and experience in mortgage underwriting. At one point,
only two out of ten persons occupying the position... (had) substan-
tial experience in performing or supervising FHA mortgage insurance
origination.2
Bazan claims that this poor supervision -- the direct outcome of
HUD's reorganization -- was the cause of many of HUD-FHA's problems of
the early 1970's. For example, Bazan blames the high losses under the
223(e) program on HUD's inability to translate Congressional intent into
effective administrative procedures. He stated that:
A decision on FHA underwriting procedure was made at too
high a level with inadequate understanding of the mortgage
underwriting process, the legal requirements, the elements
of risk, and the probable consequences. 3
While Bazan's criticism is certainly relevant, it is not the
whole story. Yet, a 1976 report by the House Committee on Government
Operations also targeted HUD's reorganization. It stated that:
(the reorganization)wrenched so many functions and offices
out of shape that the Department is just now beginning to
recover from the negative effects.4
1Horace B. Bazar., op. cit., pp. 25, 28.
2Ibid. p. 28.
3lbid. p. 25.
4Nineteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, "HUD's
Responsiveness to Previous Recommendations for Corrective Action," 94th. Cong. 2Sess. March 29, 1976, p. 4.
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While it may be logical for a massive, new piece of legislation
such as the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, to trigger a
reorganization by the implementing agency, in order to allow the agency
to gear up for its new functions, it can also be the worst possible time
for such a reorganization to take place. Not only did HUD employees have
to redefine their own roles within the Department but they also, and
at the same time, were expected to implement a new and challenging
piece of legislation.
b. Inadequate Staffing:
In addition to the above-quoted House Committee's finding that the
reorganization contributed to HUD's problems, they also concluded that:
"HUD has never had a sufficient amount of trained staff to deal with
problems it is responsible for solving."5
The problem of inadequate staffing at HUD was pinpointed in the
early 1970's. A 1972 report by the Committee on Government Operations
stated that:
The question of FHA Staff inadequacy is a national concern.
Between fiscal year 1968 and fiscal year 1971, the total
number of units in mortgage loan applications increased
nationally by 66 percent...Undoubtedly, some greater
efficiency could be expected with increased volume,but
about a 50-percent increase in processing productivity
per staff member apparently could not be achieved without
some loss of protection of the public interest...It would...
5 Ibid.
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be expecting more than could be accomplished to have a 66-
percent increase in workload absorbed by a 9-precent in-
crease of the staff without a great loss in program admini-
stration effectiveness. 6
Thus, with HUD personnel overworked and with responsibilities
and lines of supervision shifting due to the reorganization, HUD had
its problems. However, this wasn't all; HUD's difficulties also
included outright corruption on the part of some part-time appraisers
and other personnel.
c. Corruption on the Part of HUD Personnel:
Federal housing programs have a history of being abused by
speculators and shady characters working on the fringe of the real
estate business. Unfortunately, many unscrupulous people took
advantage of the Federal guarantees and subsidies of the 1968 home-
ownership programs,8 including some HUD employees. Hearings held
in Detroit in 1971 disclosed that "fee appraisers," appraisers hired
6
"'Defaults on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages -- Detroit, Michigan."
op. cit. p. 25.
7See Chapter 3, Sections4a-c and Charles Abrams' discussion of the
windfall profits stimulated by Section 608 of the Housing Act of 1942.
The City is the Frontier (New York: Harper and Row, 1965) p. 87-92.
8The abuses have been documented extensively by Congressional committees
and by journalists. See, for example: "Interim Report on HUD Investigation
of Low and Moderate Income Housing Programs, op. cit.; "Defaults on FHA-
Insured Mortgages; (Parts 1 and 2 and Fifteenth Report by the Committee onGovernment Operations) op. cit. New York Antitrust Hearings, p_. cit.,Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, "Housing
Management, Foreclosures and Abandoments" U.S. Senate, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.July 1975, Chicago; Brian Boyer, p. cit. and Leonard Downie, Mortgage onAmerica (New York, Praeger) 1974.
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by HUD on a "piece-work" basis to perform appraisals when the full-time
staff was overloaded, often had interests in the property which they
. . 9
were appraising.
In addition to potential or actual conflicts of interest on the
part of fee appraisers, a handful of HUD employees have been indicted
for fraud related to the housing programs. As of April 1975, 65 HUD
employees and over 1000 other individuals had been indicted. 10
While the number of indictments among HUD employees seems quite
small, there is evidence that many more HUD employees were probably
engaged in less flagrant, yet dishonest, schemes for which they were
never caught. For example, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly heard a Brooklyn Savings Bank executive testify that:
(Abuses and kickbacks and payoffs) are very widespread in
our metropolitan area. I would say in the FHA level, it
ranges down from the clerk at the desk to the man at the
top, and it does not miss too many people... ll
In addition, testimony at the same hearings pointed out that
short of outright fraud, HUD-FHA personnel frequently processed appli-
cations from certain mortgage companies much faster than from other
lending institutions. But, as one witness put it, FHA's excuses were
"on the surface, very legitimate"12 and, therefore, nothing could be
9
"Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages" (Part 1) op. cit. p. 39.
10Housing and Development Reporter Vol. 1, No. 24, April 21, 1975. p. 1185.
New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 759.
12Ibid. p. 76-77 and p. 759.
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done in protest and the possibility of illegal behavior could not be
substantiated.
Thus, HUD was plaqued by considerable "technical" difficulties
which hampered its execution of the homeownership programs. However,
less tangible, yet very important to understanding why HUD's implemen-
tation was defective, are the philosophical explanations.
d. Quantity vs. Quality:
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that President Johnson articu-
lated, for the first time, a housing goal in numbers. In order to reach
.the housing goal set by Congress in 1949 -- "a decent home and a suitable
living environment for every American family" -- the President asked for
the construction or substantial rehabilitation of 26 million housing
units over the following decade. Thus, FHA's long-standing production
orientation was reinforced.
FHA Commisioner Brownstein, in an October 1967 speech before HUD-
FHA Area office directors emphasized the need for field offices to
insure a large volume of mortgages:
I want you to go looking for applications. I want you to
know that applications involving the inner city, rehabilitation,
BMIR and rent supplements are the first things your staff should
work on, not the last...You will also hear more discussion of
my recent field letter eliminating the requirement for a finding
of economic soundness in riot or riot-prone areas of the city.
This has the 1 ffect of making our programs available everywhere
in the city.
13Remarks of P.N. Brownstein, Assistant Secretary-Commissioner at DirectorsConference, October 23, 1967 on"FHA's Job Today. "(Printed in HUD Senate Hearings
1968) op. cit. p. 310.
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Yet, almost in the same breath, Brownstein added some caveats,
making clear that standards were still in force and that the quality
of the property should not be overlooked.
... risks are inherent in an insurance program (otherwise there
would be no justification or need for insurance); that since
the vast majority of the Congress as well as the executive
branch expect us to carry out the mission (of assisting and
encouraging private enterprise to house low- and moderate-income
families, and to revive the inner city)...then they must expect
us willingly to take the risks inherent in such a mission.
This does not by any means require the elimination of prudence
and common sense... I want us to develop and support projects
which give reasonable promise of improving the housing conditions
of low- and moderate-income families, and improving the inner
city...A project should be rejected if it does not appear to
give reasonable promise of accomplishing these objectives. It
should not be rejected simply because it involves poor people,
or because it is in a portion of the city you have been
accustom to rejecting or red-lining for old-fashion, arbitrary
reasons.
Unfortunately, Brownstein's plea for maintaining standards was
not heeded. Instead, the message which many of the personnel took back
to their offices was the quantitative goal and the need and desire for
"decent housing" got lost in the mad rush to swell the production
figures.
Reflecting on the 1968 housing goal and the way in which HUD
responded, the "235 Audit" stated that:
The entire field structure was tending to emphasize production
of new housing units and processing of appraisals on used
houses to the degree that too little emphasis was being placed
on the quality of the units produced or appraised. Although
the need for more and better housing are great, production and
appraisals must be measured in terms of the quality of the end
products as well as in terms of the number of housing units
provided, both new and used.
14Ibid. p. 311.
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Throughout the country we have been informed, both formally and
informally, that the word was out from the Central Office to
"produce units." 15
By early 1972, Secretary Romney acknowledged the need to focus
more attention on insuring quality mortgages; his official stance
stressed quality over high production levels. In testimony before the
House Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee he stated that:
Above all, we will insist on quality production and have instructed
area and insuring offices to restrict their processing and super-
vision to what can be done on a quality basis -- even if thg
means reduction of total production levels from 1971 highs.
Yet, by 1972 much of the damage had been done. For the previous
four years high production levels were the focus of HUD policy and
Romney's call for a return to quality mortgages had the ring of a
"Monday morning quaterback."
But in spite of Romney's admission that the quality of mortgages
insured had been slipping he, nevertheless, tried to place the blame
on Congress for a faulty legislative mandate. 17 In rebutting these
charges, Senator John Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Banking and
Currency Committee stated:
To keep the record straight, there was never any Congressional
intent to authorize local FHA offices to insure substandard
housing or to accept as mortgagors the poor whose financial
condition did not justify homeownership. The strong language
in the 1968 Housing Act and subsequent administrative rulings
15
"235 Audit" op. cit., p. 8-9.
16
"Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages" (Part 2) 2. cit. p. 303.
17
"Defaults on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages -- Detroit, Michigan." (Part 1)
op. cit. p. 56. See also "Real Estate Settlement Costs, FHA Mortgage Fore-
closures, Housing.Abandonment, and Site Selection Procedures." op. cit.
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were intended to eliminate "redlining" in older declining urban
areas, but not to blanket in as insurable risks all units in
such areas regardless of their condition or otherwise insurable
qualifications. 8
e. Lower-Income Mortgagors and Inner City Properties:
HUD administrators, in charge of carrying out the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 clearly wanted HUD-FHA to become the housing
agency responsible for lower income families and inner city areas as
well as the safe and suburban middle class. Even if a major motivation
.for trying to adopt a new, social orientation was self-interest, the
desire to avoid competition with another housing agency (as discussed
in Chapter 4), HUD personnel seemed aware of the challenge. Yet, it
was extremely difficult for long-time FHA personnel to shift their
thinking and adapt their procedures to suit the new mortgagors and
properties.
On this point, the 235 Audit observed that:
With the advent of subsidized housing programs.. .many of the per-
sonnel carrying out programs have not sufficiently adjusted their
thinking and attitudes to encompass the Department's new programs
...While we recognize that the buyer must always share the respon-
sibility for the selection and purchase of his home, we believe
that intensified efforts are required to dispel remaining vestiges
of the "caveat emptor" philosophy and to more effectively implement
current Departmental policy objectives. 19
While many long-time HUD-FHA personnel had a great deal of diffi-
culty accepting the social goals of the FHA insurance programs and re-
sented the drastic change in orientation, many young personnel who joined
18Address to Homebuilders, January 25, 1972. Reprinted in "Defaults
on FHA-Insured Home Mortgages -- Detroit, Michigan" op. cit. p. 56.
19235 Audit, oR. cit. , p. 8.
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the HUD staff, not the FHA staff, have openly accepted the ideals of
the program. This view was expressed by the young Housing Counselor/
Community Services Advisor from the Phoenix HUD Insuring office:
There is a real split in our office. Some of us 2ork for HUD
and others -- the old timers,still work for FHA.
But whether or not HUD employees really believed in the new, socially
oriented programs, they were all expected to carry out the mandate of
both the President and Congress.
Talking about the new, unsophisticated mortgagors and their special
needs, Gene Birkle, of the General Accounting Office, noted that:
... the group of people that you are dealing with in subsidized
housing programs have never owned a home before.- Many of them,
or most of them, are not aware of the type of defects they might
run into, and when they see defects they do not r.ecessarily
realize their significance;... In order to make the program work
you are going to have to deal with these people in a different
manner than yoy deal with the people in your regular unsubsidized
FHA programs.2
But in HUD's desire to carry out their mandate and to reverse the
exclusionary policies and red-lining practices of the pre-1968 era,
(see Chapter 3, Section 4a) many HUD personnel seemed to lose sight of
the fact that there is probably a group of families who really should
not be homeowners, for financial and/or psychological reasons.
20Interview, Rose Strickland, op. cit.
21Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in
Government of the Joint Economic Committee, "Housing Subsidies and
Housing Policies" U.S. Congress, 92nd Congress 2nd Session, December
4, 5, and 7, 1972, p. 29.
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Representative Ben Blackburn, during hearings of the Subcommittee
on Priorities and Economy in Government, went so far as to state that
the cause of the problems with the lower-income homeownership programs
(235 and 221(d)(2)) was that program participants were not suitable for
homeownership. Arguing that the programs had no intrinsic value, he
stated that:
The problem is that we have been putting families into homes
who have no sense of responsibility of homeownership and that
is where the problem has been, and that is the intrinsic
problem in the program...Can we not conclude that there are
some people who do not have the se2 e of responsibility or
the economic income to own a home?
While it is clear that Representative Blackburn's comments were
one-sided and ignored the array of other reasons why the lower-income
homeownership programs encountered so much difficulty, an important
dilemma -- a "damned if you do and damned if you don't" situation --
arises from this discussion.
If, indeed, there is a group of people who are not capable of
being homeowners, how can HUD and mortgagees make the determination of
who should own and who should not, without being overly lenient or
overly strict? Thus, since the post-1968 homeownership programs have
been faulted for laxity in underwriting and appraising, and the pre-
1968 programs have been faulted for their conservatism and discrimina-
tion -- is it possible to administer a program fairly -- allowing parti-
22Report of the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of
the Joint Economic Committee, "Housing Subsidies and Housing Policy" March 5,
1973, p. 41-42.
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cipation by those who can own, yet barring participation by those who
clearly cannot? John H. Payne, Jr., an executive of a New York bank
accurately presented the problem before the Senate Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly:
...when I talk about quality control, I don't want to have it
interpreted to mean that we, or other mortgage bankers, are not
interested in nor are sensitive to the plight of those who desire
and require adequate housing of those who feel deeply the desire
we all share to own our own home. We recognize the need for
some form of guarantee or insurance in order that home purchase
terms may be available on an almost a hundred-percent financing
basis, and on the long-term payout not otherwise offered in the
market.
However, quality control also means keeping a man from drowning
himself in debt service, keeping him from being saddled with
payments he cannot meet, and saving him and the Government in-
surance agency from certain foreclosure, and most often from
certain dollar losses...
As the social pressures of various programs have mounted it is
easy for certain people to point their fingers at the mortgage
company who refuses to accept the mortgage application which is
loaded with danger signals, as being a company which is dis-
criminating against people who need housing the most.
However, none of us do any service to an individual or to his
family if we let him assume a mortgage whose total dollar
amount and monthly payments are something he cannot cope with.
The results of that are tragic.
On the other hand, if we bow to the social pressures and allow
these properties to be mortgaged, we are then subject to -- and
properly so -- pronounced criticism when the delinquency ratios
become too high and the foreclosure rates astronomical. 3
What seems to be needed is a system to assist in the lending/insuring
decision particularly involving borderline cases. This issue will be
examined in the last chapter.
23New York Antitrust Hearings, . cit., p. 216-217.
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Thus, there are several technical and philosophical explanations which
account for the array of problems which were associated with the implementa-
tion of the post-1968 homeownership programs, as discussed in the first
section of this chapter. Based upon the above, it is clear that many of
HUD's difficulties can be traced to an unfortuante mixture of mismanagement
and traditional practices which were not easily overcome. But HUD's attitude
toward counseling services alludes clear explanations, as discussed in the
following section.
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3.HUD'S PRE-PURCHASE COUNSELING APPROACH AND ACTIVITIES:
The most direct means which HUD has at its disposal for inter-
vening on behalf of the consumer and for diminishing its own risk,
is through a home buyer counseling program. While HUD's official
posture on this issue has been positive, it has failed to play a
strong and consistent role in supporting consumer counseling programs.
This section will first examine HUD's role in the legislative history
of funding counseling programs. Following this, the emergence and
the record of private, voluntary counseling agencies will be examined.
The third part of this section will assess HUD's attitude and
actions toward the most consumer-oriented staff person in the Area/
Insuring office -- the Housing Counselor. And, finally, the section
will conclude with a short case study of HUD's most recent effort at
launching a homeownership counseling program -- the Homeownership
Information, Advice and Assistance Program.
a. Legislative History of Funding Counseling Programs:
It will be recalled from Chapter 4 Section 3 that counseling was a
key issue in Secretary Weaver's rationale for opposing Senator Percy's
1967 homeownership legislation. The outcome of this controversy was
Section 237 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, which
authorized the funding of counseling services to S-ction 235 mortgagors
and for mortgagors who could meet the standards of one of the FHA in-
surance programs, but who had faulty credit histories.
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A report issued by the House Committee on Banking and Currency
in 1968 articulated the need for a counseling program:
Since many of the families who would be assisted have had little
experience in the proper care of a home and the budgeting of in-
come to meet regular monthly payments on a mortgage, this section
(235) would authorize appropriate counseling, either directly by
HUD or by contract with public or private agencies, t? assist
these families in meeting their new responsibilities.
And,further, on the 237 program, the report noted that:
An important element in this program is the counseling, either
directly or by contract with public or private organizations,
the Secretary would provide mortgagors and to prospective home-
owners who lack sufficient funds to supply a downpayment. While
many families who would be eligible for mortgage insurance under
this section have strong aspirations to become homeowners, their
experience in handling large financial responsibilities may be
meager. Through counseling these families can be helped to use
their resgurces efficiently in meeting homeownership responsi-
bilities.'
But, in spite of this strong language and the critical role that
counseling had played in the earlier Congressional debates on home-
ownership, Congress did not fund counseling for the 235/237 homeowner-
ship programs during the first year of their operation. This action
proved to set an unfortunate precedent: Congress rejected HUD re-
quests for funding counseling for fiscal years 1970 and 1971.
During the Senate Appropriation Hearings for FY 1971 Secretary
Romney argued that counseling was a key component of the new home-
ownership programs. He stated that:
House Committee on Banking and Currency, House Committee Report on
the 1968 Act, H. Rep. No. 1585, 90th Cong. 2nd Sess. p. 10.
2Ibid. p. 11.
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In basic concept, the statute recognizes the need for providing
family budget, credit management, and related counseling services
to help special credit-risk families to qualify for, and to obtain,
homeownership. The legislative intent of the program cannot be
achieved through voluntary effort alone; funding is essential to
a successful counseling program.3
Specifically, the HUD proposal for fiscal 1971 was as follows:
The budget request for $3,100,000 for 1971 will provide 300,000
counseling sessions for 25,000 families. It is expected that
2,500 of these families will become applicants for home mortgage
insurance under Section 237 without recourse to assistance payments.
Counseling for 25,000 families is a modest beginning for the
program in that it will provide counseling for only about 125
families in each of over 200 metropolitan areas with a popu-
lation of 100,000 persons or more...Total requirements for the
program are estimated at $3,100,000.4
However, the final appropriations for FY 1971 ignored Romney's
request and deleted the $3,100,000 requested for counseling from HUD's
budget. The final word on this issue from the House Appropriations
Committee was the following:
3Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, Department
of Housing and Urban Development, Space, Science, Veterans, and Certain
Other Independent Agencies Appropriations, 91st. Cong. 2nd. Sess. FiscalYear 1971, p. 889.
4Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, Department
of Housing and Urban Development, Space, Science, Veterans, and Certain
Other Independent Agencies Appropriations, 92nd. Cong. 1st Sess. Fiscal
Year 1972, p. 776 (Referred to as "Senate FY 1972").
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The conferees suggest that any needed counseling services can be
provided by voluntary groups and existing community services,
but where such services are not provided they may be made avail-
able as part of the ngrmal mortgage insurance initiation and
servicing activities
By the time that the House convened its appropriations hearings for
FY 1972, Romney had retreated on seeking funding for counseling agencies.
The official stance of the agency became one of increasing in-house
capabilities to manage volunteer counseling efforts and of seeking
funds for counseling from other department resources.6
Similar to the statements of the previous year, Romney's remarks
before the Senate Committee on Appropriations for FY 1972 began by
acknowledging that voluntary counseling efforts alone were not suffi-
cient. However, rather than going on to request funding for these
agencies, he proceeded to request funding to support additional HUD
personnel.
Secretary Romney stated that:
Hopefully, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees will
see fit to appropriate some money for that program (237 counseling)
this year, because unquestionably one of the real deficiencies in
our effort is the ability to give proper counseling to low-income
families, both before they move into housing units, particularly
on a homeownership basis, and after they get in.7
We have undertaken 237 counseling on a voluntary
basis to the extent we could. But we have had no funds for 23/
counseling and we have no funds for counseling under 235...We
have gone as far as we can go on a voluntary basis with 237.
5House Report No. 91-1345, 91st. Cong. 2nd. Sess. p. 9.
6Statement by Senator Walter F. Mondale quoting Assistant Secretary.
Eugene Gulledge, in testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee,
April 1971. In Senate FY 1972, op. cit. p. 964.
7Ibid. p. 350.
-253-
We have about 90 organizations in about 80 cities doing it on a
voluntary basis, but we are not doing nearly as much as we should
be doing.. .we need a certain staff nucleus to direct the voluntary
effort. The funds would be used for that purpose.. .it would mean
having staff in each of the area and FHA offices, who could or-
ganize the voluntary efforh in the communities.. .we think we need
about $3 million a year...
In the testimony that followed, HUD Assistant Secretary Richard
Van Dusen and Secretary Romney lauded the efforts of the volunteer organi-
zations, essentially back-tracked on their earlier comments which indi-
cated that these efforts were not sufficient, and continued to argue
for additional funding for HUD staff.
Mr. Van Dusen: The Urban League provides these services(counseling) in many cities, the Salvation Army, organizations
of that kind.
Secretary Romney: We succeeded in getting Sears and
Roebuck to make use of their credit personnel in a number
of cities to help identify the principal experts who could
volunteer their time to counsel some of these special risks
with respect to homeownership. And then there are many other
organizations, nonprofit organizations of various kinds. We
believe we could get real estate personnel and other people
of that type to volunteer their time on an organized basis to
give such assistance. But you would need a certain nucleus
organization to make certain that 9it operates effectively.
That is where we need some money.
One possible explanation for why Romney did not prescribe a cure --
funds for the agencies -- that followed his own analysis of the problem --
inadequate funds available -- may have been because earlier attempts to
fund these agencies directly had been unsuccessful. 10  Perhaps Romney's
8Ibid. p. 351.
9Ibid. p. 352.
10On this point, Mr Spellman, President of the Mortgage Bankers AssociationAmerica stated that: "We have to assume that the reason they (the Administration(didn't ask for funding) is because they had been rebuffed in past years." Ibid.p. 817.
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request for funding additional HUD personnel to monitor counseling efforts
was a new approach that he felt may be more attractive to Congress, but
that he, himself, did not completely believe in.
However, Romney's retreat was premature. At the same time that he
was changing his approach, Congress was also making a 180 degree reversal.
Most surprising were the actions of the House Appropriations Committee in
earmarking $3 million to fund counseling services, although HUD had not
requested this for FY 1972. From that point on, the counseling issue
continued to gain momentum. Faced with a growing awareness of the problems
that were plaguing the homeownership programs, counseling was grasped as,
the key to salvaging these programs.
By the time that the FY 1972 Senate Appropriaticns Committee convened,
many Congressmen and special interest groups were openly supporting the
funding of counseling. While Senator Gordon Allott's opening comments
reaffirmed the view of the FY 1971 House Appropriations Committee Report,
he went on to support funding counseling:
I have a suggestion from a member of my staff, that one of the
reasons for not funding this in the past was that this has been
funded to some considerable extent by charitable organizations...
We have a letter from one of our cities now saying these funds
are drying up, and there are insufficient funds available for
this purpose...It has (all been done on a voluntary basis), and
this is why the question about 237, because I have communications
from Pueblo and the private financing of this service through
eleemosynary organizations has started to dry up and they can't
continue to Qperate on the same level as they have in the past.(See Exhibit 2)11
Similarly, Senator Pastore simply said: "What bothers me, the
administration didn't ask for a dime." (for counseling)12
Ibid. p. 351-353.
12Ibid. p. 812. See also testimony of Senators Walter Mondale and Jacob Javits,
p. 964 and 678, respectively.
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SERVING THE COMMUNiTY OF U
June 2, 1971
Senator Gordon Allott
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 02169
Dear Senator Allott:
I have received the statement of James P. Twomey made to the
sub-co-mittee on HUD - SPACE - SCIENCE of the house Committee on
Appropriations. This presentation was made on May 13, 1971. I
whole heartely concur with Mr. Twaneyls sratements and especially
am I asking your suport for the Honeownership Assistance Program
Section 237.
Our agency, Social Services of Pueblo.. .United, has been certified
as a counseling agency for applicants eligible for the services
provided by Section 237. As you are well aware the counseling service
is wthout remuneration fran the federal governrent.
Our agency receives funds froa both the United Fund of Pueblo and
the Catholic Diocese of Pueblo. Our funding has never been sufficient
to provide all of the services requested of us and this year because
of the economic situation within our own conuaunity our funding
resources from the United Fund have even been reduced.
Despite this we have seen the inestimable vajue of Homeownership
Counseling for those individuals who are eligible under Section 237.
Wihout:-tfiis counseling not only would the eligible individuals be
u.nable to receive subsidization provided by the Honeownership
Assistance Program but because of their own inability, for sundry
reasons, to handle their own budgetary problems would eventually
become delinquent in their housepaymnent and subsequently loose
ownership.
Our agency has provided this counseling service icugusr-1949
and during this time have interviewed 68 families, of this number
we have reconmmended 26 to be accepted for subsidization under
Section 237 and all have been accepted. To date none of the families
we are counseling have became delinquent in their housepayment.
The Homeownership Counseling Program can well be expanded in our
agency were we able to provide more staff time. As I indicated
above because of our on financial situation we have been unable
to hire additional staff and in effect have asked staff to assume
the additional responsibility of providing this service. In most
instances this requires volunteer time on their part.
We in the agency have seen the results of this counseling program
and have a keen awareness of the necessity for its continuence
if the provisiors of Section 237 are to be effective for those
families who are inadequately housed because of low income and
a history of financial difficulties. They will be unable otherwise
to make the essential move from inadequate to adequate housing.
I'm sure all of us recognize the implications.of poor housing
not only to the family and children concerned but to our entire
comunities, states and nation.
If the Haneownership Counseling Program under Section 237 is not
funded certainly we will not be able to expand this counseling
programand there is every possibility we may have to terminate
it. In the name of those clients who are benefited by this program
I ask your support for funding of this program.
Sincerely,
(Rev.) MarvinL.-Ka pushion, ACSW
Director
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In addition to the pro-counseling mood within Congress, the National
Housing Conference, the National Association of Home Builders and the
Mortgage Bankers Association of America testified that counseling was
a critical component of the homeownership programs and that its absence
was a factor in providing an atmosphere in which abuses could flourish. 13
The Senate Appropriations Committee responded favorably to these
sentiments. They increased the House Appropriation from $3 to $4 million
and specifically directed HUD on how these funds were to be used:
The Committee directs that wherever'feasible, these funds be used
to support recognized and qualified charitable or public service
type non profit organizations engaged in counseling and assisting
eligible low income families rather than for development of dupli-
cative in-house capabilities. 14
The result was a compromise appropriation of $3.25 milion for counseling.
This was the first and only time that Congress has ever funded counseling
services.
However, rather than using the funds to support pre-purchase counseling
efforts, about $2 1/2 million was used to fund thirty-one counseling
agencies in twenty cities to do delinquency and default counseling. (See
Chapter 9 Section 6) The remainder of the appropriation, about $750,000,
13See Ibid. p. 815; 756; and 774-776, respectively.
14Senate Hearings Before the Committee on Appropriations, Department
of Housing and Urban Development; Space, Science, Veterans and Certain
Other Independent Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1973, 92nd. Cong.
2nd Sess. p. 557 (Referred to as "Senate FY 1973").
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was used by HUD to fund two studies, contracted to private consulting
firms, to study the effectiveness of pre-purchase counseling efforts
(OSTI contract) and to develop a training program for counseling
agency staff.
During the Senate Appropriations Hearings for FY 1973 an apparently
annoyed Senator Allott questioned Secretary Romney on his use of the
counseling funds.
You will recall that Senator Pastore and I specifically expressed
concern that the moneys appropriated by Congress not be utilized
for administrative purposes. Yet, from reports available to me,
it appears that the appropriated amount of $3.25 million was not
made available directly to local counseling agencies.. .I am in-
formed that this money was utilized for what is termed "techni-
cal, promotional and administrative purposes." 15
Romney denied this charge. His response suggested that, with the
aid of a new "$100 Fee Program," in which the seller would pay $100 to
a counseling agency on behalf of the counseled purchaser, the voluntary
agencies would be able to perform pre-purchase counseling adequately.16
While the favorable response to counseling, by Congress and others,
should have been a signal to HUD that counseling was an "in vogue" issue,
likely to continue to gain support, HUD's FY 1973 budget submission again
made no requests for counseling. It simply stated that any additional
funding that would be necessary to complete the demonstration developed
from the FY 1972 appropriation would be provided under the Department's
research program.
15Ibid. p. 557.
16Ibid. p. 557-558; 563.
17Ibid. p. 562.
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While HUD's apparent anti-counseling attitude in 1972 and 1973
eludes obvious explanation -- in light of its pro-counseling rhetoric --
several explanations exist:
First, the channeling of the bulk of FY 1972 funds to a default
counseling program is, perhaps, easiest to understand. In view of the
mounting default and foreclosure rates HUD chose to ignore Congress'
wishes to assist agencies in their pre-purchase counseling efforts and,
instead, opted for a program that had a chance of reducing the embar-
rassing and costly foreclosures -- its most pressing short-term problem.
(See Chapter 9 Section 2)
Up until 1969 HUD's insurance reserves were plentiful. However, by the earl3
1970's, several of the insurance funds began to show substantial deficits.
(See Chapter 9 Section 2) This must have been intensely embarrassing for an
agency that had always been fiercly proud of its financial solvency.
HUD's decision to create a default counseling program was a significant
attempt to reverse the mushrooming deficits.
A second reason why HUD's pro-counseling stance might have been
easier to talk about than to carry out involves FHA's historically close
relationship to the mortgage banker and the lack of a well-defined role
for the newcomer to the home purchas system -- the counseling agency.
While the MBAA was in favor of counseling, there is evidence that at
least some mortgage bankers resented the intrusion of the counseling
18.agency in matters that, heretofore, had involved only HUD and mort-
180STI D + D #2. p. 40-45.
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gagees. Thus, the emergence of counseling agencies presented a new actor
into a well-established system and HUD, similar to the mortgage banker,
may have been wary about how the new agency would mesh with its pre-
vailing practices.
Not only was the counseling agency a newcomer and not only was
there a great variety in agency types and functions, (See this Chapter
Section 3.b.) but the unit within HUD that had responsibility for
all counseling functions was extremely weak (See this Chapter Section 3.c).
Thus, the sheer variety in agencies, combined with an almost non-
existent internal structure for coordinating and monitoring them, pro-
.vides a third plausible explanation for HUD's unwillingness to request
funds for counseling agencies.
b. Emergence of Private, Voluntary Counseling Agencies:
In the absence of funds to support pre-purchase counseling activities,
private social service agencies voluntarily provided these services. After
the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, HUD began to certify existing
or newly formed agencies to do 235/237 counseling. This opened the way
for certification to almost any interested agency. John Andrews, the
Boston HUD Area Office Housing Counselor described the process as
follows:
The certification process helps the agencies to clarify their
own objectives concerning counseling. It's really more for their
benefit than for HUD's. Once an agency has applied for certifi-
cation, I'll work with it until its application is acceptable
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to HUD. If it's interested, it will certainly get certified.19
But, in spite of this leniency, by the end of 1970 only 63 agencies
in the entire country had received HUD certification.20 This may
have been due to: a scarcity of eligible or interested agencies;
the lack of Federal funding; or, HUD Central Office, rather than
Area/Insuring office administration of the certification process.21
But by Summer 1972, there were about 200 HUD-certified counseling
agencies and an additional 100 non-certified agencies. Based upon a
telephone survey with counseling agency personnel, OSTI Inc. found
the following patterns among the agencies:
The largest discernible groups were publicly-funded agencies
that were spin-offs of local OEO Community Action Programs,
Model Cities programs, and in some instances local welfare
programs and local housing authorities.
Among the over 300 voluntary counseling agencies.. .only 94
had assisted as many as 50 lower-income families in actual
purchases prior to 1972. Agencies that had provided ser-
vices to as many as 100 purchasers were extremely rare.
Agencies differed greatly in the services they tended to pro-
vide regularly as a part of their pre-purchase counseling
activities. Taken as a whole, the range of services they
reported cover a wide spectrum of alternative content area
19Interview, John Andrews, Housing Counselor, HUD Area Office,
Boston, Mass. August 18, 1972. Andrews also described the variety
of reasons why agencies sought HUD certification, in spite of the
lack of funding:
-in the hope that Federal funding would be forthcoming and that their
status as a certified agency would make them eligible for funding;
- to help them attain credibility with local funding sources;
- to expedite their dealings with local mortgagees and builders;
- to help them attain credibility with prospective mortagors.
20OSTI Final , op. cit. p. 30.
HUD Central Office originally had the responsibility of certifying
counseling agencies, until this responsibility was designated to the Area/
Insuring offices in July, 1972. Interview, John Andrews, op. cit.
-262-
and modes of service delivery: Informational; training; advice;
referral; direct assistance; advocacy intervention.
Although voluntary counseling agencies regularly provided infor-
mational services -- particularly dealing with budget management --
and most provided some advisory resources for clients, only a
minority of the agencies offered some form of direct, advocacy,
or referral services on a regular basis. 22
Thus, the picture that emerged from the telephone census was of a great
diversity in counseling agency styles, concerns and services. Not
only were the great majority of agencies relatively inexperienced but,
while most seemed genuinely concerned with consumer problems, only a
handful offered a wide range of consumer-oriented services.
The 235 Audit came to a similar conclusion:
In the absence of funding of Section 237, except for isolated
arrangements for counseling by non-profit groups, there has been
no existing arrangement which insures that the buyer who needs
counseling receives it...If marginal mortgagors are to be suc-
cessfully housed under Section 235, both pre-sale and post-
sale counseling is required.
We recognize that adequate funding of Section 237 to provide
needed in-house or out-of-house staff for the desirable degree
of counseling, advice and assistance to low-income and otherwise
disadvantaged mortgagors, can minimize these problems. 23
Based upon the above, it appears that Secretary Romney's later
suggestions that the voluntary agencies were providing sufficient
services, in spite of the lack of funding, were unfounded. But while
counseling agencies might have been better equipped to provide more
comprehensive, consumer-oriented services, had funding been available,
OSTI Final, op. cit. pp. 54, 56 and 59-61. This writer organized
and directed the OSTI telephone survey of counseling agencies.
23235 Audit, op. cit. p. 56.
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the record of private voluntary counseling agencies is, nevertheless,
noteworthy.
The most comprehensive study on the effectiveness of pre-purchase
counseling efforts was performed by OSTI Inc. in 1972-1974. Field
studies were conducted in twenty cities across the country to observe
how local counseling agencies operated in the context of the prevailing
235 homeownership program and the success which these agencies had
in assisting home purcha-rsto prepare for homeownership.
In general, OSTI found that:
Although many voluntary counseling efforts have been unable to
provide an adequate range of needed services, we find that past
program experience is indicative of the potential of consumer-
oriented counseling in proting increased effectiveness in
federal housing programs.
More specifically, the OSTI researchers found that there were
several critical ways in which counseled families were better prepared
for the ownership experience than similar uncounseled families:
Although counseled families more frequently purchased older houses,
they encountered less severe housing condition problems upon pur-
chase than did uncounseled purchasers. Furthermore, counseled
purchasers were more knowledgeable than uncounseled purchasers
about things wrong with their houses at purchase, and experienced
fewer and less severe unexpected housing condition problems as
a result.
That the counseled were better protected in the housing they pur-
chased is probably attributable to the independent inspection ser-
vices and quasi-legal assistance that some of the voluntary agencies
studied have provided their clients. However, most voluntary
agencies did not provide these services, and many counseled families
were insufficiently protected against inadequate hou:,ing. Neverthe-
less they fared better than uncounseled purchasers.
240STI Final, op. cit. p. 1.
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As a result of the consumer-protective aspects of pre-purchase
counseling, the counseled families incurred lower (in relation
to their incomes) housing-related expenses to maintain their
homes in adequate condition during the subsequent period of
ownership and, when interviewed, anticipated fewer major ex-
penses in the coming year. We conclude that the experience
of the voluntary agencies indicates the effectiveness of coun-
seling both in reducing risks faced by lower-income families
in the purchase market and in promoting their interests.25
Additional support for OSTI's conclusion comes from the results
of the Buyer's Agent Program. This program was designed:
to test whether or not, with counseling and subsidy payments, lower
income families thin a 50-mile radius of San Francisco could be-
come homeowners.
Preliminary results of the program have indicated that partici-
pants in the Buyer's Agent Program have had extremely good ownership
experiences. Specifically, in relation to their payment records, the
report states that:
For the first 303 mortgage loans made under BAP, there were less
than 7 percent showing any late payments. And the bulk of these
were only one month late. By contrast, figures for the State of
California covering all Section 235 purchases showed delinquencies
totaling more that 15 percent, with over a third of these due for
three or more months. Only one BAP loan, three-tenths of one per-
cent, had been foreclosed as of August, 1974 (two and one half
years after the program started), whereas foreclosures throughout
the state were running at 2.25 percent 2 or Section 235 loans for
the quarter ending September 30, 1974.
Based upon these early and encouraging findings the San Francisco
researchers reported that:
25Ibid. p. 5.
'
6Edward W. Moose, "The Buyer's Agent Program" -- Final Report, Prepared
for the San Francisco Development Fund, March, 1975. p. 22.
27Ibid. p. 46.
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Homeownership for lower income families, and specifically Section
235, can be made to work if those to whom a subsidy is given are
carefully selected and if they are well-intormed as to respon-
sibilities they are assuming. The provision of such "guidance,"
"counseling," or "training," was intended when plans for the
Section 235 legislation were first forWlated. It is unfortunate
that these plans were not carried out.
A key recommendation of the research was that any ongoing program
of homeownership for lower income families include this type of consumer
protection.
We recommend... the mandatory participation of selected prospective
buyers in pre-purchase homeownership training classes as a standard
requirement of a subsidy program. Regardless of how well they may
be selected, first-time buyers with little knowledge of ownership
responsibilities and noexperience in the housing market need infor-
mation and guidance. In the follow-up analysis of the pilot ex-
periment it was found that the effect of counseling services per-
sisted over time in several important respects. 29
Thus, there is good evidence supporting the important role that
homeownership counseling can play, particularly with regard to lower
income, first-time homebuyers. That this evidence was not yet
available to HUD while they were making their non-requests for funding
counseling is not relevant. The fact is that these studies served to
confirm the conventional wisdom on counseling, rather than to disclose
any new or unexpected revelations.
Prior to going on to examine HUD's Information Advice and Assistance
Program, HUD's 1974 homeownership counseling program, a brief assessment
of the role of the Housing Counselor at HUD will help to round out the
picture of HUD's posture vis a vis counseling.
28 San Francisco Development Fund, "Preliminary Results of the Buyer'sAgent Demonstration" Report and Recommendations. February, 1975 p. 3.
29Ibid. p. 5.
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c. The HUD Housing Counselor:
Besides contracting with private, voluntary agencies to provide
homeownership counseling services, HUD also has had the option to pro-
vide the services itself. The OSTI Final report observed that:
The creation of the HUD Housing Counselor role at the Area/Insuring
offices initially enabled HUD offices to undertake direct pro-
vision of counseling services to prospective purchasers However,
the Housing Couselor role, in which the central responsibility for
direct provision of counseling services resided, proved to be an
unpopular one in a predominantly production-oriented organization. 30
Indeed, the Housing Counselor was also viewed as a relatively low
man on the HUD totem pole by Central Office. According to William
Feingold, Assistant Director of Homeownership at HUD:
The Housing Counselor is very low in the HUD bureaucracy... It's
not even considered a high role in relation to such positions as
Property Disposition Officer or Loan Management Specialist within
the Division of Housing Management.31
HUD's lack of interest or intent to provide direct counseling ser-
vices was clearly stated by Under Secretary Richard Van Dusen before
a Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee:
We never assumed...that the Department would do counseling as a
Federal function. It just isn't organized in that manner, and
doesn't have the field establishment to do that. But if there
were in each of our field offices somebody who had the respon-
sibility to see that counseling services were available, and that
an applicant for subsidy needing counseling were referred to a
local counseling agency, and there was that followup, this we
think, would be very useful. 32
30OSTI Final op. cit. p. 40-41.
31Interview, William Feingold, Assistant Director of Homeownership,
HUD Central Office, February 20, 1 74 (telephone).
32Senate FY 1972 op. cit. p. 352. But although the official policy at HUD
discouraged in-house counseling, some Area an Insuring offices undertook their
own counseling programs. Lawrence Katz, a former HUD director in Milwaukee
initiated a widely acclaimed counseling program for ADC mothers. See, for
example, "Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages (Part 2)" op. cit. p. 143-174.
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Based upon this view of counseling, the HUD Housing Counselor emerged as
a certifier, monitor and evaluator of counseling agency efforts, but not
as a counselor. The job description of the HUD Housing Counselor outlined
his tasks.
The HUD Housing Counselor:
...provides leadership, assistance, and training to local housing
authorities, sponsors, HUD-approved ccunseling agencies, local
Insuring offices and others on homeownership counseling...He re-
cruits counseling agencies and monitors and evaluates their coun-
seling programs. He establishes and maintains liaison with public
and private agencies on the State and local levels to enlist their
participation on a voluntary basis, in counseling programs. He
reviews and make recommendations on counseling and training pro-
posals submitted to the Area Officeby local housing authorities
and HUD-assisted sponsors.3
Further, according to Mr. Feingold:
The Housing Counselor is the only advocate of the homebuyer within
HUD... Others may be sympathetic, but without a Housing Counselor,
there is no advocate.34
Yet, in spite of the seemingly important function of the Housing
Counselor, as of late February 1974 less than one-half of these positions
were filled in the Area/Insuring offices. 35
In the absence of a Housing Counselor, other HUD personnel often
carried out the former's most rudimentary tasks. For example, in
Philadelphia as of January 1973, there had been no Housing Counselor
for six months. An interview with the Community Services Advisor, the
Housing Counselor stand-in, revealed that only 3-4 hours per week were
devoted to carrying out the normal functions of the Housing Counselor,
33Area Office Organization, A HUD Handbook 1171.lA, November 1971, p. 32.
34Interview, William Feingold, p. cit.
35Ibid.
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including answering telephone calls, responding to letters, and filing
an occasional report. Moreover, to his embarrassment, the Community
Services Advisor did not know anything about the more substantive
tasks of a Housing Counselor.36
Similarly, the Hartford Insuring office had been without a Housing
Counselor for one month as of February 1974.37 In that office, the
Housing Counselor's tasks fell on a secretary in the Housing Manage-
ment section. An interview with this individual revealed that she
simply answered calls from people who were seeking information about
how to go about purchasing an FHA-insured home.
For example:
The first thing I tell them is that they must find a house and
the bank finances it. If their homes qualify, I'll refer them
to.the Connecticut Housing Finance Agency, where they can get
a lower interst mortgage.
While this type of information giving is, indeed, useful, it
represents only one facet of the tasks that are supposed to be carried out
by the Housing Counselor. Thus, HUD's willingness to "ax" its most
consumer-oriented position, is further evidence that HUD does not yet
put a high premium on serving consumer needs.
36Interview, Charles Morgan, Community Services Advisor, HUD Area
Office, Philadelphia, Pa. January ll, 1973.
In Insuring Offices, the Housing Management Representative carries
out the functions of the Housing Counselor. There is usually no Housing
Counselor, per se.
38Interview, Sarah Comber, Secretary, Housing Management
Section, FHA Insuring Uffice, Hartford Conn. February 7, 1974. (telephone)
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d. The Homeownership Information, Advice and Assistance Program:
In January 1974 HUD launched a new homeownership counseling pro-
gram, attendance at which was a requirement for any family wishing to
purchase a HUD-owned property. But, surprisingly, within the atmos-
phere of a frequently weak or nonexistent Housing Counselor, HUD chose
to .place the bulk of the responsibility for implementing the new pro-
gram on the Housing Counselor:
The Housing Counselor...shall have lead responsibility for
directing, organizin, planning, preparing and participating
in the (program)...3
Moreover, the program was specifically required to be executed "in
.house":
The sessions...are to be conducted on specific days and at
specific times in the local HUD offices. 4 0
The Homeownership Information, Advice and Assistance Program
(HIAAP) was created to give new purchasers of HUD acquired properties,
under Sections 235 and 221(d)(2),access to information related to home-
ownership. The guidebook stated the following as its key objective:
By preparing prospective purchasers for homeownership, its
responsibilities and obligations, incidences of chronic de-
linquencies, defaults, and foreclosures will be eliminated or
substantially reduced resulting in a corresponding reduction
in losses to HUD.4
There are several aspects of the HIAAP that warrant discussion. First,
the way in which HIAAP emerged within HUD is interesting.
391
"Homeownership Information, Advice and Assistance Program" A HUDHandbook, Program Participant and HUD Staff. January 1974, p. 2 (referredto as HIAAP Guidebook).
40Ibid. p. 4-5.
41Ibid. p. 1.
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William Feingold related the following story:
With the production programs in a state of decline, Sheldon
Lubar was looking around for new programs with which the pro-
duction people could become involved. He spoke to Assistant
Secretary for Housing Management Crawford about the possibility
of HPMC setting up a counseling program that could be offered
in conjunction with the disposition of HUD-foreclosed homes.
Crawford, upset about Lubar's threat to undertake a counseling
program, responded: "You can't do counseling...it's a manage-
ment thing."
And, according to Feingold -- "the next day we had a counseling program."42
Whether or not it was the rivalry within HUD, that provided the
real push for the HIAAP, the fact is that the HIAAP was not a well-
thought-out homebuyer-oriented counseling plan.
A second important aspect of the HIAAP is that by placing the
responsibility for implementing the program on HUD staff (Housing
Counselor in conjunction with Chief Property Officer and Loan Manage-
ment Specialist),43 HUD was shifting back to the earlier conceptuali-
zation of the Housing Counselor's role. But, ironically, as noted
above, this shift occurred at a time when many areas lacked the per-
sonnel to carry out the program.
Third, the program itself -- objectives, format and content -- was
based upon assumptions that were not supported by the then-available
information on the role of counseling. The HIAAP offered one group
session lasting a minimum of one hour, with an additional half hour for
questions.44 The content of the session was to include the following:
42Interview, William Feingold, op. cit.
43HIAAP Guidebook, op. cit. p. 1-2.
44Ibid. p. 5-6.
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purchase procedures; property care and maintenance; financing home-
ownership; home management; budget and debt management; referral
services; resale; recertification; and alternatives to foreclosure. 45
Chart 6 examines the structure of the HIAAP and presents
the evidence that contradicts the assumptions on which it was based.
CHART 6
Assumptions on Which the HIAAP was Based Compared with the Then-Available
Knowledge on Homeownership Counseling
Evidence
a. Group information sessions
are appropriate to assist pro-
spective mortgagors.
b. A family can be adequately
prepared to undertake the re-
sponsibilites of homeownership
by being provided with an hour
of information, and that this
information will be sufficient
to substantially reduce the in-
cidence of defaults and fore-
closures.
None. Based upon the OSTI telephone
census of counseling agencies, HUD
should have known that the great
majority of agencies offering pre-
purchase counseling used the one-to-
one counseling format and felt that
this was considerably more effective
than group sessions. 6
None. It had been widely acknowledged
that one of the causes of defaults
and foreclosures in the 235, 237 and
221(d)(2) programs was that families
were ill-prepared for their new obliga-
tions. Simple logic would suggest that one
hour could not alter this situation sub-
stantial ly. 47
In addition, again based upon the OSTI
telephone census, the great majority of
agencies that offered pre-purchase
counseling servic g spent several hours
with each client. o
45Ibid. p. 7-8.
OSTI Working Paper on Telephone Census, December, 1973 (unpublished
report).
47See, for example, "Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government
Operations,"o. cit. p. 16-17.
OSTI Working Paper, op. cit.
Assumptions
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Assumptions
C. HUD-foreclosed properties
will be suitable for new 235
and 221(d)(2) mortgagors.
Evidence
Furthermore, studies on the causes of
defaults and toreclosures point
to the fact that most people having
difficulties with their mortgage
payments are in this position for
reasons beyond their control. (See
Chapter 10 Section 2) In addition,
the OSTI study found that the
economic character of a particular
area was also a contributor 4o de-
fault and foreclosure rates. Thus,
information alone would not appear
to be the solution to defaults and
foreclosures.
None. HUD-foreclosed propert s
are frequently in bad repair.
Moreover, the cause of the fore-
closure often related to the poor
condition of the property or an
undesirable location, with falling
market values. 51 Unless HUD ensures
that the re-sold homes have good
values and are in good repair, the
new purchasers could end up in fore-
closure also. It msut be remembered
that 235 and 221(d)(2) purchasers have
low incomes and, most likely, do not
have the resources to deal with costly
repairs.
And,a fourth and final aspect of the HIAAP that warrants attention
is that the requirement that the HIAAP be administered within the local
HUD office undermined the efforts of the scores of private agencies that
had managed to offer counseling services to homebuyers. The HUD Guidebook
490STI Final op. cit. p. 227-232.
50See, for example,"Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government
Operations,"op. cit. p. 6 and p. 23-24.
51See, for example, Ibid. p. 5 and 13-17 and OSTI Final p. 233.
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specifically relegated counseling agencies to a secondary or nonexistent
role within the HIAAP:
The Housing Counselor...may call upon HUD-approved counseling
agencies to assist him in providing the necessary information,
advice and assistance for homebuyers. HUD-approved counseling
agencies shall not participate in this program gtil their staffs
have been thoroughly trained in this program...
Some HUD field office personnel registered strong disagreement
with the reduced role of the counseling agencies and argued that coun-
seling could best be achieved through a liaison between the Housing
Counselor and the counseling agency. This view was expressed in an
interview with the Region IX Community Services Advisor, Janet Miller.
The HIAAP undermined everything we were trying to do. I wanted
to sit down and cry. We wanted to get money for the counseling
agencies to do counseling. We simply don't have the in-house
capacity to do it. 53
And, in a February 25, 1974 memo to the Assistant Regional Administrator
for Housing Management, Region IX, Robert E. Boldt, Ms. Miller noted
that:
Recent developments indicate a complete lack of support for the
former counseling agency approach. In fact, the word counseling
has such a negative connotation in Washington that organizational
and title changes are in the works to "consumer" terminology.
Semantics rather than substance are the order of the day.
52HIAAP Guidebook, op. cit. p. 9.
53Interview, Janet Miller, Community Services Advisor, San Francisco
Regional Office, March 22, 1974. (The Community Services Advisor is in
charge of consumer oriented activities at the regional level. As mentionedpreviously, there may also be Community Services Advisors in Area offices
and, in such cases, these individuals often perform the Housing Counselor's
responsibilities.)
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Yet, we in Region IX are still committed to this approach, have
exerted substantial efforts in gearing up for it, and have over
thirty local agencies struggling to serve potential homebuyers'
interests. We have every reason to feel that if well-developed,
this will be the most effective way of preparing low-income
families for successfu 4homeownership and of reducing default
and acquisition rates.
Ms. Miller's conviction that counseling should be performed by
private agencies, not HUD, was so firm that she issued a set options
to Area/Insuring offices within Region IX, in which she interpreted
HUD Guidelines to conform to her own beliefs. (See Exhibit 3)
The story on HUD's pre-purchase counseling efforts ends here.
The conclusion that must be reached from the above discussion points
to the fact that HUD has not played a strong or consistent role in
promoting pre-purchase homeownership counseling. Of all the ways in
which HUD might intervene to protect the consumer and to minimize its
own risk, counseling appears to be among the most direct and potentially
beneficial. Clear explanations that would account for this behavior have
not been found.
54Memorandum: "Position Paper on Housing Counseling" from Janet
Miller, Community Services Advisor to Robert E. Boldt, Assistant Regional
Administrator for Housing Management, Region IX, February 25, 1974.
DIR\&IT 3:
II. OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
it is our interpretation that the counseling agency approach is not only
consistent with, but extends well beyond, the Homeownership Information
Program. We also recognize that the circumstances in each office differ
and will dictate variations in the program. Therefore, in implementing the
HIAPP, it is proposed that field offices choose one of three basic options
as best suits the circumstances of that office. OPTION 1 represents the
most ideal alternative.
OPTION 1. All 235 and 221(d)(2) buyers participate in a compre-
hensive counseling program conducted by a HUD-certified
counseling agency.
In those offices where it is feasible (e.g., where there
exists a sufficient number of counseling agencies, with
adequate geographic distribution, with adequate funding
resources and the expressed interest), purchasers can be
required to participate in the program of a HUD-certified
counseling agency. The agency would screen the buyer,
provide the scope of services as outlined in 7610.2, make
a judgment on his suitability for homeownership, and certify
to his eligibility. Under these circumstances, HIAAP
sessions would not be necessary. A system involving these
elements is currently being implemented in the SAN
FRANCISCO Office.
OPTION 2. All 235 and 221(d)(2) buyers participate in an HIAAP
session conducted by a HUD-certified counseling agency.
Where it is infeasible to implement OPTION 1, but where
counseling agencies exist who are interested in assisting
with the program, the counseling agency can be assigned
full responsibility for conducting the sessions, monitored
by the CSA.
OPTION 3. All 235 and 221(d)(2) buyers participate in an HIAAP
session conducted by HUD Counseling, Property Disposition
and Single-Family Mortgage Servicing staff.
Where the first two options are infeasible, the office shall
-implement the program entirely with HUD staff resources.
This is being actively done in SACRAMENTO, where no counseling
agency presently exists.
A fourth option is mailing the information and requiring a*response indicating
that the buyer has read the material. This is highly discouraged, but may be
necessary in the case of buyers too distant from the office or a participating
counseling agency.
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CHAPTER 9: DEFAULT: HUD'S INTERNAL PROCEDURES, GUIDELINES FOR MORTGAGEES AND
COUNSELING EFFORTS
1. RELATIONSHIP OF DEFAULT TO FORECLOSURE:
According to HUD a mortgagor is considered to be in "default"
thirty days after a mortgage payment is missed. He continues in de-
fault until his payments have been brought current or until the house
is disposed either through sale or foreclosure. A mortgagor is con-
sidered "delinquent" anytime a payment is due and not paid -- both
during the first thirty days of non payment and anytime thereafter.1
Sixty days in default means that three payments have not been made
and that the first of these payments is ninety days overdue.
During the period of default, mortgagees are supposed to make
every effort to assist mortgagors to become current; and mortgagors
are supposed to notify mortgagees whenever payment difficulties arise.
Yet, in many instances, mortgagees have not provided the HUD-mandated
assistance to mortgagors during the default period and many mortgagors
have been faulted by mortgagees for their lack of cooperation. The
increasing problems between mortgagor and mortgagee points to a sig-
nificant breakdown in the home finance system. (See Chart 7).
Simply stated, the default situation , is critical since, all too
often, it leads to foreclosure. It has been estimated that a high
percentage of families who are in default will eventually lose their
homes. For example, using data from Detroit, Baltis Birkle of the U.S.
General Accounting Office estimated in 1971, that at least
1HUD Handbook 4191.1, op. cit. p. 39.
CHART 7
Model of the Delinquency, Default, Foreclosure
Process: Roles of Key Actors
Mortgagor unable
to make a monthly->
payment.
Mortgagee sends a
delinquency notice--
to mortgagor.-
Mortgagor contacts Mortgagee offers
mortgagee explaining relief in accord-
problem. ance with HUD's
guidelines at his
discretion.
Mortgagor does y No relief offered.
not contact
mortgagee.
Default continues
and becomes more
serious.
Mortgagor signs agreement-4 Default is
which establishes a modi- "cured."
fied payment schedule, in
accordance with HUD's guide-
lines, and which is accept-
able to both mortgagee and
mortgagor.
Mortgagor is unable to
adhere to schedule.
At 90 days after
default, mortgagee
sends HUD form 2068,
notifying them of
the default.
Foreclosure
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75 percent of all homes one to three months in default would be
eventually acquired by HUD.2  Since Detroit was harder hit be defaults
and foreclosures than most other citiesthis number may be an exag-
geration of the situation nationwide.
Evidence that, at least in the short-run, the relationship
between default and foreclosure may be somewhat less severe that 75'.percent
comes from the OSTI research. Based upon a sample of 145 defaulting
235/237 mortgagors in eleven cities, in various parts of the country,
the OSTI researchers found that over a 10 month period slightly less
than half the defaulting mortgagors had either lost their homes,
(19.3%), or had fallen into more serious default, (28.2%),which seemed
to be heading toward foreclosure. 3 But however many defaulting families
do eventually end up in foreclosure, default is always an intermediate
and critical stage in the process.
Unfortunately, the number of people going into default in the 235
program has been climbing steadily, reaching 7.77 percent of the total number
of mortgages in force in 1973. And, while there was a slight decrease
in the default rates in the 203 and 221 programs in 1973, the trend in
recent years has been on the upswing. By the end of 1973, 134,086 FHA
2
"Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages -- Detroit" (Part 1) op. cit. p. 15.
30STI D & D #2 op. cit. p. 49-51. However, it should be added that
the OSTI researchers calculated that taking into account some "soft assump-
tions" a slightly higher percentage than 47.5% would fall into foreclosure --
53.5% (p. 55).
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homeowners were in default -- an increase of 41,000 from just three
years earlier -- and with only slightly more mortgages in force during
the latter year. (See Table 15).
Before going on to an examination of the default process, the
impacts of foreclosure on HUD and the homeowner will be assessed to
underscore the importance of giving adequate attention to default.
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TABLE 15
Defaults, FHA-Insured Home Mortgages, Selected Years, 1950-1973
Number of Defaults No. Insured Mortgages Percent of Defaults
In Force Out of Insurance in
Force
1950
Section 203 9,480 1,119,967 .85%
All home programs* 17,058 i,511,402 1.13
1955
Section 203 8,866 1,760,905 .50
All home programs* 14,988 2,140,936 .70
1960
Section 203 22,490 2,697,106 .83
Section 221 835 21,448 3.89
All home programs* 26,850 3,093,034 .87
-1965
Section 203 55,343 3,584,655 1.54
Section 221 4,154 167,003 2.49
All home programs* 64,018 4,090,458 1.57
1970
Section 203 72,097j 4,270,264 1.69
Section 221 15,919 373,239 4.27
Section 235 2,536 129,608 1.96
Section 237 756 1,248 60.58
All home programs* 93,005 5,067,933 1.84
1971
Section 203 82,858 4,329,935 1.91
Section 221 23,430 450,829 5.20
Section 235 12,300 266,807 4.61
Section 237 127 2,040 6.23
All home programs* 120,818 5,339,974 2.26
1972
Section 203 91,426 4,248,267 2.15
Section 221 30,491 498,840 6.11
Section 235 23,921 368,313 6.49
Section 237 282 2,733 10.32
All home programs* 148,614 5,396,288 2.75
1973
Section 203 73,858 4,026,849 1.83
Section 221 26,295 514,390 5.11
Section 235 31,315 403,077 7.77
Section 237 357 3,222 11.08
All home programs* 134,086 5,194,953 2.58
iot-ais OT All home programs-include other
listed in the table.
programs in addition to those
Source: 1973 HUD Statistical Yearbook,p. 185
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2. IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURE ON HUD-FHA AND HOMEOWNERS:
a) HUD-FHA:
Whenever an FHA-insured home is foreclosed, HUD becomes the owner
of the property. The mortgagee is usually responsible for all the legal
aspects of foreclosure and, upon presenting HUD with clear title to the
home, and a guarantee that it is vacant, HUD reimburses the mortgagee
for the outstanding principal balance of the mortgage, less one-third
the amount of foreclosure costs. HU) then becomes responsible for the
maintenance and the disposition of the property. Unfortunately, HUD
has become the owner of an increasing number of homes.
As evident from Table 16,the percentof foreclosures in all the FHA-
insured home programs, but particularly in the 221, 235, and 237 programs, has bE
rising steadily since 1970. In 1973, a record 63,113 FHA-insured homes were for(
closed -- more than double the number ofhomes foreclosed only three years earliel
Emphasizing the seriousness of this situation, Rep. William T.
Randall, Chairman of the Legal and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Government Operations, reported that:
During the first three months of 1973...HUD had acquired almost
as many homes due to foreclosure as in the first twenty years of
its history. In May of (1973), HUD acquired 5,624 homes, the
largest number of acquistions in a single month in t e entire
thiry-nine years in which FHA has been in existence.'
Moreover, the costs of foreclosure to HUD have been sky-rocketing.
Figures from the General Accounting Office revealed that the average
Review of FHA Part 1, Hearings. op. cit. p. 32.
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TABLE 16
Foreclosures, FHA-Insured Home Mortgages, Selected Years,1950-1973
Number of Percent of Fore- ~ Cumulative No. Percent of
Foreclosures closures Out of Through End Total Insured
Insurance in Foroe of Year
1950
Section 203 453 0.05% 6,018 0.30%
All home programs* 2,467 .19 15,351 .58
1955
Section 203 1,053 .07 10,306 .33
All home programs* 4,585 .23 27,063 .69
1960
Section 203 5,763 .23 23,879 .51
Section 221 400 3.17 446 2.04
All home programs* 7,914 .28 50,909 .91
1965
Section 203 37,759 1.11 169,563 2.54
Section 221 3,547 3.05 10,861 6.05
All home programs* 46,033 1.19 226,961 2.91
1970
Section 203 21,783 .52 316,137 3.78
Section 221 6,710 2.17 36,835 8.44
Section 235 1,171 4.58 1,212 .93
Section 237 23 5.08 25 1.96
All home programs* 31,095 .65 415,841 4.17
1971
Section 203 25,655 .60 341,792 3.94
Section 221 10,256 2.75 47,091 8.81
Section 235 6,849 5.28 8,061 2.93
Section 237 96 7.69 121 5.58
All home programs* 43,840 .87 459,681 4.37
1972
Section 203 20,554 .47 362,346 4.07
Section 221 16,184 3.59 63,275 10.36
Section 235 16,637 6.24 24,698 6.26
Section 237 134 6.61 255 8.50
All home programs* 54,453 1.02 514,134 4.69
1973
Section 203 24,792 .58 387,138 4.29
Section 221 18,025 . 3.61 81,300 12.33
Section 235 18,931 5.14 43,629 9.65
Section 237 170 6.22 425 11.58
All home programs* 63,113 1.17 577,247 5.15
"~~
*Totals of All rome
listed in the table
programs' include other programs in addition to those
Source: 1973 HUD Statistical Yearbookp. 179
-283-
cost of disposing of an acquired home ranged from $4,318 for a 235 home
to $7,767 for a 223(e) homes. (See Table 17)
In Detroit, the losses have been even more substantial. In some
sections of that city, the average loss per property has been close to
$10,000.2
There are several explanations which account for the increase in
costs. First, since many HUD inspections on homes insured after 1968
were inadequatedly performed, some of HUD's post-foreclosure
repair costs have stemmed from this early negligence.3 Second, since
many homes insured after 1968, particularly homes insured under Sections
221(d)(2) and 223(e) were in declining neighborhoods, the high incidence
of vandalism in these areas has boosted HUD's repair costs. 4
Third, since many homes that had been "rehabilitated" prior to the
original sale, had received only cosmetic repairs, but had nevertheless
commanded high prices, HUD has had to sell properties for considerably
less than its payment in the insurance settlement.5 Along with this,
the market for many of the homes that flooded the post-1968 real estate
market has diminished, further frustrating the ease of HUD's sale.6
2
"Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages"- Detroit"(Part 1) op. cit. p. 8.
3See Chapter 8 Section la and Fifteenth Report by the Committee on
Government Operations,"op. cit. p. 22.
4Ibid. p. 5-6.
5Ibid. p. 13-14.
6Review of FHA, Part 2 op. cit. p. 142.
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TABLE 17
Average Losses* to HUD Per FHA-Insured Acquired
Home Property - Fiscal Years 1972-1973
Average Losses: Average Losses:
FY 1972 FY 1973
235 $3,876 $4,318
203(b) 5,004 5,659
221(d)(2) 6,031 7,162
223(e) 7,367 7,767
Source: Review of Federal Housing Administration (Part I)
p. 29
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And, since many homeowners were ill-prepared for homeownership some of
HUD's repair costs can be attributed to mortgagorneglect or financial
inability to maintain the property adequately.7
HUD reimburses mortgagees from one of FHA's four insurance funds,
depending upon the section of the National Housing Act through which
the loan is insured. Section 203 is covered by the Mutual Mortgage
Insurance Fund (MMIF), Section 221 is covered by the General Insurance
Fund (GIF), and Sections 235 and 223 are covered by the Special Risk
Insurance Fund (SRIF). (See Appendix 9-1 for a description of each in-
surance fund.)
As of June 30, 1973, the reserves in the MMIF amounted to about
$1.72 billion and, based on FHA's estimate,- were in excess of reserve
requirements by about $338 million.8  However, both the General and
the Special Risk Insurance Funds had, as of that date, reserve deficits
which totalled $2.34 billion. (See Table 18)
The net reserve deficit of all funds combined is close to $2 billion.
However, the excesses of the MMIF (and the fourth fund, the Cooperative
Management Housing Insurance Fund) cannot be used to reduce the deficits
of the other funds. "Each fund is an individual financial entity and,
by law, the excess reserves in one fund cannot be used to cover a reserve
deficiency in another fund." 9
7"Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations," op. cit.p. 16-17.
8Review of FHA, Part 2 op. cit. p. 150.
Review of FHA, Part op. cit. p. 3.
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TABLE 18
Reserves and Reserve Requirements in the Insurance
Funds of FHA as of June 30, 1973
(in thousands of dollars)
Estimated
Reserve
Requirements
Excess of
Insurance
Reserves
Over Esti-
mated Reserve
Requirements
Outstanding
Balance Insurance
In Force (in
millions)
Mutual Mortgage
Insurance Fund -
,203(b) $1,718,973 $1,330,777 $ 388,196 $50,385
General InsurancE
Fund - 221(d)(2) - 315,641 441,690 - 757,331 NA
Other Programs 151,760 596,673 - 444,913 NA
TOTAL - 163,881 1,038,363 -1,202,244 22,796
Special Risk In-
surance Fund
223(e) - 134,060 59,931 - 193,991 1,323
235 - 186,304 321,450 - 507,754 6,805
237 - 3,026 2,741 - 5,767 41
Other Programs - 30,308 401,606 - 431,914 6,024
TOTAL - 353,698 785,728 -1,139,426 14,193
Cooperative
Management 22,839 11,096 11,743 780
Housing Insurance
Fund
TOTAL ALL FUNDS $1,224,233 $3,165,964 -$1,941,731 $88,155
Source: Review of FHA, Part 2 , p. 167
Insurance
Reserves
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In order to make up deficits, the Secretary of HUD may borrow
funds from the Treasury.10 In addition, since Congress never intended
the SRIF to be actuarily sound it "provided specific authority for HUD
to seek appropriations to cover fund deficiencies."1 As of June 30,
1973 HUD had requested an appropriation of $92 million to cover realized
losses. And, to cover the deficits in the GIF a total of $831 million
had been borrowed from the Treasury as of June 30, 1973.12
Clearly, the financial consequences of foreclosure indicate that
it is not in HUD's best interest. In addition to the costs, as described
above, there are also several other negative aspects of foreclosure, from
HUD's point of view. First, the paperwork and mechanics of foreclosing
a home are time-consuming and unwieldy. Second, the process of boarding
up, rehabilitating and selling a property is not HUD's forte. HUD has
never been, nor meant to be, directly involved with the management or
sale of real estate. And, third, with HUD's mandate to help achieve the
national goal of "a decent home... for every American family" having to
repossess a home and thereby evict a family forces HUD to take at least
one step backward in achieving this goal.
Yet, in spite of these strong disincentives to foreclose, HUD
has not played a major role in deterring foreclosures, during default, as
discussed in subsequent sections.
10Ibid. p. 34.
11 Review of FHA, Part 2 op_. cit. p. 152.
12 Ibid. p. 151-152.
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b. Homeowners:
While HUD stands a great deal to lose in foreclosure, by far the
greatest loss is to the ex-homeowner. Foreshadowing the present situation,
Secretary Weaver declared it would be a "cruel hoax" if large number of
low-income families were frustrated in achieving or maintaining homeowner-
ship, when offered to them by the government. Due to the problems of
contacting families whose homes have been foreclosed, no data exist
describing the explicit feelings of these families. But it is reasonable
to infer that they feel bitterly disappointed.
From a practical perspective, the family loses at least some or all
of its downpayment and whatever equity it has manged to build up. Fore-
closure also seriously hurts a family's credit record making it difficult,
if not impossible, for them to be approved for a loan in the future. And,
last, once a family has lost its home the issue of where to move next
must be confronted.
Thus, to both HUD and the homeowner foreclosure is an anathema.
Yet, HUD has not moved aggressively to prevent foreclosure. Similar to
the pre-purchase situation HUD has, in the default situation, a variety
of opportunities to play a strong and significant pro-homeowner role and,
in turn, to reduce its own risk. The following three sections will
examine HUD's internal guidelines and activities related to default;
HUD's guidelines for mortgagees who are dealing with defaulting mortgagors;
and HUD's default counseling program.
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3. HUD'S INTERNAL PROCEDURES DURING DEFAULT:
Mortgagees are required by HUD to fill out a default notice
(See Exhibit 4) when the mortgagor is sixty days in de-
fault or, 3 payments overdue. However, upon receiving the 2068,
HUD field office personnel are required only to file it and to stamp
and return one copy to the mortgagee. Aside from using this information
to prepare quarterly reports on defaults for the Research and Statistics
Officein HUD Central Office, the 2068's have no further required use.1
A recent report by the Comptroller General of the U. S. confirmed
that most field offices do only what Central HUD requires. They neither
use the 2068's to monitor mortgagees' servicing nor to intervene on
behalf of mortgagors. But, in spite of HUD's minimal requirements, two of
the eight field offices which were visited by the research team were
actually using the information in FHA form 2068 to monitor mortgagees'
servicing activities.2
And, going another step beyond HUD's requirements, these two offices
chose to make direct contacts with defaulting mortgagors. These contacts
were made in an attempt to cure the defaults or, when necessary, they
served to alert the mortgagor that foreclosure had started. 3
But, in spite of these consumer-oriented innovations, an untouched,
out-of-date 2068 field office card file appears to be more common.4
1Report of the Task Force on Improving the Operation of Federally
Insured or Financed Housing Programs, Volume 1, "Single Family Housing",
National Center for Housing Management Inc. Washington, D.C. 1974, p. 211.
2Non Supervised Mortgagee Report, op. cit. p. 39.
3Ibid. p. 39.
4 In fairness to HUD field offices, it should be added that one reason for
an outdated 2068 file is due to mortgagee neglect. The OSTI D & D #2 report
stated that "...not all mortgagees were conscientious in submitting 2068 reports.2p. cit. p. 47.
EXHI631T q:
ADMINISTRATION OF
INSURED HOME MORTGAGES
PHA FORM NO. 2068 Rev. 4/66 U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENrFEDE RAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
HOME MORTGAGE DEFAULT NOTICE
THIS NOTICE MAY BE SUBMITTED BY EITHER THE MORTCAGEE OR ITS SERVICER, BUT NOT BY BOTH.
Detach the First 2 copies and mci! to FH A. Reton the third copy for your files. We recommend that the lost copy
be motled to the Mortgagor of the some time; however,
1. Send report to the FHA office having jurisdiction
on or before the date on which three installments
are in default. When an installment due Sept. I
is not paid by Oct. 1, the mortgage is in default
on October 1, and if payment is not made in the
meantime, a report is required by Dec. 1.
2. After the first report is filed, reports are not re-
quired unless:
a. The account is reinstated.
b. Six installments are delinquent in which event
a report must be submitted immediately and
its use is iptionol
every 60 doys thereafter until the default is
corrected.
c. Foreclosure becomes imminent regardless of
the number of installments delinquent.
d. Foreclosure is started.
e. Foreclosure is completed.
3. No report is required between the start of fore-
closure and the report of completion unless in
the meantime the default is cured or the fore-
closure is suspended.
PI4A FORM NO. SOAR Rs,, 4/tIC Form Approved Budget Bureau No. 63-R0734
U DEPARTMENT OF HOUSNG AND URBAN OEvELOPMENT
FME GAL OUSNG ADEANSTRANON
HOME MORTGAGE DEFAULT NOTICE
.ction of National Housing Act ortgagee's Reference No.
Morigors
rLas Name First)
Property
IDot of thisa report
Number of payments post due
[] Mortgage is r.einstated and current.
( Foreclosure is imminent. [ZIForeclosure is started.
La Fcreclosure is completed
FIELD OFFICE INSTRUCTION
PLACE OFFICE RECEIVING STAMP ON
REVERSE AND RETURN TO MORTGAGEE
IN WINDOW ENVELOPE.L
MORTGAGFE'S NAME, ADDRESS AND ZIP CODE
h/7h
HUD-Wash.. D. C.
4191.1
APPENDIXC 5
FHA Cose No. T
FHA FORM NO 2068 Rev 4 6 _
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For example, this writer had the opportunity to observe such a file in
the Philadelphia HUD Area Office in early, 1973.5 In addition, inter-
views with HUD personnel in several other cities disclosed a widespread
lack of concern for the 2068's.6
In contrast to HUD's standard regulations concerning the 2068 forms,
in those cities in which a Concentrated Delinquency and Default Counseling
Program (D+D Program:;See Chapter 9 Section 6) had been set up, the 2068's
were required to be used by field office staff to refer defaulting mort-
gagors to counseling agencies. But since the D+D program was created
specifically to assist 235 mortgagors in default, most cities partici-
pating in the D+D program followed the normal procedure for handling the
2068 notices for non-235 mortgagors -- they simply filed them.7
5Field visit to Philadelphia HUD Area Office, Office of James Rolen,
Supervisor of Single Family Mortgage Servicing, January, 1973.
6 For example, interviews with Katie Washington, Little Rock, Arkansas,
op. cit. Kenneth Anderson, Chief Single Family Servicing, HUD Area Office,
San Francisco, California, and Rose Strickland, Phoenix,
Arizona. op. cit.
7For example, interviews with, William Bonner, Shreveport, Louisiana,
op. cit. Lucille Henderson, Kansas City, Missouri, op. cit. and John Fortson,
Community Services Advisor, HUD Area Office, Los Angeles, California.
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However, in at least one city, HUD personnel were using the D+D
program idea as a vehicle for making counseling services available to
non-235 mortgagors who were also in default. In Louisville, in late
1973, Thomas Clendenon, the HUD Housing Counselor, began his own default
counseling program. Rather than simply filing the 2068's that came into
the office, he sent out a letter to all defaulting mortgagors, offering
them the option of discussing their problem with a HUD representative.
While admitting that when the 2068 came in, he didn't automatically
send out the letter, and that this effort depended on his workload, he
reported enthusiastically that direct HUD involvement with defaulting
mortgagors could be extremely successful. He stated that:
When I go to a defaulting family's home with a r:n from the
mortgage company, we never get invited into the house. But
I do when I go alone...people trust me while they don't
trust the mortgage company. The only people who don't want
to see me are those who have made promises to me that they
haven't kept.8
In a report on his efforts to the Director of the Housing Management
Division, Dominic Schuler, Mr. Clendenon concluded that:
I am elated with the results of this project at this date. The
"letter" is, if nothing else, working as a collection tool. It
is not a permanent solution to a very complex problem. I am
also very happy with the results of my counseling. I am willing
to bet e can save three of the five mortgages with continued
effort.
8Interview, Thomas Clendenon, op. cit.
9Report by Thomas Clendenon, Housing Counselor, to Dominic Schuler,
Housing Management Division. "November, 1973 Report on the Counseling
of Defaulted Mortgagors in the Louisville Area." December 6, 1973.
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Thus, unlike the problems in HUD's pre-purchase activities, HUD's
internal procedures related to mortgagors in default are problematic due
to faulty regulations, rather than because of deficiencies in administration.
The ordinary HUD way of doing business around default was reflected in the
passive role required of field office staff for dealing with the 2068
default notices. The form, which could be used by an aggressive HUD
as a warning and regulatory device -- to monitor mortgagee servicing
activities or to intervene on behalf of the defaulting mortgagor to
offer counseling -- was, instead, used as a filing and information piece.
For mortgagees to simply let HUD know the problem was deemed sufficient.
But the fact that a few field offices have departed from the regulations
to directly intervene on behalf of the consumer is noteworthy.
If HUD regulations were to change to require field staff interven-
tion upon receipt of the 2068's, it would also be desirable for HUD to
require that mortgagees file the forms much earlier than 60 days in default.
By the time a mortgagor has missed 3 payments, his financial troubles are
serious and becoming current on his payments becomes more difficult.
Unlike HUD's espoused role vis a vis the consumer at the point the
home is purchased, HUD does not even define a theoretically active role
for itself at the point of its maximum liability and at a critical point for
the consumer -- default. Instead, HUD has relied upon the activities of
mortgagees and, to a lesser extent, on private counseling agencies, to
assist mortgagors in becoming current. Thus, even in HUD's "final hour"
to reduce its own risk and protect its own interests, it has chosen to play
a passive role, refusing to acknowledge the extent of its own liability.
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4. HUD'S GUIDELINES FOR MORTGAGEES WHO ARE SERVICING MORTGAGES IN DEFAULT:
The mortgagee is the key actor involved in mortgagor default. Where-
as HUD's guidelines on its own role in default are almost non-existent,
HUD's servicing guidelines for mortgagees are more detailed.1
HUD guidelines carefully explain that foreclosure is supposed to be
viewed by mortgagees as a last resort -- to be initiated only after all
other efforts have failed:
Foreclosure of a mortgage shall be undertaken only after the mort-
gagee or servicer has assured itself that the case has been handled
in full accordance with the servicing practices outlined herein.2
And, further,
In cases where the default is caused by a hardship beyond the
mortgagor's control, this decision (to acquire the property)
shall be made only after all of the relief measures.. .have been
considered, and the mortgagee has determined that none of them
is likely to be effective in making it possible for the mortgagor
to retain the property. Once the decision has been made, however,
such action shall not be delayed. 3
The relief measures referred to above were authorized in the Housing
Act of 1964. Section 104(a) of that Act states that:
With respect to any mortgage covering a one -, two -, three -, or
four -, family residence insured under this Act, if the Secretary
finds, after notice of default, that the default was due to cir-
cumstances beyond the control of the mortgagor, he may, upon such
terms and conditions as he may prescribe, (1) approve the request
of the mortgagee for an extension of the time for the curing of
the default and of the time for commencing foreclosure proceedings
or for otherwise acquiring title to the mortgaged property to such
time as the Secretary may determine is necessary and desirable to
Yet, it must be recalled from Chapter 6, Section 3a that HUD's guidelines
for mortgage servicersare, by no means, as explicit as they could be.
See Appendix9-2for a brief look at the Phoenix Insuring Offices' attempts to
initiate its own better defined set of servicing standards.
2HUD Guidebook 4191.1 op. cit. p. 44.
3Ibid. p. 55.
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enable the mortgagor to complete the mortgage payments, including
an extension of time beyond the stated maturity of the mortgage
and in the event of a subsequent foreclosure or acquisition of the
property by other means the Secretary is authorized to include
in the debentures an amount equal to any unpaid mortgage interest,
or (2) approve a modification of the terms of the mortgage for
the purpose of changing the amortization provisions by recasting,
over the remaining term of the mortgage or over such longer
period as may be approved by the Secretary...4 (underline added)
Thus, Congress was explicit about the type of relief, or assistance,
that mortgagees could offer mortgagors who were in default for reasons
beyond their control. Furthermore, the relief measures provided mort-
gagees with a guarantee that they would be fully protected against any
loss of interest,even if the mortgage should subsequently foreclose.
Following the Congressional mandate, HUD issued a set of detailed relief
measures which are available to defaulting mortgagors.
a. Special Forbearance:
Special forbearance is a written agreement worked out between mort-
gagee and mortgagor at the suggestion of the mortgagee and generally
does not require prior approval by HUD. However, while the offering of
relief is only a voluntary gesture on the part of the mortgagee, HUD
expects mortgagees "to make a concerted effort to avoid the foreclosure
or assignment of HUD insured mortgages and to utilize acceptable methods
of forbearance relief, wherever feasible." 5 Special forbearance consists
of two basic components:
4Housing Act of 1964. Public Law 88-560, approved September 2, 1964,
Stat. 769 Section 104(a) Section 204(a) National Housing Act.
5HUD Guidebook 4191.1 op. cit. p. 47.
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(1) Reduction or suspension of regular mortgage payments for a period not
exceeding 18 months; (unless a longer period is approved by HUD) and,
(2) Resumption of regular payments no more than 18 months after the date
of the special forbearance agreement (unless a longer period is
approved by HUD.)6
In addition, the special forbearance agreement allows for the maturity
date of the mortgage to be extended by the period of reduced or suspended
payments, ( up to 18 months, unless a longer period has been approved
by HUD). The agreement must also include the specific dates on which the
additional payments are due to repay the reduced or suspended payments. 7
While the HUD guidelines do not include an example, and only supply
an unfilled-in "Sample Forbearance Agreement" (See Exhibit 5) the following
example, which follows HUD's guidelines, demonstrates the usefulness and
potential benefit of this relief measure when it is used to suspend
payments for the maximum period allowed. Reduced payments or suspended
payments for a shorter period would also yield substantial, although
not as dramatic, benefits.
Special Forbearance Example:
Original Amount of Mortgage $20,000
Interest Rate 7 1/2%
Original Term 20 years
Date of First Payment October 1, 1972
Original Maturity Date September 1, 1992
Monthly Payments $161.12
6 Ibid. p. 48.
7Ibid. p. 48.
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F""74191.1 I
ADMINISTRATION OF
INSURED H(ME MORTGAGES APPED 8
SAMPLE FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT
Mr. and Mrs. John Doe
129 S. W. Avenue
Topeka, Kansas
Re: Forbearance Agreement
FHA Case No.
Dear Mr. and Mrs. Doe:
The indebtedness in the captioned case is in default and, in consideration of the (name of
mortgagee) extending forbearance for a period of time, it is necessary that you indicate, by
signing this letter agreement, your acceptance of the following conditions:
Beginning on the day of , 19_, you will remit a monthly payment
of $ * for a period of ** months. On
it is agreed that you will resume the regular monthly payments required under your
note and security instrument. In addition, you shall add
Dollars ($ ) each month to such regular monthly payment for the period of
months. Such additional payment shall commence on
.*** The debt, if not sooner paid, shall be due and payable on the first
day of , 19_ .**** All of the provisions of the note and security
instrument, except as herein provided, shall remain in full force and effect. Upon
the breach of any provision of this agreement, the (name of mortgagee) may terminate
this agreement, and, at the option of the (name of mortgagee), institute foreclosure
proceedings according to the terms of the note and security instrument without re-
gard to this instrument.
Please execute the original and first copy of this agreement and return them immediately.
Very truly yours,
(name of mortgagee)
By:
Accepted and agreed day of , 19-:
John Doe Mary Doe
*Less than regular payment
**18 months or less
***This date must be simultaneous with or later than date for resumption of regular payments
****18 months or less beyond present maturity
4/74
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Suspended Payments
November 1, 1974 - April 30, 1976
Total Amount Suspended = $2,900.16
(161.12 X 18 = 2900.12)
No. years remaining until maturity date as of April 30, 1976 =
16 yrs., 5 mos. (197 mos.)
Alternative (1 Alternative (2)
Divide amount due Extend the original maturity date by
(2900.6) by the 18 months, thereby making up the lost
total no. of payments payments. New maturity would then be
until end of maturity and March 1, 1994. Monthly payments would
add this amount to regular remain $161.12.
monthly payments.
2900.16 = 14.62 = Additional payment
197 +161.12 -- Regular monthly payment
$175.74 -- New monthly payment. Same maturity date.
In addition to being an enormous aid to mortgagors, it must be emphasized
that forbearance should also be attractive to mortgagees.
When the mortgagee extends forbearance... it will receive, as part of
its insurance settlement, unpaid mortgage interest, including
all amounts accrued prior to the execution of the forbearance
agreement... 8
Thus, if the mortgage ends in foreclosure, the mortgagee becomes fully
protected against any loss of interest, once an agreement has been executed.
b. Recasting:
Recasting is another important HUD-approved relief measure. As mentioned
above, recasting may be done when a mortgagor is in default due to a reason
8Ibid. p. 48.
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beyond his control and, similar to special forbearance, may be processed
without prior approval from HUD. Recasting may accomplish one or both
of the following:
(1) Increase the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage to include
all the sums due and payable except late charges,
(2) Extend the term of the mortgage for not more than 10 years.9
(See Exhibit 6)
Exhibit 7, from HUD Guidebook 4191.1, combines both (1) and (2)
above.
While the recasting example in Exhibit 7 assumes that the default
occurred after 10 years and, by extending the term another 10 years, resulted in
decreased payments, the following example assumes that the default
occurred in the second year of the loan and does not assume an increase in
term.
Recasting Example Number 2
Original Amount of Mortgage $15,000.00
Interest Rate 8 1/2%
Original Term 30 years
Date of First Payment January 1, 1973
Original Maturity Date December 1, 2003
Monthly Payments $ 115.34
Period of Default February 1, 1974 June 1, 1974 (5 paymen
Total Amout Past Due $ 576.70
Approximate Interest Amount Past Due $ 531.70
Approximate Principal Amount Paid
Between January 1, 1973 and
February 1, 1974 $ 115.00
Principal Amount Owed $14,885.00
+ Interest Past Due $ 532.00
New Prinicipal Amount $15,417.00
Approximate New Monthly Payment as of July 1, 1974 =$120.00
($120.00 is the approximate monthfly amount needed to amortize the new
principal amount at 8 1/2% interest over 28 1/2 years.)
9HUD Guidebook 4191.1 o.2P cit. p. 50.
EXH181T 6:
ADMINISTRATION OF
INSURED HOME MORTGAGES
4191.1
APPENDIX 9
SAMPLE RECASTING AGREEMENT
FHA Case #
This Agreement,
hereinafter referred
Borrowers, and
made this day of
to as Lender, and
,19 ,between ,
, hereinafter referred to as the
as Trustee (if applicable);
WITNESSETH:
Whereas the Borrowers are now indebted to the Lender in the sum of
Dollars ($ ) (hereinafter called "new principal amount"), consisting of
Dollars ($ ) unpaid principal, and Dollars ($ ) unpaid installments of
ground rents, hazard insurance premiums, taxes, assessments, and mortgage insurance premiums, the
payment of which is secured by a note and security instrument owned and held by the Lender, dated
, 19 , and recorded in the office for the recording of deeds in
County and State of , in book of mortgages, page , and
Whereas the parties mutually desire to modify the terms of payment of said indebtedness by
changing the amount of monthly payments required on said note and security instrument;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the covenants hereinafter contained, it is mutually agreed
as follows:
The Borrowers agree to pay the "new principal amount" with interest at the rate specified in
said note on the unpaid balance in monthly installments of Dollars
($ ) commencing on the first day of 19 , and on the first day of each month
thereafter until the "new principal amount" and interest thereon are fully paid, except that the
final payment of the "new principal amount" and interest, if not sooner paid, shall be due and
payable on the first day of , 19 .*
It is mutually agreed that said security instrument shall continue a first lien upon the
premises and that neither the obligation evidencing the aforesaid indebtedness nor the security
instrument securing the same shall in any way be prejudiced by this agreement, but said obliga-
tion and security instrument and all the covenants and agreements thereof and the rights of the
parties thereunder shall remain in full force and effect except as herein expressly modified.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed, sealed,-and delivered this agreement on the
date above written.
(SEAL)
Lender
(SEAL)
Borrower
Borrower
DEEDS OF TRUST
(If the security instrument is a deed of trust and it is necessary that the Trustee execute
recasting agreements, the following acknowledgment shall be signed by the Trustee.)
THE TRUSTEE has executed this instrument to acknowledge his (its) assent thereto andagrees
to continue to act in such capacity under the terms as modified herein.
TRUSTEE:
*This date cannot exceed by more than 10 years the maturity date of the original note.
(Add acknowledgment, if required)
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APPENDIX 10
CALCULATION OF RECAST PRINCIPAL AMOUNT AND NEW MONTHLY PAYMENT
Example - Mortgage Term Extended 10 Years
Case No. 421-019614-203-Garth Origina
Date of this Computation: 10-17-73 Date of
Original Amount of Mortgage: $15,200 Origina
Interest Rate: 5 1/4%
Monthly Installments Due 5-1-73 through 10-1-73 unpaid
Present Monthly Payment
MIP 5.26
Taxes 14.58
L Term: 30 years
First Payment: 10-1-63
L Maturity Date: 9-1-93
Insurance 5.83
Interest and Principal 84.06
$109.73
Computation of "New Original Principal Balance" to be Amortized:
No. Payments
Item Per Month Missed
Unpaid Principal Balance $12,583.43
Unpaid Interest (5 1/4%) 4-1-73 to 10-1-73 55.05 x 6 333.30
MIP (1/2%) 9-1-73 5.26 x 6 31.56
Escrow Items Due but Unpaid
Taxes
Hazard Insurance
Total "New Original
14.58 x
5.83 x
Principal
6
6
Balance"
87.48
34.98
$13,070.75
Page 1 /7)
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The first monthly installment based on the above figure will be due November 1,
1973, and the final payment to principal and interest will be due March 1, 2003
(Original Maturity Date plus 10 years).
New Monthly Payment Based on New Maturity Date and "New Original Principal Balance"
To amortize $13,070.75, the number of monthly payments in the new term must
first be computed. To the original term of 360 months is added 120 months (the
extension period of 10 years) for a total of 480 months. From the total of 480
months, subtract 121 months (the total number of payments due prior to 11-1-73)
for a remaining term of 359 months or 29 years and 11 months.
The new payment to principal and interest is reached by multiplying the new
balance by the monthly installment per $1,000 for 29 years and 11 months
($13,070.75 x $5.53+ $1,000 = $72.30). The monthly installment per $1,000 may
be found under "Amortization Tables" in FHA Form 2025. The new monthly
installment will be:
Principal and Interest $72.30
MIP 5.26 (Based on Original Amortization
Schedule)
Taxes 14.58
Insurance 5.83
$97.97
h/7h Page 24/ 4 Page 2
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Based upon the above calculations, it is clear that recasting can
be an extremely useful tool in helping a defaulting mortgagor renew his
payments with "a clean slate," and without a substantial increase in
his original monthly payments. Psychologically, the sense of being given
another chance could be of considerable benefit to a mortgagor who had
been unable to get out of a serious default.
But, clearly, there could also be some negative side effects of the
leniency provided by special forbearance and recasting. Most obvious and
drastic is the possibility that some families might go through the 18
month period without having to pay anything and then simply abandon the
property. However, there are also several deterrants to this type of be-
havior. First, the family would lose its home -- an extremely undesirable
situation to most people. Second, the family would lose whatever equity
it had built up. And, third, the foreclosure would be a serious problem
to the family in future credit transactions. Thus, the drawbacks to simply
leaving after the payment suspension period are substantial and would probably
deter most people from such actions.
TABLE 19
Status of FHA-Insured, FNMA-Owned Mortgages - January 1, 1973
FHA Section
(1)
Total
Portfolio
No.
203
221
235
Al 1
Other
FHA
TOTAL
543,898
135,192
167,820
51,604
898,514
(2) (3)
Special Delinquent
Forbearance 2 Months
No. (%of 5)
306 2.8
237 4.6
324 3.2
11 1.5
878 3.3
No.
7,278
3,327
6,539
487
17,631
(4)
Delinquent
3 Months
No.
3,346
1 ,841
3,511
246
8,944
(5)
Total Delinquent
2 + 3 Months
(3)+(4)
No.
10,624
5,168
10,050
733
26,575
(6)
*Total
Delinquent
No. (% of 1)
41,397 7.7
14,698 11.2
26,305 16.1
2,898 5.6
85,298 9.4
*This includes loans 1 month, 2 months,
delinquencies are not presented in this
and 3 months past due.
table.
Source: Federal National Mortgage Association, Delinquency Reporting System;
Monthly Summary of Delinquent Mortgages, Run Date, March 2, 1973.
One month
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5. USE OF RELIEF MEASURES BY MORTGAGEES:
In spite of the apparent usefulness of special forbearance and
recasting agreements, they have been used only infrequently. FNMA
provides the only aggregated data on the frequency of use of special
forbearance. HUD does not compile any data on the use of its prescribed
relief measures.
As shown in Table 19,special forbearance is used for only a small
percentage of delinquent FHA-insured loans owned by FNMA. Out of a
total 26,575 loans that might be considered eligible for special
forbearance -- two or more months delinquent -- only 878, or 3.3%
were receiving special forbearance.
Interviews with mortgagees confirmed the infrequent use of special
forbearance and recasting. The following comments sum up the mortgagee
attitude on this point.
We don't give formal forbearance. About 10 percent of our loans
are receiving informal forbearance. That is, no writtein agree-
ment. Formal forbearance is very rare. There's practically1no recasting.
The maximum we allow is six months to repay...We don't allow a sus-
pension of paymen s unless the mortgagor is in the military.. .we don't
do recasting now.
Recasting? I had to find out how to do it. I called the mortgage
bankers in the area and they didn't know what I was talking about.
I've done about seven recastings in my career -- never lost one --
other mortgage companies have now called me for information on how
to do it.3
Interview, Donald A. Luff, op. cit.
2 Interview Bill Salyer, p. cit.
3Interview Harold Dickson, op. cit.
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We may have had one or two forbearance agreements -- that is,
reducing payments -- over the years. We're very lenient about
foreclosure. We don't want to foreclose. We'll carry loans
that are two-four months elinquent...Recasting is very seldom
used -- like forbearance.
We're reluctant to give forbearance...We're reluctant to recast.
We try to work with mortgagors and bring the loan current. It's
an informal procedure; we feel sure that our servicers do about
the same. Rarely are we asked by a servicer for forbearance.
Maybe one time out of five-hundred defaults. 5
Off the record, I think you have a point about mortgage companies
not doing the servicing they should. The philosophy has been
Bang 'em in the head -- get the money from the government. Years
ago our company was like that. Now we're using more of the
conciliation approach.
Comments by HUD Area and Insuring Office personnel echoed those
of the mortgagees. For example, Rose Strickland observed:
Forbearance? Mortgagees don't do it -.- or recasting. Mortgagees
don't like to hear the word forbearance -- it makes them shiver
and quiver. 7
Kenneth Anderson, Chief of Single Family Servicing, summed up his
experience with mortgagees on a semi-optimistic note.
By and large, mortgagees are doing a better job now than twenty-four
months ago. For the past two years I've been talking forbearance
and recasting all the time. Two years ago none of the mortgagees
knew about these things... Recasting is simple. The Bank of America,
will use it if it's suggested to them...Lomas and Nettleton have
also improved over the last six or seven months. They hadn't been
doing any servicing at all. They were foreclosing without even
communicating with the mortgagor. But there is still a great varia- 8
tion in servicing practices -- still alot of lip service and no action.
4Interview, P.P. Flynn, Assistant Vice President for Servicing, Provident
Institution for Savings, Boston, Massachusetts, January 28, 1974.
5Interview, Vera lannello, Vice President, Servicing, Northeast
Federal Savings and Loan Association, Watertown, Massachusetts, February 1, 1974.
6Interview, Stan Goodrow, J.I. Kislak Mortgage Company, Miami, Florida,
November 6, 1974 (telephone).
7Interview, Rose Strickland, op. cit. Also, interview, Janet Miller, op. cit.
8Interview, Kenneth Anderson, p. cit.
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Similarily, personnel of HUD-certified counseling agencies that
have attempted to assist defaulting mortgagors have found resistance
on the part-of mortgagees to use the relief measures. For example,
Barbara Southwick, a Housing Counselor for the Spokane Community
Action Council complained that:
Mortgagees simply refuse to follow HUD's relief measures. They've
never heard of forbearance or recasting. I keep showing them
the guidebook but they pay no attention. I can't even get our
FHA Insuring Office to stand behind their own guidelines. If they
would, I think the mortgagees would cooperate. I think I could
really help alot of these families to become currgnt if only
the mortgagees would do what they're supposed to.
Further, OSTI, in its study of the HUD Concentrated Default
Counseling Programreported that:
Another indication that mortgagees retained the upper hand
in restricting the use of relief measures was that agencies
tended to request the kinds of mortgage relief which fell within
the accepted limits set by mortgagees. Formal forbearance agree-
ments were rarely used because mortgagees were reluctant to use
them. And only one agency counselor mentioned making an effort
to get mortgagees to recast some of her clients' mortgages; most
of the others never mentioned recasting at all, and a sixth
had never heard of it. 10
The type of relief, alluded to above, that is acceptable to most
mortgagees is known as "informal forbearance" or a repayment schedule.
A typical repayment schedule would work as follows: Suppose a mortgagor
had missed three payments of two-hundred dollars each -- mortgagee and
mortgagor would work out an agreement whereby the mortgagor would pay
anywhere between a payment and a quarter to two full payments per month
until the six-hundred dollars were repaid. This would mean required
9Interview, Barbara Southwick, Housing Counselor, Spokane Community Action
Council, Spokane, Washington, December, 1972.
10OSTI D+D #2 9p. cit. p. 43-44.
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monthly payments of between two-hundred - fifty dollars and four-hundred
dollars, instead of the normal two-hundred dollars.11  This is a very
different type of arrangement from HUD's special forbearance and recasting.
For the mortgagor trying to recover from a default, it is reasonable to
assume that this type of repayment schedule could put an enormous strain
on a family's budget.
Indeed, it would be interesting to know how many foreclosures have
resulted from a second default following the negotiation of a repayment
schedule. 12
While forbearance and recasting are, as discussed above, only rare
occurrences, they have often publicly been touted as the best approach both
for the mortgagor and H11D.
Information on repayment schedules were gathered in many interviews.
For example: Val Garcia, Mortgage Servicing Specialist, HUD Area Office,
Los Angeles, California, March, 1974; Arnold Schultz, Origination Officer,
Home Owners Federal Savings and Loan Association, Boston, Massachusetts
January 28, 1974; Stuart Blanton, 2. cit.;Stan Goodrow, op. cit.; and
Thomas Wilmore, Loan Officer, Cambridge Savings Bank, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
January, 1974.
12This writer observed a repayment schedule being set up by the
Association for Better Housing (now called the Association for Better Living)
in Boston, the only HUD-Certified Counseling Agency in that city. The
housing counselor developed a budget, based on the maximum that the family
could pay, and then telephoned the mortgagee, to read him the agreement,
thereby verbally binding the mortgagor. The payment schedule in question
required the mortgagor to make a payment and a half per month, with the
half payment due on the fifteenth of the month. While these comments are
clearly subjective, this writer vividly recalls the fear on the mortgagor's
face as the counselor read off the schedule to the mortgagee.
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In the early 1960's, during a period of rising defaults and fore-
closures in the FHA and VA programs, Sen. Tower questioned
FHA Commissioner Brownstein about "specific recommendations... for miti-
gating [the] forclosure rate." Brownstein's response emphasized the
need for forbearance to be made more attractive to lenders by ensuring
them that leniency would not involve any financial loss. 13
However, even though leniency no longer involves any financial loss,
HUD officials have still had to urge the greater use of forbearance. Testi-
fying over ten years after Brownstein, former FHA Commissioner Sheldon
Lubar stated that: "Certainly the most desirable cure for foreclosure
is not to let it happen, to work out some forbearance arrangement if that
is possible..." 14
Echoing this statement, Kenneth A. Duncan, a Regional Vice-President
of FNMA, testified that recasting is the best method to assist a defaulting
mortgagor, in the following exchange with the Assistant Counsel of the
13Until 1964, lenders only received interest as of the date of fore-
closure, rather than as of the date of default. Brownstein was arguing for
the need "to date back the debentures as of the date of default, in which
event the mortgagor then will be able to approach his lender, and say that
it will not result in a financial loss to extend forbearance." Hearings
Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, "FHA Mortgage
Foreclosures" U.S. Senate, 88th Cong. 2nd. Sess. January, 1964. p. 38.
14 Review of FHA, Part 1 oR. cit. p. 77.
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Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly:
Mr. Blum: (Assistant Counsel) In your statement you say that when
a mortgage goes into arrears, the mortgage servicer is encouraged
to find ways of reinstating an owner of the property. Is refinancing
an acceptable way out?
Mr. Duncan: Refinancing, as such, generally would require the pay-
off of the whole mortgage and a new mortgage. And this, generally,
is not a feasible method of doing it because of the cost of obtaining
the new mortgage.
The best method, I think, is to recast the mortgage within its
terms and amortize the remaining portion of the loan over the remaining
term of the mortgage. (Underline added.)
Mr. Blum: Has that been done successfully with any frequency in New
York? Do you know? Do you have any feel for it?
Mr. Duncan: I don't recall that we've had very many cases of that
kind. In fact, I don't recall any off hand.
Mr. Blum: Well, with such a high delinquency rate, wouldn't you
expect much more activity in such things as recasting and reworking
the terms of the mortgages?
Mr. Duncan: Of course, this has to be coordinated with the borrower.
If the borrower doesn't want to recast it, there's not much use in
*trying to force it on him.
Most of the time, I think the borrower is more interested in
getting the back payments caught up, rather than to recast his
mortgage.
Mr. Blum: Can he do that with a settlement plan, some sort of
agreement to pay back? What would the usual procedure be?
Mr. Duncan: Normally, in a case of that nature, the servicer would
enter into an agreement with him where he could pay a full install-
ment and a portion of1 nother installment each month in order to
catch up the arrears.
The above exchange is revealing in several ways. First, it is an
indication that defaulting FNMA-held mortgages are only infrequently recast.
And, second, according to Duncan, those mortgagors that are aware of re-
casting do not seem to understand how it could help them to wipe out arrears.
15New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 545-546.
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Indeed, Mr. Duncan's own testimony suggests that he, too, may be some-
what confused about the advantages of recasting. In view of the above
recasting examples, it is hard to imagine how a repayment schedule, that
includes a full payment, plus a portion of a past due payment, could
possibly be more appealing to defaulting mortgagors than a recasting agree-
ment.
It is ironic that in spite of Brownstein's and Lubar's apparent
enthusiasm for relief measures, individuals who have worked closely with
HUD claim that the agency is partly responsible for the infrequent use
of relief measures, as suggested by the statement by Barbara Southwick
quoted above.
Even more striking is the fact that some HUD Area Office personnel
expressed no concern over the lack of mortgagee adherence to HUD guidelines
on mortgage relief. For example, in spite of his aggressive role in
trying to help defaulting mortgagors, Thomas Clendenon stated that:
I don't know how many loans have been recast. I very seldom
try to get a loan recast. The most effective, efficient and
easiest way is to go the two payments per month route. This
is the minimum that mortgage companies will accept. They won't
accept partial payments because they say it messes up their
computer... I often get in touch with the mortgage company to
see if they'll set up this type of repayment schedule. It's
not the easiest route for the mortg gor but it's a good thing
for them to get on a strict budget.'9
But, according to Mr. Clendenon it's not only the mortgage companies
that insist on repayment schedules in preference t> the HUD approved
16Interview, Thomas Clendenon, 2p. cit.
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relief measures. Continuing, he said:
What is allowed and what will be done are two different things.
And it's not just the mortgage companies. The HUD Area Office
Director wouldn'g go for it. (i.e. special forbearance and
recasting.) He comes from a mortgage company himself.17
Thus, even some HUD personnel have resigned themselves to the non-
use of their own guidelines. Furthermore, Gene Prosnitz, a New York
Legal Services attorney, also faulted FHA's attitude toward its relief measures:
Now, when we have spoken to Fannie Mae's lawyers, they say they
will do whatever the FHA tells them to do.
And here, Fannie Mae is.. .in the same position as the banks, and
they are just following the lead of the FHA. That's why we feel
the solution is with the FHA.
In other words, for example, if the FHA tells the bank to give
forbearance relief and to allow a certain homeowner to make de-
ferred payments on his mortgage because maybe the homeowner was
injured and has to stay out of work for a while, and as a result
could not keep up with his payments, and if this man applies
to the FHA for forbearance relief, then they will go along. I
think the main way to attack the problem is through the FHA. 18
Yet, as we have seen, HUD does not become involved with relief
decisions. Forbearance, according to HUD guidelines, is an option of
the mortgagee and HUD does not use default notices for any purpose other
than data collection.
But the other stumbling block to the greater use of HUD-approved
relief measures is the mortgage servicer. Investors, such as FNMA, feel
that it is up to the servicer to make recommendations for relief.19
17Ibid.
18New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 122.
19FNMA Servicer's Guide, op. cit. p. 27-28.
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Servicersagree. One mortgage banker stated:
This is our job -- this is what we're paid for -- to make recom-
mendations to investors. 20
Mortgage servicersalso acknowledge that once a relief measure
has been worked out and a recommendation made to the investor, approval
from the investor is virtually automatic.21 Kenneth A. Duncan, stated
that:
Fannie Mae encourages servicersto use every possible method to
assist the borrower in avoiding the loss of his home. Fannie
Mae will accept any agreements with the borrower to forbear,
recast, reamortize, extend, or modify the terms of the mortgage
in hardship cases where the servicer recommends such agreement,
provided it is approved by the FHA insuring office. The condi-
tions that support the use of such relief include illness, death,
temporary suspension or reduction of income, and other con tions
which create a hardship on the borrower. (Underline added)
Thus, the servicer is in a critical position and is reponsible
for suggesting and working out relief measures with defaulting
mortgagors. Since servicersare in a position to grant relief, the
question then becomes: Why are they reluctant to do so? Before
going on to answer this question -- the subject of chapter 10 --
this chapter will conclude with an assessment of HUD's third way
of intervening on behalf of defaulting mortgagors -- counseling.
20Interview, Stan Goodrow, op. cit.
21Interviews. For example, Stuart Blanton, op. cit. and Donald A.
Luff, op. cit.
22New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 525.
-314-
6. HUD'S DEFAULT COUNSELING PROGRAM: ACTIVE INTERVENTION:
Prior to the creation of the Concentrated Delinquency and Default
Counseling Program (D+D) in 1972, HUD had never considered counseling
as a form of intervention in mortgagor default. While some HUD and
non-HUD certified voluntary counseling agencies provided mortgagors with
post-purchase assistance, default counselingper sehad been scarce, if
not totally absent.
Based upon the belief that counseling could cut down on defaults,
HUD chose to channel approximately three-quarters of Congress' $3.25
million FY1972 appropriation for homeownership counseling toward funding
a new program aimed at assisting Section. 235 and 237 mortgagors who were
in mortgage default. The HUD-implemented D+D Program marked the first
time, and still the only time, that Congress has directly funded home-
ownership counseling efforts. 2
It is important to recall the context of the D+D program and to
understand why HUD diverted funds which had been earmarked for pre-
purchase counseling to default counseling. First, beginning in 1971,
HUD personnel, including Secretary of HUD George Romney, were questioned
In OSTI's telephone survey of over 300 HUD-certified and non-certi-
fied counseling agencies, the question of whether default counseling was
ever offered was not asked. However, the survey did disclose that: "Most
agencies offered services to a family only before the family purchased a
home. Although nearly half of the agencies reported that they assisted some
families after purchase, the degree of such service provision was apparently
minimal..." OSTI Final, op. cit. p. 58.
2However, as discussed in Chapter 8, the Congressional intent of this appro-
priation was not to supply counseling assistance to defaulters. Rather, the
intent was to help fund existing voluntary counseling agencies in their on-
going efforts in counseling prospective home buyers.
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extensively by various House Committees on the rising default and
foreclosure rates that were occurring nationallybut were particu-
larly troublesome in Romney's home state, Michigan. In conjunction
with this, Congress began to articulate considerable concern over
the rapid depletion of the reserves in the FHA insurance funds. 3
Second, following the various Congressional hearings disclosing
problems with the homeownership programs, HUD's official direction
became more consumer oriented. As quoted previously, HUD's own Office
of Audit, in reviewing the 235 program, pointed out that "consumer
protection.. .is inextricably interwoven with other program objectives."
Thus, the D+D program was launched by HUD as a desperate attempt
to reverse the mounting foreclosure rate by assisting the homeowner to
keep his home and, in the process, cutting down the costs to HUD of
foreclosure. The stated objective of the D+D program reflected these
dual concerns -- for the consumer's well-being as well as HUD's.
.(to) provide concentrated counseling for delinquent or de-
faulting mortgagors to alleviate the incidence of delinquencies,
defaults and foreclosures under the Section 235 and 237 programs.
This shall be accomplished by assisting mortgagors, through
financial management and homeownership counseling, to bring
and maintain mortgage payments to a current status, thus reducing
the social and financial costs to mortgagors who would otherwise
face foreclosure, and the financial loss and adm nistrative costs
incurred by HUD when default terminations occur.
3See, for example, "Interim Report on HUD, Investigation of Low- and
Moderate-Income Housing Programs" op. cit. "Defaults on FHA-Insured Mortgages..."Parts 1 and 2, op.cit.
4Concentrated Default and Delinquency Counseling Program, HUD-RFPH-23-72, April, 1972.
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In July 1972, HUD contracted 31 private agencies in 19 cities to
provide counseling services to families who had brought homes under the
Section 235 and 237 programs and who were currently in default. (See
Exhibit 8)
The expected operation of tfe D+D program, though relatively straight-
forward, (See Exhibit 9) required a number of modifications in the normal
mortgagee/HUD relationship at the point of mortgagor default. The OSTI
D+D #2 report noted that:
Mortgagees were asked to send notification of mortgagor delinquency
after just 30 days directly to the HUD Housing Counselor, whereas
in the past notification was required by the Mortgage Servicing
Branch only after 90 days of default. Moreover, mortgagees were
requested to give special attention to defaulting mortgagors, and
to grant relief on the strength of a recommendation 5from a third
party to the affair, the Default Counseling Agency.
Not surprisingly, some of the most severe problems in the imple-
mentation of the D+D program revolved around these new relationships, with
mortgagees playing a pivotal role. The OSTI researchers found that many
mortgagees sent HUD names of defaulting 235/237 mortgagors irregularly
or only after the mortgagor had been in default for many months; other
mortgagees screened the referrals using unknown criteria; while still
others refused to participate in the D+D program at all. 6
Although the Government Technical Representatives (GTRs)7 found it
hard to generalize about mortgagees as a group and claimed that each
mortgagee had "its own personality," the reasons generally cited for
50STI D+D #2 op. cit. p. 8.
6Ibid. p. 18-27.
7The HUD official in charge of the D+D program. In most cases, the
Housing Counselor filled this role.
EXHIBJT S
SCREDULE OF DEFAULT COUNSELING CONTRACTS
Contract Name & Location of Contractor Contract Arount
No.
H-1868 Economic & Youth Opportunity Agency $ 16,500
Los Angeles, California
H-1865 Family Home Counseling 12,000
Los Angeles California
H-1919 Pasadena Area Housing Development Corp. 1,75
los Angeles, California-
H-1861 Center for Civic Initiative 33,306
Kilwaukee, Wisconsin
H-1854 Urban League of Oklahoma City, Inc. 76,517
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
H-1848 Andrews & Associates 97,658
San Antonio, Texas
H-1850 Ella Austin Community Center 112,700
San Antonio, Texas
H-1853 ' Seattle Housing Development 177,053
Seattle, Washington
H-1849 Consumer Credit Counseling Service of 83,000
Shreveport, La. (Retail Merchants Assn, Inc)
Shreveport, Louisiana
K-1920 Spokane Community Action Council 21,000
Spokane, Washington
H-1852 Spokane Retail Credit Association 21,000
Spokane; Washington
H -1870 GMUL, .Inc. 22,500
Orlando, Florida
H-1871 Metropolitan Development Agency 38,000
Tampa, Florida
H-1864 Tulsa Urban League, Inc. 81,306
Tulsa, Okladoma
H-1847 Housing Counseling Service of Urban 110,358
Rehabilitation LCorp.
Washington, D. C.
H-1867 Atlanta Urban League' Housing Center 79,3h6
Atlanta, Georgia
SCHEDULE OF DEFAULT COUNSELING CONTRACTS
'ontract Name & Location of Contractor
No.
i-1856
1-1860
Contract Amount
Consumer Credit Counseling Service
Atlanta, Georgia
Midlands Community Action Agency
Columbia, South Carolina
Dallas Urban League -
Dallas, Texas
Credit Counseling Centers, Inc.
Southfield, Michigan
Detroit Non Profit Housing Corp.
Detroit, Michigan
Mayorts Committee for Human Resources Dev.
Detroit, Michigan
TUre Housing Corporation
Detroit, Michigan
Credit Counseling Centers, Inc.
Southfield, Michigan
Community Inter-Faith Housing, Inc.
Indianapolis, Indiana
GMUL, Inc.
Jacksonville, Florida-
Jacksonville Urban League
Jacksonville Florida
The Urban Jacksonville, Inc.
Jacksonville, Florida
Urban League of Greater Little Rock
Little Rock, Arkansas
Housing Opportunity Centers, Inc.
Iouisville, Kentucky
MACBET, a Division of Sonia, Corp.
los Angeles, California
$ 69,743
310,000
89,453
193,311
198,250
136,500
L46,250
46,962
32,000
21,000
74,7507hT0
44,000
78,000
48,200
16,200
1-1855
H-1857
a-1863
E-18h44
H-1873
H-1872
H-1866
H-1859
H-1869
EX I81T: 39 -
EXPECTED OPERATION OF THE DEFAULT COUNSELING PROGRAM*
In assessing the actual operation of the DSD program, it is
useful to establish, as a frame of reference, the way in
which the program was expected to operate at its inception.
In general, the expected D&D scenario involves the following
steps:
e HUD Area/Insuring office contacts HUD-approved mortgagees
who are involved in the 235 and 237 programs to explain
the D&D program and to encourage their participation.
o Mortgagees are to send the names of defaulting 235 and
237 mortgagors as well as chronically delinquent mortga-
gors to HUD, once a month. Mortgagees are also to make
these referrals when a mortgagor is only one month in
default.
" The HUD Housing Counselor refers defaulting mortgagors
to the Default Counseling Agency in that area.
* The agency contacts the defaulting mortgagor by telephone,
if possible, and by mail and notifies him of the possibility
of free financial management and homeownership counseling
services available from HUD-approved counseling agencies.
The agency urges the mortgagor to accept a screening inter-
view with a housing counselor as soon as possible.
* If the mortgagor refuses counseling assistance, the agency
notifies the HUD Housing Counselor and the mortgagee, in
writing.
* At the screening interview the agency determines the extent
of and basic causes of the mortgagor's default; current fi-
nancial status of the mortgagor; potential effectiveness
of counseling to cure the delinquency and default and will-
ingness of the mortgagor to accept counseling.
* Taken primarily from Request for Proposal No.H-23-72, for
Concentrated Counseling of Delinquent or Default Mortgagors
under HUD Section 235 and 237 Programs.
(OST I D+D-4 1, g.3-6)
* The D&D agency communicates the findings from the screening
interview to the HUD Housing Counselor. If it is determined
that counseling cannot cure the default, the agency advises
the mortgagor of this decision, what is involved in fore-
closure, and assists the mortgagor to locate other housing.
* If counseling is in order, the agency submits to HUD a
counseling plan to meet the needs of the mortgagor.
* If counseling is recommended by the agency and approved by
the Housing Counselor, counseling is promptly offered to the
mortgagor.
* The D&D agency notifies mortgagees of each mortgagor's par-
ticipation in the counseling program. Mortgagees are request-
ed to use the appropriate relief measures.
* The agency provides counseling on an individual basis, tailor-
ed to the needs of the mortgagor. Referrals to other public
and private resources take place when necessary. Counseling
is given weekly or biweekly for the first month or two until
the mortgagor has demonstrated his ability to meet the objec-
tives of the program proposed by the agency. Counseling does
not exceed 12 sessions.
On the following page, a model of the D&D counseling program
is presented.
-'37-o-
MODEL OF THE D&D COUNSELING PROGRAM
Mobilizing the
D&D Program
The Mortgagee The HUD Housing
Referral Process Counselor Referral Process
D&D Agency
Contact Efforts
Recommendation and Screening
Approval for Counseling Interview
Offer of D&D
Counseling
Mortgagee Cooperation
. in
Using Relief Measures
D&D Counseling
Screening
Inter-view
Not Accepted
No Con-
tact Made
Mortgagor Non-
Participation
Counseling
Not
Recommended
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non-participation of mortgagees in the referral process were, according
to the OSTI researchers:
*general conservatism and lack of sympathy in the program;
*hard-nosed, inflexible mortgage servicing practices;
*mortgagee resentment of governmental and third-party (D+D
agency) intervention into servicing practices;
*mortgagee objection to increased reporting requirements;
*lack of feedback from HUD and the D+D agency to the mortgagee
on progress with defaulting mortgagors;
*lack of HUD leverage or pressure to assure broader participation
of mortgagees.8
On this point, while all the GTRs seemed to be expending a great deal
of effort to gain more effective participation by mortgagees,9 the
voluntary nature of the D+D program, compounded by the unwillingness
of HUD to put any "teeth" in the program, hindered program operation.
The OSTI D+D #2 report noted that:
A recurring theme throughout many of the agency (D+D counseling
agency) interviews was the frustration counselors felt in dealing
with mortgage companies in the absence of any significant pressure
from HUD to cooperate in the accomplishment of D+D program goals. 10
HUD, in the course of its own evaluation of the D+D program, found that
GTRs and counseling agencies were slightly more positive about mortgagees,
although problems in this area were also noted.
8OSTI D+D #2, p. 21.
9Ibid. p. 21.
10Ibid. p. 40.
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Most GTRs believe, that after a slow start, the mortgagees have
demonstrated their willingness to participate in the program.
(However) in some areas of the country, it appears that various
mortgagees are "hard nose"...especially on the West Coast. It
was also found that certain mortgagees' mortgage segicing depart-
ments have yet to fully cooperate with the program.
And, similarly,
A majority of the contractors indicate that the mortgagees are
cooperating in the program. It was discovered that on the West
Coast, however, certain lending institutions have not given the
program the attention it deserves (e.g. lacj of cooperation in
providing relief measures for mortgagors).
And further, the report stated that:
..no legal authorization was given to HUD to enforce mortgagee
cooperation in the program. What this meant was that D+D agencies
were constantly in the position of requesting that the mortgagees
grant relief measures by convincing them in each case that relief
was both necessary and appropriate. Some mortgagees were willing
to accede to the agencies' views, but others often were not. When
mortgagees were not, there was very little the agency or HUD could
do toward reinstating a client's mortgage...once agencies became
aware of how much cooperation they could expect from the mortgagees
they dealt with, they tended to accept the mortgagees' policy limits
on servicing-rather than run the risk of losing significant sources
of D+D referrals by repeated confrontation. 13
The HUD report went on to note that:
Some contractors feel that mortgagees are constrained in affecting
relief to mortgagors due to Area/Insuring office policies. 14
Unfortunately, the report did not detail exactly what field office
policies were problematic. Nevertheless, the HUD and OSTI research present
11HUD D+D report op. cit. p. 7.
12Ibid. p. 8.
130STI D+D #2 op. cit. p. 42-43.
14HUD D+D op. cit. p. 8.
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convincing evidence that HUD's lack of authority over mortgagees, com-
pounded by the unwillingness of some Area/Insuring Offices to give the
D+D program a high priority, have worked against the needs of defaulting
mortgagors and have increased HUD's risk.
Thus, the OSTI researchers found that the lack of authority vested
in HUD personnel to make demands on mortgagees worked against the goals
of the program.
Furthermore, the HUD report also disclosed that the policies of
certain Area/Insuring Offices thwarted optimal program effectiveness:
In a few instances, some GTRs felt that the program was not being
given the priority which is warranted by their respective offices.
Further, some have reported that a certain division (e.g. loan
servicing) of their offices has not yet fully utilized its resources
in helping make the default counseling program as effective as it
could be. 15
In spite of the problems, the D+D program was evaluated positively by
OSTI. The OSTI D+D #2 report concluded that:
Many, probably a majority, of local D+D programs have presently
achieved a modest degree of success in providing effective assistance
toward the remedy of mortgage delinquency/default and in lessening
the incidence of mortgage failure. Given the severe problems en-
countered in local program operation.. .these results tend to be
fairly impressive... In brief, the D+D program generally succeeded
in delivering useful resources and services to many defaulting
mortgagors who were most in need of them.16
Based upon their overall evaluation, OSTI recommended that:
HUD give serious consideration to expanding its funded counseling
efforts to include the provision of broad, preventive post-purchase
counseling resources, rather than retain its ef usive concern with
remedial counseling intervention upon default.
15Ibid. p. 7.
160STI D+D #2 op. cit. p. 84-85. HUD's report did not evaluate the success or
failure of the D+D program per se. Rather, its only concern was to assess the way
in which the program was being implemented.
170STI D+D #2 op. cit. p. 110.
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In spite of this recommendation, HUD neither continued the D+D
program beyond the two-year experimental period, 18 nor has it worked
toward setting up a comprehensive post-purchase counseling program.
Similar to pre-purchase counseling, post-purchase counseling and default
counseling have been left to the whims and minimal resources of HUD-
approved counseling agencies that "choose to do so" on a non-funded
basis. (See Exhibit 10)
In spite of the fact that default is a critical point both for HUD
and the homeowner, HUD has neither taken an active role in its internal
procedures, nor has it continued to support counseling efforts. Further-
more, while HUD has specific guidelines for mortgagees to follow who are
servicing loans of defaulting mortgagors, these relief measures are
rarely used. Thus, in the default situation, HUD has not acted in a
consistent manner with its risk-taking position and, as such, has also not
supported the interests of consumers.
18HUD Handbook 4191.1 op. cit. Appendix lp. 1.
19 Ibid. However, a long-term positive outcome of the D+D program is
that with the issuance of HUD Handbook 4191.1, Delinquency Counseling was
citied for the first time as an acceptable "Mortgage Collection Technique":
Delinquency Counseling. When normal collection techniques are not effectivE
consideration may be given to professional homeownership counseling for thedelinquent mortgagor by a HUD approved counseling agency." p. 43 .
EX IrT /0:
ADMINISTRATION OF
4191.1 -
SU APPENDIX 1
DEFAULT AND DELINQUENCY COUNSELING PROGRAM
Under the funded demonstration aspects of this program, selected HUD-
approved counseling agencies, in designated communities, provide
concentrated counseling for chronically delinquent or defaulting
mortgagors, without cost to such mortgagors, to alleviate the
incidence of delinquencies, defaults, and foreclosures under the
Sections 235 and 237 programs. Such agencies assist mortgagors
through financial management and homeownership counseling, to bring
and maintain mortgage payments to a current status, thus reducing
the financial costs to mortgagors who would otherwise face foreclosure,
and the financial loss and administrative costs by HUD when default
terminations occur.
The non-funded portion of the program is implemented by HUD-approved
homeownership counseling agencies that choose to do so, and covers all
HUD-insured home mortgage programs.
Mortgagee cooperation and assistance should be extended to HUD approved
counseling agencies under the funded delinquent and defaulL counseling
program and under the nonfunded delinquent and default counseling
program. This point is emphasized especially when the funded demon-
stration portion of the program is ended and delinquent and default
counseling continues as a nonfunded program.
The mortgagee, upon request of the default and delinquency counseling
agency, should submit copies to the counseling agency of the following
records of the mortgagor for whom the agency is providing assistance:
a. Form 2004-F, Request for Verification of Deposits
b. Form 2004-G, Request for Verification of Employment
c. Form 2900, Mortgagee's Application for Mortgage Approval and
Commitment for Mortgage Insurance under the National Housing
Act.
d. Form 3100, Application for Homeownership Assistance under
Section 235 of the National Housing Act (where applicable)
e. Form HUD-9905, Mortgage Applicant Profile (where applicable)
h/7h
Page 1
HUD-Wash., D. C.
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4191.1 
_ ADMINISTRATION OF
APPENDIX 1 INSURED HOME MORTGAGES
f. Purchase Agreement
g. Any other pertinent documents
These records may assist the counseling agency in determining the exten
of and basic causes of mortgagor's delinquency and default, current
financial status of mortgagor, potential effectiveness of counseling
to cure delinquency or default, types of counseling needed to assist
the mortgagor, and willingness of the mortgagor to accept counseling,
When a counseling agency and HUD determine that a delinquency or defaul
may be cured with appropriate counseling, and the mortgagor indicates
his willingness to accept such counseling, the counseling agency will
so inform the mortgagee of these facts in writing. In such cases, the
mortgagee is requested to withhold the initiation of foreclosure
proceedings for at least 60 days from the date of receipt of the
above-mentioned written notice.
Page 2
HUD-Wash., D. C.
t
t
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CHAPTER 10: ANALYSIS OF WHY HUD-APPROVED RELIEF MEASURES ARE NOT USED
AND OVERVIEW OF EFFORTS AT REGULATING MORTGAGEES
1. INTRODUCTION:
In the previous chapter, HUD's guidelines for mortgagees servicing
FHA-insured mortgages in default were discussed and substantial evidence
was presented that mortgagees do not generally follow these regulations.
Keeping in mind that the HUD-approved relief measures safeguard mortgagees
against any loss of interest during the period of relief if the loan is
eventually foreclosed, the question is: why are mortgagees unwilling
to follow HUD's guidelines?
There are several possible reasons why the HUD-approved relief
measures are not frequently used. This chapter will explore the ex-
planationfor why there is such widespread non-compliance with HUD
guidelines relating to forbearance and recasting.
But without digging too deeply for reasons, a basic disparity
exists between the way the Mortgage Bankers Association and HUD view
foreclosure on FHA-insured mortgages. While the MBA views fore-
closure as a last resort, they advise a double standard for loans depending
on whether or not they are FHA-insured. The MBA Manual on Collection
Procedures states:
The decision to foreclose should be made on an individual case basis.
Working with the conclusions drawn from the preforeclosure analysis,
the servicer must weigh the alternatives and evaluate the consequences
of foreclosure. If the loan truly fits a classical default pattern,
the foreclosure decision is easy. However, no two defaulted loans
are identical, and it is best to be certain that no item of consequence
is overlooked. This is particularly important with respect to the
possibilities for large losses. An alternative that would be unac-
ceptable on the usual FHA or VA loan might become very acceptable if
-329-
something had happened to invalidate the VA guaranty or FHA insurance,
leaving the lender no recourse other than taking the property.
(underline added)l
This language is in sharp contrast to HUD's guidelines. The
"Mortgagees' Handbook -- Application Through Insurance" states that:
In general terms, HUD-FHA requires that the holders of insured
mortgages service them in accordance with the accepted practices
of prudent lending institutions. This should be done in the same
manner as if the loan were not insured and the mortgagee were
dependent entirely on the property as security to protect its
+2investment.2
Thus, while HUD implores mortgagees to service FHA-insured
loans as though they carried a full amount of risk, the MBA advises
members to "bend over backwards" to prevent a foreclosure only if
the property is the investor's only protection against loss.
But beyond this basic and important difference in outlook, other
reasons exist which account for mortgagees' unwillingness to extend
HUD-approved relief to defaulting mortgagors.
MBA Collection Procedures, op. cit. p. 34.
2HUD Handbook 4000.2 op. cit. p. 3-5.
-330-
2. ACTUAL AND SERVICER-PERCEIVED CAUSES OF DEFAULT:
The cause of default is critical to the use of HUD's relief
measures. For a family to be eligible for special forbearance or
recasting HUD guidelines require that the cause of default be due to
"circumstances beyond the mortgagor's control."1 Such circumstances
include "dealth, illness, curtailment of income and uninsured damage
to the mortgaged property."
Thus, the first reason why servicers do not extend relief may
be that the cause of default is not beyond the mortgagor's control.
Or, second, the cause of default may actually be beyond the mortgagor's
control but the servicer may have a conflicting perception.
There is substantial evidence which suggests that most reasons for
mortgagor default would, in fact, make a majority of mortgagors eligible
for relief. For example, testifying before the House Subcommittee on
Housing, HUD Secretary Romney stated that:
In September 1970, we did a limited survey in Detroit's inner
city area of homeowners who were in default or had had their
homes foreclosed. This survey indicated that illness, loss of
jobs, and family problems accounted for seventy percent of the
defaults. These basic problems were compounded by excessive
maintenance cost on properties generally more than thirty-five
years old, and occupied by lower income purchasers with too
many other bills to pay and little ability to accumulate reserves
to cover unexpected expenses.3
HUD's findings were confirmed by OSTI, in the course of their
evaulation of the Concentrated Delinquency and Default Counseling Program.
1HUD Handbook 4191.1, o2. cit. p. 48.
2Ibid.
3
"Real Estate Settlement Costs..." op. cit. p. 34.
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Here, too, the most frequent causes of default were due to reasons which
were clearly beyond the mortgagor's control. Based upon information
on 124 defaulting Section 235 mortgagors, OSTI found that "unemployment,
illness in family, repair and maintenance problems and family problems...
together accounted for almost 60% of the reasons for default."4 The
single most frequent reason cited for default was budget or credit prob-
lems -- difficulties which, depending upon circumstances, may or may
not also be beyond a person's control. (See Table 20)
Another study conducted by OSTI also indicated that default is, most
often due to reasons beyond the mortgagor's control. In a survey of
.261 Section 235 homeowners, slightly over one-third of those inter-
viewed indicated that they had been in default at least once. Table 21
presents the major reasons for default according to these mortgagors.
In summarizing their findings, the OSTI report stated that there was an
underlying pattern behind most default episodes. This pattern is charac-
terized by a:
temporary family crisis which presents itself as a problem in
maintaining employment, in maintaining the health of the family,
and in maintaining the household on a limited budget, and which
cuts off the normal flow of cash to monthly mortgage payments. 5
Another recent study performed by the University of Southern California
Law School also indicated that most reasons for mortgagor default are due
to events "beyond the mortgagor's control" and, moreover, that there are
discrepancies between mortgage servicer and mortgagor perceptions concerning
4D+D #1, op. ci t. p. 12.
5OSTI Final, op. cit. p. 217-218.
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TABLE 20
Major Reasons for Default Among Section 235 Mortgagors
(As Diagnosed by D+D Counseling Agency Counselors)
Budget/Credit
Problems
Unemployment
Illness
Maintenance/Repair
Problems
Family Problems
Problems with a
Public Agency
(i.e., VA, public
assistance, for
lack of appropriate
payments, etc.)
Other
No.
I
TOTAL 154*
1
100%
*More than one major reason for default given in thirty clients' cases
Source: OSTI D+D #1 p. 20.
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TABLE 21
Major Reasons
No.
Unemployment 21
Income 8
Budget Management 20
Medical 20
Family 4
Housing-related 4
Happenstance 6
Other 6
TOTAL 89
for Most Recent Default Episode
24
9
22
22
4
4
7
7
100%
Source: OSTI Final p. 215.
-334-
the causes of default. 6
As evident from Table 22the majority of the "mortgagor" reasons for
default appear to be due to unexpected and uncontrollable hardships.
Fifty-five percent of the mortgagors listed death, illness, accidents,
and curtailment of income as the major causes of default. And, again,
depending upon how the servicer interprets"marital difficulties" and
"excessive obligations," and the particular circumstances of each case,
considerably more mortgagors may also be in default for "reasons beyond
their control."
The discrepancy between mortgagor and mortgage servicer reasons
for default is striking. The major reason for default according to
the latter was "excessive obligations," 41%, while mortgagors listed this
in only 14% of the cases. Equally striking is that mortgage servicers
found death, illness, or curtailment of income to account for only 17%
of the defaults, while these reasons were cited by mortgagors as the
causes of default in 48% of the cases.
The USC report stated that:
The significance of the divergences may be twofold: first, they
may indicate that mortgagees are not reporting the causes and
factors of mortgage defaults in a meaningful way; second, and
related but also of independent significance, mortgagees may not
have accurate information to report because they are not doing a
proper job of servicing mortgage defaults. 7
6George Lefcoe et.al. Univeristy of Southern California Default Study,
Preliminary Data, March, 1974 p. 1.
7Ibid. p. 6.
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TABLE 22
Primary Causes of Default Accordinq to Mortgagors and Mortgagees;
Sections 203(b); 221 (d)_(2)_; and 235*
Death or illness of principal
mortgagor or family member
Mortgagor Reason
No. 2
47 21
Mortgagee Reason
No.
7 3
Marital difficulties
Curtailment of income
Excessive obligations
Accident to head of household
Lender returned partial payments
Increase in housing costs/repair
costs
Mortgagor has abandoned property
Inability to sEll or rent
property
Other
TOTAL
*203(b)
235
221(d) (2)
24 .10
32 14
92 41
0
0
39
227*
17
100%
43
0
0
0
9
4
19
227* 100%
= 121
- 28
= 78
Source: University of Southern California Default Study, Preliminary
Data (Data presented in Table 22 calculated from material
presented on p. 2-4.)
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Based upon interviews with defaulting mortgagors, the USC study
found many instances of poor mortgage servicing. They learned that:
Mortgage servicing involves little more than an attempt to collect
payments. Not only do mortgagees offer no assistance in helping
mortgagors cure defaults, their mechanistic behavior actually in-
creases the chance of default and magnifies the chance of recur-
rent defaults once the first breach occurs. Lenders disregard
HUD regulations which are designed to cure breaches and prevent
defaults... If certain mortgage [servicing] practices were changed,
there would be a lower mortgagor default rate and quite possibly
a lower acquisiti.on rate for HUD.8
More specifically, the report went on to note that HUD guidelines on
special forbearance "would lead one to expect a fair number of for-
bearance arrangements among those whose defaults were caused by illness,.
accidents, or job layoffs..."9
In spite of this, forbearance was only an extremely rare occurrence.
Only seventeen forbearance agreements were found in the entire USC sample
and, significantly, "in each of these seventeen cases the mortgagor was
living up to the agreement at the time of the interview."10
The USC study then went on to estimate the number of defaults in
their sample eligible for forbearance. Using guidelines, that far sur-
8Ibid. p. 1.
9 Ibid. p. 11.
10Ibid.
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passed HUD guidelines in terms of strictness, the USC researchers con-
cluded that about one-quarter of the defaulters should have been eligible
for forbearance.12
Two earlier studies also found that the causes for mortgagor default
were, most often, due to reasons beyond their control. In addition,
according to one of the studies, conducted by the Veterans Administration
in December 1960, there was again a wide disparity between the reasons
that mortgage holders gave for default and the reasons obtained by VA
directly from mortgagors. The VA gave several explanations for these
disparities:
To some extent, differences in reasons may be attributable to
changes in the circumstances of obligors (mortgagors) between
the time the default was reported (and the holder's reason
given) and the time when reasons were given by the VA obligor.
The largest shift, however, occurs from the category classified
by holders as "Improper Regard for Obligations." This shift
appears more likely to reflect a difference in attitudes be-
tween holders and obligors, than to reflect changed circumstances. 13
For example, the VA report points out that a family that suffers
a curtailment of income may offer this as the reason for default. Yet,
theymay still have had sufficient resources to meet their payments if they
11The USC Guidelines for forbearance eligibility:
1. Illness, accident, unemployment, or curtailment of income were
counted only if experienced directly by the head of the household.
2. The mortgagor indicated that this was the first time thathe/she had been in default.
3. Forbearance was requested and not granted.
12 Ibid.
13Office of Appraisal and Department of Veterans Benefits, Veterans Admini-
stration Report of Loan Service and Claims Study, April 30, 1962, p. 187. InHearings Before A Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency, "FHAMortgage Foreclosures" U.S. Senate, 88th Cong., 2nd. Sess. January, 1964.
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had managed their finances better, thereby displaying an "improper regard
for obligations."
But, the report goes on to note that:
At the same time, the facts lead to an assumption that a considerable
body of cases may have been arbitrarily classified by holders as "Im-
proper Regard for Obligations" with little real knowledge as to the
circumstances of the obligors. 15
Moreover, it adds that:
This impression is strengthened by the fact that in 41% of all cases
in the stydy (87,155) holders had reported no personal contact with
obligors. 6
In contrast to the above,in 2900 cases there was agreement between
the reasons for default as reported by mortgagees and mortgagors. (See
Table 24) Thus, at least one-third of the VA mortgagors were in default
for reasons "beyond their control" -- according to the most conservative
estimate, by mortgagees (Table 23)-- and about two-thirds were in default
for "reasons beyond their control" based upon either the data in Table 24,
or the mortgagors' reasons for their own defaults, as presented in Table 23.
And, adding fuel to the argument that many more defaulting families
are eligible for relief than are being offered it, the VA report further
14 Ibid
15 Ibid.
16Ibid. p. 188.
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TABLE 23
Reasons for Default According to Mortgagees and VA Mortgagors - I
(Based Upon a Sample of 7964 Mortgagors)
Mortgage Holder Mortgagor
Improper regard for obligations 51 12
Extensive Obligations 9 11
Curtailment of Income 22 37
Death or Illness 6 24
Marital Difficulties 4 8
Other 8 8
TOTAL 100% 100%
Source: Veterans Administration Report of Loan Service and
Claims Study, p. 187.
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TABLE 24
Reasons for Default According to Mortgagees and VA Mortgagors - I
(Based Upon 2900 Cases in Which the Reasons Coincided)
Improper Regard for Obligations
Extensive Obligations
Curtailment of Income
Death or Illness
Marital Difficulties
Other
TOTAL
26
7
39
16
9
3
100%
Source: Veterans Administration Report of Loan Service
. and Claims Study, p. 189.
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points out that:
Of all the cases in the study, only... 2%, had been previously
extended by holders, although sixty percent of the cases involving
the filing of claims could have been extended.17
And, finally, a survey of lenders conducted by the Mortgage Bankers
Association in June, 1963 disclosed the causes of default for almost 20,000
loans -- FHA, VA, and conventional. Table25 lists the principal reasons
for default, as viewed by the lender.
Once again, it is evident that a minimum of one-third of the mortgagors
would seem to be in default for reasons beyond their control -- reduced
income and death/illness.
The MBA survey also questioned lenders about the "nature of forbearance
on loans in serious default." The fact that the question was: unanswered
for about half of the loans led MBA to suggest that, in part, this "re-
flects a lack of records that indicate the nature of past forebearance
actions."18
Further, the MBA report notes that:
Apparently, mortgage lenders have not seriously attempted to deter-
mine what effect different forbearance practices may or may not have
on saving the loan and avoiding risks of loss through foreclosure.19
These data suggest that many servicers are not adequately carrying out
one of their major responsibilities -- that of finding out why mortgagors
17Ibid. p. 195. An extension, according to VA Guidelines is a type of
forbearance. See "Lenders Handbook" Guaranty or Insurance of Loans to Veterans
... GI Loan Program, Veterans Administration, December, 1969, p. 1-40 para. 6040.
18Mortgage Bankers Association of America, "Characteristics of Delinquent
Mortgage Loans" Research Delinquency Report No. 1, 1962. p. 14.
19Ibid.
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TABLE 25
Reasons for Default According
No.
Improper Regard for Obligations
Reduced Primary Income
Death or Illness
Marital Problems
Over-Obligated
Unable to Sell or Rent
Property Abandoned
Other
Not Reported
TOTAL
4,469
4,148
2,631
2,328
2,205
1 ,543
1 ,067
997
359
19,647
to Mortgagees
23
21
13
12
11
8
5
5
2
100%
Source: MBA Delinquency Report, p. 41.
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are in default.20  It seems clear that many more mortgagors are eligible
for relief than are currently receiving it. The above data disclose that
one possible reason for this may be inaccurate assessments of the causes
of default by servicers. But other reasons may also exist. These will
continue to be assessed below.
20Mortgage Bankers Association of America, "Collection Department --
Responsibilities and Operations" -- A Manual, October, 1972 p. 13.
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3. VARYING NOTIONS ON THE MEANING OF FORBEARANCE AND CONFLICTS WITH NORMAL
MORTGAGEE OPERATIONS:
The Mortgage Bankers Association interprets forbearance in a unique
fashion that conflicts with HUD's guidelines. The MBA Manual entitled
"Collection Department -- Responsibilities and Operations" describes a
very different "special forbearance" than HUD's. First, while HUD's
"special forbearance" may extend up to eighteen months, the MBA manual
states that, "Usually, forbearance arrangements should not extend beyond
six months..." 1 Second, in direct violation of the HUD guidelines, the
MBA sample forbearance agreement does not specify when or how the deficit
,resulting from the reduced payments will be repaid. (See Exhibits 11 and
12) And, third, the MBA Manual does not mention that forbearance can allow
the length of a mortgage to be extended beyond its normal maturity.
Thus, the official trade organization of mortgage bankers does not
advocate the same relief measure as put forth in the HUD guidelines.
Similarily, FNMA's Guide to Servicers outlines a forbearance procedure that
also does not exactly coincide with HUD's. Most important in this regard
is FNMA's requirement that:
Each forbearance should provide for the reduction or suspension
of regular mortgage payments for a specified period of time not
to exceed six months and for the resumption of regular monthly
paymen s upon expiration of the forbearance period. (Underline
added)
Moreover, one the mortgagor is ready to liquidate his past due
installments, he must do so "within a period not to exceed six months"
unless approval is obtained from FNMA. (Underline added)3
1Ibid. p. 29.
2Federal National Mortgage Association, "Servicer's Guide" September,
1973, Sec. 128.07 (a) p. 31.
3Ibid. Sec. 128.07 (b) p. 31.
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E xHI18 I T/i:
Mortgage Bankers Association of America
APPLICATION FOR FORBEARANCE
MBA MORTGAGE COMPANY
To:- .MBA Mortgage CompanY Date -..June)1
We own the property located at -2 _SouthWest Eighl _Street ,-_Mi.mi-,_ Flrida
on which you hold or service a mortgage loan. Number 808.6
We are hereby making application to have our house payments reduced temporarily.
1. Personal Information: Residence address (If different). -- ---------------------------------------
Name of Husband - 4ames W. _ Cunningham ------- Age 1V.. -Tel. Nos. Home 1...1i1 Business ---
Name of Wife .. R. .- ...- . Age _K8 ..Other Dependents: No. . - - Ages . 8 -
Husband's Employer - ..Unaemployed -for.. three months --. Position ------------ How Long --------
Business Address .---- ------------------------------ Type of Business. ............- ...----
Wife's Employer ---------- ------------------------ Position ------------ -How Long- -
Business Address. ..-.-.. .-..------------------------------------------------------------------
Previous Employer - .ABC _anufacturjing......
2. Our Income:
Husband's current base pay (weekly rate XV*) . . . . UJnemployment.Compensation . . . . . . . .
Husband's commissions or fees (dependable monthly average) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Husband's overtime or other earnings (dependable monthly average) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
Wife's current base pay (weekly rate X) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
Wife's overtime, commissions, or other earnings (dependable monthly average) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Our dependable average income per month from all other sources (explain) .- . . . . . . . . . .
Total current monthly income
3. Our outgo (show average monthly costs):
Food $1/day/person less Food Stamps $ Incidentals $5/person/months S Total
Medical $ Dental $ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total
Expected Monthly House Payment (see No. 6, below). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..otal
Utilities $ Heat $ Phone $ .._._._...Total
Transportation (Gas, Oil, Maintenance, Fares, Tolls) S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total
Insurance: Health S Auto S Life $ . . . . . . . . Totalrther Expenses: Clothing S Union dues S . . . . . . . . . . Total
oans: Auto ( 12_months to go) S 41.00 Furniture ( -months to go) S . . . Total
Other: ( _ -_months to go) S (Attach List) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Total
Total monthly expenses
Net
Per Month
300.00
300.00
Per Month
69.00
10.00
60.00
60.00
30.00
15.00
15.00
41.00
300.00
4. Our mortgage is past due because (explain fully if 30 days or more past due _ -I have been urlemployed for
three months.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. If accident, sickness, or unernployment, we have received or will receive the following compensation or aid: -.......
_ r.e.c..iying ..uemploymnent. .compertsation-f 
_$0 per. JmonPtb _
6. In view of the above facts, we request your temporary forbearance and offer the following payment schedule, each payment
to be made promptly: .. educe d .p.a-yment -fox- a. peri.a.d. Df .. tie. _until -empppyment .i.s. 1ocated-......
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We certify that all statement herein are true and are made to induce you to grant us forbearance. We agree that any rights
now or hereafter possessed by the mortgage holder shall in no way be prejudiced by accepting payment, or granting forbear-
ance. You may request our employers or others to confirm our statements.
Supplemental data should be attached if the foregoing
does not supply the mortgage holder with all informa-
tior which might be helpful in considering this request.
- James W. Cunningham
Signature of Husband
_ Mary. ._uin ..gha-m
Signature cf Wife
EXH$IBT 12:
90 Management Services Department
FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT
LOAN NUMBER TF 80836
The indebtedness in the captioned loan is in default. In consideration of the forbearance
extended for a period of time by MBA Mortgage Company, it is necessary that you
indicate acceptance of the following conditions by signing this letter of agreement:
1. Beginning on the first day of July, 1971, you will remit a monthly payment of
$60.00 for a period of six months.
2. MBA Mortgage Company agrees to make a further review of your loan at the
end of the above six month period provided the above payments are made as
scheduled.
3. It is understood that the term and provisions of the note and security
instrument securing the captioned loan, shall remain in full force and effect.
MBA Mortgage Company reserves the right to institute foreclosure proceedings
according to the terms of said note and security instrument in the event of
either your breach of the term of this agreement to forbear, or your failure
to pay the note and security instrument, according to its tenor upon the
termination of this agreement to forbear.
Please execute the original and first copy hereof, and return them immediately.
Sincerely yours,
MBA MORTGAGE COMPANY
BY: A. G. Smith
Accepted and Agreed this 1st day of July, 1971.
Mary R. CunninghamJames W. Cunningham
"03'qt-
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Similar to forbearance, the MBA Manual describes a recasting
agreement which is different from HUD's. While the HUD recasting
examples are explicit and readily understandable, MBA's sample re-
casting agreement is obscure at best, and misleading at worst. (See
Exhibit 13)
Looking again to FNMA's Servicer's Guide discloses another dis-
crepancy between HUD's guidelines and FNMA's. FNMA is considerably
more strict when it comes to modifying (i.e. recasting) a mortgage. Also,
extending the teri of a mortgage, permitted by HUD's forbearance pro-
cedure, is not encouraged by FNMA. The FNMA Servicer's Guide states
that:
Modifications or extensions are neither a privilege of the mort-
gagor nor a device for eliminating delinquencies. Such actions
shouid be confined to cases in which modification of the mortgage
terms will enable the mortgagor to maintain his account in current
condition rather than lose his home because of inability to meet
the existing mortgage terms due to an adverse change in his circum-
stances. (underline added)4
This language is in sharp contrast to that of Congress'when it
specifically stated that recasting is a viable option when the default
is due to circumstances beyond the control of the mortgagor. Instead,
FNMA authorizes recasting only if the reason for default represents a
permanent change in the mortgagor's financial position.
EXHU3/T 3' ~ -
Mortgage Bankers Association of America 91
SAMPLE RECASTING AGREEMENT
FHA Case #561-195220-235
This Agreement, made this 1st day of January 1973, between MBA Mortgage Company hereinafter referred to as
Lender, and James W. Cunningham. and Mary R. Cunningham, hereinafter referred to as Borrowers, and Approved Trust
Company, as Trustee (if applicable);
WITNESSETH:
Whereas the Borrowers are now indebted to the Lender in the sum of $18,500 (hereinafter called "new principal
amount"), consisting of $17,302 unpaid principal, and S 1,198 unpaid installments of ground rents, hazard insurance
premiums, taxes, assessments, and mortgage insurance premiums, the payment of which is secured by a note and security
instrument owned and held by the Lender, dated May 15, 1969, and recorded in the office for the recording of deeds in
Dade County and State of Florida, in Book 302 of mortgages, page 1097, and
Whereas the parties mutually desire to modify the terms of payment of said indebtedness by changing the amount of
monthly payments required on said note and security instrument;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the convenants hereinafter contained, it is mutually agreed as follows:
The Borrowers agree to pay the "new principal amount" with interest at the rate specified in said note on the unpaid
balance in monthly installments of $177.00 Dollars ($177.00), commencing on the first day of January 1973, and on the
first day of each month thereafter, until the "new principal amount" and interest thereon are fully paid, except that the
final payment of the "new principal amount" and interest, if not sooner paid, shall be due and payable on the first day of
May, 1974.1
It is mutually agreed that said security instrument shall continue a first lien upon the premises and that neither the
obligation evidencing the aforesaid indebtedness nor the security instrument securing the same shall in any way be
prejudiced by this agreement, but said obligation and security instrument and all the convenants and agreements thereof and
the rights of the parties thereunder shall remain in full force and effect except as herein expressly modified.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have signed, sealed, and delivered this agreement on the date above written.
MBA Mortgage Company (SEAL) James W. Cunningham (SEAL)
Lender Borrower
Mary R. Cunningham
By Borrower
DEEDS OF TRUST
(If the security instrument is a deed of trust, and it is necessary that the Trustee execute recasting agreements, the following
acknowledgment shall be signed by the Trustee.)
THE TRUSTEE has executed this instrument to acknowledge his (its) assent thereto and agrees to continue to act in
such capacity under the terms as modified herein.
TRUSTEE:
Approved Trust Company
'Note to Reader
This daie cannot exceed by more than 10 years the inaturity date of the original note.
-349-
Further, while HUD does not require approval of a recasting agree-
ment, FNMA does (See Exhibit 14 ) -- and rightfully so. Since any
modification in the terms of the mortgage will affect the yield, the
owner of the mortgage would clearly want to be aware of any such changes.
Thus, while HUD lists recasting as an option of the mortgagee to
cure a default, the realities of the mortgage finance system make recasting
a slightly more complicated procedure, than the guidelines portray. And,
the issue of recasting aside, whenever a loan goes into default, the
cash flow to the investor is disrupted. For example, Stan Goodrow,
a Vice President of Kislak Mortgage Company pointed out that:
Since forbearance entails a decreased cash flow it is still un-
attractive to most investors, even though the interest is guaranteed
by HUD.5
Thus, most mortgagees are acutely aware of cash flows and are
concerned about how any changes in the terms of the mortgage would affect
them. Yet, it would appear that the mortgagee confronted with a defaulting
loan, which automatically means a disruption in the cash flow, would pre-
fer an option such as special forbearance that seems to offer the best
alternative in a difficult sitution.
But, in addition, while a mortgagee is assured of receiving all his
money back if a loan that has received HUD-approved relief later forecloses,
he may still suffer a reduced yield -- in addition to the disrupted cash
flow -- if the loan is eventually brought current. This, then, may be another
reason why mortgagees may be opposed to granting relief.
Goodrow, op. cit.5Interview, Stan
FORMS INSTRUCTIONS
FNMA FORM 181
(Revised 3-71)
APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION OR EXTENSION OF MORTGAGE
Purpose:
Prepared by:
Prepared in:
Distribution:
To be used by Servicer in applying for a modification or
extension of a mortgage.
Servicer.
Original plus four copies.
Original and four copies to FNMA Regional Office for con-
sideration. If approved, FNMA will retain two copies,
and forward three copies to the Servicer; one copy should
be delivered to VA or FHA, as applicable; one copy should
be retained in the Servicer's records; one copy should
be delivered to the mortgagor. (FNMA Regional Office
will forward one of its copies to Loan Accounting
Division - Washington Office.)
INSTRUCTIONS
The amount of the total sum shown in paragraph numbered (2) less the
amounts deposited with the Servicer for application as of the effective date
of the modification or extension as shown in paragraph numbered (3), if
any, shall equal the balance of the loan to be modified or extended as
shown in paragraph numbered (4). The effective date of the modification
or extension shall be entered in paragraph (4) as well as the proposed
monthly principal and interest installment and the maturity date.
FNMA FORM 181.PART IV FNMA SERVICER'IS GUIDE
EX189T /9:
PART IV FNMA SERVICER'S GUIDE FNMA FORM 181
FNMA/GNMA FORM 181
Revised 3-71 Date
APPLICATION FOR MODIFICATION
OR
EXTENSION OF MORTGAGE
TO: FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE
ASSOCIATION (FNMA)
or GOVERNMENT NATIONAL
MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION (GNMA)
FNMA/GNMA NUMBER . VA OR FHA NUMBER
MORTGAGOR (OR TRUSTOR)
ADDRESS OF PROPERTY
The undersigned, (hereinafter referred to as the "Applicant") does hereby apply for a ("Modification"or_"Extension")of the time for
("Modification" or "E xtension")
payment of the above-captioned account covering an indebtedness owing from the Applicant to (hereinafter referred to as
(FNMA or GNMA)
the "Mortgagee"), the Mortgagee evidenced by a note (or bond) and secured by a real property mortgage (or trust deed) (said note or bond
and real property Mortgage or trust deed are hereinafter referred to as the "Mortgage") and the Applicant represents as follows:
(1) Applicant is now the owner and holder of the real property encumbered bysaidMortgage, recorded in the public records in the
County of , State of , in - book page
or document or file number
(2) Under the terms of said Mortgage, there remains unpaid as of the first day of the month in which this Application is made, the
sum of S for principal, $ for interest thereon, S for advances made by
FNMA thereunder, and $ - for interest on such advances, aggregating a total sum of $ _, for which amount
the Applicant is indebted to the Mortgagee under said Mortgage, which is a valid first lien, to which Applicant has no defenses, off-sets, or
counterclaims.
(3) Applicant hereby deposits with the Mortgagee the sum of $ , which is to be applied upon the present balance
due on the principal of said Mortgage, (including advances, if any), and the sum of$ which is to be applied upon the
delinquent interest due upon said principal (and advances, if any); application of said deposited amounts is to be made as of the effective
date of the proposed modification or extension, which if not consummated, shall be returned to the Applicant.
(4) Applicant requests the terms of said Mortgage be modified or extended relative to the payment of said indebtedness by provid-
ing for payment of the balance of the principal, including any unpaid interest due thereon, (after the deposits aforementioned have been
applied thereto), as follows: Said total balance of S is to be paid, with interest at the same rate per annum stipulated in
the Mortgage, on the unpaid balance, in equal monthly installments of $ _- (exclusive of sums required to be deposited
for the payment of taxes, insurance, etc.), the first of said installments shall become due and payable on the first-day of ._,
19_., and the remaining installments, successively, on the first day of each and e-ery month thereafter, until said mortgage indebtedness
is fully paid, except that if not sooner paid, the final payment of principal and interest shall be due and payable on the first day of
, 19 .which is the present or extended maturity date.
(5) Applicant agrees to make the payments as specified in paragraph (4) hereof and understands and agrees that:
(a) All the rights and remedies, stipulations, and conditions contained in said Mortgage relating to default in the making of
payments under the Mortgage shall also apply to default in the making of said modified payments hereunder.
(b) All covenants, agreements, stipulations, and conditions in said Mortgage shall be and remain in full force and effect, ex-
cept as herein modified, and none of the Applicant's obligations or liabilities under said Mortgage shall be diminished or released by any
provisions hereof; nor shall this Application in any way impair, diminish, or affect any of the Mortgagee's rights under or remedies on the
Mortgage, whether such rights or remedies arise thereunder or by operation of law. Also, all rights of recourse to which the Mortgagee is
presently entitled against any property or any other persons in any way obligated for or liable on the Mortgage, are expressly reserved by
the Mortgagee.
(c) All costs and expenses incurred in connection with the processing of this Application, including recording fees, title ex-
amination, and attorneys' fees, shall be paid by Applicant and shall be secured by said Mortgage.
(d) Applicant agrees to make and execute such other documents or papers as may be necessary or required to effectuate the
terms and conditions of this Application which, if approved and accepted by the Mortgagee, shall bind and inure to the heirs, executors,
administrators, and assigns of the Applicant.
(6) For the purpose of inducing and influencing the Mortgagee to grant this Application, the undersigned represents of his own
knowledge that the names, and marital status, of all owners or other persons having an interest in the mortgaged property and the name of
his or her spouse are as follows:
PART IV FNMA SERVICER'S GUIDE
Name Marital Status
FNMA FORM 1811
Name of Spouse
All such persons are of legal age, and none is under any legal disability, except as follows:
*Witnessed by: (SEAL)
Applicant
PA r I
*ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Accepted: Date ,_9_ .
NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION
By
The undersigned, being obligated for the payment of the above-described Mortgage indebtedness, hereby consents to the execution
of the foregoing Application between the Applicant therein described and the Mortgagee, and further consents to any modification or ex-
tension of the Mortgage by the Mortgagee under said Application.
*Witnessed By:
Co-Makers or Endorsers
-THE EXECUTION OF THIS APPLtCATION SHOULD BE WITNESSED ANO THE APPROPRIATE ACKNOWLEDOGMENT CLAUSE SHOULD mE ADDED.
IF THESE ARE REQUIREMENTS UNDER LOCAL .AW; ALSO. THIS APPLICATION SHOULD 6E FILED FOR RECORD, IF REOUIRED UNDER
LOCAL LAW OR PRACTICE.
FNMA FORA/T 121
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4. COSTS AND TIME INVOLVED IN PROCESSING HUD-APPROVED RELIEF MEASURES:
Another possible reason why HUD's relief measures are not used by
mortgagees is that HUD does not consider the costs involved in extending
relief. Thus, if the costs to the mortgagee of forbearance or recasting
are high, this would be a deterrent to granting relief.
However, this does not seem to be the case. Interviews with mort-
gagees consistently pointed to the fact that the costs involved in extending
relief are not substantial. For example, one mortgagee said that:
HUD forbearance or recasting is not diffi ult to do. It would only
take a couple of hours -- not a bi g deal.
Another mortgagee said that it would cost $10-15 to recast a loan --
"$25 at the outside -- not more than that." 2
Several mortgagees indicated that it may take as much as a day's work,
or about $100, to execute a forbearance or recasting agreement.2 However,
when one mortgagee was asked what his attitude would be if HUD allowed
a new 1% payment to the mortgagee for recasting a loan, he indicated that
he doubted it that would change their willingness to get involved with this
type of procedure. 4
Two HUD Area Office mortgage servicing specialists also had impressions
about the time and costs involved. Val Garcia, in the Los Angeles Area
1Interview, Stan Goodrow, op. cit.
2Interview, Harold Dickson, p. cit.
3InterviewsStuart Blanton, op. cit. and Bill Salyer, p. cit.
4lbid. Interview, Bill Salyer.
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Office, stated that:
Recasting is not used very much because of the gmount of work
involved. It's almost like writing a new loan.
But, he went on to contradict himself when he added that recasting a
loan would take about two hours!6  Kenneth Anderson of the San Fran-
cisco Area Office bluntly stated:
Recasting is simple. You use just one form. But you7must
inform the investor to set up a new computer program.
Based upon the above comments, and with the lack of any evidence
to the contrary, it appears that HUD-approved forbearance and recasting
are neither time-consuming nor costly procedures for mortgagees. Thus,
this does not appear to be a viable explanation for why HUD-approved
relief measures are used so infrequently. However, the perception that
the paperwork involved with granting relief is substantial, may be
another explanation for the non-use of forbearance and recasting.
5Interview, Val Garcia, op. cit.
6Ibid.
7Interview, Kenneth Anderson, op. cit.
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5. LACK OF MORTGAGOR INFORMATION CONCERNING DEFAULT:
Another plausible reason why the HUD-approved relief measures
are so seldom used is that mortgagors have, or are given, very little
information on the types of relief for which they may be eligible.
Even when the Mortgage Bankers Association has an opportunity to
encourage its members to consider the HUD relief measures as a means
to assist mortgagors in default, it chooses not to do so. For example,
the MBA Manual on collection procedures devotes twenty-five pages to
sample letters to be sent to delinquent and defaulting mortgagors,
but not a single letter makes any reference to the fact that the
mortgagor may be eligible for HUD-approved relief measures. Rather,
the tone of nearly all the letters is extremely cold, angry, and
threatening. (See Exhibit 15)
The overriding attitude of reluctance, on the part of mortgagees,
to offer information about available relief measures was cited by
Ronald G. Yelenik, a New York Legal Services Attorney:
Even in cases of extreme emergencies, such as unemployment or
serious illness, he (the mortgagor) is- not informed of his
right to relief, which is available under HUD regulations.
The fact is that if a homeowner is ill or has encountered
some emergency he can be extended a deferred payment schedule
in reference to his mortgage. The homeowner never learns
of this right and is never educated as to this fact.
I would say that this withholding of information is almost
tantamount to fraud, in that the failure to provide this
information can result in a very serious situation and even-
tually in the foreclosure of the mortgage due to th home-
owner's inability to keep up his mortgage -payments.
MBA Collections Manual, op. cit. p. 63-88.
2New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit., p. 109.
FX1/I1T IS:
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Mvanagemen. Services Denartment
FIRST MONTH SERIES - PART I
INTERRELATED LETTERS TO BORROWER PAYING AFTER 25th OF MONTH
August 20
Dear Mr. Smith:
Your loan is now 20 days delinquent.
We have had no word from you regarding your intentions for taking care of this pay-
ment. Please call me immediately.
It is imperative that your loan be brought up to date within the next five days and
that future mortgage payments are received in our office on or before the first day of
each month.
August 25
Dear Mr. Smith:
On August 20, we wrote to you requesting that you contact us regarding your delin-
quent mortgage loan. We also asked that you send your August 1st payment imme-
diately. Thus far, we have not received your payment, nor have we heard from you.
Unless we hear from you, we assume you are not experiencing any difficulty.
Therefore, you should be making your payment on or before the first day of the
month, as outlined in the Deed of Trust.
This letter is to advise you we must receive your payment in our office not later than
August 31. If you wish to protect your interest in this property, we suggest you give
this matter your immediate attention.
Mortgage Bankers Association of America
THIRTY DAY LETTERS
First two letters are examples for use on 32nd day of delinquency
Your home loan with us is now in default. When your loan was made, the monthly pay-
ments were set up to be due on the first day of each month. The payments are due in
our office on that date.
Our records show that your payment for last month is still due, in addition to the pay-
ment for this month. Also, a late charge for last month's payment is due, as authorized
under the terms of your Deed of Trust. The total amount due at this time is shown
above.
It is not our policy to accept less than the full amount due.
Unless we receive your remittance in the full amount, or unless other arrangements are
made immediately, your loan could be referred to the holder of your mortgage for
further recommendations resulting in additional expense to you.
We urge you to give prompt attention to this matter.
FINAL NOTICE
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY:
1. Two payments are now past due on your mortgage and legally the entire balance
is now subject to payment on demand.
2. The amount now required to reinstate your mortgage includes a late charge for
last month.
3. Your failure to contact us immediately may have serious consequences.
4. Your cooperation is urgently needed now to safeguard your equity in your home.
Management Services Department
THIRTY-FIVE DAY LETTERS
September 7
Dear Mr. Smith:
Your loan on the subject property is still in default.
Because we do not have your residence telephone number, any communication con-
cerning your loan must be initiated by you.
In order to protect your interest in this property, it is necessary that you contact this
office not later than 4:30 p.m., September 12.
September 9
Dear Mr. Williams:
Your mortgage loan is still outstanding for the
ments.
August 1st and September 1st install-
We must advise you that we have a legal right to start proceedings to protect our
interest in the property. If you have concern for keeping your property, it is urgent
that the loan be brought to a current basis.
We will expect your full remittance in this office not later than 4:30 p.m., September
15.
The urgency of this matter demands immediate action on your part.
- 36~-
Management Services Department
FORTY-FIVE DAY LETTERS
We sincerely regret that you have made no effort to do anything about your loan, as we
requested on a number of occasions last month.
We use the words "sincerely regret" because they best express our feelings. There is
nothing in connection with our business that we value so highly as friendly relations
with our customers.
It's possible that you have been sick or away from home and have been unable to reply
to our previous letters. If that is the case, to avoid any steps that would further injure
your credit, we will wait five more days before taking any other action.
At that time, however, we shall feel justified in considering that we have done all in our
power to settle the matter as one between friends.
We earnestly hope that you will avoid possible legal action by paying the above amount.
Your mortgage on the subject property is now in default for the September 1st and
October 1st installments.
Must we remind you that this is a very serious matter?
All payments are due and payable on or before the first day of each month.
We have a legal right to start proceedings to protect our interest when a loan is in default.
It is in your interest that we urge you to make immediate arrangements to bring your
loan current.
1f the delinquency is not paid promptly, it is our intention to forward a recommendation
to our investor which could adversely affect your interest in this property.
Mortgage Bankers Association of America 73
FIFTY-FIVE DAY LETTERS
Although we mailed a letter to you earlier this month, you have now allowed your
mortgage loan to become seriously delinquent.
The amount shown above represents two payments and two late charges. To avoid
additional expense including attorney's fees, we urge you to pay immediately.
If the entire amount due at this time is not paid within four days of the date of this
letter, it is our intention to take further steps which could adversely affect your
interest in this property.
Your attitude concerning this obligation will be an important determining factor in
which action we take.
The loan on your property remains in default with the installments for September
and October past due.
Despite our recent letters to you we have received no word from you. Our field
representative visited your property and found no one at home. We still do not know
your residence telephone number nor your place of employment.
We have made every effort to contact you and have not been successful. It is, therefore,
up to you to contact us. We urge you not to jeopardize your interest in your property
by inaction and continued silence.
According to our records, your loan is now delinquent for the September 1st and
October 1st installments, plus two late charges. The total amount due is $208.00, and
another payment becomes due on November 1.
Unless funds are received in our office by October 31, it is our intention to recommend
that your property be posted for foreclosure sale. Payment must be in the form of a
cashier's check, money order or cash.
We suggest that if you are successful in saving your home this time, that you will not
jeopardize it again by making your mortgage payments late.
74 Management Services Departmer
SIXTY AND SEVENTY-FIVE DAY LETTERS
Your loan is three months delinquent and in serious trouble.
FORECLOSURE is imminent. If you wish io save your property, you must act now.
The amount shown above represents three payments and two late charges. To avoid
foreclosure of your mortgage, certified funds (no personal checks), representinq the full
amount of the delinquency, must be forthcoming at once.
This is the kind of letter we'd rather not write. In previous letters, we've done every-
thing we could think of, to urge you to bring your loan current and save your equity
in this property.
We've told you what action has been taken, and tried to do it in a way that didn't
sound threatening. We've now been directed to forward your loan to our attorneys, so
that they can start a foreclosure action. This we are doing and we've told them that
the total amount needed in certified funds is now $303.00, including applicable late
charges.
Legal fees will be added to this figure, when the attorneys begin their paper work. The
fees are costly and the foreclosure notice will be published in your local newspapers.
This doesn't make good sense, does it? We don't think so. We need your help to avoid
this, and we need it now.
You are about to lose your property through your failure to pay the past due mortgage
payments on your loan. .
We must receive at once either a cashier's check or money order, covering the ful
amount of the delinauency. The amount shown above represents three payments and
thrae late charges. Additonal expense will be incurred shortly, if the account is not
paid current.
If funds to cover these payments are not forthcoming immediately, it is our intention
to turn your file over to our attorney for foreclosure proceedings.
This is our last written communication with you prior to foreclosure.
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And, adding further weight behind Mr. Yelenik's statement the
USC Default Study also found that mortgagees do not generally initiate
discussions on forbearance when dealing with defaulting mortgagors.
Converstations with individual mortgagee employees indicate
that at present only the mortgagor who seeks relief receives
it. Mortgagors could be informed of this option but few
mortgagors have the skill and determination required to
negotiate a forbearance, especially when the mortgagee is
out-of-town and disinterested.3
Thus, in summary, based upon the preceding analysis, there are
several reasons why mortgage servicers do not use HUD's relief measures.
*Inability of mortgagors to push for relief measures, since they
are not supplied with information;
*Servicers not accurately determining the reason for default and
therefore fewer mortgagors are thought to be in default for reasons
beyond their control than is actually the case;
*Disruption of cash flow and change in yield;
*Perception by servicers that it is costly to execute a forbearance
or recasting agreement;
*MBA and FNMA defining forbearance and recasting in a different
way than HUD.
However, these provide only a partial explanation concerning why
HUD-approved relief measures are not used more often.
3U.S.C. Default Study, op. cit. p. 13.
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6. ABSENCE OF POSITIVE INCENTIVES TO GRANT RELIEF; EXISTENCE OF POSITIVE
INCENTIVES TO NOT GRANT RELIEF; AND ABSENCE OF NEGATIVE SANCTIONS IF RE-
LIEF IS NOT GRANTED:
While this reads like a tongue-twister, these are the key reasons
why mortgagees do not jump at every opportunity to grant relief to
defaulting mortgagors. As a background to this discussion, the work
of Kenneth Arrow on Risklessness and Motives is relevant.
a) Risklessness and Motives: Kenneth Arrow's Analysis:
If a person has little at stake in a given venture, he may have
a tendency to work for success with less conviction than if he had a
great deal at stake. Kenneth Arrow has- explored the relationship
between risk and probable success in relation to various economic
activities. In an essay entitled "Insurance, Risk and Resource
Allocation" he writes:
In a capitalist world.. .the owner of a business typically is
supposed to assume all the risks of uncertainty, paying out
the unexpected losses and enjoying the unexpected gains. But
society has long recognized the need for permitting him to shed
some of the risks. A man's capacity for running a business
well need not be accompanied by a desire or ability for bearing
the accompanying risks, and a series of institutions for shifting
risks has evolved. Insurance itself is an early and important
example of such an institution...
The possibility of shifting risk, of insurance in the broadest
sense, permits individuals to engage in risky activities which
they would not otherwise undertake. 1
1Kenneth I. Arrow, Essays in the Theory of Risk Bearing. (Chicago:
Markham Publishing Co., 1971) p. 135, 137.
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According to Arrow, this is a positive function of insurance,
since it enables and encourages innovation.
If risks cannot be shifted then very possibly none of the pro-
jects (i.e. risky and innovative) will be undertaken; if they
can be, then each individaul investor, by diversification, can
be fairly sure of a positive out ome, and society will be better
off by the increased production.
Given the productivity that can result from this ability to shift
and share risks, why aren't more economic activities subject to insurance.
Arrow poses the question:
Suppose that we could introduce into the economic system any
institutions we wish for shifting risk instead of being con-
fined to those developed historically. Why has the economic
system not developed a more completely adequate set of markets
for risk bearing?
He goes on to answer his own question with the following explanation,
noting that while there are several reasons:
... the factor known as the "moral hazard" is perhaps the most
important. The insurance policy might itself change incentives
and therefore the probabilities upon which the insurance company
has relied. Thus, a fire insurance policy for more than the
value of the premises might be an inducement to arson or at least
to carelessness. 4
Arrow further explains that if the motives of the insured are to
reduce loss, then the insurance company is out of danger. However, by
not knowing what the human motives are, the insurance company is left
2Ibid.
3Ibid. p. 141.
4Ibid. p. 142.
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in a position of having incomplete information on which it must assess
its risks. As a result:
Either he will refrain from insuring or he will resort to
direct inspection and control, to make as certain as he can
that the insured is minimizing all losses under the latter's
control.5
Summary of Arrow's Argument on Risk:
1) No risk by insured = possibility of negative behavior depending
upon motives of insured.
2) No risk by insured + motive of insured to minimize loss = con-
sistency between motives of insurer and insured.
3) No risk by insured + motive of insured not to minimize loss = in-
consistency between motives of insurer and insured.
But: Motives of Insured cannot always be known by insurer.
Therefore insurer will:
A) Not insure, or
B) Exert close control over the situation which has been insured.
Several important questions emerge from.Arrow's analysis that are
relevant to this discussion:
(1) Does FHA insurance provide mortgagees with a totally risk-
free investment? If so, what are the effects of this risklessness on
mortgage lending decisions and servicing?
5Ibid. p. 143.
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(2) What are the motives of mortgagees and servicers? Do they
have consistent interests with FHA? (i.e. to avoid foreclosure)
Thus, two independent variables must be considered: Risklessness
and Motives. By itself, risklessness is not, according to Arrow,
detrimental to the goals of the insuring agency. Only when risklessness
is accompanied by conflicting motives does a potentially dangerous situa-
tion arise. After briefly assessing the risk to mortgagees and servicers
using FHA insurance, the issue of mortgagee motives and their desire to
avoid foreclosure will be analyzed.
.b) Risk of Foreclosure to Mortgagees and Servicers:
The FHA-insured mortgage provides the mortgagee with a virtually
risk-free investment. First, since 1964 FHA has had the option of
making claims on foreclosures in cash. Previously, FHA had made
settlements only with debentures, a note which carried an interest
rate which was somewhat lower than the interest rate of the mortgage.
Second, while FHA pays only two-thirds of foreclosure costs, it is
possible for mortgagees to inflate their real costs thereby making
certain that FHA reimburses them for all, rather than only two-thirds,
of the costs of foreclosure. However, this writer found no evidence
that this, in fact, was a common or widespread practice.6
6For example, Kenneth Anderson noted that: "While it is possible
for mortgagees to blow up their foreclosure costs, most don't." Inter-
view, Kenneth Anderson, op. cit.
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In addition to the possibility of incurring some foreclosure
costs, mortgagees claim to detest foreclosure because of the red-tape
involved, bad public relations and simply not having any desire to be
in the real estate business.
Thus, while there does appear to be some tangible risk to the
mortgagee, it is also clear that this risk is minimal. Similarly, the
mortgage servicer also has a minimal risk. The MBA claims that while
a majority of mortgage companies lose money on originations, almost
all firms make money on servicing. A 1972 survey of mortgage companies
disclosed that:
To offset the losses on originating single-family loans, it is
fortunate that almost all mortgage banking firms report a net
income on servicing these loans - 163 out of the 166 firms in
this study. The 96 firms reporting an origination loss require
5.4 years on average to recover the loss. 7
Thus, for those servicers who lose money on origination, the fees
collected through servicing are critical to their survival. However,
it is important to point out that a HUD study on origination costs
did not agree with the findings of the MBA study. In contrast, HUD
found that:
Origination losses were reported by only 23 of the 98 firms
we audited. We found an average net gain of $102 per loan
7Mortgage Bankers Association of America, Research Committee
Operations Report No. 3, "Mortgage-Banking Survey of Single-Family
Loan Operations 1972: Income and Costs for Origination and Servicing
of Single Family Loans" 1974, p. 6.
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for all firms instead of a loss; and only a $56 average loss
per loan for the 23 firms reporting losses. 8
Thus, there is a basic disagreement whether servicing is needed to
offset origination losses. But even if no loss occurs at origination,
servicing fees are still an important source of the mortgage companies'
operating income and a foreclosed loan results in a reduced cash flow.
In addition, if a given investor's servicing portfolio is consistently
running a high foreclosure rate, a mortgage company may have difficulty
placing future loans with that investor. Yet, in spite of this, the
risks to both servicers and mortgagees of foreclosure are minimal.
Extending Arrow's analysis to the present discussion, it is clear
that by enabling the mortgagee to assume almost no risk, HUD-FHA has
opened the possibility of negative behavior on the part of mortgagees.
Logically, and according to prudent mortgage lending practice, it has
generally been assumed that the motives of the insured, the mortgagee,
are consistent with those of HUD-FHA -- to avoid foreclosure. Based
on this assumption, HUD-FHA has neither refused to insure, nor exerted close
control over the situation which has been insured, as Arrow's theory
suggests. However, while the motives to avoid foreclosure may not be
terribly strong, the motives to foreclose can be tempting.
8HUD-Office of Audit, "Review and Analyses of Mortgagees' Costs
of Origination Services" 05-2-3001-0000, March 23, 1973, p. 27.
-369-
c) Mortgagees and Motives:
The FHA insurance mechanism was intended to help Depression-scared
lenders regain confidence in mortgage investments. As discussed in
Chapter 3, this goal was realized. However, there is now evidence that
points to the fact that some mortgagees look to FHA insurance for more
than protection against risk: FHA insurance has enabled certain un-
scrupulous lenders to originate loans that are destined for an early
foreclosure. In addition, some lenders, either directly or through
their servicers, have been reluctant to assist defaulting mortgagors
because of the possibility of a windfall profit at the time of fore-
closure.
Since most FHA insured loans are originated at a discount, the
mortgagee has less than the face value of the mortgage note invested.
Thus, if a $20,000 mortgage is originated at a five point discount,
the lender has only advanced $19,000. However, the FHA has insured
that loan at the time of origination for the full $20,000. Thus,
similar to Arrow's mythical man who insures his home against fire
for more than the home is worth, the lender is able to obtain in-
surance for more than the mortgage is worth.
The negative implications of this incentive -- which run counter
to the motives of the insurer, HUD-FHA,-- was spelled out in an inter-
view with a high HUD Central Office official:
The investor wants to foreclose. Within the first year he
can make a lot of money. That's why they don't forbear, re-
cast or anything else. Investors give originators the direc-
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tions to foreclose as soon as it's legally possible. No for-
bearance is offered or anything. We're all against this system,
but we can't do anything about it. If the buyer wants services
such as forbearance and lenient servicing and so forth, he has
to be willing to pay for it -- in terms of the market interest
rate -- rather than the lowered rate that he gets through FHA.
FHA people aren't paying for the services that conventional home
buyers are paying for. 9
But, in contrast to this sense of resignation, others have tried
to change the system. For example, Jack Blum, Assistant Counsel to
the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on
the Judiciary, exposed the negative incentives built into the discount
.system. Throughout over a thousand pages of testimony taken during
hearings in New York City, Mr. Blum questioned witness after witness on
the practices of originating bad loans in the hopes of gaining windfall
profits on early foreclosures.
The following is a sampling of the types of dialogues between Mr.
Blum and various witnesses before the Subcommittee. While the theme
in the following excerpts is repetitive it is, nevertheless, useful to
underscore the fact that the lucrative nature of early foreclosure is
widely acknowledged.
1) Mr. Blum: There is one point I would like to go over with you,
and that is the question of how it is possible, on a quick
foreclosure where there is enough of a discount for somebody
to make quite a bit of money, might it be profitable for some-
one to originate a bad loan or enough points to make money on
9Interview, Walter J. Stuart, Director, Policy Analysis and Develop-
ment Division, Housing Production and Mortgage Credit, HUD Central Office,
Washington, D.C., September 19, 1973.
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the yield to maturity? Is that something you have heard of
happening?
Mr. Lasurdo: (Executive Vice President, Green Point Savings
Bank, Brooklyn, N.Y.) Yes.
Mr. Blum: And the way that works is the quick recapture of the
discount. FHA pays off the loan at par and the loan is originated
at 90 or 92, is that correct?
Mr. Lasurdo: That is the way it works. 10
2) Mr. Blum: If the loan is foreclosed very quickly...the yield
to maturity increases sharply.
Mr. Katz (former Chairman of the Board, United Institutional
Servicing Corp., a mortgage co., New York, N.Y.). If the loan
is foreclosed in 1 year and it is a 7-percent loan and they
bought it at a 6-percent discount, the yield to maturity is
13 percent, less expenses and there are expenses. There is
a loss of interest and the loss on foreclosure.ll
Mr. Blum: There are expenses, but it is still a significantly
greater yield than perhaps could be obtained if the mortgage
ran through its term.
Mr. Katz: That depends on the price they pay for it. If they
bought it at 98, the answer would be no.
Mr. Blum: But, if the discount is deep enough, there is con-
siderable profit possibility.12
And, further,
Mr. Blum: Are there any financial institutions that participate
in this secondary market who have reputations for looking for
paper which is likely to be foreclosed?
Mr. Katz: I know of none.
10New York Antitrust Hearings, p. 765.
11By way of clarification, HUD pays two-thirds of the costs of
foreclosure. Thus, unless the real costs of foreclosure have been inflated
by the investor to recapture the lost one-third, there can be costs of fore-
closure. However, according to HUD no interest should be lost.
12New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit., p. 308.
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Mr. Blum: Are there any paper buyers looking for the highest
possible yield with no regard for quality whatsoever?
Mr. Katz: This was true in the past, not so true now, because
of the-problems with foreclosures in the State of New York...
The cost of foreclosure now, on some of the ghetto-type pro-
perties is so high that if you have foreclosure, there will
be a loss. This did not occur 5 or 6 years ago.
Mr. Blum: At that time, there were institutions that would go
into these areas looking for highest possible yields.
Mr. Katz: Right. 13
3) Mr. Blum: Would that seven- or eight-point discount have been
sufficient to insure that you would not lose money on a fore-
closure? That is, if you would recapture that discount and
other expenses of foreclosure?
Mr. Duncan: (Regional Vice-President, Northeastern Region, FNMA).
On that particular mortgage, with a 7- or 8-percent discount, my
assumption would be that we could recover, through the discount,
sufficient to offset all the losses that we would incur other-
wise...the fact that we have a discount does not, in itself,
mean that we make a profit on the mortgages that go into foreclosure.
I would say overall, on an average, we probably come out fairly
close to even when we consider the various types of mortgages in
foreclosure.
Mr. Blum: Is it true, that if legal costs escalate sharply, they
eat up the amount that you capture on yield to maturity, and
possibly put you in a loss position?
Mr. Duncan: Yes. Legal costs, foreclosure costs, add to the
question of whether we do or do not make any profit.
Mr. Blum: Do you think on balance that Fannie Mae will make or
lose money on the New York situation?
Mr. Duncan: I think on balance we would probably come out at least
even, or better. This is putj ly a guess. I do not have any basis
for it. It is only a guess.
13Ibid. p. 323-324.
14fbid. p. 541-542.
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And, further,
... we have tried to ascertain what our position is concerning
gains and losses on foreclosure. And we conducted two studies.
One assumption shows we made a little bit of money; one showed
that we lost a little bit of money.
We have concluded, overall, we do not lose money on foreclosures.
We break about even on total.15
The following example is illustrative of how a highly suspect
deal could end up being extremely lucrative for the mortgagee.
Mr. Blum: In your statement you mentioned that you required United
to buy back 12 loans that went into foreclosure without a single
payment being made. Would that not indicate that there were
serious problems with those loans, and at least the possibility
of fraud?
Mr. Duncan: I did not consider it fraud. I considered it
either that they had not done a good job of underwriting or
they had not done a good job of servicing...
Mr. Blum: Is the line between good job of underwriting and the
possibility of fraud rather a thin one?
Mr. Duncan: Well, I have never really been experienced in fraud
enough to know what the difference is. Buy my judgment was that
there was nothing wrong with the underwriting on these loans...
Mr. Blum: Were those loans repurchased by United at a discount?
Mr. Duncan: Yes, sir; at the same price that we paid for them.
Mr. Blum: Is it possible that the amount of the discount re-
covered by United more than paid whatever expenses they might
have incurred in foreclosure.
Mr. Duncan: It is possible, yes, sir.
Mr. Blum: So they might very well have come out ahead on that
transaction?
Mr. Duncan: It is possible, yes, sir.16
15Ibid. p. 555-556.
16Ibid. p. 550.
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In addition to the above testimony which reveals how mortgagees can
make substantial profits on discounted loans which go into early foreclosure,
many HUD employees interviewed had also heard of "bad" mortgages being
originated.
For example, Thomas Clendenon of the Louisville HUD Area Office
stated that:
I know that mortgage companies originate bad loans. There's
also a possibility that some investors like buying bad loans.
I've heard that it happens.17
Also talking about Louisville, David Goss noted:
I'm quite certain that mortgage companies do originate bad loans
and that there are badinvestors who buy them. Some mortgage
companies have a failure rate that's so high that they couldn't
have done it unintentionally.18
And, Val Garcia of the Los Angeles HUD Area Office said that:
There have been two or three mortgagees who were making money on
foreclosure and purposely originating bad loans. 19
Lucille Henderson, of the Kansas City HUD Area Office, remarked that:
I've heard that mortgagees originate bad loans just for the points.
But I haven't come across this in my own experience. 20
Similarly, many mortgagees interviewed were familiar with the practice
of originating "bad" loans and of foreclosing quickly in order to cash in on
17Interview, Thomas Clendennon op. cit.
18Interview, David Goss, Loan Management Officer, HUD Area Office,
Louisville, Ky., Febrriary 11, 1974 (telephone).
19Interview, Val Garcia, op. cit.
20Interview, Lucille Henderson, op. cit.
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the points. A Louisville mortgage banker noted that:
I don't think we would follow the practice of originating bad
stuff on purpose. I suspect that the GNMA auction is for that
purpose. If an investor buys a loan that is in default, he won't
let it be reinstated, no matter what. On cases where we do make
money on foreclosures, we make a little bit -- not alot. Just a
couple of hundred dollars -- particularly it it's foreclosed within
a reasonable length of time.21
Particularly striking on this point were the comments of a Richmond,
Virginia, mortgage banker:
We had once thought of getting together the worst VA mortgages
that we could -- hoping that at least half would foreclose.22
The above comments suggest that forbearance would be less likely to
be used on deep-discounted loans. More explicitly, Eric Brestrup, a FNMA
official in Washington, observed that:
FNMA tries to instill a willingness on the part of its servicers
to forbear on deserving cases. However, on a foreclosure, an
investor can make money. Th'ere is no incentive to go the for-
bearance route either by the investor or the seller-servicer.23
And, John Waner, Director of the Chicago Area Office of HUD, in
testimony before the Illinois Legislative Investigating Commission went
so far as to state that:
... Under FHA, let me say that the average lender, because he knows
his mortgage is insured by the Government, which will reimburse his
losses, he is more inclined to speed up foreclosure. He is less
inclined to be tolerant with this individual who, through one cir-
cumstance or another, may be delinquent on his mortgage payments.
21Interview, Harold Dickson, op. cit.
22Interview, Stuart Blanton, op. cit.
23Interview, Eric Brestrup, FNMA Central Office, Washington, D.C.,September 19, 1973.
-376-
In a recent study by my office, instituted by me, I have seen that
invariably the lender who utilizes FHA for the purpose of guaranteeing
his bank against any losses, he accelerates, putting it into legal
processes where if it is a coventional loan, he will exercise more
tolerance and spend more time with the individual to try to make his
loan more current.
But if this party came in and said, "Look I can't pay July's
but I can pay June's" they say it is just too bad. You are
Federally insured and we are going to get our dough from Uncle Sam.
And they don't give him a break. But if it is conventional, they
will go along with him, carry him for a month or two or eight or 24
ten. But they don't do that with FHA. They take it and unload it.
Director Waner further observed in recent newspaper articles:
Some cash-hungry lending institutions are going out of their way to
foreclose their government-backed mortgages and force families from
their homes so they can collect the money from the United States
Treasury immediately and loan it out again. 25
In addition to there being an opportunity to make money on a
foreclosure by getting a reimbursement from HUD for the face value,
rather than the discounted value of the loan, Stan Goodrow of the Kislak mortgage
company pointed out that forbearance would be unattractive for another reason:
On a low interest rate loan, we would not be inclined to go into
forbearance.. .I won't say that investors haven't pushed for for-
closure.26
Thus, a low interest loan is particularly unattractive to an investor
when current interest rates have increased and the foreclosure proceeds can
be channeled into new, higher yielding investments.
Fortunately, however, many investors and mortgage bankers would
not tolerate these kinds of practices, as typified by the response of
a Boston area Savings and Loan officer:
24Illinois Mortgage Practices Commission Report, Chicago, Illinois, 1974.
25Ibid. p. 55. Quoted from Chicago Tribune, September 26, 1974, p.l.
26Interview, Stan Goodrow, op. cit.
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A broker called me saying, "I've got some bad stuff -- they're
sure to foreclose within a few months. Do you want any?" I
told him to go fuck himself. 27
But the general lack of willingness to forbear because of the possibility
of a lucrative foreclosure was identified as early as 1967 in HUD's report
on mortgage discounts.
Large discounts may offer a temptation to some lenders to intiate
foreclosure during the early life of a mortgage when forbearance
might preserve an owner's home and avoid a loss to be absorbed by
FHA or VA. Where discounts are small or non-existent, this incen-
tive is absent because there is no windfall to be captured.
We are confident that this is not a widespread problem, and our
outstanding instructions admonish our field offices to do every-
thing possible to help save the home of a mortgagor who is in
temporary financial straits. The overwhelming majority of re-
sponsible lenders are equally concerned that this approach be
applied. 28
-Nevertheless, the report went on to note that it was "drafting
legislative language that would authorize the removal of the 'windfall'
temptations in the event such action appears desirable in the future."
Unfortunately, however, no legislation to this effect has ever been
passed. 29
More recently, another HUD report echoed the findings of the
report quoted above.
...the discount system results in the mortgagee investing less
than the full face amount of the mortgage. The discount repre-
sents additional interest to the mortgagee amortized over the
term of the mortgage. When a mortgage is foreclosed and HUD re-imburses the mortgagee for the outstanding mortgage indebtedness,
27Interview, C.L. Gildroy,- Northeast Federal Savings and Loan
Association, Watertown, Mass.
28A Report by the Department of Housing and Urban Development "Mortgage
Discounts" February, 1967, p. 22.
29Ibid.
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the mortgagee collects for the discount which has not been earned
(amortized). Under these circumstances, we believe that the dis-
count system works counter to HUD-FHA's efforts to encourage mort-
gagees to avoid foreclosure by trying to work out a plan with the
mortgagor to bring the mortgage to a current status. 30
Based upon this finding, the report recommended legislation to correct
the possibility of abuse. The report went on:
The Secretary has recently established more realistic maximum
interest rates on insured mortgages to approximate money market
conditions. If the adjusted rates do not substantially eliminate
discount points, we recommend that the Secretary establishes regu-
lations or, if necessary, propose legislation to permit HUD to
reduce its payment of early foreclosure claims by the amount of
loan discount (points) that remains unamortized on any mortgage
foreclosed within, say, three years of loan origination. 31
Yet, at this writing, three years after the issuance of HUD's second report,
the situation remains unchanged. Positive incentives for mortgagees to
foreclose still exist and neither positive incentives for compliance nor
negative sanctions for non-compliance with HUD's relief measures have
been instituted on a widespread basis. Yet, HUD has been making some
efforts toward controlling problematic mortgagee behavior in the default
as well as during the pre-purchase period. After a brief review of HUD's and FNMA's
regulatory authority over mortgagees, HUD's recent efforts at curbing
mortgagee activities will be examined.
30All Homes Audit p. cit. p. 54-55.
31 Ibid.
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7) HUD'S REGULATION OF MORTGAGEES:
As mentioned in Chapter 6 HUD is the only agency with major regula-
tory powers over mortgage companies, the major lender in the HUD-FHA home
programs. In view of the non-compliance with HUD guidelines among mort-
gagees, particularly related to the default situation, but also during
the pre-purchase period (as discussed in Chapter 8, Section lc) it is
important to review how HUD has supervised mortgagees.
Briefly, a mortgagee must receive HUD approval before it may
either originate or purchase an FHA-insured mortgage. In the case of
financial institutions that are supervised by another Federal body, such
as the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, approval is virtually automatic.
However, in the case of non-supervised institutions, such as mortgage
companies, HUD requires documentation pertaining to the mortgagees'
financial soundness and has the prime responsibilty for overseeing its
activities.
Accompanying HUD's authority to approve mortgagees, it also has
power to withdraw approval, thereby prohibiting mortgagees from either
originating, holding, or servicing FHA-insured mortgages. (See Appendix 10-1
for detailed information on HUD's approval and dis-approval criteria
and requirements.)
While HUD's supervision of non-supervised mortgagees appears to
have reached a low pcint by 1973-1974, there is evidence that by 1975,
HUD had begun to take some positive and aggressive steps toward controlling
problematic mortgagee behavior. This section will briefly review how
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HUD supervised mortgagees during the early 1970's and Section 9
will then go on to discuss some of the recent steps that HUD has taken
to try to correct the various problems in mortgagee procedures.
HUD's Supervision of Mortgagees -- Early 1970's:
During late 1973 two independent reports disclosed severe problems
in HUD's monitoring procedures of mortgagees. One was prepared by HUD's
own audit department (All Homes Audit) and the other was the result of
an investigation launched by the Comptroller General of the U.S. (Non
Supervised Mortgagee Report).
- The All Homes Audit concluded that there was a nationwide problem
of deficiencies and irregularities in FHA loan processing activities by
HUD-FHA approved mortgagees due, primarily, to a laxity in HUD's super-
vision. Specifically:
The problem (mortgagee deficiencies) has developed due to rapid
growth in the mortgage banking industry while the loan origination
and mortgage servicing activities of mortgagees concurrently have
been subjected to less and less supervision by the insuring and
investing segments of the industry...supervision by HUD/FHA, FNMA
and private segments of the mortgage banking industry has sub-
stantially declined over the past years.1
Organizationally, the HUD field offices have been responsible for
making recommendations for mortgagee approval to Central Office and for
monitoring mortgagee servicing. However, the Comptroller General's Report
found that criteria for mortgagee approval were inconsistent among the
eight field offices examined.
IAll Homes Audit, op. cit. p. 43-44.
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HUD's careful review and appraisal of its three basic requirements
for prospective mortgagees -- assest quality, capital adequacy, and
the ability of the applicants to administer a mortgage operation --
are of paramount importance.
Although HUD field offices were not consistently verifying these
requirements, the Mortgagee Approval Officer was basing his recom-
mendation.for approving or disapproving a prospective mortgagees'
application on an assumption that the offices had verified the
requirements. The field offices failed because HUD headquarters
had not issued detailed procedures specifying how the offices were
to verify the information supplied by mortgagees applying for
approval status. 2
And, concerning the monitoring of servicing, field office reviews
have not been a common procedure. On-site reviews of mortgagees' loan
servicing practices have generally been in response to a specific problem,
such as a mortgagor complaintrather than as a routine control mechanism.3
HUD Central Office has been in charge of overseeing mortgagee
origination activities and has final authority for approving and disapproving
mortgagees. The Mortgagee Approval Officer in the Central Office is the
major contact person for mortgagees. His duties include approving mort-
gagee applications; processing changes in any mortgagees' status, such
as change of address; and analyzing annual audits of non-supervised
mortgagees. However, the All Homes Audit concluded that these activities:
2Non Supervised Mortgagee Report, op. cit. p. 14.
3 All Homes Audit, _.. cit. p. 88.
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Do not provide adequate surveillance of mortgagees' activities
since they do not provide on-site evaluations of the primary
functions of loan processing and loan servicing practices of
the HUD-approved mortgagees...(Furthermore) the Mortgagee
Approval Office has not been performing this limited surveillance
on a current basis because of a shortage in staff. On March 1,
1973, the Mortgagee Approval Office had a backlog of about 1,370
unanalyzed financial statements. This backlog consisted of
practically all statements received since January, 1972.4
Interviews with staff of the Mortgagee Approval Office in late
1973 and early 1974 also disclosed that seemingly basic record keeping
on mortgagees was not being performed. For example, no precise data
existed on mortgagees -- either supervised or non-supervised. Estimates
by HUD personnel on the number of HUD approved mortgagees ranged from
1700-1800 non-supervised institutions to 25,000-30,000 - supervised
institutions. Furthermore, that office kept no records on mortgagee
approvals or disapprovals. J.M. Hurtt, the Mortgagee Approval Officer
as of September 1973, estimated that there had been over 100 terminations
in the past year and perhaps between 100 and 900 cumulative. However,
he added that he really had "no idea" about the total number of mort-
gagee terminations and the reasons, he said, varied greatly. 5
4Ibid. p. 90.
5Interviews, J.M Hurtt, Mortgagee Approval Officer September 19, 1973.
-Washington D.C. and Mr. Hall, Management Analyst, May, 1974, Washington, D.C.
The estimated 1700-1800 non-supervised mortgagees does not include the over
4300 related branches of these institutions. (Non Supervised Mortgagee
Report p. 6). In addition, the Non Supervised Mortgagee Report stated that
there were 1,587 non supervised mortgagees' main offices and 11,593 super-
vised mortgagees' main offices and 14,775 related branches as of August, 1972
p. 6.
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Although a mortgagee may lose its HUD approval for "failure to
conduct its business in accordance with good business practices and
accepted standards of conduct"6 the "All Homes Audit" found that:
HUD applies adverse actions against mortgagees primarily in
accordance with the suspension and debarment procedures...
of the Code of Federal Regulations. These procedures state
that suspension is a drastic action t&ken when there is
suspicion of fraud or other criminal conduct...HUD has not
established a readily enforceable procedure for taking adverse
action against mortgagees which perform inadequate processing
or inadequate loan servicing but have not committed violations
that can be proven in court to be criminal. 7
Evidence that HUD is reluctant to use suspension as a penalty
comes from the Comptroller General's Report, which found that for the
5 months ending July 1972, out of 53 mortgagees who were not
complying with HUD rules and regulations, less than half (22)
had lost their status as approved mortgagees, while only another 18
were even threatened with suspension or termination. 8
Thus, the report concluded that:
HUD should have been more forceful and consistent in exercising
its authority for suspending or terminating the approval status
of HUD-approved mortgages for non-compliance with HUD rules and
regulations.
It is interesting to note that while the Comptroller General's Report
lists a variety of reasons for the threatened or actual suspensions,
none of the reasons cited dealt with mortgage non-compliance with HUD's
6 HUD Handbook 4000.2 op. cit. p. 3-6.
7All Homes Audit op. cit. p. 89.
8Non Supervised Mortgagee Report op. cit. p. 45-47.
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guidelines for dealing with mortgagors in default.9
Further evidence of the infrequent use of suspension as a disci-
plinary action comes from the Office of Loan Management. Fred W.
Pfaender, Director of that office, stated that between 1969 and
mid-May 1975, 78 mortgagees had been suspended, with 69 still sus-
pended but, of those, he did not know how many had been suspended
because of servicing.10
Thus, up until the mid-1970's suspension was used only as a
drastic measure, perhaps not even for non-compliance with servicing
guidelines. The latter half of this decade may, however, see a
change in HUD's willingness to discipline uncooperative mortgagees.
Before going on to examine HUD's recent efforts at supervising mort-
gagees, it is appropriate to briefly review FNMA's regulatory responsi-
bilities in relation to mortgagees.
9Non Supervised Mortgagee Report, op. cit. p. 45-48. Reasons for
suspensions or threats included: failure to submit the required annual
certified financial statements; failure to pay mortgage insurance premiums;
misrepresentations in sales transactions, and net worth deficits.
10Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations,
"Mortgage Servicing and HUD Property Management" House of Representatives, 94th.
Cong. 1st. Sess. July, September and October, 1975. p. 22.
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8. FNMA'S REGULATION OF MORTGAGEES:
Similar to HUD, FNMA retains the right to suspend or terminate servicers
that do not comply with its servicing standards or that are in violation
of the servicing contract. However, rather than suspension or termination,
a common path for FNMA to take with a problematic servicer is to impose
"close supervision."' In this way,FNMA has an opportunity to closely
monitor the servicer's activities, particularly those which may be the
basis for termination of the Servicing Agreement. 2
Oakley Hunter, President and Chairman of the Board of FNMA has
emphasized FNMA's rights with regard to suspension or termination of
servicers. In April of 1972 he warned that:
FNMA customers who abuse the (Government housing) programs may
lose the right to do business with FNMA. 3
Thus, while FNMA's official policy is to take harsh steps with any
servicer found to be in non-compliance with FNMA's servicing standards,
similiar to HUD, it has generally chosen not to do so.
The Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations found
that:
In Detroit...despite the high rate of defaults experienced by many
mortgagees, neither FHA nor FNMA has acted to suspend mortgagees
for building up excessive numbers of defaulted mortgages in their
portfolios.
IFNMA Servicer's Guide, op. cit. p. 3.
2Ibid. p. 2.
3FNMA Press Release, April 13, 1972. Fifteenth Report By the Committee
on Government Operations, op. cit. p. 19.
4Ibid.
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Similar to the findings of the Committee on Government Operations,
the All Homes Audit found that supervision of mortgagees by FNMA had
declined markedly:
Up to about eight years ago mortgagees which participated as
permanent mortgage investors, including the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA), involved themselves in assuring
that originating mortgagees determined the mortgagor's credit
to be sound and the underlying property to provide good
security...
For example, FNMA has eliminated its internal underwriting re-
view of FHA insured mortgages and reduced its audits of mort-
gagees. 8
Further evidence of FNMA's laxity in supervision and reluctance to act
in a hard nosed way toward servicers is found in the testimony of Kenneth
A. Duncan, before the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly.
While Mr. Duncan acknowledged that several problem laden mortgage com-
panies in his region had recently been suspended from making further
sales to FNMA, his testimony demonstrates a willingness on the part
of FNMA to cajole even the most suspect servicer.
8All Homes Audit, op. cit. p. 87. The audit also noted that:
"Private investors have continued to reduce their supervision through
audits and on-site reviews of originating mortgagees because of the
risk-free reliance they place upon FHA mortgage insurance." Further-
more other Federal financial regulatory agencies have also been abdicating
their supervisory responsibilities. "Officials of the Comptroller
of the Currency and of the Home Loan Bank Board informed us that their
audits of banks and savings and loan institutions (supervised mortgagees)
limit their review of mortgage origination practices to a determination
of institutional policies because FHA insurance covers all of the risk
involved." The problem of Federal regulatory agencies not using their
powers to their maximum extent was discussed in Chapter 3. This issue is
also relevant to the problem of discrimination in mortgage lending, such
as red-lining.
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Mr. Blum: As I understand your statement, Fannie Mae has had
a history of problems with United Institutional servicing dating
back to 1968; is that correct?
Mr. Duncan: Yes, sir; I think that's correct.
Mr. Blum: And Mr. Katz, the chairman of United, told you as early
as October 1969, that United felt it had no responsibility for
quality of the loans that originated? Is that correct?
Mr. Duncan: Yes, sir.
Mr. Blum: Did you report any of the ongoing difficulties with
United to the Washington office of Fannie Mae?
Mr. Duncan: I don't recall making any special reports to them;
no sir.. .9
Mr. Blum: When was United's bidding privilege suspended?
Mr. Duncan: We never did suspend United's bidding privilege.
Mr. Blum: Perhaps I'm a little confused here. Did they voluntarily
withdraw? Was that it? Did they agree not to bid at a certain
point in time?
Mr. Duncan: Actually, when they asked for the last 60 days
extended time, they said they would refrain from bidding in the
auction system on their own. My understanding of this - and this
is an assumption - was that Mr. Katz preferred not to have a
suspension of the company when he was trying to sell, because
this might have impaired his capability of selling.
Mr. Blum: Technically, there was no suspension, and you knew that
the company was bound to be sold and that would have simply
scrambled up the ability to sell?
Mr. Duncan: That's right, sir.
Mr. Blum: They were put on probation, however, is that correct?
Mr. Duncan: Yes, sir...
Mr. Blum: Was the servicing taken away by Fannie Mae?...
9New York Antitrust Hearings, op. cit. p. 547.
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Mr. Duncan: No, sir...
Mr. Blum: In other words, the situation was that you had re-
peatedly said to United, "Look, this servicing record is not
very good. You are going to have to improve it." And the
response was, "If we cannot improve it, we will sell it."
Is this correct?
Mr. Duncan: Yes, this is correct.
Mr. Blum: Finally, it was sold; is that correct?
Mr. Duncan: Yes...
Mr. Blum: Could you have suspended the servicing contract with
United and transferred it to another company without paying
United anything?
Mr. Duncan: It is possible. But I could not have. It is possible
that Fannie Mae could have. I do not recall, after about 12
years of being with Fannie Mae, that we have iny luntarily taken
a portfolio away from anybody and then sold it.
While FNMA requires that servicers will not foreclose "until every
11
reasonable effort has been made to arrive at some other solution, as
of July, 1975 FNMA had never suspended a servicer solely for failure to
undertake proper forbearance action. 12
Yet, Oakley Hunter openly admitted before the Manpower and Housing
Subcommittee that "there probably have been from time to time cases
where our servicers have moved rather rapidly" 13 and that overall,
"the supervision of servicers can be stepped up." 1 4
10 ibid. p. 548-549.
11FNMA Servicer's Guide Sec. 129.01, op. cit. p. 35.
12
"Mortgage Servicing and HUD Property Management" op. cit. p.65.
13Ibid. p. 68.
14Ibid. p. 79.
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One way that FNMA might be able to improve its supervision would
be to spot-check the servicers' recommendations for foreclosure.
FNMA's almost automatic acceptance of a servicer's recommendation
to foreclose is a key way in which FNMA could improve its procedures.
Joseph C. Luman, Staff Director on the Manpower and Housing Sub-
committee noted that:
Some of those (forms sent in by servicers recommending foreclosure)
I looked at had brief comment sections. It was pretty hard to tell
whether the loan had been serviced. There would be a statement that
the mortgagor had overextended and couldn't make his payments, but
you couldn't tell from the comments in the brief section of the 15form whether he had been hustling or if the servicer was really trying.
While Oakley Hunter acknowledged that spot-checking on a case by
case basis would be costly, he also agreed that "it should be done even
if it is going to cost more money." 16
A final critique of FNMA's regulatory activities comes from a
massive study of mortgage lending in Illionois. The Illionois Mort-
gage Practices Commission found that FNMA has not been carrying out its
regulatory responsibilities to its maximum capacity:
It is apparent that despite the information regularly reported to
FNMA about delinquencies and abandonments, FNMA has not chosen to
either make such information public or to promulgate and enforce
standards for the FHA mortgage servicers it does business with.
Contrasting the sanctions against servicers that FNMA has, with the
lack of effective sanctions against servicers that FHA possesses,
it is apparent to the Commission that FNMA has failed to effectively
deal with FHA servicing problems, which are beyond the regulatory
authority of FHA, as it is presently defined. Therefore, much of
the blame for the poor administration of the FHA insured housing
programs must fall on FNMA. 1 7
15Ibid. p. 75.
16Ibid. p. 78.
17Illinois Mortgage Practices Commission Report, Chapter V,
"Report on FHA-Insured Lending in Illinois." 1975, p. 67.
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Based upon the above findings, the Commission asked:
FNMA to assume the regulatory responsibilities that it has failed
to exercise for several years. 18
More specifically, the Commission urged the Governer of Illinois to
request that FNMA begin to:
a) make available to the public the future foreclosure rates of every
FHA approved mortgagee with which it does business.
b) refuse to buy FHA mortgages from any FHA seller/servicer with
an unreasonable rate of foreclosure among its FHA loans.
c) promulgate detailed servicing standards for FHA servicers and
strictly monitor such standards for compliance.19
Clearly, FNMA is in a pivotal position vis a vis servicers. It has
an enormous amount of power and should be able to wield it to require
tighter compliance with its servicing standards.
18Ibid. p. 72.
19Ibid. p. 72.
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9. 1975-1976: HUD EFFORTS AT REGULATING MORTGAGEES: RHETORIC OR ACTION?
During the spring and summer of 1975 HUD officials not only began
acknowledging the mortgagee abuses and non-compliance with HUD guidelines,
but also began to take steps toward correcting the problems. HUD's
actions were, probably to a large extent, prompted by the pressure of
citizens groups and Congress. 2  In addition, several court cases have
revolved around mortgagee unwillingness to follow HUD's guidelines re-
lated to default. (See Appendix 10-2)
In a recent court-case in Chicago (Johnnie D. Brown vs. Lynn and
Mortgage Associates) HUD was even named as a.co-defendant along with
the mortgage company. U.S. District Court Judge Herbert L. Will, in
charge of hearing the case, faulted HUD for catering to mortgage
companies rather than to low-income homeowners. Judge Will further
stated that:
Contrary to its statutory obligation, HUD has forced foreclosures
rather than taking action to prevent them... If HUD had consciously
and deliberately set out to frustrate the Congressional purpose
and sabotage the program, (235 program) it could have hardly dons
so more effectively -- short of simply refusing to carry it out.
In the wake of these criticisms, Secretary of HUD Carla A. Hills
launched a program to sharpen the monitoring of mortgagees. The first
See, for example, 1975-1976 issues of Disclosure, published by the
National Training and Information Center, Chicago. (Formerly known as the
Housing Training and Information Center.)
2See, for example, "Mortgage Servicing and HUD Property Management,"
9p. cit. and Hearings Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, "Housing Management, Foreclosures ahd Abandonments" U.S. Senate,
94th. Cong. 1st. Sess., July, 1975, Chicago, Illinois.
3Statement reprinted in Community Plannina Report Vol. 1, No. 14,
October 31, 1974, Washington, D.C. (See Appendix 10-3 for various materials
relating to Brown vs. Lynn et.al. and for HUD's new approach to relief fordefaulting mortgagors.)
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step the Secretary took was to establish a four-member "Mortgage Review
Board" with the power to revoke the approval status of mortgagees.
(Prior to this the FHA Commissioner had the ultimate authority for sus-
pensions and terminations -- See Appendix 10-4.)
Less than two months after its creation, on October 31, 1975, the
Mortgagee Review Board suspended Advance Mortgage Company (AMC), the
nation's second largest mortgage banker, for 30 days. Basing their
decision on data collected in an investiaation which has still not
been released by HUD, the board cited "widespread violations of HUD's
policies and procedures regarding the origination, servicing, and post-
foreclosure treatment of FHA-insured mortgages." 4
In what has been called a "precedent setting action" 5 HUD not only
ordered a 30-day suspension of all origination activities; placed the
mortgage company on probation for 180 days; ordered a reimbursement of
$145,000 for excessive charges in connection with the servicing of
FHA-insured loans; but also cancelled FHA insurance on all loans on
which false information had been give by AMC between January 1, 1974
and December 31, 1975 and which had either been foreclosed or would go
into foreclosure by December 31, 1979.
4Housing and Development Reporter - Vol. 3, No. 12, November 3, 1975,
p. 537. The report citing these mortgagee abuses is known as the "Moss
Report."
5Ibid. Vol. 3, No. 16, December 29, 1975, p. 723.
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Voiding the insurance on an FHA insured mortgage, thereby
shifting the responsibility for the worth of the property back to
the mortgagee and forcing him to assume a full measure of risk, is
a powerful "stick" that HUD has at its disposal for forcing mortgagees
to comply with its regulations and requirements. It is encouragina
that HUD is willing to use this important and potent disciplinary
action -- although it is clearly a "last resort" response to what must
have been major irregularities in AMC's activities. It is still too
early to judge whether the new Mortgagee Review Board's powers will be
used often, thereby creating an effective punishment for non-complying
mortgagees, or whether they will be used only as a means for HUD to
periodically display that it is doing something to force mortgagees to
follow its guidelines. Thus, the Mortgagee Review Board may become a real
watchdog over mortgagees, keeping the consumer's and HUD's interests
paramount, or it may only be used as a Dolitical device.
In addition to the creation of the Mortgagee Review Board, HUD
has also taken a series of other steps to improve the operating pro-
cedures of mortgagees. But, similar to the Mortgagee Review Board,
these actions are still too recent to provide any insight into how
broadly they will be used or how effective they will be. HUD has,
within the past year, instituted several measures that, if enforced,
would seem to be strcngly pro-consumer.
Testifying before the Manpower and Housing Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Government Operations in July, 1975, Robert C. Odle, Jr.,
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HUD Deputy Assistant Secretary for Housing Management stated that HUD
was requiring the following immediate steps:
A. Submission by each field office of a monthly report advising
of significant potential problem areas.
B. Spot-checking of credit and employment checks, required at
the mortgage origination stage.
C. Spot-checking of insured property condition at time of
transfer to HUD.
D. Spot-checking of claims submitted by mortgagees for reim-
bursement of property preservation.
In addition, Odle testified that, on a longer term basis, various
insurance and servicing activities would undergo scrutiny and, where
appropriate, revisions to existing procedures would be undertaken.
Among the areas to be studied included:
1. Clarification of standards for FHA-insured mortgage
servicing.
2. Clarification of underwriting and inspection standards for
originators of FHA mortgages.
3. Clarification of the responsibility of mortgagees to preserve
and protect FHA-insured properties during foreclosure proceedings.
4. Clarification of the sanctions applicable to mortgagees who
fail to meet HUD standards for servicing, property maintenance, and
origination.
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5. Improvement of HUD's capacities and procedures for monitoring
mortgagee compliance with HUD regulations and procedures.
6. Consideration of means to minimize the length of time during
which properties in foreclosure and HUD-acquired properties remain vacant.
7. Establishment of better lines of communication between borrowers
and lenders, including the possibility of requiring mortgagees to main-
tain a toll-free telephone number or to accept collect calls from
borrowers.
8. Finalizing a nationwide computer network which will provide
data on each FHA-insured mortgage and on the default rates of each
FHA-approved mortgagee. 6
While HUD has begun to implement some of the above measures, it
is both too early and beyond the scope of this thesis to assess how
effectively HUD will institute and monitor the new requirements. It is
encouraging that high HUD officials are trying to reverse problematic
origination and servicing procedures. But, on the other hand, HUD's
past record of acting on recommendations to improve its internal and
monitoring activities has been subject to criticism. A March,
6
"Mortgage Servicing and HUD Property Management" op. cit. p. 12-13,
In addition to the above nationally oriented efforts, in Chicago, every
property transferred to HUD is to be inspected and photographed by an
area manager or by HUD personnel within 5 days after the claim for FHA
insurance benefits.
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1976 report by the Committee on Government operations faulted HUD for
its "seeming unwillingness in the past to take corrective action."
Further,, the Committee found that:
Recommendations for improvement from internal and external sources
such as the Congress, the General Accounting Office, HUD's Inspector
General, and HUD field offices often have not been given the attention
they deserve. Consequently, reports critical of HUD seem to have a
quality of timeliness even when they are several years old. 8
There is no single reason which accounts for HUD's inaction. The
late 1960's reorganization of HUD;9 inadequate staffing; fraud and
11
abuses by HUD personnel; the inexperience of HUD staff in dealing
with a new type of mortgagor -- one with a lower income;l2 and a
sensitivity to the problems of mortgage servicers which is for greater
than its sensitivity to the problems of other groups13 provide plausible
explanations for HUD's unwillingness or inability to change and correct
its defective procedures. Whether or not HUD is now prepared to act
on its own recommendations for improving its internal and monitoring
operations of mortgagees is open to question. The issue deserves close
scrutiny.
7Nineteenth.Report by the Committee on Government Operations, op.
cit. p. 4.
8 Ibid. p.. 7.
9See, for example, Ibid. p. 4 and Horace B. Bazan. oD. cit.
10Nineteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations.
op. cit. p. 13-14, see also Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government
Operations. op. cit. p. 22-24.
Housing and Development Reporter Vol. 2, No. 24, p. 1185, April 21, 1975.
12Fifteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations. op. cit. p.19.
13Nineteenth Report by the Committee on Government Operations, p_.
cit. p. 18.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
The first part of this thesis explored the ways in which the
government has encouraged the participation of financial institutions
in mortgage lending by creating mechanisms that have reduced risk.
Specifically, SectiorsI and II assessed how the post-Depression recovery
measures -- HOLC, FHLBS, FNMA and, most important, the FHA, encouraged
financial institutions to become re-involved in mortgage lending by
shifting risk away from lenders by providing liquidity and minimizing
the possibility of losses due to foreclosure. Furthermore, the unique
characteristics of mortgage companies, the dominant lender in the HUD-
FHA home finance system, when combined with the riskless lending situation
that the government has created, have encouraged irresponsible decisions
on the part of some lenders. In addition, the multiple goals of the
homeownership programs -- to involve lenders and to achieve an array
of other social, political and economic objectives -- have also presented
some difficulties for consumers.
The multiple goals embodied in the Housing and Urban Development Act
of 1968 have also caused some problems. The political struggles which
prevented the creation of a new agency, the NHOF, to implement the socially
oriented homeownership programs may, in fact, have been more successful
than HUD has been. Furthermore, HUD Secretary Romney's intense desire
to prove that his agency could implement the programs certainly contributed
to the confusion over whether the emphasis in the homeownership programs
should be on insuring good quality homes or a large quantity of units;
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and this, in turn, contributed to a variety of problems in HUD's pre-
purchase procedures.
The second part of this thesis examined how, in the course of the
government's efforts at shifting risk away from lenders, it has shifted
the risk of mortgage lending onto itself. Section III analyzed the
numerous ways in which HUD has neglected to accept the responsibility
which is inherent in its risk taking position. Faulty appraisal and
inspection procedures; inadequate checks on the buyer's credit' almost
no controls at closing, insufficient monitoring of mortgagees; and a total
abdication of responsibility during mortgagor default -- all point to
the fact that HUD must be harshly criticized for not dealing with the
risk that is the critical element of its being a mortgage insurer.
In understanding what happened after 1968, the following analogy
is helpful:
Prior to 1968, HUD was dealing with "swimmers" that could have made
it to shore without life jackets. Thus, the pre-1968 FHA home buyer was
a reasonably safe risk, by virtue of his middle class, middle income
status. Whether HUD was exerting tighter controls prior to 1968, or
whether they were just dealing with good "swimmers," a situation was
created in which relatively few people drowned. However, after 1968,
suddenly HUD was forced to deal with people who had never even been in
the water! Everyone expected the life-jacket -- FUD-FHA -- to work.
But, to everyone's disappointment, the life jacket had holes in it and
thousands of people drowned. Thus, HUD neither accepted the risk
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inherent in its position as an insurer nor did it accept the respon-
sibility of a public agency -- to safeguard the consumer through more
direct channels, such as counseling.
In contrast to the "swimmers," not only did the mortgage lenders
have one life jacket buy they had two good ones, that fully protected
them against risk -- FHA and FNMA.
Furthermore, while many home buyers have managed to get "to shore"
-- even with their faulty life jackets, many others have drowned because
of a sudden tidal wave -- default. During default, HUD's risk intensi-
fies but, once again, they have turned their backs on their responsibilities.
The financial institutions, on the other hand, who have also been hit by
the tidal wave, have been able to ride through the storm without any major
difficulties and have been so preoccupied with getting to shore and have
been so well protected from the problems all around them because of their
double life jackets, that they have paid no attention to the fast-sinking
homeowners. Thus, many of the swimmers who managed to plug the holes of
their faulty life jackets, finally succumb. The life jackets disinter-
grate and the swimmers drown. The homeowner in default is, literally,
"at sea" and foreclosure is a frequent outcome.
But in spite of the fact that the drowning people never claimed to
be swimmers in the first place, the Administration has concluded that
in order to prevent Fnyone else from drowning, that the appropriate
policy is not to let anyone else in the water, rather than to fix the
life jackets and to teach the people to swim.
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Thus, in summary, the major conclusion of this thesis is that the
policy of homeownership for low-moderate income families has not yet
been given a fair test at the national level. The thesis has demon-
strated that the HUD-FHA home finance system has not been oriented
toward the needs of the low-moderate income consumer for-several complex
and important reasons.
1) The government has shifted risk in mortgage lending away from
financial institutions and onto itself, through a series of complex
institutions.
2) This shifting of risk has been done in order to ensure a good flow
.of mortgage credit, by encouraging the participation of lenders.
3) In addition to the government's efforts at enhancing credit flows
and encouraging lender participation, the government has also addressed
a variety of other political, economic and social goals through its home-
ownership policies. Thus, the needs of the consumer have never been the
primary concern of Federal homeownership legislation and the consumer has
suffered some adverse impacts.
4) The complexity of the resulting homeownership/home finance system has
made it less able to deal with consumers on a one-to-one basis. The
system is particularly unresponsive around mortgagor default.
5) The system is problematic for theconsumer in default, not only because
of its unwieldiness, but because there are positive incentives to fore-
close; there are no positive incentives to grant forbearance; and there
are no negative sanctions if forbearance is not granted.
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6) While HUD has shifted the risk onto itself it has not accepted the
responsibilities interwoven with this position, in numerous ways. A
key point at which it has not accepted responsibility has been during
default. HUD has not lived up to its role as a public agency and not pro-
tected the interests of consumers, which are consistent with its own
self-interest.
7) The cushions and supports that the government has supplied to the
financial institutions to produce a risk-free lending environment have not
been matched by either equal or ample supports for the consumer, by way
of consumer protection and counseling services.
Beyond these basic conclusions loom a series of issues which should
be addressed.
1) Is homeownership for low-moderate income families still a viable policy?
2) Could HUD be the implementing agency for such a program?
3) In what other ways could the homeownership/home finance system be made
more consumer oriented?
4) How could the default situation be improved?
5) Who should be the lender in the government's homeownership programs?
(With particular emphasis on the inner city.)
6) How can mortgagees be made more responsible?
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1. IS HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR LOW-MODERATE INCOME FAMILIES STILL A VIABLE POLICY?
There are three reasons why this policy should be revived.
First, many participants in the homeownership programs are probably
having at least satisfactory experiences. One of the drawbacks with an
investigation into problems in program operation is that it is very easy
to lose sight of the fact that the program was not 100% bad. If the
present foreclosure rates continue in the low-moderate income homeowner-
ship programs, somewhere between 87-90% of all program participants will
not lose their homes. And, of these families, it is probably reasonable
-to assume that a majority will be happier than with their previous housing
situation.
Based upon a survey of 260 Section 235 homeowners, OSTI researchers
found that 75% of the families claimed that their present condition was
an improvement. Furthermore,
...on balance, fewer families mention deficits at all in comparison
with the benefits they feel they have had as homeowners. Their
satisfactionsare greater than their dissatisfactions, and the
benefits outweigh the deficits.. .Whatever they had to do (to main-
tain ownership) was worth it to most of them. The opportunity to
own a home thus emerges as one of the most important values for
the lower-income families who purchased under the 235 program...
over 90% of...the families would become homeowners again. With
all the problems they have had, only a few of the families are
thinking of moving. Most of them expect to remain in the houses
they bought for at least the next ten years; some, for the rest
of their lives. 2
1OSTI Final, op. cit. p. 203.
2Ibid. p. 205..
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This, then, is fuel for the argument that the low-moderate income
family is not, per se, incapable of homeownership. The lower income
homeownership programs have, by no means, been a total failure and the
Administration's and Congress' disenchantment.with the policy is unfounded.
However, there have certainly been an abundance of problems, as
discussed throughout this thesis. These problems are, in fact, the
second and most important reason why the policy of homeownership for low-
moderate income families should not be abandoned. Even with all the
problems -- ranging from inadequate property appraisals and inspections
by HUD; to a disinterest on the part of mortgage companies in either the
person or the property; to a dearth of supports for the consumer -- many
homeowners appear to be succeeding. Reiterating the major conclusion
of the thesis, the policy of homeownership for low-moderate income
families has not yet been adequately tested, given the widespread pro-
blems that have pervaded the implementation of the homeownership programs.
The third reason why the policy is still viable relates to the successes
that small-scale lower income homeownership programs have reported. In
1970, Bernard Frieden and JoAnn Newman found that four pilot lower income
homeownership programs have achieved a high degree of success.3 More
recently, the Buyer's Agent Program (BAP) in San Francisco has demonstrated
that lower income purchasers, using Section 235 subsidies were, un-
qualifiedly, capable of homeownership. However, both Frieden and Newman
3Bernard Frieden and JoAnn Newman, "Home Ownership for the Poor?"
Trans-Action, October 1970. p. 47-53.
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and analysts of the BAP agree that counseling and consumer protection,
on the part of the implementing agency, are critical ingredients for
success.
The Final Report on the BAP concluded that:
The BAP constitutes a provocative lesson in the provision of a
service to consumers that can make housing subsidy delivery
service more effective.. .The government must begin treating
low and moderate income families as consumers of housing rather
than seeing them merely as consumers of subsidies. The BAP
approach must now be carefully evaluated in terms of subsidy
delivery and consumer protection. 4
Thus, the material presented in this thesis, when combined with
the positive findings of other lower income homeownership programs,
provide a strong case for the policy of homeownership for low-moderate
income families being given a second chance at the national level.
But, a key question would be, who would implement the program?
4Edward W. Moose, "Final Report, The Buyer's Agent Program" Pre-
pared for the San Francisco Development Fund, March 1975 p. 74-75. On the
Buyer's Agent Program also see: Raymond H. Lapin and Elizabeth Eudey,
"Section 235 Can Work: Findings of San Francisco Demonstration Indicate
235 Subsidized Homeownership Deserves Second Try" Journal of Housing,
June 1975. p. 287-289. For another story of a successful lower income
homeownership program see: Charles Abrams (with Robert Kolodny) Home
Ownership for the .Poor: A Program for Philadelphia (New York: Praeger,1970).
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2. SHOULD HUD BE THE IMPLEMENTING AGENCY FOR A HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAM
FOR LOW-MODERATE INCOME FAMILIES?
HUD's record in implementing the post-1968 homeownership programs
casts a dark shadow on whether it would be able to manage a homeownership
program for low-moderate income families. But in view of the enormous
difficulties inherent in creating a totally new agency, and taking into
account the certain strong opposition by HUD to such a proposal, the
likelihood is that HUD would be charged with the implementation of any new
homeownership program.
However, whether the implementing agency were HUD or another
agency, there are three well-defined alternatives that would dictate
its basic mode of operation. Assuming that all major aspects of the
homeownership/home finance system remain unchanged, HUD could either:
1) Accept no risk, shifting it back onto the lender;
2) Accept full risk, but carry out the responsibilities inherent in
this position; or,
3) Accept less risk, but still carry out the responsibilities of a
partial risk-taker.
Clearly, if HUD were to follow Option 1, there is a strong pos-
sibility that the pre-1968 situation would re-occur: exclusion of the
very families that are supposed to be assisted through a lower income
homeownership policy. Thus,.if the government were to remove itself
from a risk-taking position, the availability of funds for socially
oriented homeownership programs would be reduced. As a result, Option 1
must be ruled out.
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Whether or not the government chose Option 2 or 3, HUD would still
have to greatly improve its functions so that it would carry out its
tasks in a manner consistent with a risk-taking position -- whether the
risk would be total, as in the present situation, or whether it would be
shared with the lender.
There are, of course, some different implications on how HUD would
operate depending upon whether it chose Option 2 or 3. For example, as
long as HUD accepts full risk, it is probably legitimate for them to
require all participants in the homeownership programs to go through a
counseling program. On the other hand, if HUD shifted some risk onto
either the lender, the buyer, or both, the decision of counseling would
probably be a joint decision, at the discretion of all the parties who
are bearing the risk.
The point that is important to this discussion is that, as long as
HUD bears total risk, it must both act in a manner consistent with its
highly vulnerable position and it has the right to make certain requirements
of participants to protect them as well as itself.
Whether or not a new low-moderate income homeownership program re-
emerges, there are still a variety of things that HUD could do that would
reduce its risk and could benefit all housing consumers, whether or not
they have lower incomes.
The major change that is needed is attitudinal and goes against HUD's
historical outlook. HUD must redefine its mission to serve people. HUD
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must come to realize that its clients are the homebuyers not the mortgage
lenders, builders, or real estate brokers. It must become a consumer
protection agency.2
During the course of visits to HUD Area Offices and interviews with
HUD personnel, this writer was impressed by the number of dedicated people
who had already defined their role in this way. Most of these people were
relatively young and had joined HUD, not FHA. If, for no other reason than
Horace B. Bazan, for example, has defined mortgagees as the clients
of FHA. op. cit. p. 30. In addition, William B. Traxler Jr. et al. have
noted that "It is clear that HUD's dealings and concerns are with the
mortgage companies and builders and that little attention is given the
homeowner (in the 235 program)." "The 235 Housing Program in Action:
An Empirical Examination of its Administration and Effect on the Home-
owner-Participant in the Columbia, South Carolina Area," South Carolina
Law Review, Vol 24, No. 1, 1973, p. 131.
20ther analyses of HUD-FHA have come to the same conclusion. One
study concluded that: "The FHA must be redirected as an agency that once
again is concerned with people and serving their needs -- helping them
acquire the home of their choice. Citizens Planning and Housing Association,
"FHA: An Unsatisfactory Status Quo" Baltimore, Maryland, November, 1973
p. 55. Similarly, Vicent diPentima has written that "Fundamental to the
success of these (homeownership) programs is an active administration by
a concerned, social-oriented agency which engages in both safeguarding pur-
chasers and providing increased homeownership... A new initiative and a
new effort can be mounted in the FHA by restructuring it in so far as it
would assume features similar to a consumer protection agency. "Abuses
in the Low Income Homeownership Programs -- The Need For a Consumer-Pro-
tection Response by the FHA" Temple Law Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 3. Spring,
1972,p. 472, 475. See also Conclusions of the BAP, Moose, op. cit. To
provide a balanced view, it should be noted that while some analysts have
similarly faulted HUD for its lack of a consumer orientation they have
concluded that, rather than HUD try to change, new agencies should be created.
See, for example, Chester W. Hartman, Housing and Social Policy (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1975) p. 161.
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attrition of old FHA personnel, HUD could change its orientation.
But high HUD officials must become more responsive to innovation and
suggestions for improvement from HUD Area Office personnel than they have
been in the past. This thesis has discussed instances in which HUD
personnel have indicated an awareness of problems which they have
communicated to their superiors, but to no avail. 3
Of a more technical, procedural nature, HUD should undertake the
following, to further the objective of accepting its responsibility and
in becoming a more consumer-oriented agency.
1) HUD should make sure that its own guidelines concerning pre-purchase
processing are enforced. For example, HUD should rigorously spot-check
appraisals, mortgagor employment and bank deposits. In addition, HUD
should play an active role at closing and should withhold issuance of the
insurance certificate until everything meets with their approval.
2) HUD should make sure that the property to be insured is in good con-
dition and should take responsibility for such inspection.
3) The position of the Housing Counselor should be upgraded within an
expanded section dealing solely with individual consumers and counseling
agencies.
4) HUD should be a strong advocate of a comprehensive counseling program
that would include pre-purchase, post-purchase and default counseling
services.
3See Chapter 10and Appendix 9-1. Also see-"HUD's Responsiveness to Previous
Recommendations for Corrective Action" op. cit. This report faulted HUD for a
"lack of responsiveness to proposed changes.. .some HUD field officials were awar
of problems long before they became news items or subjects of...investigations.
Among those officials who recognized what was happening were some who proposed
corrections." p. 4.
-409-
5) HUD should devise rigorous certification procedures for counseling
agencies and should develop a monitoring procedure.
6) HUD should improve its monitoring of approved mortgagees, particularly
the non-supervised mortgagees. The newly created Mortgagee Review Board
should play an active role in taking strong, punitive actions against
non-complying mortgagees. Mortgagee suspensions and even terminations
should be used more frequently for violations with HUD guidelines.
HUD should also not hesitate to revoke the insurance on specific mort-
gages whenever it has established that a mortgagee has violated a pro-
cedure or guideline.
7) HUD should investigate the possibility of requiring mortgagees to have
servicing offices within a reasonable distance from the property.
8) HUD should act as a watchdog in the home finance system. Investigative
teams should delve into all aspects of the private market and monitor the
activities of private actors.
9) HUD should play a more aggressive role in the default situation.4
Thus, even if no new low-moderate income homeownership program is enacted,
that might either keep HUD's risk at the same or a lesser level, for as
long as HUD is in the business of being a mortgage insurer, it must come
to accept the responsibility inherent in this role.
4Specific suggestions on how HUD should respond in the default situation
will be discussed in Section 4, below.
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In addition to the above internal improvements that HUD must make
if it is to accept the responsibility inherent in its risk-taking position,
several changes in other aspects of the homeownership/home finance system
are needed to make the system more consumer-oriented.
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3. IN WHAT OTHER WAYS COULD THE HOMEOWNERSHIP/HOME FINANCE SYSTEM BE MADE
MORE CONSUMER ORIENTED?
An image that comes to mind that describes the post-1968 homeownership/
home finance system is a scale, with the supports and cushions heavily
weighed on the system's side without comparable supports for the consumer:
Prior to 1968, however, the scale was reasonably balanced since the con-
sumer came equipped with his own cushions,in view of his middle income
status. After 1968, however, the new consumer's lack of education, experi-
ence and resources, combined with a lack of any real government supports
to replace these deficiencies, caused an unbalanced scale.
Pre-1968
Consumer System
*Middle income 'Risk free lending
*Safe, suburban environment
property *Conservative FHA
Post-1968 Consumer
*Lower income
*No counseling
*HUD abdicating System
responsibility 'Risk free lending
*No incentives to environment
assist consumer *Liberal insuring policy
in default
While the homeownership programs may have given a new group of people an
"equal opportunity" to achieve homeownership this was not enough. More
"affirmative action" on behalf of the consumer, is required for the low-
moderate income homeownership programs to be completely successful.
Using Charles Abrams' image, the government has, once again, created "socialism
for the rich and laissez-faire for the poor."l More aids to the consumer
1Charles Abrams, The City is the Frontier op. cit. p. 255.
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are clearly required if the low-moderate income family is to be given a
chance at homeownership.
Some of the needed changes directly related to HUD's activities
were outlined above. In addition, other changes in the home finance
system would be necessary to put the consumer at a greater advantage and
to help re-balance the scale.
Congress should play a stronger role in requiring a consumer
orientation in the home finance system. Specifically, Congress should,
in any future low-moderate income homeownership program, make explicit
the fact that the goal is to assist families to attain better housing.
Other goals of housing legislation, such as improving the overall housing
stock; increasing the level of construction; encouraging lender partici-
pation by providing them with protection; and enhancing the flow of
capital, must be clearly placed in subsidiary positions.
Congress should also undertake the following:
1) Investigate the impacts of removing the FHA interest rate ceiling and
the abolition of points on the primary and secondary mortgage markets.
Direct research efforts to the question of how points could be eliminated.
2) Appropriate funds for homeownership counseling services.
3) Direct HUD to require counseling of all low-moderate income home buyers.
In addition to a need for Congress and HUD to shift their priorities
more in the direction of the consumer, there is also room for mortgagees
to play a more responsible, consumer-oriented role. While it is easy to
point to HUD as the cause of the problems in the homeownership programs,
since HUD is the public agency vested with safeguarding the public interest,
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HUD should not take the blame alone. One cannot say that mortgagees that
don't perform properly are solely HUD's responsibility, since HUD is
supposed to regulate them. Mortgagees, too, must be criticized for their
deficient procedures. That the system does not provide incentives for
them to act in a consumer-oriented fashion is a short-coming of the system.
But the failure of mortgagees to act as responsibly as possible, is a
failing for which they, alone, must be blamed.
Mortgagees must play a more responsible role in the lending decision.
By providing them with either "carrots" or "sticks," they must come to
realize that there are real risks in irresponsible underwriting and
servicing. Ways in which this could be achieved will be discussed in
following sections.
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4. HOW COULD THE DEFAULT SITUATION BY IMPROVED?
Much of this thesis has been involved with an examination of the
default situation. The following are some key changes that should be
made to make HUD a more responsible bearer of risk and to enhance the
consumer's position in default.
1) Regardless of whether or not the FHA interest rate ceiling can be
removed, the ability of mortgagees to make money of foreclosure must
be eliminated.
2) HUD guidelines for servicing mortgages in default -- relief measures --
should be given the weight of law.
3) HUD and FNMA should work together to devise a standard set of relief
measures. The MBA should be requested to adopt them.
4) HUD should require all mortgage servicers to notify defaulters of
the availability of specific relief measures.
5) HUD should send out a letter to defaulters asking their cooperation
upon their receipt of the 2068 form.
6) HUD and/or its designated counseling agency should be available to assist
mortgagors in default or to mediate between them and mortgagees.
7) FNMA should improve its monitoring of mortgagees, particularly with
respect to the extension of relief.
8) Strong sanctions -- both by HUD and FNMA -- such as fines, suspensions
or terminations should be brought against mortgagees who do not comply with
the relief measures.
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Thus, there are a number of ways in which the defaulting consumer
could be treated that would improve his position, thereby diminishing
the likelihood of foreclosure and decreasing HUD's own risk.
In addition, the Emergency Housing Act of 1975 gives HUD standby
authority to make loans to defaulting homeowners or to co-insure lender
advances of up to $250 per month for 12 months to help homeowners meet
their mortgage obligations. However, this is not as advantageous for
the consumer as are the existing HUD relief measures. Forbearance allows
non-payment for a longer period and allows the term of the mortgage to
be extended. In contrast to these lenient provisions, payment on the
loan principal, authorized by the Act, must begin 12 months after the
assistance has ended. This could easily place a severe burden on the
mortgagor recovering from a default and trying to resume his regular
mortgage payments.
HUD should direct its energies toward putting real "teeth" into its
guidelines for relief rather than diverting them into a loan or co-insurance
program that seems to primarily benefit the mortgagee. However, if this
program is ever implemented and, at the present, HUD has decided to wait
2
until the delinquency/foreclosure rate becomes more serious,- it will be
important to follow the results carefully.
1Emergency Housing Act of 1975, P.L. 94-50, 94th. Cong. July 2, 1975.
2Housing and Development Reporter, February 9, 1976, Vol. 3, No. 19,
p. 856-857.
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5. WHO SHOULD BE THE LENDER IN THE GOVERNMENT'S HOMEOWNERSHIP PROGRAMS
(WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE INNER CITY)
While this writer has been critical of mortgage companies, and would
like to see thrift institutions re-enter the HUD-FHA homeownership pro-
grams, as a matter of reality, mortgage companies are here to stay and
HUD-FHA will continue to work with them. Mortgage companies, whose
business is so heavily intertwined with HUD-FHA, are a formidable
group whose interests would not be snubbed by the government. However,
it is important to briefly underscore the up-side-down nature of our
home finance system and the need and mechanisms for conventional
lenders to re-enter the government's homeownership programs and inner
city areas.
As discussed at length in Chapter 6, the mortgage banker operates
in a national, rather than local, mortgage market. Contrary to thrift
institutions, such as savings and loan associations, which have historically
prided themselves on their expert knowledge of local real estate markets,
mortgage bankers have become experts in national investment markets. Since
HUD performs (or is supposed to perform) the property appraisals and under-
writing function, the mortgage banker has usually been more of an expediter
or broker in mortgage transactions than a mortgage lender in the traditional sen!
This distinction between the local orientation of thrift institutions
and the nationwide orientation of mortgage bankers is an important one.
It suggests that mortgage bankers, who dominate many, if not most, inner-
city areas, may, in fact, be much less equipped to perform the complex market
analyses than the thrift institutions.
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Thus, it appears tha.t we may have developed a "topsy-turvy" home
finance system. Thrift institutions have abdicated their role in the
inner city -- a role which, by virtue of their training and orientation,
they could probably fill comfortably and more easily become inner city
lending specialists. Instead, in their place, the nationally-oriented
mortgage company dominates the inner city markets.
How could this be changed -- how could conventional lenders be encouraged
to re-enter the government's homeownership programs and inner city areas?
First, it is interesting to note that it seems that we have come
full-circle in recognizing the importance and need for local lenders who
know their territory.
As early as 1934, concern was voiced over the imoortance of local
institutions originating and servicing loans during the early years
of the mortgage. Testifying during the hearings which preceded passage
of the National Housing Act of 1934 John Fahey, Chairman of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board, stated that:
Mortgages on owner-occupied homes are of necessity small in
individual amount, and preferably should be originated and
serviced during the first years by local institutions
thorougly familiar with local conditions and in a position to
keep close watch on the condition of the property and the re-
sponsibility of the borrower. After these mortgages have been
amortized to a conservative figure, however, they will constitute
safe and acceptable investments for mortgage associations operating
over a larger field, which will be able to obtain cheaply the funds
used to purchase such insured mortgages from local institutions at
a favorable price and thus release fresh funds for local investment.
INational Housing Act Hearings 1934, op. cit. p. 17.
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And, in 1974, 40 years after Fahey's remarks, Sheldon Lubar pinpointed
the need for localized institutions taking greater responsibility, parti-
cularly because of the problems related to default. Lubar noted that
a key component of a new neighborhood preservation program is to:
have banks and savings and loans recognize their responsibility to
the city -- and as primary lenders put some portion of their assets
there, and give these loans a higher level of service than they re-
ceive now when they are merely FHA insured and sold on the secondary
market...
...Right now.. .most of the FHA activity is in the central city and
we are the only participant there and all of those loans get sold into
the secondary mortgage markets.. .When there is a default those loans
are immediately foreclosed and there isn't a great attempt at forbearance
or working the problem out.
What I want to do is to have the FHLBB and, hopefully a regula-
tory agency for the commercial banks, emphasize to them their
responsibility to put some portion of their assets in home loans
in the central city where they are located...As primaty investors,
they would hold those loans for their own portfolio. If there
would be a default they would do their best to work it out. Most 2
loans can be worked out if enough time and effort is put into it.
Thus, in addition to the data presented in this thesis concerning
the more careful procedures of some financial institutions compared to
mortgage companies, "conventional wisdom" says that local lenders should
be more involved in inner city areas. Lenders would probably come back
to the government programs and inner city areas if they could be convinced
that there is money to be made there.
2Review of FHA, Part 2, p. 175.
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A small group of researchers has begun to investigate the conditions
under which inner city areas are viable investments.
Basing his comments on research carried out in three California
cities, Frederick E. Case stated that:
If there is any single overriding conclusion to be drawn, it
is that there is a viable mortgage lending market in inner
city areas, but it is a market with special characteristics
and problems which must be recognized if the market potential
is to be exploited successfully. 3
In a subsequent study, which analyzed inner city housing markets
in five cities in different parts of the country, as well as four California
cities, Case again found the above statement to hold true:
...if lenders take time to examine territories and examine
them on a direct basis, they can undoubtedly find a great
many more areas to place loans in the inner city. And they
can do this without an appreciable loss cf profit or appreciable
differences from accustomed results of suburban lending. 4
Case offers a number of hints which lenders should follow, if their
inner city lending programs are to be successful. For example, he advises
that for inner city areas, normal lending policies and risk analyses should
be supplemented by: 1) provisions for dealing with various social, health,
and employment problems; 2) in-depth credit evaluations; 3) credit collection
flexibility; 4) working with public officials to reduce the constant threat
of land-use changes; 5) education and training programs on inner-city
housing and lending markets for loan officers.
3Frederick E. Case, et al. "Housing the Underhoused: Two California
Studies," Housing, Real Estate and Urban Land Studies Program, Graduate
School of Business Administration, University of California, Los Angeles,
May 1971, p. 2.
4Frederick E. Case, ed., Inner City Housing and Private Enterprise
(New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 74-75.
5Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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Thus, it is critical that lenders and insurers of inner city
properties become better able to understand market forces in those areas.
Just as it is probably true that some families should not own homes,
it is also likely that some properties are not viable homes. But again,
it is difficult for investors not to red-line areas while still being
sufficiently cautious.
This discussion re-raises the dilemma presented in Chapter 8 con-
cerning the hair-line difference between over-caution and over-leniency
in lending decisions. How, then, can lenders be assisted in making
lending decisions in addition to becoming more familiar with market forces,
as discussed above?
A 1968 doctoral dissertation suggested the need for a tool which
could:
be used by lenders as a sieve to screen out the borrowers who are
least likely to represent good credit risks.. .This (would) hope-
fully result in turningaway those potential house buyers who should
wait a few more years before they undertake the financial obligations
that go with homeownership. The turning away of marginal accoun s
is as much a service to the lender as to the potential borrower.
In this writer's opinion, the necessary tool for making this type
of determination would involve counselors able to gauge a prospective
mortgagor's readiness for ownership as well as the basic and more easily
definable ability to pay. In addition, an assessment of a person's ability
to own a home should also consider which home. It might be wise to dis-
courage a "borderline" family from purchasing a house needing major re-
pairs while a different house, one in better condition, may permit the
6Frank Earl Dotson, "The Development of a Numerical Scoring System
for Evaluating Mortgage Loan Delinquency Risk," Dissertation, Graduate
School of Business Administration, University of Southern California, June, 1968.
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the family to become a homeowner.
Thus, while it is not a simple issue to become involved with home-
ownership programs for lower income people and inner city areas, it also
appears that there are ways in which lenders and insurers could both
minimize losses while opening participation to all eligible people, while
barring participation only to those people and properties which are clearly
ineligible.
Before going on to the last question, it is important to add that
community groups, have been trying to force conventional lenders back into
.the cities and the government programs for several years. One approach,
spear-headed by the National Training and Information Center, has been to
demand that lenders disclose the geographic areas of both savinas accounts
and mortgage loans in their portfolio. These efforts have resulted in the
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975. However, it is still too early to
know how much success this legislation will have in encouraging lenders
back into the cities. The legislation does not require lending
in any specific area, it merely requests that information on the location
of loans be made public.
Other community groups have been working with consortia of conventional
lending institutions and, when their own resources have been combined with
commitments for services from the municipal government, lenders have been
willing to re-enter an area by pooling mortgage funds. This has proven to
be a particularly successful approach in several cities.
In Pittsburgh, for example, the Neighborhood Housing Service Program
has been widely acclaimed for "bringing back" a declining area with the
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cooperation of local lenders. 7 The high degree of success attributed
to this program spurred a joint effort by HUD and the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board -- The Urban Reinvestment Task Force -- to try to duplicate
the Pittsburgh model in other cities. This type of shared-risk program
may be one answer for encouraging lenders back into the cities.
7See, for example, Roger S. Ahlbrandt, Jr. and Paul C. Brophy,
"An Evaluation of Pittsburgh's Neighborhood Housing Services Program"
(Pittsburgh: ACTION Housing, Inc.), March, 1975 (Prepared for HUD). It
must also be added, however, that some mortgage pools have not worked.
For example, the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group Program has been
faulted for encouraging unscrupulous real estate and banking activities
. and hastening the decline of an urban area rather than preventing it. See
Boston Antitrust Hearings op. cit. and Rachel G. Bratt, A Homeownership
Survey, prepared for the Boston Model City Administration, January, 1972.
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6. HOW CAN MORTGAGEES BE MADE MORE RESPONSIBLE?
First, there is a need for increased regulation of mortgage companies
by HUD. In the long run, Congress should make a thorough investigation
into this issue and consider the possibility of creating a separate regu-
latory body that would supervise mortgage companies in the same way that
the FHLBB supervises savings and loan associations.
Second, all lenders using FHA insurance could be made to share some
risk through a coinsurance program or through some other means. (This
would be Option 3, discussed above). Section 244 of the Housing and Com-
munity Development Act of 1974 established a coinsurance program. Under
this section a mortgagee may choose to assume at least 10 percent of any
loss on an FHA-insured mortgage. The mortgagee must agree to "carry
out...such credit approval, appraisal, inspection, commitment, property
disposition or other functions..." And, in exchange for this new re-
sponsibility and risk, the mortgagee will share with HUD the FHA insurance
premium.
However, it is not at all clear that coinsurance will do away with
irresponsible mortgage lending. First, since coinsurance is optional, at
the discretion of the lender, it is uncertain whether it will be used at all.
Lender participation will certainly depend, in part, upon how great an
incentive the sharing of the insurance premium will provide.
Second, even if lenders were willing to participate in the program,
the likelihood is that they will choose coinsurance only in those cases
that are deemed safest, or risk-free -- in the spite-of the language
of the legislatior: "The Secretary shall exercise his authority under
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this section only to the extent that he finds that the continued exercise
of such authority will not adversely affect the flow of mortgage credit
to older and declining neighborhoods and to the purchasers of older and
lower cost housing."
More skeptically, it is not clear that all mortgage lenders that
participate in the FHA programs are even capable of performing tihe
necessary underwriting functions, whether or not there is risk involved.
The well-formed habit of being unconcerned about underwriting, that many
mortgage companies have lapsed into, prompted one high HUD official to
note that "Most small mortgage companies don't know anything about under-
writing. They don't have to with FHA."
And, fourth, even if mortgage companies were able to do good under-
writing jobs on the coinsured loans, there is still nothing to encourage
them to take similar care on the 100 percent FHA-insured loans. Thus,
it is unlikely that a mortgage company that carefully underwrites a
low-risk coinsured loan will expend much effort screening a totally risk-
free loan.
In view of the above, it is unlikely that the present coinsurance pro-
gram will go far toward increasing the responsibility of mortgagees. Yet,
the need for mortgagees to assume some responsibility for the lending de-
-cision is clear and some type of coinsurance scheme appears to be the most
likely alternative. The next step is for the government to carefully assess
the present coinsurance plan and to experiment with modifications, as necessary.
IInterview, Walter Stuart, op. cit.
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It is critical that the whole area of risklessness in mortgage lending
be studied carefully and that there be both positive incentives for good
underwriting and clear and enforceable sanctions against irresponsible
actions.
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A FINAL NOTE:
Thus, there are a number of improvements that can be made and studies
to be undertaken. With these changes and added information the homeowner-
ship/home finance system would be more consumer-oriented and a revived
national effort at providing homeownership opportunities for low-moderate
income families would be in order.
But, even these improvements to the HUD-FHA home finance system
may still not result in the desired end: Provision of decent housing
and the choice of homeownership to a wide range of families.
Critics of the housing system point out that with its present funda-
mental characteristics, there may be no way of meeting the nation's
housing goal.
As Chester Hartman has stated:
At the government level expenditure levels are miniscule compared
with need, and the required degree of public intervention in and
control over the housing system has not been accepted. The pri-
vate sector's need for profit from new housing production -- in
land speculation, money lending, materials production, and de-
velopment -- as well as from ownership and operation of existing
housing conflicts frequently and drastically with the human right
to live decently. Establishment and implementation of a right
to decent housing is essentially a political question... Failure
to face the fundamental issues of resource distribution and political
- control will consign millions of American families to substandard
living conditions and excessive housing costs for decades to come. 2
Yet, in spite of the persuasiveness of Hartman's argument, housing
policy makers still need a direction in lieu of -- or until -- more massive
changes in our society occur. Thus, it is still fruitful to try to create
and implement policies that are directed at attaining the nation's housing
goal. Homeownership for low and moderate income people is still a viable
housing strategy and awaits a better planned and better executed trial.
2Chester Hartman, Housing and Social Policy, op. cit. p. 176.
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APPENDIX 1-1
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
OF HOMEOWNERSHIP
PROGRAMS
From: HUD Handbook 4000.2
"Mortgagees' Handbook--
Application Through
Insurance" (Single
Family) March, 1975
4000.2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1-1. THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT of 1934 established a federal program
to.foster home ownership. The Federal Housing Administration,
created to administer the program, provides insurance protection
to private lenders who provide mortgage financing to home buyers.
1-2. EVOLUTION OF HOUSING PROGRAMS. As the housing needs of America
have changed over the years, so have the organizations designed
to meet those needs.
a. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was
established to provide cohesive control over those govern-
mental programs designed primarily to provide housing and
the services and facilities essential to the improvement of
housing standards and conditions.
b. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) was made a part of
this Department, with responsibility for administering its
mortgage insurance programs for the Secretary. In most of
its programs, HUD-FHA is.an insurer whose ability to pay
claims is guaranteed by the United States Government. Its
income from fees, mortgage insurance premiums, proceeds from
the sale of acquired properties, and investments has enabled
HUD-FHA to pay its operating expenses and claims under the
unsubsidized programs while ac'cumulating substantial reserves.
The expenses of operating the unsubsidized mortgage insurance
programs of HUD-FHA are borne by the beneficiaries of these
programs. More recently, the Department has been giveh
responsibility for the administration of several newer pro-
grams designed to provide much needed housing for families
of low and moderate income, financed in part by appropriate
funds. -While some of these programs are administered by
HUD-FHA as mortgage insurance programs, mortgages originated
under them become risks of the Special Risk Insurance Fund
created for this purpose, and they have no effect on the
older insurance funds, which continue to be self-supporting.
1-3. HUD-FHA's BASIC HOME MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROGRAM was established
in Section 203(b) of the National Housing Act, and the descrip-
tions in the basic text of this handbook are based on it. Since
1934, several additional programs have been enacted to meet the
specific needs of special classes of home buyers. While the
processing of applications and the insurance of mortgages under
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these newer programs follow the same general pattern prescribed
for Section 203(b), there are some differences. Chapter 2
-contains a summary of the provisions of each of the home mort-
gage insurance programs and an explanation of any specific
processing requirements.
1-4. THE CONTRACT OF MORTGAGE INSURANCE. The Secretary and the
mortgagee are bound by the HUD-FHA Regulations with the same
force and to the same extent as if a separate contract of
insurance had been executed relating to each insured mortgage.
The mortgagee's submission of closing documents and HUD-FHA
endorsement of the Mortgage Insurance Certificate in each case
creates a contract of mortgage insurance which embodies as its
provisions the HUD-FHA Regulations in force at the time of
endorsement relating to the section of the National Housing Act
under which the mortgage is insured. The HUD-FHA commitment
is an assurance that, subject to the terms and conditions of
the commitment, the mortgage will be insured.
1-5. THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF BETTER HOUSING IN SMALL TOWNS and outlying
areas is a stated policy of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. To further this policy, the Department in September,
1969, revised'outstanding instructions to make all of its home
mortgage insurance programs available for use in all areas,
provided a market exists for the properties and the properties
themselves meet the objectives of HUD-FHA's Minimum Property
Standards. Houses to be constructed, however, must meet all
applicable standards of the MPS's.
a. When determining whether a market exists, the local market
conditions of the small town or outlying area in which
the property is located, are utilized by the HUD-FHA field
office.
b. Likewise, the Department recognizes that real estate patterns
in small towns and outlying areas include social and economic
preferences which are dissimilar to those encountered in
larger towns and cities. On existing houses, if a condition
is acceptable to the typical market in the area, the appraiser
adapts to the point of view of that market and renders his
judgments accordingly. Outstanding instructions emphasize
that comparisons to standards of the "big city" are to be
avoided.
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CHAPTER 2. HOME MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROGRAMS
2-1. GENERAL. HUD-FHA's home mortgage insurance programs are
established by the National Housing Act, and the common method
of reference to each program is by the section of the Act which
established it. Thus, the basic home mortgage program is
normally referred to as "203(b)" and the program which provides
insured mortgages for servicemen is referred to as "222." The
provisions of the Act are expanded -n the HUD-FHA Regulations,
which have the effect of law.' Each program differs from all
others in some respect. For some, there are specific eligibility
requirements. For others, the loan-to-value ratio or the
maximum insurable mortgage of each home mortgage amount is
unique. This chapter presents a capsule summary of each home
mortgage insurance program and its peculiarities and explains
any specific restrictions or processing requirements.
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SECTION 1. HOME MORTGAGE INSURANCE SECTION 203(b)
2-2. SECTION 203(b) - GENERAL. This is the basic home mortgage
program on which the processing instructions in Chapters 5, 6,
and 8 are based. It is designed to provide insurance of
mortgages to finance the acquisition of one- to four-family
housing for mortgagors having no special qualifications.
(Examples of mortgagors having special qualifications are
servicemen, disaster victims, and displacees.) If there is
doubt as to the section of the Act under which an application
should be submitted, the mortgagee should choose Section 203(b).
If, in its processing, HUD-FHA determines that the mortgage
can more appropriately be insured under another program, the
local field office will make the change before issuing a
commitment. Similarly, if the mortgagee decides that another
section would be more appropriate, the change can be requested
when the application for firm commitment (FHA Form 2900) is
submitted.
2-3. AMOUNT INSURABLE. The maximum insurable mortgage is based on
the lower of the statutory dollar limit or the appropriate
loan-to-value ratio which applies to the circumstances of the
given case.
a. Statutory Limits.
(1) Single-family structures: $45,000.
(2) Two-or three-family structures: $48,750.
(3) Four-family structures: $56,000.
b. Loan-to-Value Ratios.
(1) Occupant Mortgagors Who Are Not Veterans:
(a) Properties approved for mortgage insurance before
the beginning of construction or completed more
than one year on the date of application:
1 97% of the first $25,000 of value and closing
costs, plus
2 90% of the next $10,000 of value and closing
costs, plus
3 80% of all value and closing costs over
$35,000.
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(2-3) (b) Properties under construction or completed less
than one year on the date of application:
1 90% of the first $35,000 of value and closing
costs, plus
2 80% of all value and closing costs over
$35,000.
(2) Occupant Mortgagors Who Are Veterans: (a person who
has served on active duty in the Armed Forces for more
than 90 consecutive days and was discharged under
conditions other than dishonorable) Only single-family
structures are eligible.
(a) Properties approved for mortgage insurance before
the beginning of construction or completed more
than one year on the date of application:
1 100% of the first $25,000 of value and closing
costs, or $25,000 plus prepaid expenses less
$200, whichever is less, plus
2 90% of the next $10,000 of value and closing
costs, plus
3 85% of all value and closing costs over
$35,000.
(b) Properties under construction or completed less
than one year on the date of application:
1 90% of the first- $35,000 of value and closing
costs, plus
2 85% of all value and closing costs over
$35,000.
(3) The ratios discussed in 2-3b.(l) and (2) are available
only to mortgagors who can be expected to occupy the
property on a long-term basis. Under this section,
if the mortgagor's employment is such that he is subject
to frequent transfer and can reasonably be expected
to move from the area before living in the property
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for at least four years, he is considered a short-term
occupant, and the maximum mortgage available to him
may be reduced accordingly.
(4) Non-Occupant Mortgagors:
(a) 85% of the amount calculated under paragraph
2-3b.(1), or
(b) 100% of phe amount calculated under paragraph
2-3b.(l) if, under HUD-FHA's Escrow Commitment
Procedure, the mortgagor and mortgagee jointly
assume responsibility for reducing the unpaid
principal by not less than 15% if the property
is not sold and the mortgage is assumed by an
acceptable occupant mortgagor by the due date of
the 18th amortization installment.
1 Under this procedure, the mortgage is insured
for 100% of the amount available to an owner-
occupant mortgagor who is not a veteran. 15%
of this amount is placed in escrow with the
mortgagee until the property is sold to a
buyer acceptable to HUD-FHA under its FHA
Form 2210 procedure (See Reference (1) of the
Foreword). If the property is not sold in 18
months, the 15% in escrow is applied to reduce
the principal.
2 This provision is available and of principal
interest to builders who require insured
mortgages to finance construction (Chapter 4),
builders or real estate brokers engaged in
trade-in transactions, or home owners who
require funds to purchase new homes. FHA Form
314, Escrow Commitment Certificate, must
accompany the application.
2-4. MINIMUM INVESTMENT BY MORTGAGOR. The mortgagor's investment
in the property must be equal to the difference between the
total cost of acquisition and the amount of the mortgage to
be insured, but at least 3% of the cost of acquisition. In
no instance may his investment be less than the difference
between the cost of acquisition (the total cost including
repairs, alterations or additions, plus closing costs, but
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exclusive of non-realty items or prepaid expenses) and the
amount calculated by applying the appropriate formula from
paragraph 2-3b. to the acquisition cost. If the mortgagor
is 60 years of age or older, this investment may be made with
funds borrowed from a corporation or individual approved by
HUD-FHA. In all other transactions, secondary financing is
prohibited.
2-5. MORTGAGE TERM. 30 years, except that a mortgage on new con-
struction may have a term up to 35 years if the mortgagor is
unacceptable for a 30-year term and can qualify under the
longer term. Operative builders qualify for no more than 20-
year mortgages. The term is further limited to 3/4 of the
remaining economic life of the property, if it is less than
the maximum term otherwise allowable, but this limitation is
waived in cases insured pursuant to Section 223(e), when
remaining physical life of the property is substituted for 3/4
of remaining economic life.
2-6. INTEREST RATE. Current interest rate as determined by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (See Appendix 1).
2-7. HUD-FHA STATEMENT OF VALUE. For mortgages on one-to four-family
structures, the seller must certify in the application for
appraisal (FHA Form 2800-1) that the HUD-FHA Statement of Value
(FHA Form 2800-6) will be delivered to the purchaser, and the
purchaser must certify (on FRA Form 2900-1 or a separate state-
ment attached to it) that he received either the HUD-FHA
Statement of Value or a VA Certificate of Reasonable Value
before he signed the application and, ft closing (on FHA Form
2900-4), either that the HUD-FRA Statement of Value was
delivered to him before the sale contract was signed or that
the contract included a provision allowing him to withdraw if
the HUD-FHA appraised value (excluding closing costs) is less
than a specified amount (which must be large enough when added
to the estimated closing costs to support the mortgage applied
for).
2-8. REFINANCING. An existing mortgage, insured or uninsured, may
be refinanced with a new mortgage insured under this section.
The maximum mortgage amount and loan-to-.value ratio is the
same as if it were a new mortgage, further limited to the
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larger of 85% of the amount of a new mortgage available to an
owner-occupant, or the existing indebtedness related to the
property plus the cost of repairs and refinancing. A state-
ment of the purpose of the loan must accompany the application.
2-9. OPEN-END ADVANCES are an increase in the outstanding balance
of an insured mortgage to provide funds for improvement of the
property. They are authorized in those states in which local
statutes permit.
a. Proceeds must be used for repairs or improvements which
materially protect or improve the basic livability of
the property and for which no obligation has yet been
incurred at the time of the advance.
b. Applications are submitted on FRA Form 2004-QE, accompanie
by:
(1) Description of proposed improvements or drawings, and
Description of Materials, FRA Form 2005, in duplicate
whichever is sufficient to permit an estimate of
cost and determine compliance with the HUD Minimum
Property Standards.
(2) Copy of contractor's bid or itemized estimate of cost
(3) FRA Form 2900, Application for Mortgagor Approval.
(4) Application fee (Appendix 2). This is the only case
in which the fee accompanies the application to
HUD-FHA.
c. Commitments are issued on FHA Form 2007-QE.
d. Insurance is evidenced by FHA Form 2576-OE. When the repa
or improvements have been completed and all inspections
required by the commitment have been made, the mortgagee
returns the commitment with the mortgagor's and mortgagee',
certificates completed.
2-10. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.
a. If the Mortgagor is a Veteran requesting the higher
loan-to-value ratios described in paragraph 2-3b.(l), the
application must be accompanied by a Certificate of Vetara
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(2-10) Status, VA Form 26-8261, which the mortgagor can request
from any office of the Veterans Administration.
b. For Mortgagors Sixty Years of Age or Older, if all or any
part of the mortgagor's required investment is borrowed,
the application should be accompanied by evidence that:
(1) The lender or donor is a relative, employer, or
humanitarian institution (See paragraph 2-4 of this
handbook);
(2) The amount borrowed, when added to the mortgage amount,
does not exceed the total of HUD-FHA value plus prepaid
expenses;
(3) The interest rate on the loan does not exceed the
mortgage interest rate; and
(4) The mortgaged property is not security for the loan.
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SECTION 8. HOME MORTGAGE INSURANCE -
LOW AND MODERATE INCOME -
SECTION 221(d)(2)
2-23. SECTION 221(d)(2) - GENERAL. This program provides insured
mortgage financing for the purchase or rehabilitation of low-
cost housing in one- to four-family units for families displaced
by urban renewal or other governmental action and for other
low- or moderate-income families.
2-24. AMOUNT INSURABLE. The amount insurable is the lesser of the
statutory limit or the appropriate loan-to-value ratio.
a. Statutory Limits.
(1) Occupant Mortgagors:
(a) Families of Less Than Five Persons.
1 Single-family structures: $21,600 (may be
increased up to $25,200 in specified high-cost
areas.)
2 Two-family structures: $28,000 (may be increased
up to $36,000 in specified high-cost areas.)
3 Three-family structures: $38,850 (may be
increased up to $46,050 in specified high-cost
areas.)
4 Four-family structures: $47,500 (may be
increased up to $54,700 in specified high-cost
areas.)
(b) Families of Five or More Persons. Only single-
family structures with four or more bedrooms are
eligible for increased limits of $25,200 (up to
$28,800 in specified high-cost areas.) Approval
is limited to areas in which suitable housing for
larger families cannot be made available within
the lower limits prescribed for smaller families.
(2) Operative Builders: 85% of the amount available to a
family of less than five persons as occupant-mortgagors
of a single-family structure. Commitments may be
issued to operative builders for ultimate sale to
occupant mortgagors (see also paragraph 2-27). Other
non-occupant mortgagors are not eligible.
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(2-24) b. Loan-to-Value Ratios.
(1) Occupant Mortgagors:
(a) Displaced Families (also see paragraph 2-27):
1 Properties approved for mortgage insurance
before the beginning of construction or
completed more than one year on the date of
application, the lesser of:
a Value and closing costs, or
b Value, closing costs, and prepaid expenses,
less $200 per family dwelling unit.
2 Properties under construction or completed
less than one year on the date of application -
90% of value and closing costs.
3 Rehabilitation: The least of:
a Value before rehabilitation, plus estimated
cost of rehabilitation, and closing costs,
or
b Value and closing costs after rehabilitation,
plus prepaid expenses, less $200 per family
dwelling unit.
c Value and closing costs after rehabilitation.
(b) Other Occupant Mortgagors:
1 One unit properties approved for mortgage
insurance before the beginning of construction
or completed more than one year on the date of
application - the lesser of:
a Value and closing costs, or
b 97% of the sum of value, closing costs, and
prepaid expenses.
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*(2-24) 2 One unit properties under construction or
completed less than one year on the date of
application - 90% of value and closing costs.
3 Rehabilitation: The least of:
a Value before rehabilitation, plus rehab-
ilitation cost and closing costs, or
b Value after rehabilitation and closing
costs, or
c 97% of the sum of value after rehabilitation,
closing costs, and prepaid expenses.
4 2-to 4-unit properties approved for mortgage
insurance before the beginning of construction
or completed more than one year on the date
of application - same as 203(b), (paragraph
2-3b(1)(a)).
5 2-to 4-unit properties under construction or
completed less than one year on the date of
the application - same as 203(b), (paragraph
2-3b(l)(b)).
(2) Operative Builders:
(a) Properties approved for mortgage insurance before
the beginning of construction: the least of:
1 85% of value and closing costs, or
2 85% of the amounte prescribed in paragraph
2-24b (1) (a) 1.
(b) Rehabilitation: the least of:
1 85% of value after rehabilitation and closing
costs, or
2 Five times the estimated coqt of improvements,
or
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3 The least of:
a 85% of the sum of the purchase price and
estimated cost of rehabilitation, or
b 85% of the sum of value before rehabilitation
and the estimated cost of rehabilitation,
and closing costs, or
c 85% of the amounts prescribed in paragraph
2-24b,(l) (a) 3.
2-25. MINIMUM INVESTMENT BY MORTGAGOR. This minimum investment may
include amounts covering settlement costs, initial payments
for taxes, hazard insurance premiums, mortgage insurance pre-
miums, and other prepaid expenses. It need not be in cash but
may be represented by the fair market value of the mortgagor's
labor in constructing the house. The minimum investment should
be:
a. Displaced Families: At least $200 per family unit.
b. All Other Mortgagors: At least 3% of acquisition cost.
2-26. ADDITIONAL PROGRAM SUMMARY INFORMATION.
a. Mortgage Term. The mortgage term is the lesser of:
(1) Three quarters (3/4) of the remaining economic life of
the property (this may be waived if the mortgage is
insured pursuant-to Section 223(e)), or
(2) For displaced families: 30 years (35 to 40 years
under special credit conditions), or
(3) For other occupant mortgagors:
(a) Housing built subject to inspection by HUD-FRA
or VA: 30 years (35 to 40 years under special
credit conditions).
(b) All other housing: 30 years.
(4) For non-occupant mortgagors: 30 years.
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b. Interest Rate: Same as Section 203(b) (paragraph 2-6).
c. HUD-FHA Statement of Value. Same as Section 203(b)
(paragraph 2-7).
d. Refinancing. Same as Sectiorr 203(b) (paragraph 2-8).
e. Open-End Advances. Same as Section 203(b) (paragraph 2-9).
2-27. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS.
a. Applications from families displaced by urban renewal or
other governmental action who qualify for higher loan-to-
value ratios or purchase under equity accumulation contracts
must be accomapnied by FHA Form 3476, Certificate of
Eligibility (Figure 2-2), from the appropriate local
government agency. These certificates need not be used in
the area in which they were issued, but may be used to
support applications for mortgage insurance anywhere in
the United States.
b. Operative Builders may sell single-family dwellings to
displaced families on a deferred basis through the use- of
an installment contract or contract for deed not exceeding
18 months. Such an arrangement must be approved in advance
by HUD-FHA.
c. Certification by appropriate local government officials
that the property meets or exceeds local code requirements
in all areas where a local code exists, is required.
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SECTION 9. MORTGAGE INSURANCE FOR LOW INCOME REHABILITATION
HOUSING - SECTION 221(h) AND MORTGAGE INSURANCE
FOR LOW AND NODERATE INCOME CONDOMINIUM FAMILY
UNITS - SECTION 221(1)
2-28. SECTION 221(h) and (i). Section 221(h) is a combination multi-
family - single-family mortgage insurance program described in
detail in Reference (2) of the Foreword. It provides for
insured project mortgages to permit non-profit sponsors to
purchase and rehabilitate projects for eventual resale as
individual dwellings or condominium units to low-income pur-
chasers. The purchaser of an individual unit is charged
interest at one, two, or three percent, depending on his income.
All mortgages at these rates are held by the Government
National Mortgage Association under its special assistance
function. Section 221(1) is a similar program providing for
the sale as condominium units in a project with a mortgage
insured under Section 221(d)(3). No new program commitments
are being issued by HUD-FHA under these two programs.
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SECTION 11. MISCELLANEOUS HOUSING INSURANCE -
SECTION 223(e)
2-33. SECTION 223(e) - GENERAL. Under this program, properties which
do not qualify under any other programs solely because of
locational factors may be insured. Mortgagees may not submit
applications under this program. The determination of the use
of Section 223(e) is at the discretion of HUD-FHA.
a. HUD-FHA will first consider applications on the basis of
the requirements for insurance under the Section of Title
II specified in the application. If the application would
not be eligible because of locational factors but the
property is in a location which is judged to be reasonably
viable, considering the need for housing for low- and
moderate-income families and the objective of upgrading
older, declining neighborhoods, the mortgage may be insured
under the Section of Title II applied for, "Pursuant to
Section 223(e)."
b. The Suffix of the Case Number will be changed by HUD-FHA
(see Reference (3) of the Foreword, also see
Appendix 3 'and Appendix 4 of this handbook).
c. Mortgages insured pursuant to Section 223(e) are not subject
to restrictions on mortgage term based on the remaining
economic life of the property.
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SECTION 14. HOMEOWNERSHIP FOR LOWER INCOME FAMILIES -
SECTION 235
2-36. SECTION 235. This program is designed to provide insured
mortgage financing for the purchase of homes by low-income
families. While the income of the mortgagor family remains
below certain income limits, a portion of the monthly mortgage
payment is made by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment directly to the mortgagee. This program is designed
primarily to help low-income families buy single-family homes
and is administered by the Office of Underwriting Standards.
The Assistant Secretary for Housing Management also administers
the program from a servicing standpoint. No new program
commitments are being issued by HUD-FHA under this program.
Further information is available in Reference (4) of the
Foreword.
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SECTION 15. HOME MORTGAGE INSURANCE, SPECIAL CREDIT RISKS -
SECTION 237
2-37. SECTION 237. Under this program, an applicant, who would not
qualify for an insured mortgage under one of several other
home mortgage programs because of his credit or income history
or characteristics, may be eligible if it is determined that he
would be an acceptable risk if provided with credit and debt
management counselling. This program is administered by the
Assistant Secretary for Housing Management.
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APPENDIX 1-2
HOMEOWNERSHIP: A BASIC INGREDIENT OF AMERICAN LIFE:
Homeownership, it has been noted, is an ideal "almost as sacrosanct
as motherhood or apple pie." Consistent with some of the most basic tra-
ditions in this country, homeownership has won widespread and enthusiastic
support throughout American history. The homeowner was clearly in step
with Thomas Jefferson's "rugged individual" and the Protestant ethic
lauded the self-sufficiency and hard work which are still associated with
the meaning of owning a home.
Whether of not "a nation of homeowners is unconquerable" 2 as Franklin
Roosevelt claimed, it is certainly likely that most Americans would agree
with Lyndon Johnson's view of the homeowner:
Homeownership is a cherished dream and achievement of most
Americans.. .Owning a home can increase responsibility and
stake out a man's place in his community. The [man who owns
a home has something to be proud of and good reason to pro-
tect and preserve it.3
This type of sentiment is, perhaps, at the heart of why homeownership
is the preferred form of tenure of the majority of people in this country.
Numerous surveys have confirmed that most people prefer homeownership
over rental situations.
For example, in a study done by the Joint Center for Urban Studies of
MIT and Harvard, "America's Housing Needs: 1970-1980" it was found that
Bernard J. Frieden and Joann Newman, op. cit.
2Speech before the United States Savings and Loan League, quoted in
the New York Times, November 17, 1972.
3Lyndon B. Johnson, "The Crisis of the Cities", The President's Message
to the Congress on Urban Problems, February 12, 1968.
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homeownership is a goal among all socio-economic groups. 4
The ruling ideal among working-class men and women under
forty-five years of age in both Boston and Kansas City is
to have "a place of our own", meaning...a single-family home
that they own, not rent -- with a "piece of ground and grass
around us" in a neighborhood where "we can have piece of
mind -- we can leave the house and not worry about it."5
Among families of the middle class a propelling goal is to
attain housing of "pleasantly good" status. At the presen
time this is typified by -a home of at.least seven rooms...
Among families of solidly upper-middle-class status, it is
expected that by the time the household head is in his thirties
and approaching the years of his prime earning powers, the 7family should have acquired a home of at least eight rooms...
Surveys done in the late 1930's also produced similar findings. John
Dean, in his book Homeownership: Is It Sound? noted that:
One study, involving over a thousand face-to-face inter-
views, found more answers to the question "Why do you pre-
fer to own?" falling into the category "like the feeling
of ownership" than into any other. Another study of 253
new home owners gave as their primary reason why these
Except perhaps the lowest class, where such fantasies may frequently
be left unspoken. Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard,
"America's Housing Needs: 1970-1980", p. 5-34. However, on this point
Michael Stegman found, in a recent survey of lower income families in
Baltimore, that there was "an overall interest in homeownership among
87% of the low-income inner city renter population". Housing Invest-
ment in the Inner City, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973), p. 193.
5
"America's Housing Needs", op. cit. p. 5-22.
6Ibid. p. 5-12.
Ijbid. p. 5-8.
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families bought homes "Belief in home ownership." These
results suggest that home ownership is not merely a means
by which one achieves other values; it is also an end in
itself..."8
Indeed, tenure statistics bear out this preference for homeownership.
A majority of family have managed to satisfy their desires to own their
own homes (see Table 1).
8John P. Dean, Homeownership: Is It Sound? (New York: Harper and
Row, 1945), p. 13. Also on this point, Meyerson et. al. have written
that: "Surveys taken since the early thirties show that 70 percent of
the country's population desire homeownership for themselves." Martin
Meyerson, Barbara Terrett, William L.C. Wheaton, Housing, People and
Cities (.New York: McGraw-Hill,1962) p. 84. However, these writers
also point out that many of these studies have examined the housing
preferences of husband-wife families, who are most likely to prefer the
single fafiily home (p. 93). Similarly, Herbert Gans in "Urbanism and
Suburbanism as Ways of Life" has observed that: "As soon as they can
afford to do so, most Americans head for the single-family house and
the quasi-primary way of life of the low-density neighborhood, in the
outer city or the suburbs." (P. 48). And earlier in the same essay,
he noted that "the quasi-primary way of life is associated with the
family stage of the life cycle and the norms of child-rearing and paren-
tal role..." (p. 45). It is also important to point out that fewer
families might prefer homeownership if more suitable rental alterna-
tives were available. In a survey of homeowners in Boston it was found
that the respondents fell into two groups: "Those who were always in-
terested in homeownership and those who were more or less forced to be-
come homeowners due to an apparently unsatisfactory rental stock...The
quest for space was a significant determinant in steering families out
of the rental market and into the house-buying market." Rachel G.
Bratt, "A Homeownership Survey: A Report on the Boston Banks Urban
Renewal Group" prepared for the Boston Model City Administration,
January, 1972. Thus, it is possible that it is not really the actual
ownership that appeals to families, but rather that families desire the
improved quality which is associated with ownership. Michael Stegman
has found that there is a prevailing investor view that: "Many low-
income renters indicating an interest in owner-occupancy are really ex-
pressing a desire for better neighborhoods and improved housing quality,
and not simply a fee interest in their dwellings. Owner-occupancy, they
assert, is an instrumental variable in the improved housing equation,
but not the real preference." Thus, Stegman proposes that "a simple
change in tenure would produce less improvement in consumer satisfaction
than many would like to believe." (Michael Stegman, op. cit. p. 194-195)
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TABLE 26
Occupied Housing Units, By Tenure
1890 to 1970
Owner-occupied
units
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
Renter-occupied
units
Total-occupied
units
Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census of
Housing and 1970 Census of Housing, Vol I. Compiled in 1973 HUD
Statistical Yearbook, p. 317.
Number (000) Percent Number (000) Percent Number (000)
6,066 47.8 6,624 52.2 12,690
7,455 46.7 8,509 53.3 15,964
9,301 45.9 10,954 54.1 20,256
11,114 45.6 13,238 54.4 24,352
14,280 47.8 15,624 52.2 29,905
15,196 43.6 19,659 56.4 34,855
23,560 55.0 19,266 45.0 42,826
32,797 61.9 20,227 38.1 53,024
39,885 62.9 23,565 37.1 63,450
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APPENDIX 1-3
QUALITATIVE APPROACH
The approach of the research has been qualitative. Data have been
gathered from over eighty interviews with, for example, HUD employees,
mortgage lenders and homeownership counseling agency personnel located
all across the country. Another key primary source of information has been
Congressional hearings and Government Audit Reports.
At no point during the thesis has any attempt been made to develop
causal relationships between the problematic procedures of the homeowner-
ship system and default and foreclosure rates.
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INDIVIDUALS CONSULTED:
1) Mortgage companies and other lending institutions:
Thomas Wilmore - Cambridge Savings Bank
P. Flynn - Provident Institution for Savings, Boston
Arnold Schultz - Homeowners Federal Savings & Loan Association, Boston
Donald J. McLaughlin - Provident Institution for Savings, Boston
Thomas H. Leahy - Beacon Mortgage Co., Boston
*George Silva - Old Stone Bank, Providence
*Robert Evans - Old Stone Bank, Providence
*C. Crocker - Citizens Savings Bank, Providence
Stanley Goodrow - Kislak Mortgage Co., Miami
Robert R. Jordan - Kislak Mortgage Co., New Jersey
William Salyer - Louisville Mortgage Company
Sharon Bolton - Jay F. Zook Mortgage Co., Cleveland
Donald Luff - Jay F. Zook Mortgage Co., Cleveland
Stuart Blanton. - First Mortgate Corp., Richmond, Va.
William Sawyer - Northeast Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., Watertown, Mass.
Vera Iannello - Northeast Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., Watertown, Mass.
C. L. Gildroy - Northeast Federal Savings & Loan Assoc., Watertown, Mass.
Harold Dickson - Pence Mortgage Co., Louisville
Michael Aguirre - Gibralter Savings and Loan Association, Los Angeles
Gladys Zumwall - Western Mortgage Co., Los Angeles
Marie Greenwood - Gibralter Savings and Loan Association, Los Angeles
*F. McCafferty - Bogley Mortgage Company, Philadelphia
*Romeo Valentino - Colonial Mortgage Company, Philadelphia
*Robert Schimony - Colonial Mortgage Company, Philadelphia
2) Department of Housing and Urban Development:
John C. Fortson - Los Angeles
David Goss - Louisville
Katie Washington - Little Rock
Val Garcia - Los Angeles
*John Andrews - Boston
Lucille Henderson - Kansas City, Kansas
Rose Strickland - Phoenix
Thomas Clendenon - Louisville
Kenneth Anderson - San Francisco
*William Bonner - Shreveport
Janet Miller - San Francisco
Sarah Comber - Hartford
William Feingold - Washington
D. Hall - Washington
J. M. Hurtt - Washington
*Wallace St. Angelo - Providence
*Douglas Chaffen - Philadelphia
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*James Rolen - Philadelphia
*Michael Cosantino - Philadelphia
*Charles Morgan - Philadelphia
*R. Merrell - Philadelphia
*Robert O'Connor - Philadelphia
Water J. Stuart - Washington
3) Federal National Mortgage Association:
Oakley Hunter - Washington, D.C.
Norman Camber - Los Angeles
Ellen Allison - Los Angeles
Oliver McCarron - Philadelphia
Betty Brouwer-Ancher - Philadelphia
Harry S. Schwartz - Washington
Loretta Wing - Philadelphia
Allan E. Arneson - Los Angeles
Fred Mowatt - Washington
John Kuhnle - Washington
Robert Kahn - Washington
John Blakistone - Washington
Eric Brestrup - Washington
4) Miscellaneous:
Carl Freeman - Association for Better Living/Surburban Housing Project,
Boston
Clark Prichard - Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Washington
Gavin Brown - Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Washington
John Wetmore - Mortgage Bankers Assoc., Washington
Eugene Toten - University of Southern California
George Lefcoe - University of Southern California
Hilbert Fefferman - Consultant to FNMA
Victor Bach - Project Director, OSTI
*Welton Myers - Better Rochester Living
David Madway - National Housing and Law Project, Berkeley
Seymour Mansfield - Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago
Meg Frisbee - FHLB of Boston
*Garfield Harris - Maple Corporation, Philadelphia
*Harry Reno - Maple Corporation, Philadelphia
Tom Jones - NHS Program, Pittsburgh'
Barbara Dingfield - Assoc. for Better Housing, Boston
*Barbara Southwick - Spokane Community Action Council
*Sadelle Sachs - Fair Housing Inc., Boston
Jack Blum - Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
Bill Whiteside - Urban Reinvestment Task Force, Washington
*Shreveport Consumer Credit Agency
*Louisville Urban League (Counseling Agency)
Kenneth Plant - Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
*B. Ormes - Philadelphia Urban League Housing Information Center
Don Kaplan - FHLBB, Washington
Margaret Drury - Urban Institute, Washington
Mort Isler - Urban Institute, Washington
*Individuals interviewed while working at OSTI.
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APPENDIX 1-5
AN IMAGE OF A "CONSUMER-ORIENTED" HOMEOWNERSHIP/HOME FINANCE SYSTEM:
It is valuable to briefly describe some of the key aspects of a home-
ownership/home finance system that would be oriented toward the needs of
consumers. The following image of a consumer-oriented system points to
many mis-matches between it and the actual practices and procedures of the
present HUD-FHA home finance system, as discussed throughout this thesis.
A consumer oriented homeownership/home finance system would be based
on a set of consumer rights. In the first major address by a President
on protecting the consumer interest, President Kennedy suggested that con-
sumer rights include the following:
1. The right to safety - to be protected against the mar-
keting of goods which are hazardous to health or life.
2. The right to be informed - to be protected against
fraudulent, deceitful, or grossly'misleading informa-
tion, advertising, labeling, or other practices, and
to be given the facts he needs to make an informed
choice.
3. The right to choose - to be assured, wherever possible,
access to a variety of products and services at competi-
tive prices and in those industries in which competition
is not workable and Government regulation is substituted,
to be assured satisfactory quality and service at fair
prices.
4. The right to be heard - to be assured that consumer in-
terests will receive full and sympathetic consideration
in the formulation of Government policy, and fair and 1
expeditious treatment in its administrative tribunals.
Executive Office of the President "Consumer Advisory Council, First
Report", October 1963. This report contains the text of President
Kennedy's March 15, 1962 "Special Message on Protecting the Consumer
Interest."
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Translating these "rights" into the present context--the homeowner-
ship/home finance system--the following is a list of the types of expec-
tations that a consumer should reasonably expect to be fulfilled in pur-
chasing and maintaining a home:
1. Being in a position to understand the home purchase process, particu-
larly the roles and goals of each actor and institution.
2. Being able to articulate and answer the key questions related to buying
a home.
3. Having access to a source of information--such as a homeownership counsel-
ing agency--which is-able to provide advice and advocate on the consumer's
behalf.
4. Being assured that the Government agency involved in the home purchase
process--in this case HUD-FHA--will protect his interests and will act as
a watchdog over the other actors and institutions in the system.
5. Understanding the implications of default and foreclosure and knowing
how to act if mortgage payment difficulties arise. Also, being assured
that the mortgage lender will assist him to the fullest extent and will
comply with the Government's guidelines concerning default.
6. Being able to file a complaint about any aspect of the home purchase
process in which the consumer feels he has been wronged. And, being as-
sured that this complaint will receive prompt attention and that the problem
will be rectified if the complaint is justified.
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APPENDIX 2-1
THE FHLBS AND ITS ADJUNCTS: FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN INSURANCE COR-
PORATION (FSLIC) AND THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION (FHLMC):
FSLIC
Just as the FHLBS's credit advance mechanism addressed itself to
the liquidity problem that lenders faced during the Depression, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and later the FSLIC, helped
depositors to overcome the mistrust in financial institutions which had
been so widespread in the 1930's.
Using the Federal Reserve System as the model, Congress created the
FSLIC in 1934. The FDIC, established earlier that year, was set up to
insure savings accounts in commercial and mutual savings banks. Through
this new mechanism, depositors were assured that if, for any reason,
a bank were forced to close down, the money on depsoit in each account
could be recouped through the FDIC.
Writing about the success of the FDIC, Hoagland and Stone have ob-
served that:
Immediately after provision by Congress for the insurance of
bank accounts, the old boot, the clock, and the tin can buried
in the backyard began to disgorge their currency contents.
Public confidence in our commercial banking system was miracu-
lously restored. The about-face was immediate and complete.1
But, in order to restore confidence in savings and loan associations,
a comparable insurance mechanism was needed. Thus, the creation of FSLIC 2
was critical to the S and L's if they were to continue to be able to at-
tract deposits and be competitive with the insured savings institutions.
Hoagland and Stone, op. cit. p 461.
2Title IV. -National Housing Act of 1934, op. cit.
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FHLMC, or "FREDDIE MAC"
The FHLMC, a subsidiary of the FHLBS, is the last link of the FHLBS,
as well as the newest member of the Federal credit family.3 FHLMC was
created by Title III of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 and serves
as a secondary mortgage market facility, primarily for savings and loan
associations. It is part of the Federal Government's continuing effort
at decreasing risk for lenders by providing them with an additional source
of liquidity. As a purchaser of conventional mortgage loans, FHLMC dupli-
cates FNMA's recently granted authority to purchase non-insured loans.
3For a good summary of FHLMC's functions see Richard W.Bartke,
"Home Financing at the Crossroads". A Study of the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation; FHLMC Monographs: No. 1. February, 1973.
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APPENDIX 3-1: HISTORY OF RISK
CONCEPTS IN HOME MORTGAGE
INSURANCE LEGISLATION
From: Fifteenth Report by the
Committee on Government
Operations, "Defaults on
FHA--Insured Home Mort-
gages--Detroit, Mich."
June 20, 1972
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A.--HISTORY OF RIsK CONCEPTS IN HOME MORTGAGE
INSURANCE LEGISLATION
The National Housing Act of 1934, as amended, provides for insur-
ance of home mortgage loans by the iSeccetary of HUD. Originally,
the authority to insure mortgage loans was vested in the Adminis-
trator of the Federal Housing Administration. Although the author-
ity was transferred to the Secretary of Housing and U"rban Develop-
ment when the Deparitment was created by the Department of Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1965, mortgage loans insured under
various sections of the National Housing Act have continued to be
identified as FHA-insured mortgage loans.
Section 203
Section 203, enacted in 1934, provided authority for insurance of
mortgage loans to finance the purchase of one- to four-family new
or existing homes. Designed to restore the confidence of lenders in resi-
dential mortgage loans, it insured them against losses from default,
except for a, part of foreclosure costs. To stimulate residential construe-
tion in a depressed economy, it authorized the insurance of mortgages
with relatively low downpavments on the purchase price and extended
loan maturities. In addition to those provisions to keep monthly
principal and interest payments low, the interest rate was not to
exceed a regulatory ceiling that could be established below a statutory
ceiling. Administrative expenses and insurance claims were to be paid
from proceeds of annual mortgage insurance premiums collected from
the homeowner mortgagors. The premium has been one-half of 1 per-
cent of the outstanding loan balance except for a short period in the
early years of the program.
The mortgage insurance program, thus, was to be self-sufficient.
In 35 years, after insurance of some 8.4 million home mortgages under
section 203, an accumulation of $1.3 billion in insurance fund reserves
was built up through an excess of insurance premium income over
administrative, expenses, claim payments and mutual fund participa-
tion payments to mortgagors. To reinforce the prudent character of the
operation, section 203 provides that "no mortgage shall be accepted
for insurance under this section unless the Secretary finds that the
project with respect to which the mortgage is executed is economically
sound." Under this mandate, the FHA mortgage insurance program
was administered in such a way as to avoid the risks of mortgages
on properties in declining inner-city neighborhoods, or of mortgagors
whose income was considered too low to assure loan repayments without
excessive risk.
(51)
Section221(d) (2) -o |'"
In 1954, the urban renewal program, which had been enacted
in 1949, was revised and expanded in the Omnibus Housing Act of
1954. Related to the urban renewal legislation, in the same act, new
mortgage insurance legislation was enacted to meet some of the special
problems engendered by the urban renewal program.
One of the new housing provisions enacted was section 221 (d) (2)
of the National Housing Act. The section "is designed to assist private
industry in providing housing for low- and moderate-income families
and displaced families." The words "displaced families" were substi-
tuted in 1961 for the original clause: "families displaced from urban
renewal areas or as a result of governmental actions."
Many of the families being displaced from housing to be rehabili-
tated or demolished for redevelopment on urban renewal sites had lim-
ited incomes. The 1954 legislation, therefore, permitted home purchases
with a $200 minimum down payment to be financed with an FHA-
insured section 221 (d) (2) mortgage. Such a mortgage also could have
a maturity of up to 40 years, instead of the 30-year maximum then per-
mitted under section 203. Most important of all, there was no "eco-
nomic soundness" criterion in the section 221 statute. There is a pro-
vision (in sec. 221(f)) that "The property shall comply with such
standards and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe to establish
the acceptability of such property for mortgage insurance." This ap-
proaches the "acceptable risk" concept which is to become more explicit
in subsequent legislation- it apparently was intended to be a relaxation
from the "economic soundness" concept and certainly came to be inter-
preted as a less rigid criterion.
On the other hand, it should also be noted that section 221(d) (2) re-
quires that the property shall be one which meets "the requirements of
all State laws, or local ordinances or regulations, relating to the public
health or safety, zoning or otherwise, which may be applicable thereto."
Section 203(1)
A more explicit exemption from the "economic soundness" criterion
was enacted by the Congress in 1966. In the general context of the
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966,
approved November 3, 1966, which was aimed at the improvement of
conditions in the inner city, section 302 added section 203(1) of the
National Housing Act:
(1) The Secretary is authorized to insure under this section
any mortgage meeting the requirements of this section, other
than the requirement in subsection (c) relating to economic
soundness, if he determines that (1) the dwelling covered by
the mortgage is situated in an area in which rioting or other
civil disorders have occurred or are threatened, (2) as a result
of such actual or threatened rioting or other disorders the
property with respect to which the mortgage is executed can-
not meet the normal requirements with respect to economic
soundness, and (3) such property is an acceptable risk giving
due consideration to the need for providing adequate housing
for families of low and moderate income in such area.
This section was repealed by the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968 in which sections 223(e) and 237 were enacted to serve -%2--
the same purpose with less limitations as to the applicable geographic
areas. The two latter sections are discussed below. Section 203 (1) was
significant, however, since it apparently was the basis for mortgage
insurance policy changes that were made in .1967.
Section 235
Section 235, enacted in 1968, authorized a mortgage interest rate
subsidy program to support homeownership by low- and moderate-
income families, generally those with incomes below 135 percent of lo-
cal public housing limits. In addition to an interest rate subsidy, in the
form of monthly assistance payments to cover part of the regular
monthly debt service, the section 235 mortgage loan could cover
all of the purchase transaction price except a $200 downpayment and
could have a maturity of up to 40 years.
There is no "economic soundness" requirement for Section 235
mortgage insurance. The statute provides that "to be eligible for in-
surance under this subsection, a mortgage shall meet the requirements
of Section 221(d) (2) or 234(c)." Section 234(c) refers to condo-
miniums and cooperatives. By cross reference, therefore, the concept
of the "acceptable risk" becomes applicable to section 235. Also ap-
plicable by reference would be the section 221(d) (2) requirement for
compliance with State and local code regulations.
The term "acceptable risk" also appears specifically in section 235
(b) (1) in a proviso that. a section 235 mortgage may be insured,
pursuant to Section 237 provisions, for a mortgagor who is determined
to be not an acceptable risk but would otherwise be eligible to receive
a mortgage loan insured under 235 (j) (that is, a home rehabilitated
under the special 235(j) financing program), 221(d) (2) or 234(c)
and is accepted as "a reasonably satisfactory" risk under Section 237.
Section 237
Section 237, also included in the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968, states that:
The purpose of this section is to help provide adequate
housing for families of low and moderate income, including
those who, for reasons of credit history, irregular income
patterns caused by seasonal employment, or other factors, are
unable to meet. the credit, requirements of the Secretary for
the purchase of a single-family home financed by a mortgage
insured under section 203, 220, 221,234, or 235(j) (4), but who,
through the incentive of homeownership and counseling as-
sistance, appear to be able to achieve homeownership.
Subsection (c) (3) provides that the Secretary must determine that
a mortgagor whose loan is being insured pursuant to section 237
would be "a reasonably satisfactory credit risk, consistent with the
objectives stated in subsection (2), if he were to receive budget, debt
management and related counsel ing".
A subsequent, amendment to section 237 (in see. 110 of the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1969) included families eligible for
assistance payments under section 235--not only 235(j)-among ap-
plicants who are to be given a preference for mortgage insurance and
counseling services.
Another significant subsection is section 237(e) which reads:
4 (33- (e) The Secretary is authorized to provide, or contract
with public or private organizations to provide, such budget,
debt management, and related counseling services to mort-
gagors whose mortgages are insured under this section as he
determines to be necessary to meet the objectives of this sec-
tion. The Secretary may also provide such counseling to
otherwise eligible families who lack sufficient funds to supply
a downpayment to help them to save an amount necessary
for that purpose.
In the HUD budget requests submitted to the Congress by the
Executive, an appropriation to fund activities authorized under sec-
tion 237 was requested for fiscal years 1970 and 1971 (as part of
"salaries and expenses") but disapproved by the Congress. For fiscal
1972, HUD did not include such a request in its budget, but the
Congress, on its own initiative appropriated $3,250,000 for counsel-
ing services that had been authorized under Section 237. HUD, ac-
cording to its budget summary for fiscal year 1973, is using the funds
"to assist public and private voluntary agencies in bringing additional
and more effective counseling services to low-income families, and to
evaluate the effectiveness of providing counseling services." 86 The
HU.D 1973 budget contains no appropriation request for additional
section 237 funding. It states that "additional funding" required to
complete the demonstration program will be provided through the
87Department's research program.
The section 237 funds, thus, generally have not been used for coun-
seling of individual home purchasers. In mid-January 1972, HUD did
initiate a program, however, under which counseling is provided to
purchasers of homes under the section 235 program, or under other pro-
grams but pursuant to the provisions of section 237. In instances of
such purchases when the HUD or FHA office reviewing the applica-
tion determines that the home purchaser requires counseling, it is
made a prerequisite to the closing of an FHA-insured loan to finance
the purchase. The seller is required to pay the counseling fee of up to$100 to a HUD-approved counseling agency from the mortgage pro-
ceeds disbursed at time of the loan closing.
Section 223(e)
Another section of the Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968, approved August 1, 1968, added section 223(e) to the National
Housing Act, which reads as follows:
Notwithstanding any of the provisions of this act except
section 212, and without regard to limitations upon eligibility
contained in any section of this title or title XI, the Secretary
is authorized, upon application by the mortgagee, to insure
under any section of this title or title XI a mortgage executed
In connection with the repair, rehabilitation, construction, or
8HUD Budget Justificatien, pt. 3, p. C-1.ff Ibid.
purchase of property located in an'older, declining urban area
in which the conditions are such that one or more of the eli-
gibility requirements applicable to the section or title under
which insurance is sought could not be met, if the Secretary
finds that (1) the area is reasonably viable, giving considera-
tion to the need for providing adequate housing or group
practice facilities for families of low and moderate income in
such area, and (2) the property is an acceptable risk in view
of such consideration. The insurance of a mortgage pursuant
to this subsection shall be the obligation of the Special Risk
Insurance Fund.
Legislative Intent and Implementation
The history of legislative amendments with respect to mortgage
insurance risks to be assumed by HUD, especially in 1966 and 1968
amendments, indicates an intent that greater risks were to be assumed
in order to aid low income, inner city residents to acquire homes. A
significant policy change toward implementation of this intent was
made by the then FHA Commissioner Brownstein within a year after
the enactment of section 203(1). At a conference of FHA insuring
office directors on October 23, 1967, he said:
* * * Risks are inherent in an insurance program (other-
wise there would be no justification or need for insurance)
* * * This does not by any means require the elimination of
prudence and common sense. * * * I want us to develop and
support projects which give reasonable promise of success,
which give reasonable promise of improving the housing
conditions of low- and moderate-income families, and improv-
ing the inner city. A project should be rejected if it Joes not
appear to give reasonable promise of accomplishing these ob-
jectives. It should not be rejected simply because it involves
poor people, or because it is in a portion of the city you have
been accustomed to rejecting or redlining for old fashioned,
arbitrary reasons.
In testimony before the Housing Subcommittee of the House Bank-
ing and Currency Committee on February 22, 1972, IUD Secretary
Romney, in discussing the recent marked increase in FHA foreclo-
sures, defaults and abandonments, traced the legislative history of the
"acceptable risk" concept in lieu of "economic spundness". He also
placed in the record the above quoted 1967 statement by former FHA
Commissioner Brownstein.
In a public statement in January 1972, Secretary Romney had said
that there was graft, corruption and kickback and that thousands of
families who bought homes with FHA-insured mortgage loans had
been victimized.
With reference to Secretary Romney's January statement and Feb-
ruary testimony, at a hearing of the Legal and Monetary Affairs Sub-
committee on February 24, 1972, Subcommittee Chairman Monagan
said:
Unfortunately, this belated recognition of the seriousness
of today's crisis in subsidized housing has been accompanied
by a tendency to affix blame in an oversimplified manner, vir-
tually ignoring administrative responsibility for the past 3
years. There may be defects in the basic statute involved, as
has been stated.
The distinguished Senator from Alabama, John Sparkman, chair-
man of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, because of this
apparent finger-pointing attitude, stated in his address to the home-
builders on January 25:
To keep the record straight, there was never any congres-
sional intent to authorize local FHA offices to insure sub-
standard housing or to accept as mortgagors the poor whose fi-
nancial condition did not justify honeownership. The strong
language in the 1968 Housing Act and subsequent adminis-
trative rulings were intended to eliminate "redlining" in
older declining urban areas, but not to blanket in as insurable
risks all units in such areas regardless of their condition or
otherwise insurable qualifications.
An objective reading of the statute, the legislative history, and a
review of subsequent administrative rulings support Chairman Spark-
man's interpretation. It is disturbing, therefore, to learn that the im-
pression left by the Secretary in response to questioning before the
Housing Subcommittee of the House Banking and Currency Commit-
tee was that Congress was the principal villain in the piece.
Former FHA Commissioner Brownstein, in response to the Secre-
tary's testimony, submitted for the record of the Housing Subcom-
mittee hearing a letter to Chairman Barrett, which included the
following:
You will note that throughout all of the directives there is
a common theme-the revision of criteria relating to property
location. In no way does it relax the requirement that the
house itself meet minimum property standards. There is no
suggestion whatever that appraisers "throw away the book"
in establishing their valuation.38
He also said that waiving "economic soundness" for "acceptable
risk" analysis carries with it the necessity of a sound appraisal and
a structurally sound dwelling unit.
8 Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing of the House Committee on Banking andCurrency, Feb. 22, 24, 1972, p. 269.
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APPENDIX 5-1
ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL OR BAN DISCOUNTS
By the end of World II, the various types of problems associated with
discounts began to be acknowledged.1 In 1950, and then again in 1957,
Congress passed legislation which attempted to control discounts. However,
both bills were repealed. (See Chart 8 ). In both cases the
repeal had to do with the notion that the ban on discounts was imposing
unnatural constraints on the market.
In the earlier legislation, lenders were having difficulty selling
undiscounted loans to secondary investors without accruing losses and
this, in turn, resulted in mortgage capital drying up. Similarly, in the
later legislation, discounts were blamed as one reason why lenders were
simply not making mortgage credit available, thereby contributing to the
declining home building industry.
In arguing for the repeal of the 1957 legislation the FHA Commissioner
stated that:
FHA has made every effort to administer the provisions of this section
(Discount Control) in a manner that would cause as little disruption
of the normal practices of the homebuilding and financing industries
as possible, while at the same time preventing any charges to home
buyers. In spite of these efforts this provision has created confusion
and reluct nce or the part of lenders toward using FHA-insured
financing.
"Mortgage Discounts" op. cit.
2-Ibid. p. 33
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Keeping in mind that the 1957 law was repealed less than nine months
after its enactment, the Commissioner's remarks lack credibility. First,
it is hard to imagine the FHA being able to make "every effort" in such a short
period. And, second, nine months would hardly seem to be a sufficient
amount of time to as certain that the control on discounts was the cause of
the decreasing amount of mortgage capital. It would appear, then, that
the discount control law was not given a fair chance.
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CHART 8
Summary of Legislative History of Discount Control Laws
Legislation Provision Outcome
Section 504
Housing Act of 1950
Gave authority to VA
Administrator and FHA
Commissioner to limit
the charges and fees
imposed upon builders,
veterans or other pur-
chasers of VA or FHA
housing. No loan shall
be insured or guaranteed
unless the mortgagee
certifies that it has
adhered to these regu-
lations.
1. Amended by Housing
Amendments of 1953
(Sec. 23) to the ef-
fect that the regu-
lations which limited
charges and fees of
mortgagees should
not be construed to
include any loss
suffered by an origi-
nating lender in the
sale of mortgages to
secondary investors.
It appears that this
amendment was added
because Section 504
was cutting off in-
volvement among sec-
ondary mortgage mar-
ket investors who
had been purchasing
FHA and VA loans at
par. Capital scarce
areas were hardest
hit by Section 504.
2. Section 504, repealed
by Section 813 of the
Housing Act of 1954.
Determined that Sec-
tion 504, was no long-
er needed since con-
trol of fees is other-
wise available. While
this was not detalied,
it was the intent of
Congress that FHA and
VA would continue to
protect purchasers
against excessive fees.
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Summary of Legislative History of Discount Control Laws, cont'd.
ProvisionLegislation
Housing Act
of 1957
Section 605
Outcome
Repealed by Emergency
Housing Act of 1958,
Section 6. Following
President Eisenhower's
suggestion, less than
a year after the dis-
count control law went
into effect, it was
repealed by Congress.
The apparent reason
was that the home-
building industry was
in a serious slump
and the ban on dis-
counts was blamed as
one reason why lenders
were moving away from
FHA and VA programs,
thereby making mort-
gage money scarce.
Source: Gathered from information presented in "Mortgage Discounts"
pp. 25-34.
Gave authority to the
FHA Commissioner and
the VA Administrator
to fix reasonable
limits on the charges
fees, and discounts
imposed upon the
builder, seller or
purchaser in connec-
tion with any hous-
ing insured or guar-
anteed by these agen-
cies. No loan shall
be insured or guar-
anteed unless the
lender certifies that
it has adhered to
these regulations.
While the language
of this and the 1950
legislation is al-
most identical, the
1957 law did not in-
tend to eliminate
discounts entirely,
as did the earlier
legislation.
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APPENDIX 6-1
EARLY MORTGAGE COMPANIES:
While the mortgage company has grown considerably under the FHA,
a variety of mortgage banking firms have operated since the late eighteenth
century. Before the emergence of the "modern mortgage company", following
the creation of the FHA, four distinct types of specialized mortgage lend-
ing institutions had developed:
(1) Mortgage banks originated mortgages, and held them in their own
portfolio. In order to raise the funds to convert into mortgage loans,
they issued their own obligations, secured by these mortgages, for sale to
the public.
(2) Mortgage guarantee companies originated mortgages and either
sold them to investors or issued bonds which were backed by these mortgages.
These companies guaranteed the payment of principal and interest on the
bonds to the investors.
(3) Mortgage loan companies originated and sold mortgages directly
to investors.
(4) Mortgage brokers arranged transactions between borrowers and
lenders without any direct ownership of the mortgages. I
The modern mortgage company most resembles the mortgage loan company.
As intermediates between borrower and investor, they are free of any direct
obligations upon the sale of the mortgage. In a legal sense, they have no
interest in the mortgage following its sale. An overriding difference
between the four mortgage entities described above and modern mortgage
1Typology developed by Klaman, op. cit.; p. 5.
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companies is that the latter sell the overwhelming proportion of the
mortgages which they originate to institutional investors, while the
earlier mortgage banking firms sold most of their mortgages of individuals.2
2 Ibid
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APPENDIX 8-1
HUD'S HANDLING OF MORTGAGORS' COMPLAINTS
Information on how HUD has handled mortgagors' complaints is
skimpy. However, the 235 Audit and the All Homes Audit present some
data on HUD's procedures related to both existing and new Section 235
homes.
New Homes
The 235 Audit found that although:
The prescribed procedures for the handling of mortgagors' com-
plaints on new housing..(was) generally adeTuate.. .better im-
plementation by field offices (was) needed.
Based upon the findings of new 235 Audit, Central Office developed pre--
cise procedures for handling complaints on new housing. However, the All
Homes Audit found that in five of the nine field offices reviewed, the im-
plementation of the new homes complaint procedure was still not adequate.
The major deficiency was the lack of prompt advice on the availability of
HUD assistance provided to dissatisfied mortgagors.2 One reason given by
HUD officials for inactivity and/or delays was the inability to obtain the
FHA case files. 3
It is a disconcerting fact that once the FHA insurance certificate
has been issued, the entire case file is shipped from the Area or Insuring
Office to Central Office in Washington. Moreover, the only way for field
office personnel to obtain a specific case file is by knowing the FHA case
number.
1235 Audit op. cit. p. 43
2All Homes Audit op. cit. p. 62
3Ibid.
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However, the 235 Audit found that:
No records are regjired to be maintained in the field office
that permit access to any information it might have in its 4files, or in the case file that is stored in Washington, D.C.
If the complaining mortgagor knows his case number, or if this can be
obtained from the mortgagee, the file can be sent for in Washington. How'-
ever, there is no certainty that the file will be readily found. For ex-
ample, part of the field research by OSTI, under contract to HUD, included
pulling a sample of 235 case files from specific locales. Upon visiting
the file room in Washington, OSTI researchers learned that many files
were missing, particularly because of the variety of investigations that
were then underway. For some locales, 235 mortgagor case files were al-
most totally absent, and the person in charge only could offer that they
had been "borrowed"--not even sure by whom.5 Thus, access to any one of
these mortgagors' case files was virtually impossible.
In such a situation, or if the field office wanted to try to handle
the case without dealing with Central Office, case information is freqeunt-
ly obtained from the mortgagee, who usually keeps a copy of most, if not
all, of the information contained in the FHA case file. However, there
are shortcomings with this approach. The 235 Audit reported that:
We observed a number of cases in which mortgagors' complaints
were handled without access to the data in the case file. In
a good percentage of such cases, the field offices requested
data from the mortgagees' files about the certifications of,
for example, plumbing, roofing or heating, in order to evalu-
ate the likelihood of an inaccurate certification by a trades-
4235 Audit op. cit. p 45
5Writer's experience while employed by OSTI.
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man. Often, the mortgagee had certified to the satisfactory
completion of repairs about which the mortgagor was complaining.
Accordingly, we do not consider the mortgagees' files to be a
proper continuing reference source which substitutes for ac-
cess to information contained in HUD files. 6
The All-Homes Audit also found that:
In four field offices, complaints covered by builders' war-
ranties were not being processed promptly and insufficient
or untimely action was taken against builders who failed to 7
correct defective conditions for which they were responsible.
Further:
Four of the offices failed to act on a number of
referrals.. .some field office took from six months
to more than one year to obtain corrective action. One field
official told us that he did not act on referrals until
the mortgagors filed a written complaint, which no one advised
the mortgagor to do.8
Existing Homes
Until April 1971, HUD had no prescribed procedures or policies for
the handling of mortgagors' complaints on existing Section 235 housing.
The December 1971 235 Audit found that:
The policies, procedures, and controls for handling of
mortgagors' complaints on existing housing as well as the
field offices' implementation thereof were substantially
deficient. Many mortgagors' legitimate complaints about
serious problems were not resolved promptly, if at all. 9
But, in April 1971, HUD implemented the Section 518(b) program,
which attempted to make amends to Section 235 mortgagors with legitimate
complaints. As discussed in Chapter 8, this program authorizes the Secre-
tary of HUD to compensate 235 mortgagors and, since 1974, mortgagors under
6235 Audit, op. cit. p. 45-46
7All-Homes Audit, op. cit. p. 66
8 Ibid. p 64
9235 Audit, op. cit. p. 42
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the other home insurance programs, for structural or other defects which
seriously effect the use and livability of the dwelling.
As a result of the slow processing of complaints on both new and
existing housing, some families have been forced to abandon their homes
and foreclosure has resulted.
For example, in one existing housing case:
A complainant sought assistance to repair leaky rusted-out
water pipes that had caused ten inches of water to stand
under his house. After about three months the complainant
advised the field office that he intended to abandon the
house because of "red tape" and the unlivable condition of
the house. 10
In addition, the Audit noted that some owners of new homes:
Have defaulted on their mortgages due to dissatisfaction with
their property and frustration in obtaining the needed cor-
rective action.11
This is, in part, due to HUD's procedures for closing complaint cases.
In compliance with HUD policy as stated in Handbook 4070.1:
The field offices closed complaint cases without taki-ng any
action to assure that the work was done. When the work was
not done as promised, which was not uncommon, the mortgagor
again had to notify HUD of his complaint, which further ir-
ritated the mortgagor.12
Thus, while it seems that HUD has become more responsive to consumers'
complaints, the fact remains that during the early years of the low-moderate
income families' participation in the homeownership programs, HUD's pro-
cedures were problematic. HUD's failure to institute good procedures
for handling mortgagors' complaints early in the homeownership programs
10All Homes Audit, op. cit. p. 64
11 Ibid. p. 66
12Ibid.
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is further indication of HUD's unwillingness to accept a full measure
of responsibility and, as a result, the interests of consumers have
not been served.
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APPENDIX 9-1:
THE FOUR INSURANCE FUNDS
AUTHORIZED BY THE
NATIONAL HOUSING ACT
From: Twenty-Third Report by the
Committee on Government
Operations, "Alarming
Deterioration of Reserves
of FHA Mortgage Insurance
Funds." December 18, 1974
-/ 7-
II. THE FOUR INSURANCE FUNDS AUTHORIZED BY THE
NATIONAL HOUSING ACT
The Federal Housinig Administration, Department, of Housing and
Urban Developient, admini st ers umortgage insurance prograis under
which lending institutions (iortgagees) that have financed first mort-
gages on various types of housing are insured against loss on these
mortgages as well as on loans which finance property alterations,
repairs and/or improvements.
Most of the insurance written by the FHA covers mortgages on
small homes--one to four families-and on multifamily housinmg prop-
erties. From its inception on June 27, 1934, through June 30, 1973,
the FHA wrote approximately $180 bilion in insurance, of which
about $SS billion was in force as of the latter date.'
Originally, the systiem of mortgage insurance was designed to create
a sound debt structure to support residential construction activity.
The National Housing Act of 1034 provided for a single amortized
nortgage with relativ ely low downpayments and for a self-supporting
insurance fund. Since its inception, Government. mortg-c''ge insurance
has provided access to the housing market for millions of families on
an economically sound basis, not only through FLA progTamus, but
also by demonstrating to conventional nortgaige lenders the soundness
of low downpaym ent, long-term mortgage lending.
FHA insurance programs, as a result of the lousing and Urban
Development Act of 1965 and subsequent amendments, are now con-
ducted under four insurance funds aut horized by the -National Housing
Act. These are revolving funds which are used for carrying out the
insurance operations of specific sections of the enabling legislation.
Thle funds are credited with fees, premiums, and investment income
and are charged with debenture interest, administrative expenses,
and insurance losses.
These funds include the mutual mortgage insurance fund, the
general insurance fund, the cooperative management housing insurance
fund, and the special risk insurance fund.
MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND
The mutual mortgage insurance (MMI) fund, established by the
original National Hlousing Act in 1934, was to be used as a revolving
fund for the insurance of home mortgages under section 203 and
low-cost housing projecis under section 207. Since 1938, the IMI
fund has been utilized solely in connection with FHlA operations under
section 203 to insure one-to-four family homes wtth loan-to-value
ratios of 80 to 96 percent. The mortgage term can now be as long as
35 years, although imost are for 30 years or less. This insurance fund
is a mutual one because mortgagors (homeowners) who have fully
4 Hearings, pt. 1, p. 2; pt. 2, p. 11S.
(3)
43-427--74--2
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4
repaid their mortgages may receive a share of funds accumulated in a
participating reserve account established for the purpose of making
such payments.
As of June 30, 1973, this fund had about $50 billion of outstanding
insurance in force.5 The assets of this insurance fund are, for the most
part, invested in the public debt of the United States.'
GENERAL INSURANCE FUND
The general insurance fund was established on August 10, 1965,
by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 to consolidate
a number of previously established insurance funds authorized by
the National Housing Act. Included were the assets and liabilities of
all insurance accounts and funds, and all previously issued outstanding
commitments, except those resulting from operations under section
203 (the MMI fund) or section 213 to the extent they involved
mottgage insurance under the cooperative management housing
insurance fund, which was also established in 1965.
The general insurance fund insures a wide variety of mortgages and
notes of varying risk which finance the purchase, construction, and/or
improvement of small homes, multifamily property, nonresidential
property, and commercial or farm structures. Among the programs
insured are title I home improvement and mobile home loans, section
207 multifamily housing, title VI war housing, section 220 urban
renewal housing, and section 221 multifamily and single-family
insurance for displaced families and families of low and moderate
income.
As of June 30, 1973, the general fund had about $23 billion of out-
standing insurance in force. vlost of the dollar volume of insurance
outstanding in this fund is for insuring mortgages on section 221(d) (2)
low downpayment, homeownership property and market and below-
market interest-rate multifamily rental property.8
COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT HOUSING INSURANCE FUND
The cooperative management housing insurance (CMHI) fund,
also established by the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965,
was designed to serve as a revolving fund for mortgages, loans, and
commitments transferred to it from the general insurance fund, or
those covered by insurance written after that date, on section 213
management-type cooperative projects. In a manner similar to that
of the MMI fund, section 213(1) provides that "Upon termination
of the insurance obligation * * * by payment of any mortgage or
loan insured under this section, and at such time or times prior to
such termination as the Secretary may determine, the Secretary is
authorized to distribute to the mortgagor or borrower a share of the
Participating Reserve Amount in such manner and amount as the
Secretary shall determine to be equitable and in accordance with sound
actuarial and accounting practice * * *." These provisions for
mutuality payments to mortgagors or borrowers distinguish the MMI
'Hearings, pt. 2, p. 150.
* See app. A for a detailed listing of investments.
7 Hearings, pt. 2, p. 151.
$ Hearings, pt. 1, p. 6.
and CMIHI funds from other insurance funds established under the
National Housing Act."
Outstanding insurance in force under this fund totaled about
$780 million as of June 30, 1973.10
SPECIAL RISK INSURANCE FUND
The special risk insurance (SRI) fund was established on August 1,
1968, pursuant to the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.
Under this fund, mortgages are insured which finance (1) homes
purchased by low income families who are assisted with their mortgage
paynents by the FIIA; (2) homes purchased by low and moderate
income families who, because of the nature of their credit histories or
irregular income patterns, could not qualify for mortgage insurance
under other FIIA insurance programs; and (3) the repair, rehabilita-
tion, construction, or purchase of property located in older, declining
urban areas in which conditions are such that eligibility requirements
for mortgage insurance could not be satisfied under other FHA
insurance programns.
As of June 30, 1973, this fund had about $14 billion in insurance in
force, nearly all of which covered the subsidized section 235 homeowner-
ship and section 236 rental assistance programs and the section 223(e)
insurance in declining neighborhoods."
9 I bid., p. 34.
10 Hearings, pt. 2, p. 151.
11 Hearings, pt. 1, p. 4; pt. 2, p. 152.
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APPENDIX 9-2
CASE STUDY OF ATTEMPT BY LOCAL HUD OFFICE TO INSTITUTE DETAILED, CONSUMER-
ORIENTED MORTGAGE SERVICING STANDARDS
In spite of an apparent concern for defining mortgagee responsibility
during default, the HUD guidelines leave some key words open to interpre-
tation. For example, HUD Guidebook 4191.1 advises that: "Approved mort-
gagees are required to service their insured mortgage accounts in accordance
with the accepted practices or prudent lending institutions"' thus turning
the responsibility for judgment back on the mortgagee (underline added).
In view of the abovethe "Report of the Task Force on Improving the Opera-
tion of Federally Insured or Financed Housing Programs", stated that there
was still a need for "a set of detailed servicing requirements to be ob-
served by all mortgage servicers with respect to FHA-insured single family
mortgages".2
The Single Family Mortgage Servicing Specialist of the Phoenix Insur-
ing Office concurred with this recommendation. In an attempt to make HUD's
servicing guidelines more specific, he encouraged the Phoenix Insuring Of-
fice Director to issue a set of "Minimum Servicing Standards" to all ap-
proved mortgagees in his area.3 These new guidelines went beyond HUD ser-
vicing guidelines in the following ways: ( See Exhibit- 16)
1HUD Guidebook 4191.1 oR. cit. p. 2.
2Volume 1 "Single Family Housing", op cit. p 275.
3Interview, Rose Strickland, op. cit.
DEPARUTITT OF HOUSIG AND URBAN DEVELOP7T
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
- Phoenix Insuring Office
244 West Osborn Road, P.O. Box 13468
) & IT 1~ Phoenix, Arizona 85002
November 29, 1973
OFFICE OF TBE DIRECTOR CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 73-13 1
TO : ALL APTROVED HORTGAGEES
RE : MINIMI SINGLE FAMILY MORTGAGE SERVICING STANDARDS
The Phoeni Insuring Office of the Department of Housing and Urban Development
is continuously receiving inquiries from borrowers involving mortgage servicing
matters which are within the purview of the lending institutions. In oider to
assure that mortgagors have an opportunity to work out their problems and have
their questions answered promptly, this office Las developed minimum standards
of prudent mortgage servicing.
Every FHA approved mortgagee having an investment or servicing portfolio of
FMA insured mortgages encumbering properties situated within the State cf Arazor
must meet the mainimum servicing standards enunciated below:
Minimum Servicinz Standards
1. Every mortgagee shall have a home office, a branch office, or an FIFP approve
servicing agent within the State of Arizona. The office or agent shall prov
the full range of mortgage servicing activities. In the case of a mortgagee
using a servicing agent, there must be a formal, written contract delegating
to the agent the authority to perform all duties required to meet these mini
servicing standards. We ask each lender to submit a copy of the original ar.
any subsequent contracts to this office for review and retCn tica in he f ilc
HUD approval of the servicing contract will constitute approval of the
servicing agent,
2. The local office or agent shall respond to mortgagor requests for informatic
and complaitis from mortgagors about payment procedures witin 2. hours of
initial contact. The office or agent must also agree to accept collect call
from mortgagors. Under no circumstances may a borrower, his representative,
or an official* of HUD be asked or required to write or call an office cut sid
the State of Arizona for any type of information, advice, or assi.sta.ce
pertaining to an FHA insured mortgage. Every approved iortgagee whoce home
office or servicing office is outside the State of Arizona must inform every
mortgagor in writing of the address and telephonae number of the office in
Arizona to which he can write or call for information, advice, or assistance
We will need a sample copy of the letter for the files in this office.
3. It is recommended that correspondence with borrowers be under a letterhead
prominently displaying the address and telephone number of the lender's
Arizona office or agent.
4. The office of the local representative shall provide answers to all borrower
inquiries including but not limited to analysis of impound accounts, questio
relating to payment of taxes and insurance premiums, pay-ment changes,
i.ssumptions, pay off information, Section 235 recertifications, and defaults
and repayment plans.
5. Th local offica or agent shall have a full time servicimg representative -
who in imavledgeable in servicing practices and MIAM home rtgage regulations.
The local oiffle or agent must have someone who is authcrized Lo bind the
mue i aters invoving all aspects of servin of insurea mortgages.
This authority is to include but is not limited to adjustment of impound
accounts, acceptance of partial payments, and negotiaticns of repayment plans
in cases of default. One of the touchstones of competernt servicing is the
ability to analyze financial data, determine causes of default, and work out
rayment pI..ans. The local representative must be autborized to meet
this reonsibility
6. Prudent servicing makes it essential that there be maintained within the
State of 3Aiz.na a documented collection file that contains copies of
letters from rowers; replies to such l a relcoy of the -ceoults
of eaan tel.ph2 call, offic visit, or fiel viit; inc data or
a statement cs to why the data was not obtained; the paymcnt history of
the cam; a statement of the cause of default; and the teams of any repayment
7. Every borrower shall receive telephone contact, if possible, on or before
the 30th day of delinquency.
8 If a personal meeAting is necessary, the borrower should be asked to come to
the lender's office. In cases in which telephone contact cannot be made and
in cas'es in whion distance or hardship preclude a visit tc the office, it is
the responsibiity of the lender to make a field servicing visit to the
property on or before the 45th day of delinquency (15th day of default).
This visit will be a servicing visit, not merely a foreclosure inspection.
Lande-rs are not required to make continuous field servicIng visits to
recalcitrant mortgagors. Lenders are expected to make a sinere effortto
cure defaults, assist borrowers in hardship cases, and correct the bad
paying' -abits -of lronic delinuents. If the lender does not make a field
visit within the prescribed time, the servicing file must contain documented
evidence of past prudent servicing efforts.
Every FRA approved mortgagee is asked to notify this office in writ-ing
within 90 days whether it is in full compliance with these minimum
servicing standards or has disposed of its portfolio to a lender .ho is
in full comoliance
HUD Assistance
Tic Single Famiily Mlortgage Servicing Specialist of the Phoenix Office has already
begun a proganm of visiting FEA approved mortgagees in Arizona to assist them
with servicing probims and to re-view their servicing policies and procedures.
We urge all lenders to inform their local representatives that servicing personnel
of the Phoenix Office are prepared to meet with them and to provide any type of
assistance possible under outstanding HUD regulations and policies. Please call
261-1923 when requesting assistance.
IRRITT R. S!KTl
Director
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- Required each FHA approved mortgagee doing business with Arizona
to have an office or representative within the state. (1)4
- Set a time limit within which mortgagees were required to respond
to mortgagor questions and prescribed other specific requirements
for dealing with mortgagors. (2,3,4)
- Required mortgagees to have a full-time servicing representative who
was to be knowledgeable in all aspects of servicing -- including
dealing with mortgagors in default and record-keeping. (5,6,7,8)5
While this writer was unable to learn the details of Central HUD's
reaction to this circular, it is fair to say that it was not favorable:
Assistant Secretary Crawford ordered that it be rescinded.6 However, the
Phoenix Insuring Office Director issued a new circular which said most
of the same things as the earlier one, but referred more directly to HUD
guidelines and regulations as the basis for its specific recommendations.7
(See Exhibit 17)
This circular was also not received favorably by Central Office8 and
on February 8, 1974 it, too, was rescinded with the following brief and
weak explanation (See Exhibit 18)
4Numbers in parentheses refer to the specific paragraphs in Circular
73-13M.
5Circular Letter No. 73-13M; From the Office of the Director, Phoenix
HUD/FHA Insuring Office, To All Approved Mortgagees Re: Minimum Single
Family Mortgage Servicing Standards, November 29, 1973.
6Interview, Rose Strickland, op. cit.
7Circular Letter No. 74-2M; From the Office of the Director, Phoenix
HUD/FHA Insuring Office, To all Approved Mortgagees, Re: Single Family
Mortgage Servicing, Jan. 31, 1974.
8Interview, Rose Strickland, op. cit.
DE1-AIME NT 0 0E I G AND WRBAN DIAELOPMENT
VFD(mAL lNI Ami N1S RATION
Phoenix Ins ringr Off ice
6/'/~ /~(20'S Obor Rod j Box 13,463
N. Ar i io ) 0
Ja.n ua 3, 1974
OFFICE OF THE DlICOR CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 74-2 M
TO ALL APPRO13 MORTGA E
RE Single Fam ily Mortgae Servicing -
The Phoenix Insuring Ofie Circular Let er 7- 13 M, daTed November 29, 1973 is
resci nded.
In this let t r we reimlind ali onUtgagleus C the requ irement of HJUD-FHA regulations
and guides pertI ain ing to e ser tc Ing 1o mo.rt.gages The comments herein apply to
all lenders who ha;e an nvestment or servicing portfolio of FHA insured mortgages
encumbering proper!ies situia led within the State of Arizona,
HUED-FA Regulati on 203 9 requires;"Ali appr oced iortgagees are required to
service i nsured oans in aordane Ni th Iaccptable mort gage practices of prudent
lending insLi I-tinii lons. i j teeent 0' 1 rf c(I otfau t, he mortI gagee should be able to
contact the m01 1 gagUr and otihe-rwtnise exersise djliIgence in co lecting the amounts
due, Paragraph 3-7 of the Mlortgagees Guide -Appiicati on Through CommiLment
requires: "Mo tgagees are expec ted to i ns ure t h dt ag1 t e f ac ii ties are ava l
able in the area in whici 1e propet Iy is 0 a ted to eeii the mo rtgagor to get
timely informa ion cerni his aicoumn and joc e ie th mrgeeto take
adeq uate steps to pec ;the security for iTs 1oan
The term " 0adequa e fi i iti C Friea isO1 al servi ing representation, The term
"in the area in ich thIe pioperty itE crcated" niens wi thi n the State cf Arizona.
Therefore, eveiy lender mist have a homae office, a branch off ice, or a servicing
agent within lhe State of Arizona. The ofice or' agent must provide the full
range of mortgage sexicing aci vities, In order to assure t hat the facility will
be adequate, mortgagues using a servici ng agent must hare a formal wri t Ten
contract delegating to tic agent the aut horilty to meet HUD requirements. Each
lender shall submit a copy of the original. and any subsequent contracts to this
office for review and r1-et ention in the file, HD appro L of the servicing
contract will constitu c appro1ae of Ie sercvicing_ agent.
The local represen.ative mus go0 de 0 eitx info a on to the mortgagor (Para-
graph 3-7 of the GuIide). To aS sure hat. ecv borrowei is aware of this service,
every mortgagee whose Lomie office or ericing office is outside the State of
Arizona must inform every borrower in writig of the name and address of the
local representathie
Page 2
The local rcpresentative musi be comipe ent to protect the security for the
loan (HUD-J FiA Regulation 203.) and paragraph 3-7 of the Guide). He will be
expected to m-ake field risivs :o borrol:ers, ob;ain financial information, deter-
mine causes of defaul. and negotiate repayment pians. Lenders are urged to grant
local representaTives authority to bind the corporation in all servicing matters
including repayment agreements. If the home office wishes to reserve to itself
approval authority of repayment plans, the loal representative should make an
immediate report to the home office, in luding a statement of the borrower's
repayment ofter, If the offer is accepted, no further action would be necessary
other than routine notification to the corrower, If tne offer is rejected, the
home office should take rne following action. Within 72 hours of receipt of the
local representative's reporr, an official of the home office who is authorized
to accept repayment plans siIouid establish telephone contact with the mortgagor,
After an explanation of the rejection, the borrower should be given an opportu-
nity to present His side of the story and to make further repayni.. It offers. UpoA
completion of the interview, a full resume of the contact must be sent to the
local representative for retention in his collection file,
Generally, communication expenses relating to servicing inquiries and negotiations
shall be borne by the lender. In any unusual instance in which a lender refuses
to bear such expense, we advise a thorough explanation be forwarded to this office
to assure such action is prudent and reasonable. However, we would expect such
instances to be extremely rare, recognizing that many mortgagors are completely
uninformed about mortgage matters.
In the Form 2001 series, the mortgagee agrees it will submit at any time to such
examination of its records and accounts as trie Secretary may require. The Phoenix
office of HUD is primarily concerned with collection records. Prudent servicing
makes it essential that there be maintained within the State of Arizona a documen-
ted collection file that contains copies of letters from borrowers; replies to
such letters; a record of the results of each telephone call, office visit, or
field visit; financial data or a statement as to why the data was not obtained;
the payment history of the case; a statement of the cause of default; and the
terms of any repayment plan negotiated.
Prudent servicing of HUD-FHA insured mortgages in Arizona must be in effect on or
before April 1, 1974. Every HUD-FHA approved mortgagee is asked to notify this
office on or before that date whether it is in full compliance with the contents
of this letter. The letter of compliance is to be accompanied by a copy of the
servicing contract if applicable.
Those lenders who responded to Circular Letter 73-13 M and who indicated full
compliance therewith, need not respond to this letter,
x~S4
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EgXH16)T ):
DEPARTFENT 0F HOUSING AND URBAN DEELOPENT
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION
Phoenix Insuring Office
244 West Osborn Road, P. 0. Box 13468
Phoenix, Arizona 85002
February 8, 1974
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR CIRCULAR LETTER NO. 74-4 14
TO : ALL APPROVED MORTGAGEES
: SINGLE FAMILY MORTGAGE SERVICING
The Phoenix Insuring Office Circular Letters No. 73-13 M, dated
November 29, 1973, and No. 74-2 M, dated January 31, 1974, are
rescinded.
This action is necessitated in order to minimize and/or eliminate
variations in local servicing practices policy and assure com-
pliance with National policy which is currently under discussion
at the UD Central Office.
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This action is necessitated in order to minimize and/or
eliminate variations in local servicing practices policy
and assure compliance with National policy which ig cur-
rently under disucssion at the HUD Central Office.
This incident is important for several reasons. First, it points
out that at least some Area Office personnel have tried to deal with
mortgagee servicing issues in a hard-nosed, consumer oriented fashion.
Not only have they identified serious deficiencies in mortgagee servic-
ing activities but they have been willing to take steps to try to cor-
rect them.
Second, HUD chose to act in a mortgagee-oriented rather than con-
sumer-oriented fashion, even though it appears that it would have been
easy and straight-forward to follow the latter course.
And, third, Central HUD's requests to rescind the circulars could
only serve to weaken the Phoenix Insuring Office in terms of its deal-
ings with mortgagees. Imagine the raction of a mortgagee who receives
a succession of firm circulars that he is later told to ignore by Central
HUD. Clearly, this could result in the local office having an even more
difficult time persuading mortgagees to follow their requests or recom-
mendations. Rather than helping local personnel to deal with mortgagees
with authority, HUD chose to diminish their power.
9Circular Letter No. 74-4M; From the Office of the Director, Phoenix
HUD /FHA Insuring Office, To All Approved Mortgagees, Re: Single Family
Mortgage Servicing, Feb. 8, 1974.
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APPENDIX 10-1:
HUD CRITERIA FOR
APPROVAL AND DISAPPROVAL
OF MORTGAGEES
From: HUD Handbook 4000.2
Mortgagees' Handbook--
Application Through
Insurance" (Single
Family) March, 1975
4000.2
CHAPTER 3. APPROVAL OF MORTGAGEES
3-1. RESTRICTIONS. A mortgage insured by the Secretary may not be
originated or purchased by a lender which has not first been
approved as a mortgagee by the Secretary, except under special
conditions described in Section 203.433 of the FHA Regulations.
Similarly, an insured mortgage may not be sold to other than an
approved mortgagee except as provided in Section 203.433 of.the
FHA Regulations. The authority to grant and withdraw approval
of mortgagees has been delegated to the Director, Participant
Control and Supervision' Division, Office of Management Systems,
HPMC, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Washington,
D. C. 20411. Approval permits the approved mortgagee to
participate in all mortgage insurance programs administered by
HUD-FHA, and is not restricted to home mortgage programs.
3-2. AUTOMATIC APPROVAL. The Federal National Mortgage Association,
Government National Mortgage Association, Federal Reserve Banks,
Federal. Home Loan Banks, and all other Federal, State, or
municipal government agencies enpowered by law to hold insured
mortgages are approved as mortgagees. For accounting purposes
only, such agencies should file FtA Form 2001, Application for
Approval as Mortgagee, with the local IHUD field office and obtain
a mortgagee code number before dealing in insured mortgages.
3-3. APPROVAL REQUIIEMENTS. Chartered institutions, permanent insti-
tutions having succession, or trusts may be approved as mortgagees
on application to the local HUD field office. An approved
mortgagee must have sound capital funds (used herein synonymously
with "acceptable net worth") properly proportioned to its lia-
bilities and to the character and extent of its operation.
a. Approved Mortgagees are divided into six groups,' and the
requirements for approval vary from group to group.
(1) Group 1. Members of the Federal Reserve System and
institutions whose deposits are insured by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation or the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation need only submit FHA
Forms 2001, Application for Approval as Mortgagee, and
2001-b, Resolution of Authority (Figures 3-1 and 3-2,
respectively).
(2) Group 2. Supervised Institutions.
(a) Supervision. A mortgagee in this group must be
subject to the supervision of a governmental agency
which is required by law to make regular examina-
tions of its books and accounts.
Page 3-1 3/75
HUD-Wash., D. C.
4000.2
(3-3) (b) Available Funds. A mortgagee in this group must
have sound capital funds of not less than $100,000,
or if it is a mutual company or association with-
out capital funds, it must have an acceptable net
worth of not less than $100,000.
(c) Application. FRA Form 2001, Application for Approv
as Mortgagee and FHA Form 2001-B, Resolution of
Authority (Figures 3-1 and 3-2), accompanied by thE
applicant's latest published financial statement;
a list of branch offices, if any, and their
addresses; a list of the directors and officers of
the corporation; and a list identifying each holdei
of ten percent or more of the corporate stock.
(3) Group 3, Non-supervised Institutions. Mortgagees in
this group are subject to supetvision by HUD-FHA, but
not by any other governmental agency (in contrast to
Groups 1 and 2).
(a) Activity. A mortgagee in this group must have as
-its principal activity the lending or investing of
funds under its own control in real estate mortgage
(b) Available Funds. Sound capital funds of not less
than $100,000.
(c) Application. FHA Form 2001-B, Resolution of
Authority and FHA Form 2001-C, Application for
Approval as Mortgagee (Figures 3-2 and 3-3),
accompanied by letters.from banks setting forth
available lines of credit; and a current, detailed
audit of the company's books by an'independent
accountant, satisfactory to the Commissioner,
including his unqualified opinion of the firm's
financial condition.
(4) Group 4, Loan Correspondents.
(a) Activity. Approval must be requested by an approve
mortgagee in Group 1 or 2, above. The sponsoring
mortgagee must be investing in insured mortgages
for its own portfolio in a volume sufficient to
enable the correspondent to operate successfully.
The loan correspondent is limited to originating
or purchasing insured mortgages for its sponsor.
3/75 Page 3-2
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(3-3) (b) Available Funds. Sound capital funds of at least
$5,000.
(c) Application. The sponsor and correspondent must
file a joint FHA Form 2001-D, Application for
Approval of Loan Correspondent (Figure 3-4). The
loan correspondent must file FHA Form 2001-B,
Resolution of Authority; a detailed, current audit
of the company's books and accounts by an independent
accountant, as in Group 3; and letters from banks
setting forth lines of credit available.
(5) Group 5, Charitable or Non-Profit Institutions, Pension
Funds, or Trust.
(a) Activity. A mortgagee in this group must have
investment experience and ability. It may invest
in insured mortgages but may neither originate nor
service them.
(b) Available Funds. Permanent funds of not less than
$100,000.
(c) Application. FHA Form 2001-E, Applichtion for
Approval as Mortgagee (Figure 3-5).
(6) Group 6, Investing Mortgagees.
(a) Experience. A mortgagee in this group must have
experience in investing in real estate mortgages.
Insured mortgages may not be originated or serviced,
but may be acquired by purchase from other approved
mortgagees and held as investments.
(b) Available Funds. Sufficient capital to support a
projected investment of at-least $1,000,000 in
real estate mortgages.
(c) Application. FHA Form 2001-G, Application for
Approval as Investing Mortgagee (Figure 3-7),
accompanied by a current, detailed audit of the
company's books by an independent accountant, as
in Group 3.
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b. Mortgagee Application Forms FHA 2001, 2001-B, 2001-C, 2001-D,
2001-E, 2001-F, and 2001-G are available from HUD field
offices.
c. Reports, Audits, and Examinations. Any approved mortgagee
may, at any time, be required to furnish the Secretary or
his representative with a copy of its current financial
statement or report. In addition, a mortgagee in Group 3,
4, or 6 must submit a detailed audit of its books by an
independent accountant at least once in each calendar year.
Any mortgagee must submit -to examination of its books
whenever requested by the Secretary.
3-4. AUTHORIZED AGENTS. Authorized agents are not approved as mort-
gagees. Any corporate entity, partnership, firm, or individual
may be appointed by an approved mortgagee in Groups 1 or 2 to
act in its name in originating and servicing insured mortgages.
Two copies of the resolution by which the principal grants this
authority must be forwarded to the local HUD field office, with
a letter from the principal requesting approval of the agent.
The resolution must describe the nature and scope of the agent's
authority. The Department has no liability or responsibility
to the mortgagee for actions by an authorized agent outside the
scope of his authority.
3-5. BRANCH OFFICES. Any approved mortgagee in Group 3 may request
HUD-FHA approval to establish branch offices through which it
originates and services insured mortgages.
a. Mortgagees in Groups 1 and 2 need not request approval, but,
if bills for fees or mortgage insurance premiums are to be
directed to a branch office, a request for assignment of a
branch code number must be forwarded in letter form to the
Director, Participant Control and Supervision Division,
Office of Management Systems, HPMC, Department of Housing
and Urban Development, Washington, D. C. 20411.
b. Standards for Approval are set forth in FHA Form 2001-F,
Application for Approval of Branch Office (Figure 3-6).
There are no financial requirements for approval if the
branch office is located in the mortgagee's home state or
in a contiguous state. However, to establish a branch office
in a non-contiguous state, the Group 3 mortgagee must have
acceptable net worth of at least $150,000.. For each non-
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contiguous state to that of its main office, in which it
establishes a branch office or offices, Group 3 mortgagees
must have an additional $50,000 in net worth until net
worth reaches $250,000. Upon reaching this level, no
further increase in net worth will be required if branches
are opened in additional non-contiguous states.
3-6. MORTGAGEE CODE NUMBERS. HUD-FIIA's accounting system is completely
automated, and billing for fees and mortgage insurance premiums
is included in this system. In addition, many of HUD-FIIA's
statistical and administrative activities, although not auto-
mated, are coordinated with the accounting system. Therefore,
each mortgagee and, in some cases, each branch office, is
assigned a code number. This number, along with the mortgagee's
complete name and address, must appear on all processing docu-
ments, applications, commitments, servicing report forms, claims
for insurance benefits, and the like. The mortgagee number
appears in its letter of approval from HUD-FHA.
3-7. LOAN ORIGINATION RESPONSIBILITY. HThUD requires the originators
of insured mortgages to develop such loans in accordance with
accepted practices of prudent lending institutions and HUD--
FRA requirements. They must obtain and verify information
with at least the same care that would be exercised in origin-
ating a loan in which the mortgagee would be entirely dependent
on the property as security to protect its investment.
3-8. SERVICING RESPONSIBILITY. Even though servicing of an insured
mortgage may be done under contract by a mortgagee other than
the mortgagee on record, HUD-FHA holds the owning mortgagee
responsible for the adequate administration of each insured
mortgage in its portfolio. HUD-FRA will look to the owning
mortgagee for the correction of any errors or omissions.
Mortgagees are expected to insure that adequate facilities are
available in the area in which the property is located to enable
the mortgagor to get timely information concerning his account
and to enable the mortgagee to take adequate steps to protect
the security for its loan. in general terms, IuD-AHA iequLres
that the holders of insured mortgages service them in accordance
with the accepted practices of prudent lending institutions.
This should be done in the same manner as if the loan were not
insured and the mortgagee were dependent entirely on the property
as security to protect its investment.
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3-9. WITHDRAWAL OF APPROVAL. Any mortgagee's approval may be with-
drawn at any time for any reason which the Secretary determines
justifies the withdrawal. Like the authority to approve mort-
gagees, authority to withdraw approval has been delegated to.
the Director, Participant Control and Supervision Division,
Office of Management Systems, HPMC, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Washington, D. C. 20411.
a. Some Specific Reasons for Withdrawal of approval are:
(1) Transfer of an insured mortgage to a mortgagee not
approved by the Secretary, except as permitted by
Section 203.433 of the FHA Regulations.
(2) Failure on the part of a mortgagee in Groups 3 and 6
to segregate escrow deposits and deposit them in a
special account or accounts with a banking institution
whose accounts are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation or the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation.
(3) The use of escrow;funds for any purpose other than that
for which they were received.
(4) Failure of any mortgagee to conduct its business in
accordance with good business practices and accepted
standards of conduct.
(5) Termination of a Group 2 mortgagee's supervision by a
governmental agency.
(6) The payment by the mortgagee of any fee, kickback, or
other consideration (directly or indirectly) in
connection with any insured mortgage transaction (or
transactions) to any person including an attorney,
escrow agent, title company, consultant, mortgage
broker, seller, builder, or real estate agent if such
person has received any other payment (or other conside
ation) from the mortgagor, the seller, the builder, or
any other person for services related to such transacti
(or transactions) or from, or related to, the purchase
or sale of the mortgaged property. However, compensati
may be paid for the actual performance of such services
as may be approved by the Commissioner. (See Chapter 8
of this Handbook).
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(3-9) b. Withdrawal of Approval does not affect the insurance on
mortgages held in the lender's portfolio or commitments out-
standing in the name of the lender at the time of-withdrawal.
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APPENDIX 10-2
CASE STUDY OF COURT CASE INVOLVING FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT:
First National City Bank, Plaintiff vs. Geneav Moncrief, Defendant March-
May, 1973, Indianapolis
Mr. and Ms. NcNeil and Geneav Moncrief were mortgagors on an FHA-in-
sured 203(b) 20 year loan. By the time of the case, ten of these years
had passed with an apparently good payment record. Mr. and Ms. Moncrief
had been separated for five of these years, but Mr. Moncrief continued to
make the monthly mortgage payments of $115.00 for the house in which his
wife and three children still lived.
About a year before the case, Mr. Moncrief stopped making the monthly
mortgage payments. However, because Mr. Moncrief had, from time to time,
been late in making payments, Ms. Moncrief did not, at first, become over-
ly concerned. As Ms. Moncrief realized that this situation was not about
to change she sought and found employment which, both she and her attorney
felt was sufficient to meet the mortgage payments. Moreover, while Ms.
Moncrief claimed that she would no longer be dependent upon Mr. Moncrief
for the mortgage payments, the latter had agreed to resume payments.
Advance Mortgage Company (AMC), servicer for the mortgagee and Plain-
tiff, First National City Bank, did not offer Ms. Moncrief any form or re-
lief, in spite of the fact that the default was apparently for a reason
beyond her control. Instead, they initiated foreclosure proceedings.
While ignoring requests for forbearance from Ms. Moncrief's attorneys, AMC
finally agreed to dismiss its suit for foreclosure only if the following
terms were met:
1 - Immediate payment of $262.50 as reimbursement for accrued
fees;
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2 - Payment of $162.00 per month for the next 30 months so
as to amortize the delinquent amount;
3 - No extension of the original maturity date of the mortgage.
Moreover, Ms. Moncrief's attorney, Davis S. Walker, wrote in a letter to
the Indianapolis Area Office of HUD that:
The Attorney for AMC was unfamiliar with the FHA regulations
providing such relief (i.e. forbearance) and asked for my
consent to a foreclosure decree in late December of 1972.
When I again requested special forbearance he was unfamiliar
with such relief and, in any event, did not believe that his
client (i.e. First National City Bank) would accept it. The
only reason he stated was that the money could be loaned at
a higher rate of interest now.2
Based upon AMC's response to requests for relief for Ms. Moncrief, Mr.
Walker concluded that:
AMC is not servicing this mortgage beyond the bare minimum
of collecting payments. The regulations (HUD) plainly en-
vision that it will do more, and at the very least mean that
the mortgagee will devote earnest attention and considera-
tion to a request for special forbearance. In the circum-
stances of the present case....I believe that the mortgagee
is required by the regulations to grant the relief.3
HUD responded to Walker's argument by putting pressure on AMC to
grant relief. In a letter to the Assistant Vice President of AMC, the
Deputy Director of the Indianapolis HUD Area Office, Choice Edwards
stated that:
In view of the remedies available to deserving mortgagors
under our insurance programs, we cannot help but feel that
your offer (as described above) is unnecessarily harsh for
IThe above description is condensed from information presented in a
letter from David S. Walker to Mr. Thomas McNally, Area Counsel, Depart-
ment of HUD, Indianapolis, Indiana. February 15, 1973. (Cause No. S572-716)
2Ibid
3Ibid.
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a homebuyer who has paid one-half of her mortgage, who is
47 years of age, has three children living with her, who be-
came delinquent through no apparent fault of her own, who
has made a determined effort to find employment to continue
her payments and through her past payment record would nor-
mally be considered a good risk.4
After reminding AMC of their responsibility to service loans in ac-
cordance with acceptable mortgage practices of prudent lending institu-
tions and of the array of relief measures ?vailable, Mr. Edwards con-
cluded with the following:
HUD-FHA is more than willing to approve Ms. Moncrief's pro-
posal that the mortgage term be extended one year in order
to maintain her payments at $115.00 per month. In the event
Ms. Moncrief again defaults and the property is foreclosed,
you will be reimbursed for all of the interest during the
year the mortgage was in default, no matter when that fore-
closure should occur. Since the government bears all the
risk of loss, we do not understand your reluctance to rein-
state the mortgage and hope that this letter will convince
you to review your course of action. 5
While HUD's resonse was good, it lacked promptness. Almost three
weeks had passed from the time of Mr. Walker's February letter to HUD.
Mearwhile, Ms. Moncrief's attorneys continued their case through the
courts. It is an interesting coincidence that Mr. Edward's letter bears
the same data as Ms. Moncrief's "Answer and Counterclaim" against the
Plaintiff. In this document the attorneys charged that the plaintiff:
a. failed to visit the mortgaged property, telephone and
meet with the defendants, and inquire into the cir-
cumstances of the default;
4Letter from Choice Edwards, Deputy Director, Indianapolis Area
Office, HUD, to Mr. John Heitkamp, Asst. Vice Pres. Advance Mortgage
Corp., Detroit, Mich. March 6, 1973.
5Ibid.
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b. refused to accept partial payments and insisted upon
full payment of the delinquent amount, including all
late charges;
c. failed to inform the defendant of special relief in
lieu of foreclosure authorized by the FHA and avail-
able to mortgagors whose default occurs under circum-
stances beyond the control of the mortgagor;
d. failed to give good faith consideration to the defend-
ant's request for special forbearance relief, as
authorized by regulations of the FHA;
e. failed to make all reasonable efforts to avoid fore-
closure of a mortgage that is in default due to circum-
stances beyond the mortgagor's control. 6
The clear and undeniably sound arguments of Ms. Moncrief's case com-
bined with the pressure from HUD and the court, finally compelled AMC to
execute a forbearance agreement with Ms. Moncrief 14 months after the date
of her default. The case was dismissed and Ms. Moncrief continued making
payments of $115.00 per month and the date of maturity of the loan was
simply extended one year. The ease with which the matter was finally re-
solved would be comical were it not for the energy, money and anguish ex-
pended on what should have been a routine procedure. To underscore the
simple nature of a forbearance agreement, even following such a prolonged
problem, the actual agreement, along with the "Stipulation of Dismissal" is
included. (See Exhibit 19).
6Superior Court of Marion County, State of Indiana: Cause no. S572-
716. "Answer and Counterclaim of Geneav Moncrief", Filed March 6, 1973.
EylF~46T M; FORDEARANCE AGimEME bh:NT
THIS AGRE .MENT, made and entered into this day of
April, 1973, by and between FIRST NATIONAL CITY 3ANK (hereinafter
rcfcrrcd to as "Mortgagee") and GENEAV MONCRIEF (hereinafter
referred to as o ag , SITESSTH THAT:
WHEREAS Mortgagee is the holder, by virtue of an
assignment, of a promissory note and real estate mortgage
executed by the Mortgagor and her husband on October 2, 1962;
which mortgage (1) was given as security for the repayment of
the debt evidenced by the aforesaid note, (2) is a first and
prior lien upon certain real estate located in Marion County,
Indiaiiapolis, Indiana, which real estate is legally described
as follows:
Lot 4 in Northeastern, an Addition
to the City of Indianapolis, the plat
of which is recorded in Plat Book 18,
page 1 63 , in tn'e oilrice or the Recorder
of Marion County, Indiana,
and (3) is insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA
Case No. 151-007265-203); and
WHEREAS the Mortgagor, due to circumstances beyond her
control, failed to make monthly mortgage payments required under
the aforesaid note and real estate mortgage from March 1, 1972
through February 28, 1973;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises
contained herein, it is agreed by and between the Mortgagor
and Mortgagee:
1. That the Mortgagor has been and is now in default
under the terms of the aforesaid note and real estate mortgage
for the period commencing March 1, 1972 and extending through
February 28, 1973.
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2. That pursuant to 12 U.S C. SS1709 - 1710 and 24 C.F.R.
5203.340 the -tgdgee is willing to and h2rcby docs extend
to the Mortgagor a spccial forbearance suspending the monthly
mortgage payments during the aforesaid period of default.
3. That as of March 1, 1973 Mortgagor will resume and
thereafter continue to make the regular -monthly payments
required under the aforesaid note and real estate mortgage.
4. That the original mortgage term shall be and hereby
is extended one (1) year, and that the debt, if not sooner paid,
shall be due and payable on the 1st day of October, 1983.
5. That all of the provisions of the note and real estate
mortgage, except as herein provided, shall remain in full force
and effect.
6. That upon the breach of any provision of. this agree-
ment, the Mortgagee may terminate the same, and, at the option
of the Mortgagee, institute foreclosure proceedings according
to the terms of the note and real estate mortgage without regard
to this agreement.
WITNESS OUR HANDS, this April 24 , 1973:
Geneav oncrief
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK
By: .Vicr- Presi
~~.: C. I'l. Munz.
Eske i Mitchell & Yosha[
Attorneys a w
220 N. Meridian S
STATIE 0F INDIANA ) SS:
COUNTY OF MARION )
IN TilE SUPERIOR COURT OF MARION COUNTY
ROOM NO. 5
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK, )
Paintiff,
VS. CAUSE NO. S572-716
McNEIL MONCRIEF, )
GENEAV MONCRIEF, )
and )
THE STATE OF INDIANA )
GROSS INCOME TAX DIVISION,) )
Defendants,)
STIPULATION
AY 21973
cLERK
OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff First National City Bank by its attorney
attorney David S. Walker, hereby stipulate that the above-
entitled civil action be discontinued and dismissed, without
prejudice, pursuant to Trial Rule 41 (a) (1), Indiana Rules
of Procedure, and as grounds therefor state that said
parties have agreed to a settlement of the plaintiff's
claim for relief.
rwin 'J. Prince
Eskenazi, Mitchell & Yosha
r "Attorneys for Plaintiff
2220 North Meridian Street
Indianapolis, Indiana
925-90 na
9~73 (
David S. Walker
Attorney for Dcfendant Geneav Moncrie2f
Legal Servi ces Organ i zation
of Indianapolis, Inc.
---603-
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APPENDIX 10-3:
- MATERIAL RELATING TO BROWN VS. LYNN ET. AL.
- HUD'S NEW APPROACH TO RELIEF FOR DEFAULTING
MORTGAGORS.
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64 East Jackson Boulevard, Chicago, Ilinois 60604 (312) 922-5625
Legal Assistane Foundation of Chicago
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Ms. Rachel G. Bratt
Worcester Road
Princeton, Massachusetts 01501
Dear Rachel:
I very much enjoyed our phone conversation of yester-
day. It is a refreshing coincidence for me to find
other people working in depth to solve FHA quick-fore-
closure problems, especially so in this case since the
information you have compiled seems so helpful to Brown
v. Lynn.
I give you my firm assurance that if you were to send us
the draft of your thesis, it would only be shown to and
used by counsel in the Brown case. You would be advised
before any part of your thesis would be introduced in evi-
dence or otherwise released, and if you declined to approve
such release, we would not proceed. Hopefully, you would
be available to testify at trial in lieu of the introduction
of your thesis, if we thought your input was probative to
the case.
I have enclosed copies of the following documents:
(1) Chapter 2, Report of Illinois Mortgage Practices
Commission;
(2) Testimony of John Waner, HUD area director, before
the Illinois Legislative Investigating Coimmission;
(3) MBA National Delinquency Survey, June 30, 1974.
I am awaiting receipt from you of a copy of the first draft
of the OSTI report. Hopefully, Mr. Bach will send us the
'-SO'6-
Ms. Rachel Bratt
Page Two
March 14, 1975
final report.
Thank you for your help.
Very truly
SJM:cd
enclosures
P.S. Rachel, are you aware of two "studies of mortgage
default" (dated Dec., 1974 and Feb., 1975) supposedly
done by HUD Office of Program Development? An
attorney from D.C. asked if I had seen them but
had no further description.
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Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago
July 25, 1975
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Ms. Rachel G. Bratt
Worcester Road
Princeton, Mass. 01541
Dear Rachel:
Please accept my apologies for not writing sooner. Your
thesis draft has been very, very useful. We have used
the information in it (but not the physical text itself)
in the depositions of John Waner, the Chicago Area Office
Director, and William Miller, local head of Housing Man-
agement; and we intend to use the draft in the upcoming
depositions of Washington HUD officials.
We have now compiled probably the most complete (and
incriminating) documentary-discovery library on FHA
single-family mortgagee servicing available. I am sure
you would be interested in perusing our material before
you finalize your thesis. Besides, I would love to talk
to you - so why not plan to come to Chicago during the
summer.
In the meantime, do you have an updated version of the
thesis? Do you have any background material on Philip
Forrest, Chief, Mortgage Servicing Evaluation Branch;
Julius Williams, Director, Single Family Housing Divi-
sion; Fred Pfeander, Director, Office of Loan Management;
H.R. Crawford, Assistant Secretary, Housing Management, all
in D.C.? We will be taking some or all their depositions
in September.
I hope to hear from you soon
SJM:eg
Very truly yours,
SiM UR J. MANSFIELD
P.S. Rachel, I would still like to talk to you about being
an expert witness or affiant in Brown - now probably going
to trial in October or November, 1975. - SJM
LEGAL
AssisT
FOUNDA
CHICAGO
EIGHTEENTH STREET LEGAL
SERVICES
1413 West 18th Street
Chicago, Illinois 60608
421-1900
ENGLEWOOD LEGAL SERVICES
6401 South Halsted St.
Chicago, Illinois 60621
651-3100
F.A.C.T. PROJECT
4 North Cicero Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60644
379-7800
GARFIELD/AUSTIN LEGAL
SERVICES
4 North Cicero Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60644
379-7800
JUVENILE COURT LEGAL
SERVICES
1114 South Oakley Boulevard
Chicago, Illinois 60612
421-2061
LAWNDALE LEGAL SERVICES
911 South Kedzie Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60612
638-2343
MENTAL HEALTH ADVOCACY
PROJECT
343 South Dearborn St.
Chicago, Illinois 60604
341-1307
MID-SOUTH SIDE LEGAL
SERVICES
4655 South Michigan Ave.
Chicago, Illinois 60653
538-0733
MIGRANT LEGAL SERVICES
1212 North Ashland Ave.
Chicago, Illinois 60622
489-6797
NORTHWEST LEGAL SERVICES
1212 North Ashland Ave.
Chicago, Illinois 60622
489-6800
PRISONERS LEGAL
ASSISTANCE
343 South Dearborn St.
Chicago, Illinois 60604
996-5540
UPTOWN LEGAL SERVICES
4564 North Broadway
Chicago, Illinois 60640
769-1015
ANCE
TION of
343 South Dearborn Street Chicago, Illinois 60604 (312) 341-1070
August 3, 1976
Ms. Rachel G. Bratt
Worcester Road
Princeton, MA 01541
Dear Rachel,
Just a note on Brown (now called Ferrell vs. Hills).
As you can see from the enclosed regulations, the
settlement stipulation, final order, and our descrip-
tive memo, the Brown case has been settled. We are
happy with the settlement - indeed we think it's the
best thing HUD has done in the last 40 years to help
save distressed homeowners from foreclosure. However,
we are receiving a lot of complaints around the country
from Legal Service attorneys and community organizations
that HUD is violating the settlement. Thus, we seem
only to be biding our time until we go marching back
into court to obtain an injunction requiring HUD on
pain of contempt to earnestly implement and enforce
the assignment program.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
Very truly yours,
S YMOUR J. MANSFIELD
SJM:cd
P.S. How are you enjoying motherhood?
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES and JOYCE FERRELL, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs,
)
v. ) Case No. 73 C 334
)
CARLA HILLS, et al., )
)
Defendants.
S T I P U L A T I 0 N
WHEREAS, on February 13, 1973, plaintiffs filed, on
behalf of Johnnie D. Brown and others, their complaint against
George Romney, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (hereinafter "HUD") , and John Waner, Director of the
Chicago Area Office of HUD, and Mortgage Associates, Inc.; and
WHEREAS, on May 3, 1973, plaintiffs filed an aimended
cciplaint on behalf of the above-named plaintiffs and others against
James Lynn, Secretary of HUD; John Waner, Director of the Chicago
Area Office of HUD; Mortgage Associates, Inc.; L.E. Lay and Company;
Simmons First National Bank of Pine Bluff, Arkansas; First Federal
Savings and Loan Association of Gary, Indiana; Elmira Savings and
Loan Association; Charleroi Federal Savings and Loan Association;
James F. Messenger; Unity Savings and Loan Association; Federal
National Mortgage Assocation and First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of South Holland; and
WHEREAS, on October 11, 1974, the Court dismissed the
- 5/0-
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defendant mortgagees on the ground that plaintiffs' amended complai
failed to state a cause of action as to those defendants, but did,
part, state a valid cause of action against the federal defendants,
Brown v. Lynn, 385 F. Supp. 986 (N.D. Ill. 1974); and
WHEREAS, on March 17, 1975, the Court determined that pla
tiffs' cause of action could proceed as a nationwide class action o.
behalf of the named plaintiffs and on behalf of all other persons w
(a) have purchased a home pursuant to three programs of homeownersh
for low and moderate-income families established by the National Ho.
ing Act: Section 203, 12 U.S.C. §1709; Section 221(d) (2); 12 U.S.C
§17151(d) (2); and Section 235, 12 U.S.C. 91715z; and (b) are curren
or in the future become in default on mortgages insured under said
programs; and
WHEREAS the plaintiffs, James and Joyce Ferrell, et al.,
filed a second amended complaint on October 20, 1975, seeking, inte:
alia, declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants, Carla H
and John Waner, and to require said defendants to (a) promulgate an
enforce a continuing, binding and effective regulatory scheme and e;
lish procedures to prevent holders and servicers of HUD-insured mor
gages from prematurely and precipitously foreclosing on said mortga
and (b) require relief in the alternative to foreclosure to distres:
homeowners such as forbearance relief, recasting of the mortgage or
the taking of an assignment of the mortgage by HUD to avoid foreclo:
and
WHEREAS, on May 17, 1976, the defendant, Secretary of HUD
issued HUD Notice HM 76-43 and Mortgagee Letter 76-9, which notice
-3-
and mortgagee letter incorporate the Department's revised policy
regarding acceptance of assignments of insured mortgages in de-
fault; and
WHEREAS, in order to avoid further costly and time-
consuming litigation, the parties have agreed to compromise and
settle their disputes;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED BY
THE PARTIES HEREIN THROUGH THEIR ATTORNEYS, PURSUANT TO RULE 41(a)
OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, THAT:
1. Nothing in this Stipulation shall constitute an
admission by the defendants of any of the facts alleged in plain-
tiffs' complaints or that those facts are sufficient to state a
cause of action, nor shall this Stipulation constitute an admission
by plaintiffs that their complaints, or any parts thereof, fail to
state a sufficient and provable cause of action. Nor shall any pro-
vision of this Stipulation be deemed an adjudication by the Court
of the merits of this cause.
2. On May 17, 1976, HUD issued Notice HM 76-43 and HM
Mortgagee Letter 76-9, copies of which are attached hereto as Ex-
hibits A and B, and explicitly made a part of this Stipulation. HUD
Will take appropriate measures, within its regulatory authority, to
require HUD-approved mortgagees to process, request and execute
assignments to avoid foreclosure of HUD-insured, single family home
%mortgages, and HUD will process and act upon requests for assignment,
and thereafter service said mortgages substantially in accordance
A'A
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with said HUD Notice 76-43 and HM Mortgagee Letter 76-9, as amended
to comply with paragraph 9 of this Stipulation.
3. The aforesaid Notice and Mortgagee Letter incorporate
the terms and conditions of HUD's policy respecting assignments of
HUD-insured mortgages in default.
4. HUD will promptly submit for publication in thc
Federal Register HM Notice 76-43 and HM Mortgagee Letter 76-9 for
informational purposes.
5. HUD will proceed expeditiously to revise FHA Form
No. 2068F (Rev. 10/69) so as to be substantially similar to the
attached Exhibit C, and subject to necessary clearance by the Offic
of Management and Budget, will issue said Form for use in connectic
with said assignment program.
6. Within a reasonable time, HUD will modify paragraph 9
of HUD Notice 76-43 by substituting explicit and expeditious time
limits within which Area/Insuring Offices will be expected to proce
assignments.
7. Within a reasonable time, HUD will develop a statis-
tical reporting system concerning the assignment program hereby
established which information will be made available upon written
request.
8. HUD Handbook 4155.1, Mortgage Credit Analysis Hand-
book paragraphs 2-8(e) will be promptly modified by adding a new
subparagraph (3) as follows:
4A
13/>
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(3) The term "extenuating circumstances beyond
the mortgagor's control" may include:
(a) Curtailment of family income, such as
unemployment; loss, reduction or delay
in receipt of federal, state, municipal
benefits (e.g., Social Security, Supple-
mental Security Income, Public Assistance,
government pensions) or of private bene-
fit payments (e.g. , pensions, annuities,
retirement plans); loss of support payments;
or other loss of income due to divorce or
separation;
(b) Uninsured damage to the mortgaged property,
affecting its livability, of a type which
is commonly insured against but which was
not covered or not fully covered by insur-
ance because adequate insurance coverage was
not available;
(c) Death or illness in the mortgagor's household
and expenses attributable thereto;
(d) Unanticipated increase of payments to mortgage
escrow account to compensate for past under-
estimates of requirements.
Such circumstances must have resulted directly in
the mortgagor's default and the foreclosure. In no
case shall the foreclosure action or deed in lieu
of foreclosure by itself be deemed to make the de-
faulting mortgagor ineligible for an insured mortgage
if, when given an opportunity, the mortgagor demon-
strates that it was caused by extenuating circum-
stances beyond the mortgator's control.
9. HUD will proceed expeditiously to amend said NoLice,
paragraph 10(c) , the second sentence, to read as follows:
"... In any case, however, the mortgage
payments during the reinstatement period,
including all escrows, must be no more
than the highest payment obtainable under
one of the following three alternatives:
(2) The amount obtained by adding all out-
standing' arrearages to the unpaid principal
balance and recasting the mortgage to allow
for completion of its payment as amortized
- 5"'/ -
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over its reirainincg term, plus current
escrow recuireents. The term may be
extended by up to 10 years if, on the
date of assignment, 10 years or more
had elapsed since the due date of the
first paymelnt under the mortgage.
(See Appendix 4) ; or . . .
10. Whenever the term "IIUD" is used in this Stipulation,
it shall refer collectively to the United States Departrent of IiUD,
the defendants, their successors in office, and their agents, subordinates
and employees.
In consideration of the above agreemeants, the plaintiffs
and the plaintiff class remabers, by and through their attorneys,
agree to the entry of an order dismissing their cc.r plaint without
prejudice, subject to the approval of the Court pursuant to Rule 23(e)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiffs James and
Joyce Ferrell, et al.
SEY RJ. I7'-SFj EL
to ey forl'l tiffs
WqILLIAMT- P. W .14iM
Attorney for Plaintiffs
'bi U- t 2711
Defendants Carla liills
and John Waner
SAMLEL K. SKIiELR
United States Attorney
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
JAMES AND JOYCE FERRELL,et al., ))
Plaintiffs,
)
vs. ) No. 73 C 334)
CARLA HILLS, et al., ))
Defendants.
ORDER APPROVING SETTLEMENT
AND DISMISSAL
This cause comes on to be heard on the oral motion of the
plaintiffs for approval of settlement and to dismiss this action
without prejudice. The Court having considered the entire record
in these proceedings, the oral presentations of counsel, and
being fully advised in the premises, makes the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law:
1. This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of
this case and of the parties.
2. On February 13, 1973, plaintiffs filed, on behalf of
Johnnie D. Brown and others, their complaint against George
Romney, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment (hereinafter, "HUD"), and John Waner, Director of the Chicago
Area Office of HUD, and Mortgage Associates, Inc.
3. On May 3, 1973, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on
behalf of the above-named plaintiffs and- cthers against James
Lynn, Secretary of HUD; John Waner, Director of the Chicago Area
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Office of HUD; and certain HUD-insured mortgagees.
4. On October 11, 1974, the Court dismissed the defendant
mortgagees on the ground that plaintiffs' amended complaint
failed to state a cause of action as to those defendants, but
denied federal defendants' mo-tion to dismiss, ruling that plain-
tiffs' amended complaint did, in part, state a valid cause of
action against said federal defendants, Brown v. Lynn, 385 F. Supp.
986 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
5. On March 17, 1975, the Court determined that plaintiffs'
cause of action could proceed as a nationwide class action on
behalf of the named plaintiffs and on behalf of all other persons
who (a) have purchased a home pursuant to three programs of home-
ownership for low and moderate-income families established by the
National Housing Act: Section 203, 12 U.S.C. S1709; Section 221(d)
(2); 12 U.S.C. §17151(d) (2); and Section 235, 12 U.S.C. S1715z;
and (b) are currently or in the future become in default on mort-
gages insured under said programs. .
6. On October 20, 1975, to more specifically comport with thE
Court's rulings of October 11, 1974 and March 17, 1975, plaintiffs
James and Joyce Ferrell, et al., filed a second amended complaint,
seeking, inter alia, declaratory and injunctive relief against
defendants, Carla Hills and John Waner, and.to require said defen-
dants to.(a) promulgate and enforce a continuing, binding and
effective regulatory scheme and establish procedures to prevent
holders and servicers of HUD-insured mortgages from prematurely
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and precipitously foreclosing on said mortgages, and (b) require
relief in the alternative to foreclosure to distressed home-
owners such as forbearance relief, recasting of the mortgage or
the taking of an assignment of the mortgage by HUD to avoid fore-
closure.
7. Commencing on about January 28, 1976, the parties entered
into negotiations regarding settlement of this case. Those negotia-
tions began after discovery procedures had been initiated. The
Court was advised of the pendancy of those negotiations. Based
upon the information so received and the record in these proceed-
ings, the Court is satisfied that the conflicting positions of the
various parties were ably represented, and that the eventual
settlement agreement was negotiated in good faith.
8. On May 17, 1976, the defendant, Secretary of HUD, issued -
HUD Notice HM 76-43 and Mortgagee Letter 76-9, which notice and
mortgagee letter incorporate the Department's revised policy
regarding acceptance of assignments of insured mortgages in default
(hereinafter, "assignment program").
9. On July 2, 1976, the parties, by and through their attor-
neys, voluntarily entered into and filed with the Court a Stipula-
tion containing the entire agreements of the parties to compromise
and settle their disputes. Said Stipulation is incorporated here-
in by reference. At that time, the plaintiffs orally moved this
Court to enter an order approving said Stipulation and the dismis-
sal of this action.without prejudice in accordance with Rule 23(e),
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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10. During the pendency of the settlement negotiations
and at the time of the filing of the Stipulation with the Court,
on July 2, 1976, the defendants represented to the plaintiffs and
to this Court their intention to modify or amend, at some future
time, the assignment program-which is by reference incorporated in
the aforesaid Stipulation. The plaintiffs advised the defendants
and this Court that they understood defendants had such intention,
but irrespective thereof, plaintiffs did not waive their right to
challenge or acquiesce to the contents of any such amendment or
modification, nor did they waive any rights created under said
Stipulation.
11. Pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, notice of the settlement of this action is waived and
excused for good cause shown and this Court's findings that the
settlement and dismissal of this action cannot prejudice the right!
of members of the plaintiff class.
12. In assessing the fairness and reasonableness of the
proposed settlement, the Court considered that this case raised
substantial, complex, and contested issues of law and fact and
that the public interest was significantly involved herein. This
Court considered the likely eventual rewards of litigation to
members of the plaintiff class as compared with the benefits
offered by the Stipulation and the assignment program incorpor-
ated by reference therein.
13. This Court is of the opinion that the settlement
represents a fair resolution of the competing interests of
-6~9-
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the plaintiff class and the defendants. The Court concludes that
the settlement is fair, reasonable and adequate. The Stipulation
accordingly will be approved.
14. Moreover, there is pending before the Court in this
case plaintiffs' motion for contempt, fees, and per diem fine.
The administrative costs which defendants may be required to bear
or expend in connection with resolution of the aforesaid applica-
tion may be substantial, and in order to avoid such costs and time
consuming litigation, the parties have settled their disputes by
the plaintiffs' agreement to withdraw the motion for contempt,
fees and per diem fine, and the defendant's agreement to make a
payment of $4,587.00.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
A. The Stipulation filed July 2, 1976, is hereby approved
pursuant to Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as
fair and reasonable. Notice of settlement is waived and excused
as the settlement and dismissal of this action in no way can
prejudice the rights of the members of the plaintiff class.
B. The rule to zhow cause why defendants should not be held
in contempt is hereby discharged and plaintiffs' motion for a
finding of contempt, fees and per diem fine is hereby withdrawn.
C. A judgment in the amount of $4,587.00 is hereby entered
against the defendants in favor of the Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago.
D. This action be and the same is hereby dismissed without
prejudice.
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E. The terms and conditions of said dismissal are contained
in the Stipulation executed by the parties, by and through their
attorneys, on July 2, 1976, which Stipulation is incorporated
herein by reference.
ENTER:
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated:
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20413
May 17, 1976
IN REPLY REFER TO:
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR HOUSING MANAGEMENT
HM Mortgagee Letter 76-9
TO ALL APPROVED MORTGAGEES
SUBJECT: Acceptance of Assignment of Home Mortgages in Default
1. PURPOSE: The purpose of this letter is to announce the Department's
policy in connection with the acceptance of home mortgages in default in
order to avoid foreclosure and to promulgate procedures for the implemen-
tation of that policy. The following instructions are effective
immediately and, pending revision of Handbook 4191.1, Administration of
Insured Home Mortgages, supersede the instructions in paragraph 126 of
that Handbook.
2. GENERAL. Effective immediately, HUD will accept assignment of any
fully insured mortgage if all the criteria in paragraph 3 below are met.
Any mortgagor owning a home subject to a fully insured mortgage,
regardless of the section of the National Housing Act under which the
.-mortgage is insured, is entitled to a conference with a responsible
representative of HUD before the mortgage is foreclosed, unless-the
Department agrees to accept assignment of the mortgage without such a
conference. This Mortgagee Letter applies to all HUD--insured single
family mortgages, except single family mortgages coinsured by HUD pursuant
to Section 244 of the National Housing Act.
In any case where the mortgagor has voluntarily abandoned the mortgaged
property, the mortgagee may initiate foreclosure without adhering to the
procedures for assignment set forth in this Mortgagee Letter.
The requirements of this Letter shall be applicable to each mortgagee's
HUD-insured portfolio. If servicing functions are performed by a contract
servicer, it is the responsibility of the mortgagee to insure that the
servicer meets these requirements.
3. ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA. All of the following criteria must be met in
order for the mortgage to be eligible for assignment. If the criteria
are met, the mortgagee shall request that the Secretary accept assignment
of the mortgage.
a. The mortgagee must have indicated to the mortgagor its intention
to foreclose the mortgage.
LL
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b. At least three full monthly installments must be due and unpaid
under the mortgage.
c. The mortgaged property must be the principal residence of the
mortgagor, unless this criterion is waived by HUD.
d. The mortgagor must not own other property subject to a mortgage
insured or held by HUD, unless this criterion is waived by HUD.
e. The default must have been caused by a circumstance or set of
circumstances beyond the mortgagor's control which temporarily
renders the family financially unable to cure the delinquency
within a reasonable time or make full mortgage payments.
Examples of qualifying reasons for default include, but are not
limited to:
(1) Curtailment of family income, such as unemployment or
underemployment; loss, reduction or delay in receipt of
federal, state, municipal benefits (e.g. Social Security,
Supplemental Security Income, Public Assistance, govern-
ment pensions) or of private benefit payments (e.g.
pensions, annuities, retirement plans);.loss of support
payments, or other loss of income due to divorce -or
separation.
(2) Uninsured damage to the mortgaged property, affecting its
livability, of a type which is commonly insured against
but which was not covered or not fully covered by
insurance because adequate insurance coverage was not
available..
(3) Death or illness in the mortgagor's household or expenses
attributable thereto.
(4) Unanticipated increase of payments to mortgage escrow
account to compensate for past underestimates of require-
ments.
f. There must be a reasonable prospect that the mortgagor will be
able to resume full mortgage payments after a temporary period of
reduced or suspended payments not exceeding 36 months, and will
be able to pay the mortgage in full by its maturity date, extended,
if necessary, by up to ten years if, on the date of assignment,
ten years or more have elapsed since the due date of the first
payment under the mortgage.
g. The mortgagee must have done everything it might reasonably be
expected to do to avoid foreclosure.
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4. MORTGAGEE DECISIONS. In every case in which the mortgagee decides to
foreclose, it must decide prior to initiating foreclosure whether or not
to request that HUD accept assignment of the mortgage to avoid the fore-
closure. If all of the criteria listed in paragraph 3 above are met, HIUD
must be requested to accept assignment and, if such a request is made,
must have rejected it, before foreclosure is started.
5. NOTICE TO MORTGAGORS.
a. When the Mortgagee is Considering Foreclosure.
(1) Time of Notice. No sooner than five days after the date three
full monthly installments are due and unpaid under the mort-
gage, but in any event prior to instituting foreclosure or
acquisition of the mortgaged premises, the mortgagee shall
send to the mortgagor a notice as below prescribed.
(2) Content of Notice. The notice shall advise the mortgagor
of the following:
(a) He is now in default, and the mortgagee intends to
foreclose unless he cures the default or alternative
relief is afforded.
(b) If the default is due to circumstances beyond his
control, he may be eligible for relief in lieu of
foreclosure by assignment of the mortgage to HUD.
(c) The mortgagee is currently considering whether or
not to apply to HUD for assignment of the mortgage.
(d) He will be advised shortly of the mortgagee's
decision in writing.
(e) If he wishes to contact the morLgagee concerning his
eligibility for assignment, he may write, call or
visit the mortgagee.
(f) If he does not understand his rights, he is admonished
to secure assistance from an attorney or HUD-approved
counseling agency.
An acceptable form of notice is attached hereto as Exhibit 1,
and its use is suggested, although it may be modified to suit
the mortgagee if it still includes the items above designated.
524-
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b. When the Mortgagee Decides to Request that HUD Accept Assignment.
The mortgagor shall be notified of the request by a letter including
the substance of Exhibit 2. The letter must include a statement
that HUD has been requeste'd to accept assignment of the mortgage and
it must enclose Form 2Q68F with item 14 completed. Instead of
asking the mortgagor to mail the completed Form 2068F to it, the
mortgagee may give the mortgagor the option of visiting its office
for the purpose of completing the form.
c. When the Mortgagee Decides Not to Request that HUD Accept Assignment.
The mortgagor shall be notified of the decision by a letter including
the substance of Exhibit 3. The letter must include a statement that
the mortgagee has decided to foreclose and has decided not to request
that HUD accept the assignment, and it must identify the specific
criteria for assignment identified in paragraph 3, above, which were
not met. The letter must describe the mortgagor's right to request
that HUD accept the assignment, with a brief explanation of the
effect of assignment, specify the fifteen day time limit within
which the mortgagor must act, and admonish him to seek legal or
professional assistance if he does not understand his rights and
obligations.
d. Spanish Language Warning. The letter required by paragraph 5b and
the notice of decision required by paragraph 5c shall contain at
the bottom thereof a warning to Spanish-speaking mortgagors to have
the notice translated, as follows:
"ESTES ES UN AVISO MUY IMPORTANTE QUE AFECTORA SU DERECHO A
CONTINUAR VIVENDO EN SU CASA. SI NO PUEDE LEERLO, HABALO TRADUCIR
IMMEDIATAMENTE. A MEMOS QUE RESPONDA DENTRO DE QUINCE (15) DIAS A
PARTIR DE LA FECHA QUE TENGA EL AVISO, UD. PUEDE PERDIR SU CASA EN
FUTURO."
e. Time Limits. All time limits for the sending of notices required
by this Mortgagee Letter, and for mortgagors required responses shall
be deemed to be calendar days, unless otherwise expressly stated.
If the last day for sending any notice, performing any act or making
any response falls on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, the last
day for sending such notice, doing such act or making such response
shall be the next following regular working day.
6. NOTICE TO HUD.
a. Negative Decisions. If the mortgagee decides not to request that HUD
accept assignment of the mortgage, HUD need not be notified of that
decision, although the mortgagor must be notified as prescribed in
paragraph 5c, above.
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b. Positive Decisions. When the mortgagee decides to request that HUD
accept assignment of the mortgage, it must notify the inortgagor and
HUD simultaneously. The notification to HUD shall be in the form
of a letter requesting that assignment be accepted and accompanied
by the f ollowing:
(1) A copy of the notice to the mortgagor required by paragraph
5b, above.
(2) A copy of the related ledger record or payment record card
reflecting the payment history on the account since
inception of the loan or, if the indebtedness was assumed
by the present mortgagor, since the assumption.
(3) Copies of all related collection records documenting the
efforts of the mortgagee's staff to collect the debt and
the mortgagor's reactions to those efforts.
(4) Copies of FNMA Forms 145 or similar reports to the investor
recommending any action requiring approval of the investor.
If no such formal reports or recommendations were made,
substitute a brief narrative description of the reasons for
the default, as seen by the mortgagee, arn the basis on
which the decision to foreclose was made.
(5) A brief statement of mortgagee's opinion as to the
probability of restoring the mortgage to good standing and
the reasons for that opinion.
(6) A completed Form 2068F. Pending revision of this form,
item 14 shall be completed by the mortgagee before it is
given to the mortgagor.
7. PROVIDING MATERIAL TO HUD. When a mortgagee has notified a mortgagor
that it intends to foreclose the mortgage and does not intend to request that
HUD accept assignment of the mortgage, the mortgagor has fifteen days in
which to request tnat HUD accept assignment of the mortgage during which the
mortgagee must withhold foreclosure. If the mortgagor responds within this
time period, HUD will direct the mortgagee to delay the initiation of
foreclosure. HUD also will ask that the mortgagee provide the documentary
information described in paragraph 6, above, except the completed Form 2068F.
Mortgagees shall respond promptly to such requests and should remember that
delays in responding will only serve to delay the cate on which the mortgage
can either be foreclosed or assigned to HUD.
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8. MORTGAGEE ACTIONS
a. General. Mortgagees must take, or refrain from taking, actions as
indicated below. Deviations from these requirements shall cause HUD
to consider suspending or withdrawing the mortgagee's approval to
participate in the-Department's programs of mortgage insurance.
b. Mortgagee Actions. Mortgagees shall not initiate any action
leading to foreclosure of the mortgage, acquisition of the
mortgaged property without the consent of the mortgagor, or
dispossession of the mortgagor until HUD's consideration of
whether or not to accept an assignment is completed. Mortgagees
must also honor, immediately, directions from HUD that
mortgages be assigned. Whenever any mortgagee refuses to honor
HUD's direction to assign, or refuses to refrain from
foreclosure, acquisition, or dispossession as above described
pending HUD's determination on accepting assignments, the
circumstances will be reported to the Director, Single Family
Housing Division, Office of Loan Management, who shall take
appropriate action, including, if warranted, recommending
suspension or withdrawal of the mortgagee's approval to the
Mortgagee Review Board. HUD field office Directors are
instructed to process requests that assignment be considered
as rapidly as possible, and the mortgagee will be notified, by
telephone and by mail, as soon as any decision has been reached.
c. Granting Additional Relief. When the mortgagee is advised by HUD
that assignment of a mortgage will not be accepted because the
criterion described in paragraph 3g above has not been met,
specific additional relief measures deemed reasonable by the
Director will be prescribed. Mortgagees are.expected to grant
such relief.
9. MORTGAGES NOW IN FORECLOSURE. With regard to all fully insured single
family mortgages in the process of foreclosure or acquisiton on the
effective date of this Mortgagee Letter, where no final court judgment has
been entered pursuant to judicial foreclosure, or where no sale of the
mortgaged property has taken place under a power of sale, mortgagees shall
stay any foreclosure suit, seeking leave of court where necessary, or shall
defer any sale until after such mortgagees have considered whether
mortgagors are eligible for assignment and have afforded mortgagors an
opportunity for review and final determination by HUD in accordance with
the provisions of this Mortgagee Letter. Field office Directors are to
give priority to processing requests involving cases already in foreclosure.
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10. EFFECT OF ASSIGNMENT. Mortgagees are reminded that assignment of a
mortgage to the Secretary has advantages over completion of foreclosure
to all parties. The mortgagor i provided an added opportunity to prevent
foreclosure permanently, and HUD gains the potential for recovering all or
a significant part of the amount paid in the mortgage insurance claim to
the mortgagee. The mortgagee, however, benefits most. If the mortgage is
foreclosed and a claim for mortgage insurance benefits is paid, the
mortgagee loses two months' interest completely and is paid interest at
the lower debenture rate from the date of default to the date of settlement
of the claim. Further, it is reimbursed for only two thirds of the cost
of completing the foreclosure. If, on the other hand, the mortgage is
assigned, the claim includes all unpaid mortgage interest to the date of
assignment, as well as all costs of completing the assignment. Mortgagees
should consider these facts carefully in determining whether to request
that HUD accept assignments of mortgages.
Sincerely,
- James L. Young /
Assistant SecpetaK for
Management < '
EXHIBIT 1
[LETTERHEAD OF MORTGAGEE]
Dear
Your mortgage is in default in the amount of $
covering the months of and late charges. Unless
you are able to cure this default by promptly remitting the above
amount to this office, we intend to commence foreclosure of your
mortgage.
However, if the default was caused by circumstances beyond your
control, you may be eligible for an assignment of your mortgage to the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to avoid foreclosure.
If HUD were to accept assignment of your mortgage, it would become your
lender and might be able to work out a more favorable payment plan
whereby your mortgage payments might be reduced or suspended for a
period of time or you might be allowed to cure the default by making
only small additional payments with your monthly mortgage payments.
We are currently considering whether you meet the criteria for
assignment specified in the HUD regulations. If we find that you do,
we will request HUD to accept an assignment of your mortgage. If we
decide that you do not, we will proceed with foreclosure, unless you
seek further review of that decision by HUD. In either case, you will
be advised shortly of our deelsion.
If you have any questions or wish to give us information concerning
your eligibility for an assignment, please call at
( ) - or visit him/her at our office. If you do not under-
stand what this means to you, you might want to contact one of the
agencies listed in the HUD booklet we sent you recently or seek legal
advice.
Sincerely,
EXRBIT 2
[LETTERHEAD OF MORTGAGEE]
Dear
Your mortgage is in serious default and we have decided that we
are unable to provide any additional assistance to you in your attempts
to save your hone. We have, however, decided to ask that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) accept assignment of
your mortgage to avoid foreclosure.
If HUD agrees to our request, HUD will become your lender and
your future payments will be made directly to HUD. You may be able to
work out some arrangement which will make it possible for you to bring
your mortgage account current and save your home.
We are including a copy of Form 2068F. This asks several questions
about your financial situation and your plans for the future. Answers
to those questions are needed if HUD is to make a decision in your case.
You must complete the form as fully as possible and return it to us
WITHIN 15 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS LETTER. If you do not do this, we
must assume that you are not interested in saving your home, and we
will proceed with foreclosure. If you need help completing the form,
please call at ( ) - or visit him/her
at our office.
If HUD decides for any reason that it will not accept assignment
of your mortgage, unless you seek further review,- we plan to start
foreclosure as soon as we have been advised of that decision.
Spanish Language Warning: ESTE ES UN AVISO MUY IMPORTANTE QUE
AFECTORA SU DERECHO A CONTINUAR VIVENDO EN SU CASA. SI NO PUEDE
LEERLO, HAGALO TRANDUCIR IMNEDIATATMENTE. A MENOS QUE RESPONDA DETRO
DE QUINCE (15) DIAS A PARTIR DE LA FECHA QUE TENGA EL AVISO, UD.
PUEDE PERDIR SU CASA EN EL FUTURO.
Sincerely,
EXHIBIT 3
[LETTERHEAD OF MORTGAGEE]
Dear
Your mortgage is in serious default and we have decided that we
are unable to provide any additional assistance to you in your attempts
to save your home. Under certain circumstances, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) might be able to accept assignment
of your mortgage from us and offer additional help. This would mean
that HUD would become your lender and you would make future payments to
HUD. We have decided that you are not eligible for an assignment and
we will not ask HUD to do this because: HERE LIST THE SPECIFIC
ELIGIBILITY CRITERION OR CRITERIA -FROM PARAGRAPH 3 W-HICH MAKE THE CASE
INELIGIBLE FOR ASSIGNMENT.
You have the right to go directly to HUD to ask that they consider
your case, and we will not start foreclosure of your mortgage until you
have had an opportunity to do so. If you wish to be sure that
foreclosure will be delayed while HUD is considering acceptance of
assignment of your mortgage, you must contact HUD WITHIN 15 DAYS
OF THE DATE OF THIS LETTER. We intend to proceed automatically with
foreclosure of your mortgage unless we have heard from HUD within that
time.
If you want to ask HUD t'o consider accepting assignment of your
mortgage, you should call or write them at ADDRESS OF LOCAL HUD OFFICE,
( ) - , immediately. If you do not understand what this
means to you, you might want to seek help. You may call the HUD office
identified above or you might want to contact one of the agencies
listed in the HUD booklet we sent you recently or seek legal advice.
Spanish Language Warning: ESTE ES UN AVISO NUY IMPORTANTE QUE
AFECTORA SU DERECHO A CONTINUAR VIVENDO EN SU CASA. SI NO PUEDE
LEERLO, HAGALO TRANTUCIR IMMEIATATMENTE. A 4ENOS QUE RESPONDA DETRO
DE QUINCE (15) DIAS A PARTIR DE LA FECHA QUE TENGA EL AVISO, UB.
PUEDE PERDIR SU CASA EN EL FUTURO.
Sincerely,
* US. GOVERNMEKT P~iN1iNG O.MCE: 197&-- 210-966/264
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APPENDIX 10-4:
MORTGAGEE REVIEW BOARD
HUD'S REGULATIONS ESTABLISHIIG A MORTGAGEE REVIEW BOARD
Title 24-Housing and Urban Development
SU3T!i7LE A-CFFICE CF THE SECRETAOY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUS:NG AND UR-
B'd DEVELOPMENT
LDo et No. R-75--352,}
PART 25-MORTGAGEE REVIEW BOARD
Subpart A-Department of Housing and
Urban Development Mortgagee Review
Board
The Department is establishing a
Mortgagee Review Board to act for the
Secretary in determining whether or not
to withdraw approval of a mortgagee un-
der IRUD programs.
The establishment of this Board and
creation of a new Part 25 are matters of
internal management and operation not
subject to the requirements of 5 U.S.C.
553 or 24 CFR 10.5. Moreover, inasmuch
as the part sets forth duties, functions,
and final authority that is not regulatory
in nature, this document is effective as
of September 12, 1975.
Accordingly, Title 24 is amended by
adding a new Part 25, Mortgagee Review
Board, to read as follows:
Subpart. A-Department of Housing and Urban
Developrnent Mortgagee Review Board
Sec.
25.1 Establshment of the Board.
15.2 Members.
25.3 Functions, duties and powers.
25.4 Withdrawal determinations.
25.5 Grounds for withdrawal.
25.6 Effecti-:e date of withdrawal.
Avroarrr: Sec. 7(d), Department of
Housing and Urban Development Act; 42
U.S.C. 3535(d) .
Subpart A-Department o' Housing and
Urban Development Mortgagee Revie.v
Board
§ 25.1 E-stablishment of the Board.
There is hereby established in the
Office of the Secretary a Mortgagee Re-
view Board.
S 25.2 Member5.
The MortgagEe Review Board is con-
posecd of the folloving members: Assist-
ant Secrettry for Housing Production
and Mortgage Credit-Federal Housing
Comrnisioner, Chairman; General
Couns:1; Afoitant Sacretary for Hous-
ing nargemnent; Inspector General, or
their dsirnees.
S25.3 unctions, duties and powers.
Exc-pt as linnited by this part, the
Mor ee Review Board shall exercise
all or h ahority and perform iall of
the fucton ef the Secretary with re-
suect t :tdra:al of mortgagee ap-
pro'aL Th, Board shall have all powers
a:and icident to the proper
eofomance o: these functions and
S 25. W itlhdrawval deterrminations.
ini Determinations by the Board. If
the Boar! unanimously determines that
a imtje's approval be continued,
s approval shall be con-
tned. if the Board unanimously de-
termines that a nortgagee's approval
be withdrawn, tm geographical extent
of such vi the duration of such
withdrawa3, an thr th withdra '
shall be pariUal r otal, the mortgagee's
approval shall be 0ahdrawn pursuant to
the Board's determnation.If the Board's
determination i n aot un nimous con-
cerning v drawal, the geographical
extent of such wtrawal the duration
of such withdrawval, or the nature of
such withdraw-al, the Under Secretary
shall determine those matters as to
which the Board's determination is not
unanimous, and the mortgagee's ap-
proval shall be withdrawn pursuant to
the Board's unranimous determination
and the determination of the Under See-
retary. As used in this Part, "duration
of withdrawal" shall include permanent
withdrawal, withdrawal for a specific
length of time or rwithdra.al for an in-
determinate period pending satisfaction
by the mortgagee of conditions specified
by the Board or the Under Secretary.
(b) Notification of mortgagee. When-
ever the Board or the Under Secretary
determines pursuant to paragraph (a)
of this section that a mortgagee's ap-
proval be withdra, the Chairman shall
in writing notify, or cause to be notified,
the mortgagee of such determination and
the extent, duration and nature of such
withdrawal. Such notice shall specify the
reasons for the deternination and the
facts upon which the determination is
based and shall further specify the name
and address of the designated Depart-
mental hearing oficer to whom the mort-
gagee sh ould address a request for a
hearing pursuant to paragraph (c) of
this section.
(c) Hearings. Whenever the Board or
the Under Secretary determines that a
mortgagee's approval be w.ithdrawn in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this
section, the muortgagee shall have a pe-
riod of 30 days in which to request in
writing a hearing on such withdrawal
action before the designated Depar tmen-
tal hearing officer.
(d) Conduct of hearing. Upon receipt
of a request for. a hearing, the hearing
officer shall arrange a timely hearing.
Notice of the time and place of such
hearing shall be in writing, transmitted
by registered or certified mail, rebu:n
receipt requested. it shall be within the
discretion of the haring officer to deter-
mine the hearing place.
(1) The hearing officer shall be re-
sponsible for the fair and expeditious
conduct of proceedings. The Departntt
shall be reproeseted by the General
Counsel or his des mnee. A record shall be
made of the proncedings and shall be
made available to the parties upon re-
quest. After the mortgagee against whom
action is proo>oed has oeen afforded an
opportunity to he ieard, the hearing of-
ficer shall make an initial written deter-
mination on the evidence presentedl. The
hearing oflicers determination shall be
final unless reversed or miodified within
30 days by the Secretary. Each determi-
nation shall becone a part of the record.
Notice of the final determination shall
be given in writing, signed by th
ing officer and transmitted by r istered
or cor tified ami, ren reeam r.s l
The final duterinination sha be con-
clusive.
(Ce) Failure to reqjuest a hear-ng. If thr
mortgagee does not request -: haring be-
fore the Departmental hearing oflcer for
a review of the Board's or the Under See-
retary's withdrawal determination within
the period prescribed in paragraph (c)
of this section, the determination shall
become final.
§ 25.5, Grounds for whhdrawal.
Any withdrawal or propiosed with-
drawal of approval under § 25.4 shall be
upon one or more of the following
grounds:
(a) The transfer of an insured mort-
gage to a non-approved mortgages, ex-
cept pursuant to Hi 203.333 or 203!335
of Part 203.
(b) The failure of a nonsnpervised
mortgagee to segregate all escrow funds
received from mortgagors on account of
grountd rents, taxes, assessments and in--
surance premriuns, and to deposit suclh
funds to a special accoint or account
with a financial institution who-se ac-
counts are insured by tihe Federal Dc-
posit Insurance Corporation or by the
Federal Savings and Loan 2Iurance
Corporation;
(c) The use of escrow funda for any
person other than that for wihich they
were received;
(d) The failure of a nonsupervisedt
mortgagee to conduct its business in
accordance with the plan indicated by
its application for aipproval;
(e) The termination of a mortgagee's
supervision by a governnental agency;
(f) The failure of. a nonsuperviserd
mortgagee or an investing nrctgagea
to sub-oit the required annual audit r'e-
port of its financial condition within 75
days of the close Qf its fiscal year or such
longer period as the Assistant Secretary
for Hiousing Production and Mortgage
Credit-Federal Housing Conimissioner
may determine;
(g) The payment by the mortgagee of
any fee, kickback, or other considera tio-n,
directly or indirectly, in connection w. ith
any insured mortgage transaction or
transactions to any person including in
attorney, escrow agent, title company,
consultant, mortgage bro-er, seller,
builder, or real estate agent it suc per-
son has received any other pamnient )r
other consideraution from the mort
tihe seller, the builder, or any other per-
sonl for services related to such trans:c-
tion or transactions or from or reiated to
the purchase or sale of the mor
property. except that compensaton may
he paid for the a!tual performne of-
such services as may Le approved by tne
Assistant Secretary for Hoing Produc-
tion and M,1ortage C rd- e
Hoiusin Comnissioner;
(h) Such other reason !s the oa,
Secretary, Unhder Secretary or
oleer, as appririate, deermuins t
ju.tiflied.
2'5.6 Eftective date of wvithdrawal.
Widhdrawal of a mortgag2e's approval
pursuant to this part shall be effective:
(a) Immediately if the Board unani-
mously deterrines that continuation of
the mortgr2ges approva'~i oending a re-
que- of the miortagee for a hearing
pursuant to § 25A(c) would not be in
the public interest or in the best inter-
ests-of the Department;
(b) At the expiration of the 30 day
period specified in § 25.4(c) if the mort-
gagee has not requested a hearing; or
() 30 days aft-cr the hea-ring officer's
written determination pursuant to § 25.4(d).
Effective date. This regulation is effec-
tive as of September 12, 1975.
CARLA A. Hr.Ls,
Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development.
[FR Doc.75-24840 Filed 9-17--75;8:45 amj
V OL-ce-OL.
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